Paulina Szwed
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Paulina Szwed has a total of 823 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Małgorzata Kossowska
Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of Psychology Jagiellonian University Kraków Poland
23 shared publications Gabriela Czarnek
11 shared publications- Gabriela Czarnek
Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland
8 shared publications - Aaron Lee Wichman
Western Kentucky University, Bowling Green, USA
6 shared publications - Abdelilah Charyate
Higher College of Education and Training, Ibn Tofail University, Kenitra, Morocco
6 shared publications - Adrian Dahl Askelund
Norwegian Institute of Public Health
6 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 14 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
The Ideological Boundary of Belief Change
This article investigates the relationship between political ideology and the extent to which individuals revise their beliefs when confronted with counter‐attitudinal information. Across two preregistered experiments conducted with demographically quota‐matched Polish samples (total N = 1096), we assessed belief change on political and non‐political issues among participants spanning the full ideological spectrum. Exposure to counterevidence significantly increased belief revision, especially for non‐political topics. Although right‐leaning individuals showed slightly greater belief change than left‐leaning participants, model comparisons favoured an inverted U‐shaped over a linear association: people with moderate ideological views updated more, whereas those at either ideological extreme updated less. These findings suggest that reduced belief updating is associated more consistently with ideological extremity than with ideological direction, informing ongoing debates on ideological asymmetry.
- 14 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
The Ideological Boundary of Belief Change
This article investigates the relationship between political ideology and the extent to which individuals revise their beliefs when confronted with counter‐attitudinal information. Across two preregistered experiments conducted with demographically quota‐matched Polish samples (total N = 1096), we assessed belief change on political and non‐political issues among participants spanning the full ideological spectrum. Exposure to counterevidence significantly increased belief revision, especially for non‐political topics. Although right‐leaning individuals showed slightly greater belief change than left‐leaning participants, model comparisons favoured an inverted U‐shaped over a linear association: people with moderate ideological views updated more, whereas those at either ideological extreme updated less. These findings suggest that reduced belief updating is associated more consistently with ideological extremity than with ideological direction, informing ongoing debates on ideological asymmetry.
- 10 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Motivation and Emotion
- Vol. 50 (3) , 455-466
Personal importance as a boundary condition in effortful dissonance reduction
- 10 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Motivation and Emotion
- Vol. 50 (3) , 455-466
Personal importance as a boundary condition in effortful dissonance reduction
- Open Access
- 2 October 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 17 (19) , 8836
Wasting Despite Motivation: Exploring the Interplay of Perceived Ability and Perceived Difficulty on Food Waste Behavior Through Brehm’s Motivational Intensity Theory
Household food waste remains a persistent challenge despite widespread pro-environmental intentions. Drawing on Brehm’s Motivational Intensity Theory, this study examined how perceived difficulty and perceived ability interact with motivation to predict self-reported food waste. We surveyed 939 participants in Flanders and Spain, measuring motivation to avoid waste, self-rated perceived ability to manage food, meal planning perceived difficulty, and food waste. Moderated moderation analyses revealed that motivation and perceived ability each independently predicted lower waste. Crucially, a significant three-way interaction showed that motivation most effectively reduced waste when perceived difficulty was low and perceived ability was high; when perceived difficulty exceeded perceived ability, motivation had no mitigating effect. These findings underscore that effort mobilization influenced by both individual capacity and situational demands is key to closing the intention–behavior gap in food waste. Practically, interventions should go beyond raising awareness to simplify tasks and bolster consumers’ skills, aligning action demands with realistic effort levels.
- 2 October 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 17 (19) , 8836
Open AccessWasting Despite Motivation: Exploring the Interplay of Perceived Ability and Perceived Difficulty on Food Waste Behavior Through Brehm’s Motivational Intensity Theory
Household food waste remains a persistent challenge despite widespread pro-environmental intentions. Drawing on Brehm’s Motivational Intensity Theory, this study examined how perceived difficulty and perceived ability interact with motivation to predict self-reported food waste. We surveyed 939 participants in Flanders and Spain, measuring motivation to avoid waste, self-rated perceived ability to manage food, meal planning perceived difficulty, and food waste. Moderated moderation analyses revealed that motivation and perceived ability each independently predicted lower waste. Crucially, a significant three-way interaction showed that motivation most effectively reduced waste when perceived difficulty was low and perceived ability was high; when perceived difficulty exceeded perceived ability, motivation had no mitigating effect. These findings underscore that effort mobilization influenced by both individual capacity and situational demands is key to closing the intention–behavior gap in food waste. Practically, interventions should go beyond raising awareness to simplify tasks and bolster consumers’ skills, aligning action demands with realistic effort levels.
