Antonio Maldonado

Decisional Balance and Processes of Change are generally addressed in motivational interventions for the treatment of cannabis use disorders. However, specific aspects of these multifaceted constructs, with greater relevance for severe cannabis users, need to be ascertained to enable better interventions. This study aimed to compare the different facets of decisional balance and processes of change between mild and severe cannabis users in a community-based sample of young undergraduates. Thirty-one severe cannabis users and 31 mild cannabis users, indicated with the Severity of Dependence Scale, were assessed using the Decisional Balance Questionnaire (DBQ) and the Processes of Change Questionnaire (PCQ). We found that severe cannabis users had higher scores in the DBQ dimensions of Utilitarian Gains for the Self, Utilitarian Gains for Significant Others, and Self-approval, as well as in the total subscale of Gains but not Losses. The group of severe cannabis users also had higher scores in the PCQ dimensions of Self-revaluations and Counter-conditioning. Our results pinpoint specific dimensions of Decisional Balance and Processes of Change that are endorsed by severe cannabis users. This knowledge could be applied to inform motivational interventions targeting severe cannabis users.

Putting money at stake produces anticipatory uncertainty, a process that has been linked to key features of gambling. Here we examined how learning and individual differences modulate the stimulus preceding negativity (SPN, an electroencephalographic signature of perceived uncertainty of valued outcomes) in gambling disorder patients (GDPs) and healthy controls (HCs), during a non-gambling contingency learning task. Twenty-four GDPs and 26 HCs performed a causal learning task under conditions of high and medium uncertainty (HU, MU; null and positive cue-outcome contingency, respectively). Participants were asked to predict the outcome trial-by-trial, and to regularly judge the strength of the cue-outcome contingency. A pre-outcome SPN was extracted from simultaneous electroencephalographic recordings for each participant, uncertainty level, and task block. The two groups similarly learnt to predict the occurrence of the outcome in the presence/absence of the cue. In HCs, SPN amplitude decreased as the outcome became predictable in the MU condition, a decrement that was absent in the HU condition, where the outcome remained unpredictable during the task. Most importantly, GDPs’ SPN remained high and insensitive to task type and block. In GDPs, the SPN amplitude was linked to gambling preferences. When both groups were considered together, SPN amplitude was also related to impulsivity. GDPs thus showed an abnormal electrophysiological response to outcome uncertainty, not attributable to faulty contingency learning. Differences with controls were larger in frequent players of passive games, and smaller in players of more active games. Potential psychological mechanisms underlying this set of effects are discussed.

Complex tasks require the learning and integration of multiple cognitive, sensory, and psychomotor skills for correct execution. Driving-related skills are developed step by step through the increase of mileage driven and the accumulation of practice in different traffic situations. The acquisition of these skills should be reflected in the brain structure. However, no previous studies have explored brain structural variations associated with driving experience. The aim of the present study was to investigate whether driving frequency, defined as average annual driving mileage, is related to neuroanatomical variations in gray matter (GM) volume and white matter (WM) integrity using voxel-based morphometry (VBM) and DTI-based fractional anisotropy (FA), respectively. We recruited 83 drivers with variable range of annual driving mileage and controlled for age, sex, handedness, IQ, time since the acquisition of driving license, use of motorcycles/mopeds and bicycles, perceived driving skills, and subjective probability of having an accident. Our results showed variations in white matter FA as a function of mileage driven. Driving experience was related to a significant increase of FA in parts of the right hemisphere superior and inferior longitudinal fasciculus, anterior thalamic radiation, forceps majors, inferior fronto-occipital fasciculus, and corticospinal tract. No significant differences were observed in gray matter volumes. FA variations were found in brain regions that have been associated with cognitive, visual, and motor processes necessary for skilled performance in driving. These results suggest that variations in white matter diffusivity can underlie the development of driving skills and safer driving.

The aim of this research was to investigate whether the use of messages with negative emotional content is effective in promoting safe behavior of moped riders and how exactly these messages modulate rider behavior. Participants received negative feedback when performing risky behaviors using a computer task. The effectiveness of this treatment was subsequently tested in a riding simulator. The results demonstrated how riders receiving negative feedback had a lower number of traffic accidents than a control group. The reduction in accidents was accompanied by a set of changes in the riding behavior. We observed a lower average speed and greater respect for speed limits. Furthermore, analysis of the steering wheel variance, throttle variance, and average braking force provided evidence for a more even and homogenous riding style. This greater abidance of traffic regulations and friendlier riding style could explain some of the causes behind the reduction in accidents. The use of negative emotional feedback in driving schools or advanced rider assistance systems could enhance riding performance, making riders aware of unsafe practices and helping them to establish more accurate riding habits. Moreover, the combination of riding simulators and feedback-for example, in the training of novice riders and traffic offenders-could be an efficient tool to improve their hazard perception skills and promote safer behaviors.

Causal learning is the ability to progressively incorporate raw information about dependencies between events, or between one’s behavior and its outcomes, into beliefs of the causal structure of the world. In spite of the fact that some cognitive biases in gambling disorder can be described as alterations of causal learning involving gambling-relevant cues, behaviors, and outcomes, general causal learning mechanisms in gamblers have not been systematically investigated. In the present study, we compared gambling disorder patients against controls in an instrumental causal learning task. Evidence of illusion of control, namely, overestimation of the relationship between one’s behavior and an uncorrelated outcome, showed up only in gamblers with strong current symptoms. Interestingly, this effect was part of a more complex pattern, in which gambling disorder patients manifested a poorer ability to discriminate between null and positive contingencies. Additionally, anomalies were related to gambling severity and current gambling disorder symptoms. Gambling-related biases, as measured by a standard psychometric tool, correlated with performance in the causal learning task, but not in the expected direction. Indeed, performance of gamblers with stronger biases tended to resemble the one of controls, which could imply that anomalies of causal learning processes play a role in gambling disorder, but do not seem to underlie gambling-specific biases, at least in a simple, direct way.

The main aim of this research was to investigate the decision making process in risky situations. We studied how different types of feedback on risky driving behaviors modulate risk evaluation and risk-taking. For a set of risky traffic situations, participants had to make evaluative judgments (judge the situation as risky or not) and urgent decisions (brake or not). In Experiment 1, participants received feedback with and without negative emotional content when they made risky behaviors. In Experiment 2 we investigated the independent effects of feedback and negative emotional stimuli. The results showed three important findings: First, urgent decisions were faster [F(1, 92) = 6.76, p = .01] and more cautious [F(1, 92) = 17.16, p < .001] than evaluative judgments. These results suggest that evaluative judgments of risk and actual risk-taking may not always coincide, and that they seem to be controlled by two different processing systems as proposed by dual process theories. Second, feedback made participants’ responses even faster [F(1, 111) = 71.53, p < .001], allowing greater risk sensitivity [F(1, 111) = 22.12, p < .001] and skewing towards more cautious responses [F(1, 111) = 14.09, p < .001]. Finally, emotional stimuli had an effect only when they were presented as feedback. The results of this research increase our understanding of the processes involved in risky driving behavior and suggest efficient ways to control risk taking through the use of feedback.