Radu Teodorescu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Radu Teodorescu has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yinqian Zhang
Southern University of Science and Technology, Shenzhen, China
3 shared publications - Jingren Wei
The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA
2 shared publications - Kristin Barber
Google, Mountain View, California, USA
2 shared publications - Moein Ghaniyoun
The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA
2 shared publications Yinqian Zhang
Southern University of Science and Technology, Shenzhen, Guangdong, China
2 shared publications- Yuan Xiao
School of Information Science and Technology, ShanghaiTech University, Shanghai, China
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 71-75
FactorEQ: A Materialization-Free Hardware Architecture for Equality Polynomial Generation in SumCheck
- 30 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 71-75
Open AccessFactorEQ: A Materialization-Free Hardware Architecture for Equality Polynomial Generation in SumCheck
- 1 July 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 25 (2) , 247-250
Fingerprinting Attacks on Machine Learning-Based Hardware Prefetchers
- 1 July 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 25 (2) , 247-250
Fingerprinting Attacks on Machine Learning-Based Hardware Prefetchers
- Open Access
- 17 June 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-15
TEESec: Pre-Silicon Vulnerability Discovery for Trusted Execution Environments
Trusted execution environments (TEE) are CPU hardware extensions that provide security guarantees for applications running on untrusted operating systems. The security of TEEs is threatened by a variety of microarchitectural vulnerabilities, which have led to a large number of demonstrated attacks. While various solutions for verifying the correctness and security of TEE designs have been proposed, they generally do not extend to jointly verifying the security of the underlying microarchitecture. This paper presents TEESec, the first pre-silicon framework for discovering microarchitectural vulnerabilities in the context of trusted execution environments. TEESec is designed to jointly and systematically test the TEE and underlying microarchitecture against data and metadata leakage across isolation boundaries. We implement TEESec in the Chipyard framework and evaluate it on two open-source RISC-V out-of-order processors running the Keystone TEE. Using TEESec we uncover 10 distinct vulnerabilities in these processors that violate TEE security principles and could lead to leakage of enclave secrets.
- 17 June 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-15
Open AccessTEESec: Pre-Silicon Vulnerability Discovery for Trusted Execution Environments
Trusted execution environments (TEE) are CPU hardware extensions that provide security guarantees for applications running on untrusted operating systems. The security of TEEs is threatened by a variety of microarchitectural vulnerabilities, which have led to a large number of demonstrated attacks. While various solutions for verifying the correctness and security of TEE designs have been proposed, they generally do not extend to jointly verifying the security of the underlying microarchitecture. This paper presents TEESec, the first pre-silicon framework for discovering microarchitectural vulnerabilities in the context of trusted execution environments. TEESec is designed to jointly and systematically test the TEE and underlying microarchitecture against data and metadata leakage across isolation boundaries. We implement TEESec in the Chipyard framework and evaluate it on two open-source RISC-V out-of-order processors running the Keystone TEE. Using TEESec we uncover 10 distinct vulnerabilities in these processors that violate TEE security principles and could lead to leakage of enclave secrets.
- 29 June 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Micro
- Vol. 42 (4) , 6-9
Special Issue on Top Picks From the 2021 Computer Architecture Conferences
Prospective authors are requested to submit new, unpublished manuscripts for inclusion in the upcoming event described in this call for papers.
- 29 June 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Micro
- Vol. 42 (4) , 6-9
Special Issue on Top Picks From the 2021 Computer Architecture Conferences
Prospective authors are requested to submit new, unpublished manuscripts for inclusion in the upcoming event described in this call for papers.
- 14 February 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 21 (1) , 9-12
A Pre-Silicon Approach to Discovering Microarchitectural Vulnerabilities in Security Critical Applications
Microarchitectural vulnerabilities have become an increasingly effective attack vector. This is especially problematic for security critical applications, which handle sensitive data and may employ software-level hardening in order to thwart data leakage. These strategies rely on necessary assumptions about the underlying microarchitectural implementation, which may (and have proven to be) incorrect in some instances, leading to exploits. Consequently, devising early-stage design tools for reasoning about and verifying the correctness of high assurance applications with respect to a given hardware design is an increasingly important problem. This letter presents a principled dynamic testing methodology to reveal and analyze data-dependent microarchitectural behavior with the potential to violate assumptions and requirements of security critical software. A differential analysis is performed of the microarchitectural state space explored during register transfer-level (RTL) simulation to reveal internal activity which correlates to sensitive data used in computation. We demonstrate the utility of the proposed methodology through it's ability to identify secret data leakage from selected case studies with known vulnerabilities.