- Open Access
- 26 June 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Rethinking Effort in Dissonance Reduction: Integrating Motivational Intensity Theory with Cognitive Dissonance Theory
One of Festinger’s core assumptions in cognitive dissonance theory was that dissonance reduction is an effortful process whose intensity varies with the magnitude of dissonance. That is, the greater the dissonance, the stronger the motivation to reduce it, and consequently, the greater the invested effort (Festinger, 1957). For many years, this assertion was accepted without direct empirical testing. Moreover, Motivational Intensity Theory (MIT; Brehm & Self, 1989) provides well-established empirical evidence about the factors that determine motivated effort investment and explains why it is inaccurate to perceive dissonance reduction as always, an effortful process. Motivated effort is influenced by various factors, not just motivation, such as the difficulty of the task and the individual’s level of ability (which was incorporated into the original theory by Rex Wright, 1996). I argue that these principles should be applied to other mental activities, like cognitive dissonance reduction. The primary objective of this article is to propose a fusion of Cognitive Dissonance Theory, proposed by Leon Festinger, with Motivational Intensity Theory, proposed by Jack Brehm. I believe this integration significantly contributes to psychological knowledge.
- 26 June 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessRethinking Effort in Dissonance Reduction: Integrating Motivational Intensity Theory with Cognitive Dissonance Theory
One of Festinger’s core assumptions in cognitive dissonance theory was that dissonance reduction is an effortful process whose intensity varies with the magnitude of dissonance. That is, the greater the dissonance, the stronger the motivation to reduce it, and consequently, the greater the invested effort (Festinger, 1957). For many years, this assertion was accepted without direct empirical testing. Moreover, Motivational Intensity Theory (MIT; Brehm & Self, 1989) provides well-established empirical evidence about the factors that determine motivated effort investment and explains why it is inaccurate to perceive dissonance reduction as always, an effortful process. Motivated effort is influenced by various factors, not just motivation, such as the difficulty of the task and the individual’s level of ability (which was incorporated into the original theory by Rex Wright, 1996). I argue that these principles should be applied to other mental activities, like cognitive dissonance reduction. The primary objective of this article is to propose a fusion of Cognitive Dissonance Theory, proposed by Leon Festinger, with Motivational Intensity Theory, proposed by Jack Brehm. I believe this integration significantly contributes to psychological knowledge.
- Open Access
- 30 March 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Beyond Magnitude: The Role of Personal Importance in Cognitive Dissonance Reduction
In everyday life, we encounter information that contradicts our beliefs, often disrupting our self-concept and triggering cognitive dissonance. Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CDT) suggests that discrepancies between cognitions create discomfort, motivating individuals to restore psychological consistency. It indicates that the magnitude of dissonance depends on the importance of conflicting beliefs, yet the role of importance has not been fully explored. Our hypothesis posits that the importance of a cognition moderates’ motivation to reduce dissonance. Two studies (N = 640) were conducted to test how people respond to discrepancy about their abilities. Study 1 showed that dissonance led to greater motivation toward reduction, but only for those who found those abilities as important. Study 2 (with a measure of the dissonance state) confirmed that dissonance magnitude and importance interact, influencing motivation to reduce dissonance. This research expands CDT by highlighting the role of importance in dissonance reduction.
- 30 March 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessBeyond Magnitude: The Role of Personal Importance in Cognitive Dissonance Reduction
In everyday life, we encounter information that contradicts our beliefs, often disrupting our self-concept and triggering cognitive dissonance. Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CDT) suggests that discrepancies between cognitions create discomfort, motivating individuals to restore psychological consistency. It indicates that the magnitude of dissonance depends on the importance of conflicting beliefs, yet the role of importance has not been fully explored. Our hypothesis posits that the importance of a cognition moderates’ motivation to reduce dissonance. Two studies (N = 640) were conducted to test how people respond to discrepancy about their abilities. Study 1 showed that dissonance led to greater motivation toward reduction, but only for those who found those abilities as important. Study 2 (with a measure of the dissonance state) confirmed that dissonance magnitude and importance interact, influencing motivation to reduce dissonance. This research expands CDT by highlighting the role of importance in dissonance reduction.
- Open Access
- 31 October 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Students’ self-views, feedback source and feedback preference
The article reports the results of study where four groups of students: architecture & design student and linguistic students with either positive or negative self-views of their spatial abilities received feedback on these abilities from another student or a professor, depending on the condition.
