Jenna Bednar
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Jenna Bednar has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Scott E. Page
Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan
5 shared publications Scott E. Page
3 shared publicationsScott Page
University of Michigan
3 shared publications- Yan Chen
School of Information, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109
3 shared publications Andrea Jones-Rooy
2 shared publicationsJohn Ferejohn
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
What does the public want their local government to hear? A data-driven case study of public comments across the state of Michigan
City council meetings are vital sites for civic participation where the public can speak directly to their local government. By addressing city officials and calling on them to take action, public commenters can potentially influence policy decisions spanning a broad range of concerns, from housing, to sustainability, to social justice. Yet studies of these meetings have often been limited by the availability of large-scale, geographically-diverse data. Relying on local governments' increasing use of YouTube and other technologies to archive their public meetings, we propose a framework that characterizes comments along two dimensions: the local concerns where concerns are situated (e.g., housing, election administration), and the societal concerns raised (e.g., functional democracy, anti-racism). Based on a large record of public comments we collect from 15 cities in Michigan, we produce data-driven taxonomies of the local concerns and societal concerns that these comments cover, and employ machine learning methods to scalably apply our taxonomies across the entire dataset. We then demonstrate how our framework allows us to examine the salient local concerns and societal concerns that arise in our data, as well as how these aspects interact.
Open AccessWhat does the public want their local government to hear? A data-driven case study of public comments across the state of Michigan
City council meetings are vital sites for civic participation where the public can speak directly to their local government. By addressing city officials and calling on them to take action, public commenters can potentially influence policy decisions spanning a broad range of concerns, from housing, to sustainability, to social justice. Yet studies of these meetings have often been limited by the availability of large-scale, geographically-diverse data. Relying on local governments' increasing use of YouTube and other technologies to archive their public meetings, we propose a framework that characterizes comments along two dimensions: the local concerns where concerns are situated (e.g., housing, election administration), and the societal concerns raised (e.g., functional democracy, anti-racism). Based on a large record of public comments we collect from 15 cities in Michigan, we produce data-driven taxonomies of the local concerns and societal concerns that these comments cover, and employ machine learning methods to scalably apply our taxonomies across the entire dataset. We then demonstrate how our framework allows us to examine the salient local concerns and societal concerns that arise in our data, as well as how these aspects interact.
- 25 April 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 234
Institutions and cultural capacity: A systems perspective
- 25 April 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 234
Institutions and cultural capacity: A systems perspective
- 6 December 2021
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 118 (50)
Polarization, diversity, and democratic robustness
In the Madisonian Constitution, fragmented and overlapping institutions of authority are supposed to manage democracy’s innate rivalry, channeling competition to serve the public interest. This system of safeguards makes democracy more robust: capable of withstanding and, if need be, adapting to challenges posed by a changing problem environment. In this essay, I suggest why affective polarization poses a special threat to democratic robustness. While most scholars hypothesize that polarization’s dangers are that it leads to bimodality and extremism, I highlight a third hypothesized effect: Polarization reduces interest and information diversity in the political system. To be effective, democracy’s safeguards rely upon interest diversity, but Madison took that diversity for granted. Unique among democracy’s safeguards, federalism builds in a repository for diversity; its structure enables differences between national- and state-expressed interests, even within the same party. This diversity can be democracy hindering, as the United States’ history with racially discriminatory politics painfully makes clear, but it can also serve as a reservoir of interest and information dispersion that could protect democracy by restoring the possibility that cross-cutting cleavages emerge.
- 6 December 2021
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 118 (50)
Polarization, diversity, and democratic robustness
In the Madisonian Constitution, fragmented and overlapping institutions of authority are supposed to manage democracy’s innate rivalry, channeling competition to serve the public interest. This system of safeguards makes democracy more robust: capable of withstanding and, if need be, adapting to challenges posed by a changing problem environment. In this essay, I suggest why affective polarization poses a special threat to democratic robustness. While most scholars hypothesize that polarization’s dangers are that it leads to bimodality and extremism, I highlight a third hypothesized effect: Polarization reduces interest and information diversity in the political system. To be effective, democracy’s safeguards rely upon interest diversity, but Madison took that diversity for granted. Unique among democracy’s safeguards, federalism builds in a repository for diversity; its structure enables differences between national- and state-expressed interests, even within the same party. This diversity can be democracy hindering, as the United States’ history with racially discriminatory politics painfully makes clear, but it can also serve as a reservoir of interest and information dispersion that could protect democracy by restoring the possibility that cross-cutting cleavages emerge.
