MHMartin Hinton

Martin Hinton

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Martin Hinton has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The Identity Function of Argumentation in Religious Discourse: A Comparative Case Study

    by Agnieszka Bryła-Cruz, Martin Hinton, Weronika Olkowska, Miriam Kobierski

  • Witchcraft in Your Lips? – Prosody as Persuasion in Advertising

    by Gabrijela Kišiček, Agnieszka Bryła-Cruz, Martin Hinton

    In this study, we consider the way that elements of prosody are used in advertising texts to produce effects corresponding to the three classical strands of persuasion: ethos, logos, and pathos. By looking at the connection between prosodic features and persuasion, we aim to draw conclusions which will assist in the interpretation of multimodal arguments featuring linguistic content expressed in speech and to illustrate the flexibility and continued relevance of the traditional rhetorical categories in the age of digital communication. By consider-ing several examples of audio-visual persuasive texts, we are able to illustrate the range of effects that can be achieved and the variety of rhetorical and argumentative techniques with which they can be combined. We show that the features of accent, rate of speech, and intonation can all be employed with the goal of persuasion across a variety of contexts and wgenres.

  • Two-Tier Fallacy Theory

    by Martin Hinton, Jean Wagemans

    Conceptions of fallacies suggested by philosophers vary significantly. Often these contributions are little more than lists, only sometimes approaching a fully-developed theory of fallacy. Where there is a clear understanding of what is meant by the term fallacy, the problem of how to identify them in discourse remains, often leading to a conflation of descriptive and evaluative analyses. We present a two-tier procedure that strictly distinguishes the descriptive and normative dimensions of identifying fallacies. The combination of the descriptive Argument Type Identification Procedure (ATIP), which enables the characterization of an argument in terms of the Periodic Table of Arguments (PTA), and the evaluative Comprehensive Assessment Procedure for Natural Argumentation (CAPNA), provides a basis for systematic, repeatable, and explainable argument acceptability judgements. We explain how this two-tier procedure overcomes some of the difficulties of fallacy identification and categorization and list several other advantages that a procedural approach to fallacies brings.


  • Open Access

    Charity as Just Deserts

    by Maciej Kulik, Martin Hinton, Katarzyna Budzynska

    The principle of charity (PC) is widely discussed in the philosophy of language and argumentation theory. Typically, in these disciplines, it is considered justified for prudential and epistemic reasons. However, the limitation of such arguments lies in their dependence on the goals of the individual interpreter and the usefulness of PC to facilitate them. Ethical reasons based on broadly accepted principles of fairness and rights offer more universal justifications. Stevens (Charity for moral reasons?–a defense of the principle of charity in argumentation. Argumentation and Advocacy 57:67–84, 2021), divides those into the deontological, which refer to respect for dignity, and the consequential, which rely upon the duty to avoid harm. The goal of this paper is to provide a systematic conceptual framework, rooted in the Socratic conception of justice, which strengthens and elaborates these ethical reasons for PC. On a psychological view of harm, the consequential argument seems to suggest an obligation to interpret even the most extreme and harmful claims charitably. To avoid this problematic outcome, we propose an approach to harm as unjust damage, originating with Socrates and refined by Feinberg (The moral limits of the criminal law, vol 1. Oxford University Press, New York, NY; Oxford, UK, 1984). We also apply the distinction between compensatory justice and the principle of equal measure that Ajdukiewicz (On justice. Philosophy of Science 30(1):119–130, 2022) draws from Aristotle (Nicomachean ethics. Oxford University Press, London, UK,1966) to show that the charitable interpretation of arguments is the just desert of a dignified human being, due to their status as a rational subject. In this way, the deontological and consequential arguments put forward by Stevens are united into one ethical support for PC and the potential paradox of charity raised by Lewiński (The paradox of charity. Informal Logic 32(4):403–439, 2012) is dissolved.

  • Open Access

    Evaluating Argumentative Discourse Processes

    by Martin Hinton

    This paper sets out basic principles for the interpretation and assessment of contextual factors in argumentative discourse, which may be combined with argumentation norms to build a system of argument evaluation. The theoretical background is given, and the procedure for evaluation is described, then exemplified. This Informal Argument Pragmatics forms the basis for part of a larger evaluation tool, the Comprehensive Assessment Procedure for Natural Argumentation (CAPNA). CAPNA is based on an understanding of argumentation as having three distinct, but related, parts: process, reasoning, and expression. This paper describes how the procedural questions for pragmatic process evaluation are derived and employed, and considers how the proposed pragmatics relates to the rules for argumentation given in the pragma-dialectical approach.