- 31 October 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessStudents’ self-views, feedback source and feedback preference
The article reports the results of study where four groups of students: architecture & design student and linguistic students with either positive or negative self-views of their spatial abilities received feedback on these abilities from another student or a professor, depending on the condition.
- 10 November 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Learning and Instruction
- Vol. 83
The interplay of positivity and self-verification strivings: Feedback preference under increased desire for self-enhancement
- 10 November 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Learning and Instruction
- Vol. 83
The interplay of positivity and self-verification strivings: Feedback preference under increased desire for self-enhancement
- 24 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Human Behaviour
- Vol. 6 (9) , 1318-1319
Author Correction: A multi-country test of brief reappraisal interventions on emotions during the COVID-19 pandemic
- 24 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Human Behaviour
- Vol. 6 (9) , 1318-1319
Author Correction: A multi-country test of brief reappraisal interventions on emotions during the COVID-19 pandemic
- Open Access
- 27 May 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
PSACR: The Psychological Science Accelerator's COVID-19 Rapid-Response Dataset
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Psychological Science Accelerator coordinated three large-scale psychological studies to examine the effects of loss-gain framing, cognitive reappraisals, and autonomy framing manipulations on behavioral intentions and affective measures. The data collected (April to October 2020) included specific measures for each experimental study, a general questionnaire examining health prevention behaviors and COVID-19 experience, geographical and cultural context characterization, and demographic information for each participant. Each participant started the study with the same general questions and then was randomized to complete either one longer experiment or two shorter experiments. Data were provided by 73,223 participants with varying completion rates. Participants completed the survey from 111 geopolitical regions in 44 unique languages/dialects. The anonymized dataset described here is provided in both raw and processed formats to facilitate re-use and further analyses. The dataset offers secondary analytic opportunities to explore coping, framing, and self-determination across a diverse, global sample obtained at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, which can be merged with other time-sampled or geographic data.
- 27 May 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessPSACR: The Psychological Science Accelerator's COVID-19 Rapid-Response Dataset
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Psychological Science Accelerator coordinated three large-scale psychological studies to examine the effects of loss-gain framing, cognitive reappraisals, and autonomy framing manipulations on behavioral intentions and affective measures. The data collected (April to October 2020) included specific measures for each experimental study, a general questionnaire examining health prevention behaviors and COVID-19 experience, geographical and cultural context characterization, and demographic information for each participant. Each participant started the study with the same general questions and then was randomized to complete either one longer experiment or two shorter experiments. Data were provided by 73,223 participants with varying completion rates. Participants completed the survey from 111 geopolitical regions in 44 unique languages/dialects. The anonymized dataset described here is provided in both raw and processed formats to facilitate re-use and further analyses. The dataset offers secondary analytic opportunities to explore coping, framing, and self-determination across a diverse, global sample obtained at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, which can be merged with other time-sampled or geographic data.
- Open Access
- 4 November 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Says Who? Credibility Effects in Self-Verification Strivings
Research shows that people prefer self-consistent over self-discrepant feedback—the self-verification effect (Swann, 1983, 2012). It is not clear, however, whether the effect stems from striving for self-verification or from the preference for subjectively accurate information. We argue that people self-verify because they find self-verifying feedback more accurate than self-discrepant feedback. We thus experimentally manipulated feedback credibility by providing information on its source: a student in the control condition and an experienced psychologist in the experimental condition. In line with our expectations, the results of two preregistered studies with 342 preselected participants showed that people self-verified only in the control condition. In the experimental condition, the effect disappeared (or reversed in Study 1). Study 2 showed that individual differences in credibility (epistemic authority) ascribed to self and psychologists matter as well. These findings suggest that feedback credibility, rather than the desire for self-verification, often drives the self-verification effect.
- 4 November 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessSays Who? Credibility Effects in Self-Verification Strivings
Research shows that people prefer self-consistent over self-discrepant feedback—the self-verification effect (Swann, 1983, 2012). It is not clear, however, whether the effect stems from striving for self-verification or from the preference for subjectively accurate information. We argue that people self-verify because they find self-verifying feedback more accurate than self-discrepant feedback. We thus experimentally manipulated feedback credibility by providing information on its source: a student in the control condition and an experienced psychologist in the experimental condition. In line with our expectations, the results of two preregistered studies with 342 preselected participants showed that people self-verified only in the control condition. In the experimental condition, the effect disappeared (or reversed in Study 1). Study 2 showed that individual differences in credibility (epistemic authority) ascribed to self and psychologists matter as well. These findings suggest that feedback credibility, rather than the desire for self-verification, often drives the self-verification effect.