Kazuma Ohara
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Kazuma Ohara has a total of 33 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jun Furukawa
NEC Israel Research Center, Tel Aviv, Israel
5 shared publicationsToshinori Araki
NEC, Tokyo, Japan
5 shared publications- Yehuda Lindell
Coinbase
4 shared publications Ariel Nof
3 shared publicationsAssi Barak
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
3 shared publications- Goichiro Hanaoka
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, Tokyo, Japan
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 19 May 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (4) , 9614-9631
SilentNoise: Non-Interactive Noise Generation for Differential Privacy With Malicious Security
Differential privacy (DP) is a standard notion of privacy-preserving data analysis. Traditionally, DP has been studied in the central model, where a trusted curator collects all private inputs and releases aggregation results preserving DP. However, this model creates a single point of failure, as all private data are held by a single party. We aim to decentralize additive noise DP mechanisms by leveraging secure multiparty computation (MPC) techniques. The main technical challenge is how to obliviously sample secret noise from specific probability distributions in the presence of malicious parties. Most existing maliciously secure protocols require multiple rounds of interaction, resulting in high communication and computation overheads. Moreover, the only known maliciously secure, non-interactive protocol suffers from a utility loss that grows exponentially with the number of computing parties. In this work, we propose SilentNoise, a general framework for maliciously secure, non-interactive protocols for sampling DP noise, and present several instantiations that improve utility and efficiency both theoretically and empirically. In our protocols, any incorrect noise contributed by malicious parties is rejected and meaningful utility is guaranteed whenever the protocols succeed. After a one-time interactive setup that can be amortized over multiple uses, parties can non-interactively generate an unbounded number of shares of noise. This leads to a significant improvement in efficiency compared to the previous interactive protocols. Furthermore, our protocols improve the utility loss of the prior maliciously secure, non-interactive protocol by an exponential factor in the number of computing parties. They can even achieve a constant utility loss that is comparable to central-model DP mechanisms, under a strong honest-majority setting.
- 19 May 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (4) , 9614-9631
SilentNoise: Non-Interactive Noise Generation for Differential Privacy With Malicious Security
Differential privacy (DP) is a standard notion of privacy-preserving data analysis. Traditionally, DP has been studied in the central model, where a trusted curator collects all private inputs and releases aggregation results preserving DP. However, this model creates a single point of failure, as all private data are held by a single party. We aim to decentralize additive noise DP mechanisms by leveraging secure multiparty computation (MPC) techniques. The main technical challenge is how to obliviously sample secret noise from specific probability distributions in the presence of malicious parties. Most existing maliciously secure protocols require multiple rounds of interaction, resulting in high communication and computation overheads. Moreover, the only known maliciously secure, non-interactive protocol suffers from a utility loss that grows exponentially with the number of computing parties. In this work, we propose SilentNoise, a general framework for maliciously secure, non-interactive protocols for sampling DP noise, and present several instantiations that improve utility and efficiency both theoretically and empirically. In our protocols, any incorrect noise contributed by malicious parties is rejected and meaningful utility is guaranteed whenever the protocols succeed. After a one-time interactive setup that can be amortized over multiple uses, parties can non-interactively generate an unbounded number of shares of noise. This leads to a significant improvement in efficiency compared to the previous interactive protocols. Furthermore, our protocols improve the utility loss of the prior maliciously secure, non-interactive protocol by an exponential factor in the number of computing parties. They can even achieve a constant utility loss that is comparable to central-model DP mechanisms, under a strong honest-majority setting.