  • Open Access

    Criticizing Language

    by Martin Hinton

    In this paper, I consider a number of philosophical critiques of language and describe how their criticisms compare. In particular, I discuss how the current trend in the philosophy of language known as conceptual engineering fits into this tradition and to what extent it can be considered a critique of language per se, rather than a method of addressing dissatisfactions with certain individual terms. I suggest that criticisms can be divided allegations of two types of shortcoming: dangers and deficiencies. In the category of dangers, I consider some well-known examples from the history of philosophy, and suggest that they partly rely on an unexpressed from of Linguistic Determinism. I then move on to the deficiencies highlighted in the critiques offered by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and Mauthner in his Contributions to a Critique of Language. These form a pair of apparently opposite ways of considering the flaws in language, but I shall argue that they have much in common. I then describe the conceptual engineering movement and its mission to provide ‘improved’ meanings of certain terms. I show that implicit in the assumptions behind conceptual engineering are criticisms of language of both varieties – current meanings are seen as dangerous as they represent a threat to social justice, and the system of allocation of meaning is seen as flawed and in need of external intervention.

  • Open Access

    Conceptual Engineering and the Philosophical Fallacies of Language

    by Martin Hinton

    Conceptual Engineering, the practice of stipulating a change in the meaning of a word in order to improve it in some fashion, for some end, has proved a popular topic among philosophers of language in recent times. Deutsch (Philos Stud 177:3935–3957, 2020) has argued that it has received an undue degree of interest since its implementation falls onto one of the horns of a dilemma: either the change to be effected is in the global semantic meaning of the given word/concept, in which case it is infeasible, or it is merely in the local speaker-meaning, in which case it is largely trivial. I suggest, however, that there is a deeper, more troubling, objection to Conceptual Engineering. My criticism does not strictly take the form of a dilemma, since some cases may fall upon both horns at once and others may be able to squeeze through the gap, but it does involve highlighting two potential weaknesses of the project: one of those, as with Deutsch, is the danger of triviality, although it is not concerned only with the division between semantic and speaker meaning. It seems clear that there are cases where a particular authority or legislature has the capacity to alter a word’s legal meaning; others where certain groups may discuss the best way to use a technical term, each putting forward their preferred suggestions; and individual speakers are at liberty to choose to use a word with a particular intention. None of this is new, nor controversial, and, thus, is largely trivial. In all cases, but particularly where meanings are manipulated without due authority, inexplicitly, or in order to further a particular theoretical conception, however, there is a strong chance that the engineer will be led to commit one of the fallacies of language to which philosophy is particularly vulnerable (Hinton Evaluating the language of argument, Springer, Cham, 2021). These include fallacies of vagueness, equivocation, and persuasive definition. In this paper, I use examples to illustrate the likely fallaciousness of conceptual redefinitions and highlight in particular the ‘Philosophical Fallacy’, outlined by Nelson (A theory of philosophical fallacies.Translated by Leal F, Carus D. Springer, Cham 2016). I conclude that, as a method for philosophers, Conceptual Engineering is, in broad terms, either trivial or fallacious.


  • Argument Evaluation: If your Snark be a Boojum…

    by Martin Hinton

    In this essay, I make a plea for a wide-ranging, open perspective on the evaluation of arguments. This involves a more flexible understanding of what fallacies are and for what argu-ments may be used. I acknowledge the great wealth of argumentation theory, but bemoan the lack of systematic, re-peatable, and explainable evaluation procedures. I then go on to introduce the works which contribute to this spe-cial issue and explain how they assist in the fulfilment of my hopes. Résumé: Dans cet essai, je plaide en faveur d’une perspective large et ou-verte sur l’évaluation des arguments. Cela implique une compréhension plus flexible de ce que sont les sophismes et des arguments qui peuvent être utilisés. Je reconnais la grande richesse de la théorie de l’argumentation, mais je dé-plore le manque de procédures d’éval-uation systématiques, reproductibles et explicables. Je présente ensuite les travaux qui contribuent à ce numéro spécial et explique comment ils con-tribuent à la réalisation de mes espoirs.