- 14 February 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 21 (1) , 9-12
A Pre-Silicon Approach to Discovering Microarchitectural Vulnerabilities in Security Critical Applications
Microarchitectural vulnerabilities have become an increasingly effective attack vector. This is especially problematic for security critical applications, which handle sensitive data and may employ software-level hardening in order to thwart data leakage. These strategies rely on necessary assumptions about the underlying microarchitectural implementation, which may (and have proven to be) incorrect in some instances, leading to exploits. Consequently, devising early-stage design tools for reasoning about and verifying the correctness of high assurance applications with respect to a given hardware design is an increasingly important problem. This letter presents a principled dynamic testing methodology to reveal and analyze data-dependent microarchitectural behavior with the potential to violate assumptions and requirements of security critical software. A differential analysis is performed of the microarchitectural state space explored during register transfer-level (RTL) simulation to reveal internal activity which correlates to sensitive data used in computation. We demonstrate the utility of the proposed methodology through it's ability to identify secret data leakage from selected case studies with known vulnerabilities.
- Open Access
- 18 September 2020
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems
- Vol. 16 (4) , 1-27
RNNFast
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) are an important class of neural networks designed to retain and incorporate context into current decisions. RNNs are particularly well suited for machine learning problems in which context is important, such as speech recognition and language translation. This work presents RNNFast, a hardware accelerator for RNNs that leverages an emerging class of non-volatile memory called domain-wall memory (DWM). We show that DWM is very well suited for RNN acceleration due to its very high density and low read/write energy. At the same time, the sequential nature of input/weight processing of RNNs mitigates one of the downsides of DWM, which is the linear (rather than constant) data access time. RNNFast is very efficient and highly scalable, with flexible mapping of logical neurons to RNN hardware blocks. The basic hardware primitive, the RNN processing element (PE), includes custom DWM-based multiplication, sigmoid and tanh units for high density and low energy. The accelerator is designed to minimize data movement by closely interleaving DWM storage and computation. We compare our design with a state-of-the-art GPGPU and find 21.8× higher performance with 70× lower energy.
- 18 September 2020
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems
- Vol. 16 (4) , 1-27
Open AccessRNNFast
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) are an important class of neural networks designed to retain and incorporate context into current decisions. RNNs are particularly well suited for machine learning problems in which context is important, such as speech recognition and language translation. This work presents RNNFast, a hardware accelerator for RNNs that leverages an emerging class of non-volatile memory called domain-wall memory (DWM). We show that DWM is very well suited for RNN acceleration due to its very high density and low read/write energy. At the same time, the sequential nature of input/weight processing of RNNs mitigates one of the downsides of DWM, which is the linear (rather than constant) data access time. RNNFast is very efficient and highly scalable, with flexible mapping of logical neurons to RNN hardware blocks. The basic hardware primitive, the RNN processing element (PE), includes custom DWM-based multiplication, sigmoid and tanh units for high density and low energy. The accelerator is designed to minimize data movement by closely interleaving DWM storage and computation. We compare our design with a state-of-the-art GPGPU and find 21.8× higher performance with 70× lower energy.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Internet Society
SPEECHMINER: A Framework for Investigating and Measuring Speculative Execution Vulnerabilities
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Internet Society
Open AccessSPEECHMINER: A Framework for Investigating and Measuring Speculative Execution Vulnerabilities
- Open Access
SPEECHMINER: A Framework for Investigating and Measuring Speculative Execution Vulnerabilities
SPEculative Execution side Channel Hardware (SPEECH) Vulnerabilities have enabled the notorious Meltdown, Spectre, and L1 terminal fault (L1TF) attacks. While a number of studies have reported different variants of SPEECH vulnerabilities, they are still not well understood. This is primarily due to the lack of information about microprocessor implementation details that impact the timing and order of various micro-architectural events. Moreover, to date, there is no systematic approach to quantitatively measure SPEECH vulnerabilities on commodity processors. This paper introduces SPEECHMINER, a software framework for exploring and measuring SPEECH vulnerabilities in an automated manner. SPEECHMINER empirically establishes the link between a novel two-phase fault handling model and the exploitability and speculation windows of SPEECH vulnerabilities. It enables testing of a comprehensive list of exception-triggering instructions under the same software framework, which leverages covert-channel techniques and differential tests to gain visibility into the micro-architectural state changes. We evaluated SPEECHMINER on 9 different processor types, examined 21 potential vulnerability variants, confirmed various known attacks, and identified several new variants.
Open AccessSPEECHMINER: A Framework for Investigating and Measuring Speculative Execution Vulnerabilities
SPEculative Execution side Channel Hardware (SPEECH) Vulnerabilities have enabled the notorious Meltdown, Spectre, and L1 terminal fault (L1TF) attacks. While a number of studies have reported different variants of SPEECH vulnerabilities, they are still not well understood. This is primarily due to the lack of information about microprocessor implementation details that impact the timing and order of various micro-architectural events. Moreover, to date, there is no systematic approach to quantitatively measure SPEECH vulnerabilities on commodity processors. This paper introduces SPEECHMINER, a software framework for exploring and measuring SPEECH vulnerabilities in an automated manner. SPEECHMINER empirically establishes the link between a novel two-phase fault handling model and the exploitability and speculation windows of SPEECH vulnerabilities. It enables testing of a comprehensive list of exception-triggering instructions under the same software framework, which leverages covert-channel techniques and differential tests to gain visibility into the micro-architectural state changes. We evaluated SPEECHMINER on 9 different processor types, examined 21 potential vulnerability variants, confirmed various known attacks, and identified several new variants.