- 1 September 2019
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E102.A (9) , 1101-1117
Shortening the Libert-Peters-Yung Revocable Group Signature Scheme by Using the Random Oracle Methodology
Japan's largest platform for academic e-journals: J-STAGE is a full text database for reviewed academic papers published by Japanese societies
- 1 September 2019
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E102.A (9) , 1101-1117
Shortening the Libert-Peters-Yung Revocable Group Signature Scheme by Using the Random Oracle Methodology
Japan's largest platform for academic e-journals: J-STAGE is a full text database for reviewed academic papers published by Japanese societies
- 1 September 2019
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E102.A (9) , 1079-1090
Multi-Party Computation for Modular Exponentiation Based on Replicated Secret Sharing
In recent years, multi-party computation (MPC) frameworks based on replicated secret sharing schemes (RSSS) have attracted the attention as a method to achieve high efficiency among known MPCs. However, the RSSS-based MPCs are still inefficient for several heavy computations like algebraic operations, as they require a large amount and number of communication proportional to the number of multiplications in the operations (which is not the case with other secret sharing-based MPCs). In this paper, we propose RSSS-based three-party computation protocols for modular exponentiation, which is one of the most popular algebraic operations, on the case where the base is public and the exponent is private. Our proposed schemes are simple and efficient in both of the asymptotic and practical sense. On the asymptotic efficiency, the proposed schemes require O(n)-bit communication and O(1) rounds,where n is the secret-value size, in the best setting, whereas the previous scheme requires O(n2)-bit communication and O(n) rounds. On the practical efficiency, we show the performance of our protocol by experiments on the scenario for distributed signatures, which is useful for secure key management on the distributed environment (e.g., distributed ledgers). As one of the cases, our implementation performs a modular exponentiation on a 3,072-bit discrete-log group and 256-bit exponent with roughly 300ms, which is an acceptable parameter for 128-bit security, even in the WAN setting.
- 1 September 2019
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E102.A (9) , 1079-1090
Multi-Party Computation for Modular Exponentiation Based on Replicated Secret Sharing
In recent years, multi-party computation (MPC) frameworks based on replicated secret sharing schemes (RSSS) have attracted the attention as a method to achieve high efficiency among known MPCs. However, the RSSS-based MPCs are still inefficient for several heavy computations like algebraic operations, as they require a large amount and number of communication proportional to the number of multiplications in the operations (which is not the case with other secret sharing-based MPCs). In this paper, we propose RSSS-based three-party computation protocols for modular exponentiation, which is one of the most popular algebraic operations, on the case where the base is public and the exponent is private. Our proposed schemes are simple and efficient in both of the asymptotic and practical sense. On the asymptotic efficiency, the proposed schemes require O(n)-bit communication and O(1) rounds,where n is the secret-value size, in the best setting, whereas the previous scheme requires O(n2)-bit communication and O(n) rounds. On the practical efficiency, we show the performance of our protocol by experiments on the scenario for distributed signatures, which is useful for secure key management on the distributed environment (e.g., distributed ledgers). As one of the cases, our implementation performs a modular exponentiation on a 3,072-bit discrete-log group and 256-bit exponent with roughly 300ms, which is an acceptable parameter for 128-bit security, even in the WAN setting.
- Open Access
- 26 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Security and Communication Networks
- Vol. 2019, 1-36
Group Signatures with Message-Dependent Opening: Formal Definitions and Constructions
This paper introduces a new capability for group signatures called message-dependent opening. It is intended to weaken the high trust placed on the opener; i.e., no anonymity against the opener is provided by an ordinary group signature scheme. In a group signature scheme with message-dependent opening (GS-MDO), in addition to the opener, we set up an admitter that is not able to extract any user’s identity but admits the opener to open signatures by specifying messages where signatures on the specified messages will be opened by the opener. The opener cannot extract the signer’s identity from any signature whose corresponding message is not specified by the admitter. This paper presents formal definitions of GS-MDO and proposes a generic construction of it from identity-based encryption and adaptive non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Moreover, we propose two specific constructions, one in the standard model and one in the random oracle model. Our scheme in the standard model is an instantiation of our generic construction but the message-dependent opening property is bounded. In contrast, our scheme in the random oracle model is not a direct instantiation of our generic construction but is optimized to increase efficiency and achieves the unbounded message-dependent opening property. Furthermore, we also demonstrate that GS-MDO implies identity-based encryption, thus implying that identity-based encryption is essential for designing GS-MDO schemes.
