Paula Castro
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Paula Castro has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Carola Klöck
Center for International Studies, Sciences Po, Paris, France
2 shared publications - Adelle Thomas
Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, USA
1 shared publication - Alexandra Lesnikowski
Department of Geography, Planning & Environment, Concordia University, Montreal, Canada
1 shared publication - Ambuj D. Sagar
School of Public Policy, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, New Delhi, India
1 shared publication - Carl-Friedrich Schleussner
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria
1 shared publication - J. Timmons Roberts
Institute at Brown for Environment and Society, Brown University, Providence, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
- Vol. 26 (4) , 745-766
Climate agreement-making across negotiation and non-negotiation spaces: how states participate in the UN climate negotiations
Participation in multilateral negotiations such as those on climate change is key to understanding negotiation processes and outcomes. Despite its importance, participation – what negotiators actually do – remains understudied and ill understood. We address this gap by examining participation in UN climate negotiations. Specifically, we collect data across all 198 Parties and 58 negotiation sessions (subsidiary body meetings, SBs, and Conferences of the Parties, COPs) since 1995 on a total of six activities across both negotiation and non-negotiation spaces: oral interventions, written submissions, and services as chairs for negotiation activities; and press conferences, side events, and exhibits for non-negotiation spaces. Our analysis shows that participation spans different spaces, even if negotiations dominate. Nevertheless, non-negotiation spaces are growing in importance, with COP15 serving as a turning point. Non-negotiation spaces complement negotiations: Parties active in negotiations also tend to pursue non-negotiation spaces. Finally, Parties differ strongly in the extent to which they engage, with many Parties remaining relatively passive, sometimes despite a continuous presence at negotiation sessions. These observations already help to understand UN climate negotiations better, but invite further work, including more qualitative research – for which our data can provide a helpful starting point.
- 29 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
- Vol. 26 (4) , 745-766
Open AccessClimate agreement-making across negotiation and non-negotiation spaces: how states participate in the UN climate negotiations
Participation in multilateral negotiations such as those on climate change is key to understanding negotiation processes and outcomes. Despite its importance, participation – what negotiators actually do – remains understudied and ill understood. We address this gap by examining participation in UN climate negotiations. Specifically, we collect data across all 198 Parties and 58 negotiation sessions (subsidiary body meetings, SBs, and Conferences of the Parties, COPs) since 1995 on a total of six activities across both negotiation and non-negotiation spaces: oral interventions, written submissions, and services as chairs for negotiation activities; and press conferences, side events, and exhibits for non-negotiation spaces. Our analysis shows that participation spans different spaces, even if negotiations dominate. Nevertheless, non-negotiation spaces are growing in importance, with COP15 serving as a turning point. Non-negotiation spaces complement negotiations: Parties active in negotiations also tend to pursue non-negotiation spaces. Finally, Parties differ strongly in the extent to which they engage, with many Parties remaining relatively passive, sometimes despite a continuous presence at negotiation sessions. These observations already help to understand UN climate negotiations better, but invite further work, including more qualitative research – for which our data can provide a helpful starting point.
- 19 December 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in International Negotiation
- Vol. 31 (2) , 259-287
Negotiation Capacity in un Climate Negotiations
Despite the formal equality of all states, in practice, international negotiations are highly unequal. In particular, small delegation size limits countries’ capacity to meaningfully engage with complex global processes. Yet, delegation size is an insufficient indicator of negotiation capacity. We argue that we also need to pay attention to delegation composition. Indeed, we propose that small delegation size can be compensated by including non-governmental delegates, by sending more senior and experienced negotiators, and by sending the same delegates over time. We use the example of climate negotiations to map and explore the interlinkages between delegation size and delegation composition. Our quantitative analysis across all countries, as well as a focus on Seychelles and Mauritius, shows that countries do indeed seek to compensate for small delegation size. Yet, these compensation mechanisms, especially sending more senior negotiators and maintaining delegation continuity, require resources that not all Parties have.
