Andrew Metrick
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Andrew Metrick has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Gary Gorton
6 shared publicationsDavid Laibson
4 shared publicationsBrigitte C. Madrian
2 shared publicationsJames J. Choi
Yale University and NBER
2 shared publicationsJoy Ishii
Department of Finance, Stanford Graduate School of Business , Stanford University
2 shared publicationsMartin L. Weitzman
Professor of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 June 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Stability
- Vol. 48
The run on repo and the Fed’s response
- 1 June 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Stability
- Vol. 48
The run on repo and the Fed’s response
- 1 November 2018
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Financial Economics
- Vol. 10 (1) , 153-172
Regulatory Reform
In the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC), many nations embarked on reform to the financial regulatory system. This reform, unprecedented in its scope, touched virtually every part of the financial system in the United States and Western Europe. This article summarizes the key reforms, explains how these reforms fit together, assesses the relevant scholarly literature, and suggests six significant areas of open questions for researchers. These six areas are ( a) liquidity rules, ( b) central clearing of swaps, ( c) shadow banking, ( d) lenders of last resort, ( e) extended guarantees, and ( f) resolution and restructuring.
- 1 November 2018
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Financial Economics
- Vol. 10 (1) , 153-172
Regulatory Reform
In the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC), many nations embarked on reform to the financial regulatory system. This reform, unprecedented in its scope, touched virtually every part of the financial system in the United States and Western Europe. This article summarizes the key reforms, explains how these reforms fit together, assesses the relevant scholarly literature, and suggests six significant areas of open questions for researchers. These six areas are ( a) liquidity rules, ( b) central clearing of swaps, ( c) shadow banking, ( d) lenders of last resort, ( e) extended guarantees, and ( f) resolution and restructuring.
- Open Access
- 1 November 2013
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 27 (4) , 45-64
The Federal Reserve and Panic Prevention: The Roles of Financial Regulation and Lender of Last Resort
This paper surveys the role of the Federal Reserve within the financial regulatory system, with particular attention to the interaction of the Fed's role as both a supervisor and a lender-of-last-resort. The institutional design of the Federal Reserve System was aimed at preventing banking panics, primarily due to the permanent presence of the discount window. This new system was successful at preventing a panic in the early 1920s, after which the Fed began to discourage the use of the discount window and intentionally create "stigma" for window borrowing -- policies that contributed to the panics of the Great Depression. The legislation of the New Deal era centralized Fed power in the Board of Governors, and over the next 75 years the Fed expanded its role as a supervisor of the largest banks. Nevertheless, prior to the recent crisis the Fed had large gaps in its authority as a supervisor and as lender of last resort, with the latter role weakened further by stigma. The Fed was unable to prevent the recent crisis, during which its lender of last resort function expanded significantly. As the Fed begins its second century, there are still great challenges to fulfilling its original intention of panic prevention.
- 1 November 2013
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 27 (4) , 45-64
Open AccessThe Federal Reserve and Panic Prevention: The Roles of Financial Regulation and Lender of Last Resort
This paper surveys the role of the Federal Reserve within the financial regulatory system, with particular attention to the interaction of the Fed's role as both a supervisor and a lender-of-last-resort. The institutional design of the Federal Reserve System was aimed at preventing banking panics, primarily due to the permanent presence of the discount window. This new system was successful at preventing a panic in the early 1920s, after which the Fed began to discourage the use of the discount window and intentionally create "stigma" for window borrowing -- policies that contributed to the panics of the Great Depression. The legislation of the New Deal era centralized Fed power in the Board of Governors, and over the next 75 years the Fed expanded its role as a supervisor of the largest banks. Nevertheless, prior to the recent crisis the Fed had large gaps in its authority as a supervisor and as lender of last resort, with the latter role weakened further by stigma. The Fed was unable to prevent the recent crisis, during which its lender of last resort function expanded significantly. As the Fed begins its second century, there are still great challenges to fulfilling its original intention of panic prevention.
- 13 December 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 128 (1) , 425-467
A Revealed Preference Ranking of U.S. Colleges and Universities *
We present a method of ranking U.S. undergraduate programs based on students’ revealed preferences. When a student chooses a college among those that have admitted him, that college “wins” his “tournament.” Our method efficiently integrates the information from thousands of such tournaments. We implement the method using data from a national sample of high-achieving students. We demonstrate that this ranking method has strong theoretical properties, eliminating incentives for colleges to adopt strategic, inefficient admissions policies to improve their rankings. We also show empirically that our ranking is (1) not vulnerable to strategic manipulation; (2) similar regardless of whether we control for variables, such as net cost, that vary among a college’s admits; (3) similar regardless of whether we account for students selecting where to apply, including Early Decision. We exemplify multiple rankings for different types of students who have preferences that vary systematically. JEL Codes: I2, I23, C35, D11.
- 13 December 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 128 (1) , 425-467
A Revealed Preference Ranking of U.S. Colleges and Universities *
We present a method of ranking U.S. undergraduate programs based on students’ revealed preferences. When a student chooses a college among those that have admitted him, that college “wins” his “tournament.” Our method efficiently integrates the information from thousands of such tournaments. We implement the method using data from a national sample of high-achieving students. We demonstrate that this ranking method has strong theoretical properties, eliminating incentives for colleges to adopt strategic, inefficient admissions policies to improve their rankings. We also show empirically that our ranking is (1) not vulnerable to strategic manipulation; (2) similar regardless of whether we control for variables, such as net cost, that vary among a college’s admits; (3) similar regardless of whether we account for students selecting where to apply, including Early Decision. We exemplify multiple rankings for different types of students who have preferences that vary systematically. JEL Codes: I2, I23, C35, D11.