- 26 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Security and Communication Networks
- Vol. 2019, 1-36
Open AccessGroup Signatures with Message-Dependent Opening: Formal Definitions and Constructions
This paper introduces a new capability for group signatures called message-dependent opening. It is intended to weaken the high trust placed on the opener; i.e., no anonymity against the opener is provided by an ordinary group signature scheme. In a group signature scheme with message-dependent opening (GS-MDO), in addition to the opener, we set up an admitter that is not able to extract any user’s identity but admits the opener to open signatures by specifying messages where signatures on the specified messages will be opened by the opener. The opener cannot extract the signer’s identity from any signature whose corresponding message is not specified by the admitter. This paper presents formal definitions of GS-MDO and proposes a generic construction of it from identity-based encryption and adaptive non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Moreover, we propose two specific constructions, one in the standard model and one in the random oracle model. Our scheme in the standard model is an instantiation of our generic construction but the message-dependent opening property is bounded. In contrast, our scheme in the random oracle model is not a direct instantiation of our generic construction but is optimized to increase efficiency and achieves the unbounded message-dependent opening property. Furthermore, we also demonstrate that GS-MDO implies identity-based encryption, thus implying that identity-based encryption is essential for designing GS-MDO schemes.
- Open Access
- 15 October 2018
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2198-2200
How to Choose Suitable Secure Multiparty Computation Using Generalized SPDZ
- 15 October 2018
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2198-2200
Open AccessHow to Choose Suitable Secure Multiparty Computation Using Generalized SPDZ
- Open Access
- 15 October 2018
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 880-895
Generalizing the SPDZ Compiler For Other Protocols
Protocols for secure multiparty computation (MPC) enable a set of mutually distrusting parties to compute an arbitrary function of their inputs while preserving basic security properties like privacy and correctness. The study of MPC was initiated in the 1980s where it was shown that any function can be securely computed, thus demonstrating the power of this notion. However, these proofs of feasibility were theoretical in nature and it is only recently that MPC protocols started to become efficient enough for use in practice. Today, we have protocols that can carry out large and complex computations in very reasonable time (and can even be very fast, depending on the computation and the setting). Despite this amazing progress, there is still a major obstacle to the adoption and use of MPC due to the huge expertise needed to design a specific MPC execution. In particular, the function to be computed needs to be represented as an appropriate Boolean or arithmetic circuit, and this requires very specific expertise. In order to overcome this, there has been considerable work on compilation of code to (typically) Boolean circuits. One work in this direction takes a different approach, and this is the SPDZ compiler (not to be confused with the SPDZ protocol) that takes high-level Python code and provides an MPC run-time environment for securely executing that code. The SPDZ compiler can deal with arithmetic and non-arithmetic operations and is extremely powerful. However, until now, the SPDZ compiler could only be used for the specific SPDZ family of protocols, making its general applicability and usefulness very limited. In this paper, we extend the SPDZ compiler so that it can work with general underlying protocols. Our SPDZ extensions were made in mind to enable the use of SPDZ for arbitrary protocols and to make it easy for others to integrate existing and new protocols. We integrated three different types of protocols, an honest-majority protocol for computing arithmetic circuits over a field (for any number of parties), a three-party honest majority protocol for computing arithmetic circuits over the ring of integers Z2n, and the multiparty BMR protocol for computing Boolean circuits. We show that a single high-level SPDZ-Python program can be executed using all of these underlying protocols (as well as the original SPDZ protocol), thereby making SPDZ a true general run-time MPC environment.In order to be able to handle both arithmetic and non-arithmetic operations, the SPDZ compiler relies on conversions from field elements to bits and back. However, these conversions do not apply to ring elements (in particular, they require element division), and we therefore introduce new bit decomposition and recomposition protocols for the ring over integers with replicated secret sharing. These conversions are of independent interest and utilize the structure of Z2n (which is much more amenable to bit decomposition than prime-order fields), and are thus much more efficient than all previous methods. We demonstrate our compiler extensions by running a complex SQL query and a decision tree evaluation over all protocols.