- 19 April 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 22 (3) , 705-734
Directional behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects in multiple repeated games
In this study, we use a novel design to test for directional behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects in a set of multiple repeated games. Specifically, in our experiment, each subject plays a common historical game with two different matches for 100 rounds. After 100 rounds, the subject switches to a new game with one match and continues playing the historical game with the other match. This design allows us to identify the direction of any behavioral spillover. Our results show that participants exhibit both behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects. First, for pairs of Prisoners’ Dilemma and Alternation games, we find that subjects apply strategies from the historical game when playing the new game. Second, we find that those who participate in a Self Interest game as either their historical or new game achieve Pareto efficient outcomes more often in the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Alternation games compared to their control counterparts. Overall, our results show that, when faced with a new game, participants use strategies that reflect both behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects.
- 19 April 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 22 (3) , 705-734
Directional behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects in multiple repeated games
In this study, we use a novel design to test for directional behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects in a set of multiple repeated games. Specifically, in our experiment, each subject plays a common historical game with two different matches for 100 rounds. After 100 rounds, the subject switches to a new game with one match and continues playing the historical game with the other match. This design allows us to identify the direction of any behavioral spillover. Our results show that participants exhibit both behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects. First, for pairs of Prisoners’ Dilemma and Alternation games, we find that subjects apply strategies from the historical game when playing the new game. Second, we find that those who participate in a Self Interest game as either their historical or new game achieve Pareto efficient outcomes more often in the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Alternation games compared to their control counterparts. Overall, our results show that, when faced with a new game, participants use strategies that reflect both behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects.
- 25 January 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 112 (1) , 82-98
When Order Affects Performance: Culture, Behavioral Spillovers, and Institutional Path Dependence
Evidence suggests that the cultural context influences the performance of laws, policies, and political institutions. Descriptive accounts reveal that outcomes and behaviors often depend on the array of historical institutions. This article presents a multi-institutional framework that can account for those findings through path-dependent behavioral spillovers. Individuals learn equilibrium behaviors when interacting in a new institutional setting. Initially, some individuals choose behaviors that align with their behaviors in similar extant institutions, creating a cultural context that can lead to inefficient outcomes. The article shows how avoiding path dependence requires sequencing (or designing) institutions to maintain behavioral diversity. Optimal sequencing thus requires positioning institutions with clear incentives early in the sequence as well as avoiding strong punishments that can stifle attempts to break established behavioral patterns.
- 25 January 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 112 (1) , 82-98
When Order Affects Performance: Culture, Behavioral Spillovers, and Institutional Path Dependence
Evidence suggests that the cultural context influences the performance of laws, policies, and political institutions. Descriptive accounts reveal that outcomes and behaviors often depend on the array of historical institutions. This article presents a multi-institutional framework that can account for those findings through path-dependent behavioral spillovers. Individuals learn equilibrium behaviors when interacting in a new institutional setting. Initially, some individuals choose behaviors that align with their behaviors in similar extant institutions, creating a cultural context that can lead to inefficient outcomes. The article shows how avoiding path dependence requires sequencing (or designing) institutions to maintain behavioral diversity. Optimal sequencing thus requires positioning institutions with clear incentives early in the sequence as well as avoiding strong punishments that can stifle attempts to break established behavioral patterns.
- 22 September 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology
- Vol. 41 (1) , 26-45
Adoption as a social marker: Innovation diffusion with outgroup aversion
Social identities are among the key factors driving behavior in complex societies. Signals of social identity are known to influence individual behaviors in the adoption of innovations. Yet the population-level consequences of identity signaling on the diffusion of innovations are largely unknown. Here we use both analytical and agent-based modeling to consider the spread of a beneficial innovation in a structured population in which there exist two groups who are averse to being mistaken for each other. We investigate the dynamics of adoption and consider the role of structural factors such as demographic skew and communication scale on population-level outcomes. We find that outgroup aversion can lead to adoption being delayed or suppressed in one group, and that population-wide underadoption is common. Comparing the two models, we find that differential adoption can arise due to structural constraints on information flow even in the absence of intrinsic between-group differences in adoption rates. Further, we find that patterns of polarization in adoption at both local and global scales depend on the details of demographic organization and the scale of communication. This research has particular relevance to widely beneficial but identity-relevant products and behaviors, such as green technologies, where overall levels of adoption determine the positive benefits that accrue to society at large.