- 19 December 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in International Negotiation
- Vol. 31 (2) , 259-287
Negotiation Capacity in un Climate Negotiations
Despite the formal equality of all states, in practice, international negotiations are highly unequal. In particular, small delegation size limits countries’ capacity to meaningfully engage with complex global processes. Yet, delegation size is an insufficient indicator of negotiation capacity. We argue that we also need to pay attention to delegation composition. Indeed, we propose that small delegation size can be compensated by including non-governmental delegates, by sending more senior and experienced negotiators, and by sending the same delegates over time. We use the example of climate negotiations to map and explore the interlinkages between delegation size and delegation composition. Our quantitative analysis across all countries, as well as a focus on Seychelles and Mauritius, shows that countries do indeed seek to compensate for small delegation size. Yet, these compensation mechanisms, especially sending more senior negotiators and maintaining delegation continuity, require resources that not all Parties have.
- Open Access
- 16 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Data
- Vol. 12 (1)
Participation, Cooperation and Conflict in UN Climate Negotiations
This paper describes a coding algorithm and corresponding dataset of negotiation interventions and negotiation interactions by country parties and groupings in the multilateral negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The data is obtained by scraping and automatically coding the negotiation summaries published in the Earth Negotiations Bulletins (ENBs) between 1995 and 2023. The data is validated by comparing it with a hand-coded dataset of negotiation interactions under the UNFCCC. One limitation discovered upon validation is that our automated procedure finds significantly fewer opposition interactions than the hand-coding procedure. The main reason for this is that the algorithm identifies negotiation interactions on the basis of individual sentences, while the hand coding is able to identify them across sentences and even paragraphs. However, the distribution of opposition interactions seems to be representative of the larger dataset and therefore not substantively biased. We describe possible uses of this data in research, and provide the algorithm, which can be adapted for application to other negotiations covered by the ENBs.
- 16 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Data
- Vol. 12 (1)
Open AccessParticipation, Cooperation and Conflict in UN Climate Negotiations
This paper describes a coding algorithm and corresponding dataset of negotiation interventions and negotiation interactions by country parties and groupings in the multilateral negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The data is obtained by scraping and automatically coding the negotiation summaries published in the Earth Negotiations Bulletins (ENBs) between 1995 and 2023. The data is validated by comparing it with a hand-coded dataset of negotiation interactions under the UNFCCC. One limitation discovered upon validation is that our automated procedure finds significantly fewer opposition interactions than the hand-coding procedure. The main reason for this is that the algorithm identifies negotiation interactions on the basis of individual sentences, while the hand coding is able to identify them across sentences and even paragraphs. However, the distribution of opposition interactions seems to be representative of the larger dataset and therefore not substantively biased. We describe possible uses of this data in research, and provide the algorithm, which can be adapted for application to other negotiations covered by the ENBs.
- 5 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Climate Change
- Vol. 15 (11) , 1136-1140
Expert retrospective on a decade of the Paris Agreement
- 5 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Climate Change
- Vol. 15 (11) , 1136-1140
Expert retrospective on a decade of the Paris Agreement
- Open Access
- 25 May 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 65 (3) , 683-698
The Institutionalization of a Cleavage: How Differential Treatment Affects State Behavior in the Climate Negotiations