- 15 October 2018
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 880-895
Open AccessGeneralizing the SPDZ Compiler For Other Protocols
Protocols for secure multiparty computation (MPC) enable a set of mutually distrusting parties to compute an arbitrary function of their inputs while preserving basic security properties like privacy and correctness. The study of MPC was initiated in the 1980s where it was shown that any function can be securely computed, thus demonstrating the power of this notion. However, these proofs of feasibility were theoretical in nature and it is only recently that MPC protocols started to become efficient enough for use in practice. Today, we have protocols that can carry out large and complex computations in very reasonable time (and can even be very fast, depending on the computation and the setting). Despite this amazing progress, there is still a major obstacle to the adoption and use of MPC due to the huge expertise needed to design a specific MPC execution. In particular, the function to be computed needs to be represented as an appropriate Boolean or arithmetic circuit, and this requires very specific expertise. In order to overcome this, there has been considerable work on compilation of code to (typically) Boolean circuits. One work in this direction takes a different approach, and this is the SPDZ compiler (not to be confused with the SPDZ protocol) that takes high-level Python code and provides an MPC run-time environment for securely executing that code. The SPDZ compiler can deal with arithmetic and non-arithmetic operations and is extremely powerful. However, until now, the SPDZ compiler could only be used for the specific SPDZ family of protocols, making its general applicability and usefulness very limited. In this paper, we extend the SPDZ compiler so that it can work with general underlying protocols. Our SPDZ extensions were made in mind to enable the use of SPDZ for arbitrary protocols and to make it easy for others to integrate existing and new protocols. We integrated three different types of protocols, an honest-majority protocol for computing arithmetic circuits over a field (for any number of parties), a three-party honest majority protocol for computing arithmetic circuits over the ring of integers Z2n, and the multiparty BMR protocol for computing Boolean circuits. We show that a single high-level SPDZ-Python program can be executed using all of these underlying protocols (as well as the original SPDZ protocol), thereby making SPDZ a true general run-time MPC environment.In order to be able to handle both arithmetic and non-arithmetic operations, the SPDZ compiler relies on conversions from field elements to bits and back. However, these conversions do not apply to ring elements (in particular, they require element division), and we therefore introduce new bit decomposition and recomposition protocols for the ring over integers with replicated secret sharing. These conversions are of independent interest and utilize the structure of Z2n (which is much more amenable to bit decomposition than prime-order fields), and are thus much more efficient than all previous methods. We demonstrate our compiler extensions by running a complex SQL query and a decision tree evaluation over all protocols.
- 1 May 2017
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 843-862
Optimized Honest-Majority MPC for Malicious Adversaries — Breaking the 1 Billion-Gate Per Second Barrier
Secure multiparty computation enables a set of parties to securely carry out a joint computation of their private inputs without revealing anything but the output. In the past few years, the efficiency of secure computation protocols has increased in leaps and bounds. However, when considering the case of security in the presence of malicious adversaries (who may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol specification), we are still very far from achieving high efficiency. In this paper, we consider the specific case of three parties and an honest majority. We provide general techniques for improving efficiency of cut-and-choose protocols on multiplication triples and utilize them to significantly improve the recently published protocol of Furukawa et al. (ePrint 2016/944). We reduce the bandwidth of their protocol down from 10 bits per AND gate to 7 bits per AND gate, and show how to improve some computationally expensive parts of their protocol. Most notably, we design cache-efficient shuffling techniques for implementing cut-and-choose without randomly permuting large arrays (which is very slow due to continual cache misses). We provide a combinatorial analysis of our techniques, bounding the cheating probability of the adversary. Our implementation achieves a rate of approximately 1.15 billion AND gates per second on a cluster of three 20-core machines with a 10Gbps network. Thus, we can securely compute 212,000 AES encryptions per second (which is hundreds of times faster than previous work for this setting). Our results demonstrate that high-throughput secure computation for malicious adversaries is possible.