- 22 September 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology
- Vol. 41 (1) , 26-45
Adoption as a social marker: Innovation diffusion with outgroup aversion
Social identities are among the key factors driving behavior in complex societies. Signals of social identity are known to influence individual behaviors in the adoption of innovations. Yet the population-level consequences of identity signaling on the diffusion of innovations are largely unknown. Here we use both analytical and agent-based modeling to consider the spread of a beneficial innovation in a structured population in which there exist two groups who are averse to being mistaken for each other. We investigate the dynamics of adoption and consider the role of structural factors such as demographic skew and communication scale on population-level outcomes. We find that outgroup aversion can lead to adoption being delayed or suppressed in one group, and that population-wide underadoption is common. Comparing the two models, we find that differential adoption can arise due to structural constraints on information flow even in the absence of intrinsic between-group differences in adoption rates. Further, we find that patterns of polarization in adoption at both local and global scales depend on the details of demographic organization and the scale of communication. This research has particular relevance to widely beneficial but identity-relevant products and behaviors, such as green technologies, where overall levels of adoption determine the positive benefits that accrue to society at large.
- 19 August 2016
- Published by MIT Press
Evolution of Institutions and Organizations
Some economists argue that institutions are the most important factor affecting variation in economic growth. We need, however, to better understand how and why institutions emerge and change. This chapter develops a conceptual framework, informed by evolutionary theory and complexity science, that follows models of cultural evolution in viewing institutions as part of a nongenetic system of inheritance. This framework is used to examine how broad historical factors (not just economic factors) influence present-day institutional arrangements and economic outcomes, as well as how noninstitutional aspects of culture (e.g., values, beliefs) interact with institutions to shape behavior in particular contexts. Overall, this framework emphasizes the processes by which institutions evolve, and how they can coevolve with other institutions and culture. This approach is illustrated using four examples to demonstrate how evolution theory and complexity science can be used to study institutional emergence and change. Explicit models of the processes of institutional evolution need to be developed and then tested and assessed with data. This framework holds promise to bring together and synthesize the findings and insights from a range of different disciplines.
- 19 August 2016
- Published by MIT Press
Evolution of Institutions and Organizations
Some economists argue that institutions are the most important factor affecting variation in economic growth. We need, however, to better understand how and why institutions emerge and change. This chapter develops a conceptual framework, informed by evolutionary theory and complexity science, that follows models of cultural evolution in viewing institutions as part of a nongenetic system of inheritance. This framework is used to examine how broad historical factors (not just economic factors) influence present-day institutional arrangements and economic outcomes, as well as how noninstitutional aspects of culture (e.g., values, beliefs) interact with institutions to shape behavior in particular contexts. Overall, this framework emphasizes the processes by which institutions evolve, and how they can coevolve with other institutions and culture. This approach is illustrated using four examples to demonstrate how evolution theory and complexity science can be used to study institutional emergence and change. Explicit models of the processes of institutional evolution need to be developed and then tested and assessed with data. This framework holds promise to bring together and synthesize the findings and insights from a range of different disciplines.
- 19 August 2016
- Published by MIT Press
Robust Institutional Design
Institutions are designed to alter human behavior. To remain effective over time, institutions need to adapt to changes in the environment or the society the institution is meant to regulate. Douglas North referred to this property as adaptive efficiency and suggested the need for a model of how institutions change to remain effective. This essay contributes to a theory of adaptive efficiency by relating it to the burgeoning literature in robust system design. It reviews five models of institutional change, paying particular attention to each model’s ability to explain institutional adaptation. It isolates three common structural features of a robust, adaptive institutional system: diversity, modularity, and redundancy. It illustrates the theory with a brief application to federal systems, and closes by describing some open research questions relating to institutional adaptive efficiency.
- 19 August 2016
- Published by MIT Press
Robust Institutional Design
Institutions are designed to alter human behavior. To remain effective over time, institutions need to adapt to changes in the environment or the society the institution is meant to regulate. Douglas North referred to this property as adaptive efficiency and suggested the need for a model of how institutions change to remain effective. This essay contributes to a theory of adaptive efficiency by relating it to the burgeoning literature in robust system design. It reviews five models of institutional change, paying particular attention to each model’s ability to explain institutional adaptation. It isolates three common structural features of a robust, adaptive institutional system: diversity, modularity, and redundancy. It illustrates the theory with a brief application to federal systems, and closes by describing some open research questions relating to institutional adaptive efficiency.
- Open Access
- 9 August 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Chinese Political Science Review
- Vol. 1 (3) , 448-471
Complex Adaptive Systems and Comparative Politics: Modeling the Interaction between Institutions and Culture
- 9 August 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Chinese Political Science Review
- Vol. 1 (3) , 448-471
Open AccessComplex Adaptive Systems and Comparative Politics: Modeling the Interaction between Institutions and Culture
- 1 December 2015
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 40, 312-332
Choosing a future based on the past: Institutions, behavior, and path dependence
- 1 December 2015
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 40, 312-332
Choosing a future based on the past: Institutions, behavior, and path dependence