Differential treatment is a key norm in multilateral environmental agreements. Its main objective is to increase compliance and reduce the free-rider problem by apportioning the costs and benefits of implementation more equitably across the parties in an agreement. The question of how to differentiate those burdens is inextricably linked to national interests, and while in some instances differential treatment is well designed and facilitates cooperation, in other cases a rigid divide—or cleavage—leads to a stalemate and constant conflict. This article studies the consequences of differential treatment as institutionalized under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Previous research has shown that the separation of UNFCCC parties into two opposing groups has deepened the polarization in the negotiations. We identify two causal mechanisms that may have driven this polarization, namely socialization through material incentives and the formation of group identity. We draw on an original dataset that records (dis)agreements between country pairs, coded from negotiation summaries between 1995 and 2013. Using a relational events model, we show that the division of UNFCCC parties into Annex I (with obligations) and non-Annex I (without obligations) is related primarily to material incentives and less to group identity formation.El trato diferenciado es una norma fundamental en los acuerdos ambientales multilaterales. Su principal objetivo es aumentar el cumplimiento y reducir el problema de los oportunistas distribuyendo los costos y los beneficios de la implementación de forma más equitativa entre las partes de un acuerdo. La cuestión de cómo diferenciar esas cargas está inextricablemente vinculada a los intereses nacionales y mientras que en algunos casos el trato diferenciado está bien diseñado y facilita la cooperación, en otros casos, una división rígida o escisión conduce a un estancamiento o un conflicto constante. En este artículo se estudian las consecuencias del trato diferenciado institucionalizado en la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático (CMNUCC). Investigaciones anteriores han demostrado que la separación de las partes de la CMNUCC en dos grupos opuestos ha profundizado la polarización en las negociaciones. Identificamos dos mecanismos causales que pueden haber impulsado esta polarización; a saber, la socialización a través de incentivos materiales y la formación de la identidad de grupo. Nos basamos en un conjunto de datos original que registra los (des)acuerdos entre pares de países, codificados a partir de resúmenes de negociación entre 1995 y 2013. Utilizando un modelo de eventos relacionales, demostramos que la división de las partes de la CMNUCC en Anexo I (con obligaciones) y no Anexo I (sin obligaciones) está relacionada principalmente con los incentivos materiales y no tan relacionada con la formación de la identidad de grupo.Le traitement différencié est une norme clé des accords environnementaux multilatéraux. Son principal objectif est d'accroître la conformité et de réduire le problème de bénéficiaire sans contrepartie en répartissant plus équitablement les coûts et les avantages de la mise en œuvre d'un accord entre les parties qui y sont impliquées. La question de savoir comment différencier ces « fardeaux » est inextricablement liée aux intérêts nationaux, et bien que dans certains cas, le traitement différencié soit bien conçu et facilite la coopération, dans d'autres cas, une séparation rigide—ou clivage—conduit à une impasse et à un conflit permanent. Cet article étudie les conséquences du traitement différencié tel qu'il est institutionnalisé dans la Convention-cadre des Nations unies sur les changements climatiques (CCNUCC). Une recherche précédente a monté que la séparation des parties de la CCNUCC en deux groupes opposés avait accru la polarisation des négociations. Nous avons identifié deux mécanismes causaux qui peuvent avoir entraîné cette polarisation: la socialisation par incitations matérielles et la formation d'une identité de groupe. Nous nous appuyons sur un jeu de données original retraçant les (dés)accords entre paires de pays, qui ont été codés à partir des résumés des négociations qui sont intervenues entre 1995 et 2013. Nous utilisons un modèle d’événements relationnels et montrons que la séparation entre parties de la CCNUCC en pays de l'Annexe I (avec obligations) et pays hors Annexe I (sans obligations) est principalement davantage associée à des incitations matérielles qu’à une formation d'identité de groupe.