- 1 May 2017
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 843-862
Optimized Honest-Majority MPC for Malicious Adversaries — Breaking the 1 Billion-Gate Per Second Barrier
Secure multiparty computation enables a set of parties to securely carry out a joint computation of their private inputs without revealing anything but the output. In the past few years, the efficiency of secure computation protocols has increased in leaps and bounds. However, when considering the case of security in the presence of malicious adversaries (who may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol specification), we are still very far from achieving high efficiency. In this paper, we consider the specific case of three parties and an honest majority. We provide general techniques for improving efficiency of cut-and-choose protocols on multiplication triples and utilize them to significantly improve the recently published protocol of Furukawa et al. (ePrint 2016/944). We reduce the bandwidth of their protocol down from 10 bits per AND gate to 7 bits per AND gate, and show how to improve some computationally expensive parts of their protocol. Most notably, we design cache-efficient shuffling techniques for implementing cut-and-choose without randomly permuting large arrays (which is very slow due to continual cache misses). We provide a combinatorial analysis of our techniques, bounding the cheating probability of the adversary. Our implementation achieves a rate of approximately 1.15 billion AND gates per second on a cluster of three 20-core machines with a 10Gbps network. Thus, we can securely compute 212,000 AES encryptions per second (which is hundreds of times faster than previous work for this setting). Our results demonstrate that high-throughput secure computation for malicious adversaries is possible.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 24 October 2016
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- Vol. 2016, 805-817
High-Throughput Semi-Honest Secure Three-Party Computation with an Honest Majority
In this paper, we describe a new information-theoretic protocol (and a computationally-secure variant) for secure three-party computation with an honest majority. The protocol has very minimal computation and communication; for Boolean circuits, each party sends only a single bit for every AND gate (and nothing is sent for XOR gates). Our protocol is (simulation-based) secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries, and achieves privacy in the client/server model in the presence of malicious adversaries. On a cluster of three 20-core servers with a 10Gbps connection, the implementation of our protocol carries out over 1.3 million AES computations per second, which involves processing over 7 billion gates per second. In addition, we developed a Kerberos extension that replaces the ticket-granting-ticket encryption on the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in MIT-Kerberos with our protocol, using keys/ passwords that are shared between the servers. This enables the use of Kerberos while protecting passwords. Our implementation is able to support a login storm of over 35,000 logins per second, which suffices even for very large organizations. Our work demonstrates that high-throughput secure computation is possible on standard hardware.
- 24 October 2016
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- Vol. 2016, 805-817
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessHigh-Throughput Semi-Honest Secure Three-Party Computation with an Honest Majority
In this paper, we describe a new information-theoretic protocol (and a computationally-secure variant) for secure three-party computation with an honest majority. The protocol has very minimal computation and communication; for Boolean circuits, each party sends only a single bit for every AND gate (and nothing is sent for XOR gates). Our protocol is (simulation-based) secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries, and achieves privacy in the client/server model in the presence of malicious adversaries. On a cluster of three 20-core servers with a 10Gbps connection, the implementation of our protocol carries out over 1.3 million AES computations per second, which involves processing over 7 billion gates per second. In addition, we developed a Kerberos extension that replaces the ticket-granting-ticket encryption on the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in MIT-Kerberos with our protocol, using keys/ passwords that are shared between the servers. This enables the use of Kerberos while protecting passwords. Our implementation is able to support a login storm of over 35,000 logins per second, which suffices even for very large organizations. Our work demonstrates that high-throughput secure computation is possible on standard hardware.
- Open Access
- 24 October 2016
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1841-1843
DEMO
Secure multi-party computation (SMPC) is a cryptographic tool that enables a set of parties to jointly compute any function of their inputs while keeping the privacy of inputs. The paper \"High Throughput Semi-Honest Secure Three-Party Computation with an Honest Majority\" in this ACM CCS 2016 [4] presents a new protocol which its implementation carried out over 1,300,000 AESs per second and was able to support 35,000 login queries of Kerberos authentication per second. This poster/demo presents the design of the implementation and demonstrates the Kerberos authentication over here. The design will show how this high-throughput three-party computation can be done using simple servers. The demonstration proves that secure multiparty computation of Kerberos authentications in large organizations is now practical.
- 24 October 2016
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1841-1843
Open AccessDEMO
Secure multi-party computation (SMPC) is a cryptographic tool that enables a set of parties to jointly compute any function of their inputs while keeping the privacy of inputs. The paper \"High Throughput Semi-Honest Secure Three-Party Computation with an Honest Majority\" in this ACM CCS 2016 [4] presents a new protocol which its implementation carried out over 1,300,000 AESs per second and was able to support 35,000 login queries of Kerberos authentication per second. This poster/demo presents the design of the implementation and demonstrates the Kerberos authentication over here. The design will show how this high-throughput three-party computation can be done using simple servers. The demonstration proves that secure multiparty computation of Kerberos authentications in large organizations is now practical.
- Open Access
- 3 June 2014
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 23-32
Privacy-preserving smart metering with verifiability for both billing and energy management
- 3 June 2014
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 23-32
Open AccessPrivacy-preserving smart metering with verifiability for both billing and energy management