NLNicola Lacetera

Nicola Lacetera

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Nicola Lacetera has a total of 55 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Is the Price Right? The Role of Economic Trade-Offs in Explaining Reactions to Price Surges

    by Julio Elías, Nicola Lacetera, Mario Macis

    Public authorities often introduce price controls following price surges, potentially causing inefficiencies and exacerbating shortages. A survey experiment with 7,612 Canadian and U.S. respondents shows that unregulated price surges raise moral objections and widespread disapproval. However, acceptance increases and demand for regulation declines when participants are prompted to consider economic trade-offs between controlled and unregulated prices, whereby incentives from higher prices lead to additional supply and enhance access to goods. Moreover, highlighting these trade-offs reduces polarization in moral judgments between supporters and opponents of unregulated pricing. Textual analysis of responses to open-ended questions provides further insights into our findings, and an incentivized donation task demonstrates consistency between stated preferences and real-stakes behavior. Although economic trade-offs do influence public support for price control policies, the evidence indicates that even when the potential gains in economic efficiency from unregulated prices are explicit, a significant divide persists between the utilitarian views that standard economic thinking implies and the nonutilitarian values held by the general population. This paper was accepted by Dorothea Kübler, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This work was supported by Johns Hopkins “Catalyst Award” and Business of Health Initiative (HBHI) and the Sandra Rotman Centre for Health Sector Strategy at the University of Toronto. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04555 .


  • Open Access

    Incentives and prosocial discomfort: A laboratory experiment

    by Grace E. Steward, Mario Macis, Nicola Lacetera, Jeffrey P. Kahn, Vikram S. Chib

  • Open Access

    Sticky price for declining risk? Business strategies with “behavioral” customers in the hotel industry

    by Nicola Lacetera, Claudio A. Piga, Lorenzo Zirulia

    Using data from about 25 million hotel room postings in four countries, we document that rather than decreasing to zero as the likelihood of cancellation declines, the difference between the prices for refundable and nonrefundable reservations remains positive at roughly 10%–15% of the full price. A model where travelers have different willingness to pay and some of them overestimate the probability to cancel their trip explains these price‐setting patterns more consistently than alternative interpretations. We denote these business strategies as naiveté‐based price discrimination. Our data and theory, therefore, show that this form of apparent inertial behavior of companies regarding a major strategic variable can be an intentional managerial choice. We demonstrate, finally, that this profit‐enhancing commitment to limited flexibility may also benefit customers in some cases, by expanding the reach of the market. Thus, strategies that rely on cognitive biases on the demand side may not necessarily exploit consumers.


  • Open Access

    Quality and safety for substances of human origins: scientific evidence and the new EU regulations

    by Julio J Elias, Nicola Lacetera, Mario Macis, Axel Ockenfels, Alvin E Roth


  • Open Access

    The Effect of Incentivizing Pro-Social Behavior is Context Dependent

    by Grace E Steward, Joseph Galaro, Nicola Lacetera, Mario Macis, Jeffrey Kahn, Vikram S. Chib

    Standard economic theory would predict that offering financial incentives to complete an altruistic act should increase individuals' willingness to donate. However, the existing evidence on this effect is mixed. We conducted a laboratory experiment to examine the effects of monetary incentives on an individual’s willingness to accept physical discomfort for donations to charity. Overall, we found that larger monetary incentives increased participants’ likelihood of incurring discomfort for donations to charity, when compared to a purely altruistic condition. However, we also observed an ordering effect, suggesting that if a participant is offered donations to charity alone in return for physical discomfort first, they remain highly motivated by donations to charity when personal incentives are added. These results suggest that context is critical when offering incentives to motivate prosocial behavior, such as blood donation.

  • Open Access

    Out-Group Penalties in Refugee Assistance: A Survey Experiment

    by Cristina Cattaneo, Daniela Grieco, Nicola Lacetera, Mario Macis

    We study out-group biases in attitudes toward refugees, and the effect of European Union (EU) immigration policies on these views, using an online survey experiment including 4,087 Italian participants. We assess attitudes using donations to a randomly assigned group: Italian victims of violence or refugees fleeing wars in Ukraine or African countries. We also employ a novel measure, the share donated in cash. While donations indicated less support for African and Ukrainian refugees compared to Italian victims, the cash measure revealed a stronger prejudice against distant out-groups, with participants giving African refugees a smaller proportion of cash donations. This result was mainly driven by individuals with right-leaning political views. Providing information about immigration policy reforms that give the EU a more substantial role in receiving and allocating refugees had no impact. Textual analysis supports these findings.

  • Open Access

    Out-Group Penalties in Refugee Assistance: A Survey Experiment

    by Cristina Cattaneo, Daniela Grieco, Nicola Lacetera, Mario Macis

    We study out-group biases in attitudes toward refugees, and the effect of European Union (EU) immigration policies on these views, using an online survey experiment including 4,087 Italian participants. We assess attitudes using donations to a randomly assigned group: Italian victims of violence or refugees fleeing wars in Ukraine or African countries. We also employ a novel measure, the share donated in cash. While donations indicated less support for African and Ukrainian refugees compared to Italian victims, the cash measure revealed a stronger prejudice against distant out-groups, with participants giving African refugees a smaller proportion of cash donations. This result was mainly driven by individuals with right-leaning political views. Providing information about immigration policy reforms that give the EU a more substantial role in receiving and allocating refugees had no impact. Textual analysis supports these findings. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

  • Open Access

    Opt-out choice framing attenuates gender differences in the decision to compete in the laboratory and in the field

    by Joyce C. He, Sonia K. Kang, Nicola Lacetera

    Significance: How can we close the gender gap in high-level positions in organizations? Interventions such as unconscious bias training or the “lean in” approach have been largely ineffective. This article suggests, and experimentally tests, a “nudge” intervention, altering the choice architecture around the decision to apply for top positions from an “opt in” to an “opt out” default. Evidence from the laboratory and the field shows that a choice architecture in which applicants must opt out from competition reduces gender differences in competition. Opt-out framing thus seems to remove some of the bias inherent in current promotion systems, which favor those who are overconfident or like to compete. Importantly, we show that such an intervention is feasible and effective in the field.