- 25 May 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 65 (3) , 683-698
Open AccessThe Institutionalization of a Cleavage: How Differential Treatment Affects State Behavior in the Climate Negotiations
Differential treatment is a key norm in multilateral environmental agreements. Its main objective is to increase compliance and reduce the free-rider problem by apportioning the costs and benefits of implementation more equitably across the parties in an agreement. The question of how to differentiate those burdens is inextricably linked to national interests, and while in some instances differential treatment is well designed and facilitates cooperation, in other cases a rigid divide—or cleavage—leads to a stalemate and constant conflict. This article studies the consequences of differential treatment as institutionalized under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Previous research has shown that the separation of UNFCCC parties into two opposing groups has deepened the polarization in the negotiations. We identify two causal mechanisms that may have driven this polarization, namely socialization through material incentives and the formation of group identity. We draw on an original dataset that records (dis)agreements between country pairs, coded from negotiation summaries between 1995 and 2013. Using a relational events model, we show that the division of UNFCCC parties into Annex I (with obligations) and non-Annex I (without obligations) is related primarily to material incentives and less to group identity formation.El trato diferenciado es una norma fundamental en los acuerdos ambientales multilaterales. Su principal objetivo es aumentar el cumplimiento y reducir el problema de los oportunistas distribuyendo los costos y los beneficios de la implementación de forma más equitativa entre las partes de un acuerdo. La cuestión de cómo diferenciar esas cargas está inextricablemente vinculada a los intereses nacionales y mientras que en algunos casos el trato diferenciado está bien diseñado y facilita la cooperación, en otros casos, una división rígida o escisión conduce a un estancamiento o un conflicto constante. En este artículo se estudian las consecuencias del trato diferenciado institucionalizado en la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático (CMNUCC). Investigaciones anteriores han demostrado que la separación de las partes de la CMNUCC en dos grupos opuestos ha profundizado la polarización en las negociaciones. Identificamos dos mecanismos causales que pueden haber impulsado esta polarización; a saber, la socialización a través de incentivos materiales y la formación de la identidad de grupo. Nos basamos en un conjunto de datos original que registra los (des)acuerdos entre pares de países, codificados a partir de resúmenes de negociación entre 1995 y 2013. Utilizando un modelo de eventos relacionales, demostramos que la división de las partes de la CMNUCC en Anexo I (con obligaciones) y no Anexo I (sin obligaciones) está relacionada principalmente con los incentivos materiales y no tan relacionada con la formación de la identidad de grupo.Le traitement différencié est une norme clé des accords environnementaux multilatéraux. Son principal objectif est d'accroître la conformité et de réduire le problème de bénéficiaire sans contrepartie en répartissant plus équitablement les coûts et les avantages de la mise en œuvre d'un accord entre les parties qui y sont impliquées. La question de savoir comment différencier ces « fardeaux » est inextricablement liée aux intérêts nationaux, et bien que dans certains cas, le traitement différencié soit bien conçu et facilite la coopération, dans d'autres cas, une séparation rigide—ou clivage—conduit à une impasse et à un conflit permanent. Cet article étudie les conséquences du traitement différencié tel qu'il est institutionnalisé dans la Convention-cadre des Nations unies sur les changements climatiques (CCNUCC). Une recherche précédente a monté que la séparation des parties de la CCNUCC en deux groupes opposés avait accru la polarisation des négociations. Nous avons identifié deux mécanismes causaux qui peuvent avoir entraîné cette polarisation: la socialisation par incitations matérielles et la formation d'une identité de groupe. Nous nous appuyons sur un jeu de données original retraçant les (dés)accords entre paires de pays, qui ont été codés à partir des résumés des négociations qui sont intervenues entre 1995 et 2013. Nous utilisons un modèle d’événements relationnels et montrons que la séparation entre parties de la CCNUCC en pays de l'Annexe I (avec obligations) et pays hors Annexe I (sans obligations) est principalement davantage associée à des incitations matérielles qu’à une formation d'identité de groupe.
- 15 September 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in International Political Science Review
- Vol. 42 (1) , 95-113
National interests and coalition positions on climate change: A text-based analysis
Coalitions play a central role in the international negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. By getting together, countries join resources in defending their interests and positions. But building coalitions may come at a cost. Coalition positions are a result of compromise between their members, and thus the increase in bargaining power may come at a price if the preferences of their members are heterogeneous. Relying on automatic text analysis of written position papers submitted to the negotiations, I analyze the extent to which coalitions represent the preferences of their members and discuss whether this contributes to disproportionate policy responses at the international level. I focus on a recently formed coalition: the Like-Minded Developing Countries, a large and heterogeneous group that brings together emerging, oil-dependent and poor developing countries.