- 14 May 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 18 (2) , 178-181
Isolating Speculative Data to Prevent Transient Execution Attacks
Hardware security has recently re-surfaced as a first-order concern to the confidentiality protections of computing systems. Meltdown and Spectre introduced a new class of exploits that leverage transient state as an attack surface and have revealed fundamental security vulnerabilities of speculative execution in high-performance processors. These attacks derive benefit from the fact that programs may speculatively execute instructions outside their legal control flows. This insight is then utilized for gaining access to restricted data and exfiltrating it by means of a covert channel. This study presents a microarchitectural mitigation technique for shielding transient state from covert channels during speculative execution. Unlike prior work that has focused on closing individual covert channels used to leak sensitive information, this approach prevents the use of speculative data by downstream instructions until doing so is determined to be safe. This prevents transient execution attacks at a cost of 18 percent average performance degradation.
- 14 May 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 18 (2) , 178-181
Isolating Speculative Data to Prevent Transient Execution Attacks
Hardware security has recently re-surfaced as a first-order concern to the confidentiality protections of computing systems. Meltdown and Spectre introduced a new class of exploits that leverage transient state as an attack surface and have revealed fundamental security vulnerabilities of speculative execution in high-performance processors. These attacks derive benefit from the fact that programs may speculatively execute instructions outside their legal control flows. This insight is then utilized for gaining access to restricted data and exfiltrating it by means of a covert channel. This study presents a microarchitectural mitigation technique for shielding transient state from covert channels during speculative execution. Unlike prior work that has focused on closing individual covert channels used to leak sensitive information, this approach prevents the use of speculative data by downstream instructions until doing so is determined to be safe. This prevents transient execution attacks at a cost of 18 percent average performance degradation.
- 10 July 2012
- Published by Wiley in Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience
- Vol. 25 (6) , 790-807
Runtime failure rate targeting for energy‐efficient reliability in chip microprocessors
SUMMARY: Technology scaling is having an increasingly detrimental effect on microprocessor reliability, with increased variability and higher susceptibility to errors. At the same time, as integration of chip multiprocessors increases, power consumption is becoming a significant bottleneck. To ensure continued performance, growth of microprocessors requires development of powerful and energy‐efficient solutions to reliability challenges. This paper presents a reliable multicore architecture that provides targeted error protection by adapting to the characteristics of individual cores and workloads, with the goal of providing reliability with minimum energy. The user can specify an acceptable reliability target for each chip, core, or application. The system then adjusts a range of parameters, including replication and supply voltage, to meet that reliability goal. In this multicore architecture, each core consists of a pair of pipelines that can run independently (running separate threads) or in concert (running the same thread and verifying results). Redundancy is enabled selectively, at functional unit granularity. The architecture also employs timing speculation for mitigation of variation‐induced timing errors and to reduce the power overhead of error protection. On‐line control based on machine learning dynamically adjusts multiple parameters to minimize energy consumption. Evaluation shows that dynamic adaptation of voltage and redundancy can reduce the energy delay product of a chip multiprocessor by 30 − 60% compared with static dual modular redundancy. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 10 July 2012
- Published by Wiley in Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience
- Vol. 25 (6) , 790-807
Runtime failure rate targeting for energy‐efficient reliability in chip microprocessors
SUMMARY: Technology scaling is having an increasingly detrimental effect on microprocessor reliability, with increased variability and higher susceptibility to errors. At the same time, as integration of chip multiprocessors increases, power consumption is becoming a significant bottleneck. To ensure continued performance, growth of microprocessors requires development of powerful and energy‐efficient solutions to reliability challenges. This paper presents a reliable multicore architecture that provides targeted error protection by adapting to the characteristics of individual cores and workloads, with the goal of providing reliability with minimum energy. The user can specify an acceptable reliability target for each chip, core, or application. The system then adjusts a range of parameters, including replication and supply voltage, to meet that reliability goal. In this multicore architecture, each core consists of a pair of pipelines that can run independently (running separate threads) or in concert (running the same thread and verifying results). Redundancy is enabled selectively, at functional unit granularity. The architecture also employs timing speculation for mitigation of variation‐induced timing errors and to reduce the power overhead of error protection. On‐line control based on machine learning dynamically adjusts multiple parameters to minimize energy consumption. Evaluation shows that dynamic adaptation of voltage and redundancy can reduce the energy delay product of a chip multiprocessor by 30 − 60% compared with static dual modular redundancy. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.