- 1 June 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 104 (3) , 425-451
Securitized banking and the run on repo
- 1 June 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 104 (3) , 425-451
Securitized banking and the run on repo
- 1 May 2012
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 102 (3) , 101-106
The Safe-Asset Share
We document that the percentage of all U.S. assets that are “safe” has remained stable at about 33 percent since 1952. This stable ratio is a rare example of calm in a rapidly changing financial world. Over the same time period, the ratio of U.S. assets to GDP has increased by a factor of 2.5, and the main supplier of safe financial debt has shifted from commercial banks to the “shadow banking system.” We analyze this pattern of stylized facts and offer some tentative conclusions about the composition of the safe-asset share and its role within the overall economy.
- 1 May 2012
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 102 (3) , 101-106
The Safe-Asset Share
We document that the percentage of all U.S. assets that are “safe” has remained stable at about 33 percent since 1952. This stable ratio is a rare example of calm in a rapidly changing financial world. Over the same time period, the ratio of U.S. assets to GDP has increased by a factor of 2.5, and the main supplier of safe financial debt has shifted from commercial banks to the “shadow banking system.” We analyze this pattern of stylized facts and offer some tentative conclusions about the composition of the safe-asset share and its role within the overall economy.
- 22 May 2011
- Published by Wiley in European Financial Management
- Vol. 17 (4) , 619-654
Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: a Survey
- 22 May 2011
- Published by Wiley in European Financial Management
- Vol. 17 (4) , 619-654
Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: a Survey
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 September 2010
- Published by Project MUSE in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
- Vol. 2010 (2) , 261-297
Regulating the Shadow Banking System
The shadow banking system played a major role in the recent financial crisis but remains largely unregulated. We propose principles for its regulation and describe a specific proposal to implement those principles. We document how the rise of shadow banking was helped by regulatory and legal changes that gave advantages to three main institutions: money-market mutual funds (MMMFs) to capture retail deposits from traditional banks, securitization to move assets of traditional banks off their balance sheets, and repurchase agreements (repos) that facilitated the use of securitized bonds as money. The evolution of a bankruptcy safe harbor for repos was crucial to the growth and efficiency of shadow banking; regulators can use access to this safe harbor as the lever to enforce new rules. History has demonstrated two successful methods for regulating privately created money: strict guidelines on collateral, and government-guaranteed insurance. We propose the use of insurance for MMMFs, combined with strict guidelines on collateral for both securitization and repos, with regulatory control established by chartering new forms of narrow banks for MMMFs and securitization, and using the bankruptcy safe harbor to incentivize compliance on repos.
- 1 September 2010
- Published by Project MUSE in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
- Vol. 2010 (2) , 261-297
Top Cited PapersRegulating the Shadow Banking System
The shadow banking system played a major role in the recent financial crisis but remains largely unregulated. We propose principles for its regulation and describe a specific proposal to implement those principles. We document how the rise of shadow banking was helped by regulatory and legal changes that gave advantages to three main institutions: money-market mutual funds (MMMFs) to capture retail deposits from traditional banks, securitization to move assets of traditional banks off their balance sheets, and repurchase agreements (repos) that facilitated the use of securitized bonds as money. The evolution of a bankruptcy safe harbor for repos was crucial to the growth and efficiency of shadow banking; regulators can use access to this safe harbor as the lever to enforce new rules. History has demonstrated two successful methods for regulating privately created money: strict guidelines on collateral, and government-guaranteed insurance. We propose the use of insurance for MMMFs, combined with strict guidelines on collateral for both securitization and repos, with regulatory control established by chartering new forms of narrow banks for MMMFs and securitization, and using the bankruptcy safe harbor to incentivize compliance on repos.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 22 April 2010
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 23 (6) , 2303-2341
The Economics of Private Equity Funds
This article analyzes the economics of the private equity industry using a novel model and dataset. We obtain data from a large investor in private equity funds, with detailed records on 238 funds raised between 1993 and 2006. We build a model to estimate the expected revenue to managers as a function of their investor contracts, and we test how this estimated revenue varies across the characteristics of our sample funds. Among our sample funds, about two-thirds of expected revenue comes from fixed-revenue components that are not sensitive to performance. We find sharp differences between venture capital (VC) and buyout (BO) funds. BO managers build on their prior experience by increasing the size of their funds faster than VC managers do. This leads to significantly higher revenue per partner and per professional in later BO funds. The results suggest that the BO business is more scalable than the VC business and that past success has a differential impact on the terms of their future funds.
- 22 April 2010
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 23 (6) , 2303-2341
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessThe Economics of Private Equity Funds
This article analyzes the economics of the private equity industry using a novel model and dataset. We obtain data from a large investor in private equity funds, with detailed records on 238 funds raised between 1993 and 2006. We build a model to estimate the expected revenue to managers as a function of their investor contracts, and we test how this estimated revenue varies across the characteristics of our sample funds. Among our sample funds, about two-thirds of expected revenue comes from fixed-revenue components that are not sensitive to performance. We find sharp differences between venture capital (VC) and buyout (BO) funds. BO managers build on their prior experience by increasing the size of their funds faster than VC managers do. This leads to significantly higher revenue per partner and per professional in later BO funds. The results suggest that the BO business is more scalable than the VC business and that past success has a differential impact on the terms of their future funds.