Dorothea Hilhorst

In the last few decades, there has been a marked turn to “humanitarianism from below” in thinking about and organizing humanitarian action, which is among other expressed in the localization agenda of humanitarian action. In the last years, there have been many initiatives to strengthen national actors as well as initiatives that are directed to organization, advocacy, and collective action. This paper theoretically positions the role of national and local service providers in the humanitarian arena and politics of knowledge production and then presents a specific initiative of humanitarian observatories in three countries. The paper brings out a number of issues relevant for other initiatives aiming to strengthen the role of national and local actors, namely that humanitarians are not the only relevant actors to deal with humanitarian crises, that context matters, the importance of agenda-setting, and the importance of sideways interaction between observatories in different crisis-affected regions.

Purpose: The transcript takes you on a journey of the book mapping vulnerability and the developments thereafter.Design/methodology/approach: The transcript and video was developed in the context of a United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) project on the History of DRR.Findings: This interview highlights how DRR is central to conflict settings as well.Originality/value: The interview provides reflections on DRR in conflict settings.

In high-conflict scenarios, humanitarian needs often surpass resources, and humanitarians are faced with ongoing challenges of whom to prioritise and where to work. This process is often referred to as ‘targeting’, but this article uses the concept of ‘triage’ to emphasise how prioritisation is a continuous and political process, rather than a one-off exercise to find the best match between needs and programme objectives. This study focused on South Sudan, exploring the formal and informal dynamics at the national, regional and local levels of humanitarian decisions. The article is based on semi-structured interviews and multiple meetings and observations of programmes over four months of fieldwork in 2017. This fieldwork was beset by many of the problems that humanitarians also encounter in their work, including complicated access, logistics difficulties and security challenges. Humanitarian action is meant to be flexibly deployed to respond to priority needs resulting from conflict or disasters, and agencies have multiple tools and policies to facilitate this. However, in reality, we find humanitarian action largely locked into path-dependent areas of intervention because agencies must rely on logistics, trust and local partners, all of which take years to develop, and because local actors’ commitment to see programmes continued.

Although a growing number of NGOs are combining humanitarian and development activities, it was long the case that humanitarian action was isolated from discussions and practices in the world of development. The work of saving lives was deemed to be guided solely by the humanitarian principles, and discussions on accountability were rare. In the 1990s, humanitarian standards initiatives arose in recognition that humanitarian organisations were not accountable to affected populations. This article aims to take stock of accountability initiatives and practices in the sector. It builds on accountability theory in distinguishing upward, sideways, and downward accountability, and incorporates formal and informal forms of accountability. It is based on empirical research in Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Sierra Leone. The first part of the article outlines the history of accountability in the humanitarian sector, including an accountability timeline, and discusses current trends in performances around accountability towards displaced people, minorities, and other recipients of aid. It then presents the findings from the three countries. The article concludes by calling attention to the everyday politics of accountability, the widening accountability arena, the differential accountability demands on international and national aid providers, and the crucial importance of sideways accountability to bring accountability to a next level.

The Covid‐19 pandemic has magnified existing crises and vulnerabilities, but much remains unknown about how it has affected fragile and conflict‐affected settings. This paper builds on the theory that hazards become a disaster in interaction with vulnerability and response policies, yet often lead to renewed disaster risk creation. It is based on seven case studies of countries worldwide that experienced social conflict at the advent of the pandemic, covering the period from March–August 2020. The findings show that authorities instrumentalised Covid‐19 to strengthen their control and agendas. Responsibility was assumed for lockdowns, but this was not accompanied by care to mitigate their adverse effects. Social conflict shaped the response, as high levels of mistrust in authorities complicated the implementation of measures, while authorities did not support community‐based coping initiatives. Whether Covid‐19 will trigger or exacerbate conflict and vulnerabilities depends on pre‐existing, country‐specific conditions, and how a government and other actors frame the issue and respond.

"Hope generation among refugees and migrants" published on 30 Oct 2020 by Wageningen Academic.

Conflict aggravates disaster risk and impact through increased vulnerability and weakened response capacities. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) and disaster governance are needed – but often deemed unfeasible – in conflict-affected areas. In Afghanistan, despite the high-intensity conflict (HIC), there is a growing body of practice on DRR. To provide insight on DRR in HIC contexts, this study used document analysis, stakeholder interviews, and participant observation to analyse the promotion, implementation, and challenges of DRR in Afghanistan. The findings show that DRR was promoted after international recognition of Afghanistan’s high disaster risk, which coincided with expanding opportunities for development. Early Afghan DRR projects were hazard-oriented and focused on mitigation infrastructure, but some have shifted towards an integrated approach. DRR is challenging in HIC contexts because of complex logistical and funding needs required to overcome access and security issues. The Afghan experience shows that DRR is possible in HIC countries, provided that different levels of conflict are acknowledged, sufficient time and funding are available, and disaster governance arrangements are in place. Expectations regarding the possibilities for DRR in HIC areas should be tempered by the realities of limitations in terms of geographical coverage, real impact, and capacities to reduce vulnerability in an integrated way.