- 15 September 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in International Political Science Review
- Vol. 42 (1) , 95-113
National interests and coalition positions on climate change: A text-based analysis
Coalitions play a central role in the international negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. By getting together, countries join resources in defending their interests and positions. But building coalitions may come at a cost. Coalition positions are a result of compromise between their members, and thus the increase in bargaining power may come at a price if the preferences of their members are heterogeneous. Relying on automatic text analysis of written position papers submitted to the negotiations, I analyze the extent to which coalitions represent the preferences of their members and discuss whether this contributes to disproportionate policy responses at the international level. I focus on a recently formed coalition: the Like-Minded Developing Countries, a large and heterogeneous group that brings together emerging, oil-dependent and poor developing countries.
- 24 October 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Transnational Environmental Law
- Vol. 5 (2) , 379-400
Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Beyond the Nation State: How Is Differential Treatment Addressed in Transnational Climate Governance Initiatives?
Many multilateral environmental agreements have adopted differentiated rules for different countries, based on the recognition of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDRs) of states. By establishing two rigid groups of countries with and without emissions reduction obligations, the intergovernmental climate regime represents the most extreme case of such differentiation. The regime has struggled to overcome this rigidity and the resulting political deadlock between developing and developed countries. Transnational climate governance (TCG) initiatives have emerged as an alternative to provide mitigation, adaptation or finance outside the multilateral process. By drawing on synergies between public and private actors, it is hoped that they overcome the paralysis of the intergovernmental process. Yet, they take place in the same world of unequal peers, with different levels of capacity and responsibility for climate change. This article investigates the extent to which such TCG initiatives reflect the CBDR principle. Do different types of initiative – involving different types of actor or with different climate-related goals – address differentiation in distinct ways? Does taking account of CBDRs affect the membership of transnational initiatives? This article explores these questions empirically by analyzing a sample of TCG initiatives in terms of how they include differential treatment of states and non-state members. It concludes that TCG initiatives address differentiation in a pragmatic way. Most frequently, they either offer participants flexibility in how to implement their commitments, or provide support to members from developing countries. Such support is, so far, still insufficient to address the limited involvement of developing country actors.
- 24 October 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Transnational Environmental Law
- Vol. 5 (2) , 379-400
Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Beyond the Nation State: How Is Differential Treatment Addressed in Transnational Climate Governance Initiatives?
Many multilateral environmental agreements have adopted differentiated rules for different countries, based on the recognition of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDRs) of states. By establishing two rigid groups of countries with and without emissions reduction obligations, the intergovernmental climate regime represents the most extreme case of such differentiation. The regime has struggled to overcome this rigidity and the resulting political deadlock between developing and developed countries. Transnational climate governance (TCG) initiatives have emerged as an alternative to provide mitigation, adaptation or finance outside the multilateral process. By drawing on synergies between public and private actors, it is hoped that they overcome the paralysis of the intergovernmental process. Yet, they take place in the same world of unequal peers, with different levels of capacity and responsibility for climate change. This article investigates the extent to which such TCG initiatives reflect the CBDR principle. Do different types of initiative – involving different types of actor or with different climate-related goals – address differentiation in distinct ways? Does taking account of CBDRs affect the membership of transnational initiatives? This article explores these questions empirically by analyzing a sample of TCG initiatives in terms of how they include differential treatment of states and non-state members. It concludes that TCG initiatives address differentiation in a pragmatic way. Most frequently, they either offer participants flexibility in how to implement their commitments, or provide support to members from developing countries. Such support is, so far, still insufficient to address the limited involvement of developing country actors.
- 1 November 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Global Environmental Change
- Vol. 29, 413-423
Climate policy innovation in the South – Domestic and international determinants of renewable energy policies in developing and emerging countries
- 1 November 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Global Environmental Change
- Vol. 29, 413-423
Climate policy innovation in the South – Domestic and international determinants of renewable energy policies in developing and emerging countries
- 1 March 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Global Environmental Change
- Vol. 25, 109-120
Constructed peer groups and path dependence in international organizations: The case of the international climate change negotiations
- 1 March 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Global Environmental Change
- Vol. 25, 109-120
Constructed peer groups and path dependence in international organizations: The case of the international climate change negotiations