Prasanna Gai
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Prasanna Gai has a total of 43 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Sujit Kapadia
9 shared publicationsKartik Anand
Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt, Germany
6 shared publications- Kartik Anand
Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
4 shared publications Matthew Willison
3 shared publicationsNicholas Vause
Bank for International Settlements Staff
3 shared publicationsSimon Brennan
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 18 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Coordination and Fragility in Production Networks
We study coordination and fragility in production networks using a role-based framework in which firms perform complementary production roles across functional segments. Large-scale coordination arises only once participation exceeds a sharp threshold. With endogenous participation, coordination comes to rely disproportionately on a small set of influential firms. This same concentration generates fragility: targeted disruptions to key firms can trigger abrupt collapses of coordination even when aggregate shocks are small. We show that resilience depends not only on average participation or connectivity, but on how influence and participation incentives are distributed across the production network.
- 18 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCoordination and Fragility in Production Networks
We study coordination and fragility in production networks using a role-based framework in which firms perform complementary production roles across functional segments. Large-scale coordination arises only once participation exceeds a sharp threshold. With endogenous participation, coordination comes to rely disproportionately on a small set of influential firms. This same concentration generates fragility: targeted disruptions to key firms can trigger abrupt collapses of coordination even when aggregate shocks are small. We show that resilience depends not only on average participation or connectivity, but on how influence and participation incentives are distributed across the production network.
- Open Access
- 19 March 2024
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 100 (329) , 137-159
Alternative Monetary Policy Commitments and the Yield Curve*
We present a simple model to characterise central bank forward guidance, large‐scale asset purchases and yield curve control. Endogenous yield curve reactions to policy shocks are a key determinant of monetary conditions and can support or offset policy intentions. Alternative monetary policy tools allow the central bank to signal central bank private information to investors when the policy rate is at the effective lower bound, shaping yield curve reactions. Commitments to these tools offer policy certainty but can become time‐inconsistent if the economy recovers sooner than expected. If commitments become time‐inconsistent, endogenous yield curve tightening can offset excess stimulus. The strength of this offset, and the optimality of monetary conditions, improves with the precision of investor inferences of central bank private information.
- 19 March 2024
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 100 (329) , 137-159
Open AccessAlternative Monetary Policy Commitments and the Yield Curve*
We present a simple model to characterise central bank forward guidance, large‐scale asset purchases and yield curve control. Endogenous yield curve reactions to policy shocks are a key determinant of monetary conditions and can support or offset policy intentions. Alternative monetary policy tools allow the central bank to signal central bank private information to investors when the policy rate is at the effective lower bound, shaping yield curve reactions. Commitments to these tools offer policy certainty but can become time‐inconsistent if the economy recovers sooner than expected. If commitments become time‐inconsistent, endogenous yield curve tightening can offset excess stimulus. The strength of this offset, and the optimality of monetary conditions, improves with the precision of investor inferences of central bank private information.
- Open Access
- 9 March 2024
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 126 (4) , 773-809
Asset bubbles and wealth inequality
We examine the causal link between asset bubbles and wealth inequality in a two‐agent macroeconomic model. Bubbles influence wealth inequality through two channels: altering the debt–asset ratio and fuelling speculation. When bubbles grow, they can temporarily decrease wealth inequality if asset prices rise faster than debt. However, when they burst, wealth inequality increases as the debt–asset ratio rises. Steady‐state wealth inequality is unaffected by bubbles if household types share symmetric speculative timing. Although macroprudential policy, communication, and leaning against the wind can reduce negative bubble effects on aggregate utility, they have a limited effect on wealth inequality.
- 9 March 2024
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 126 (4) , 773-809
Open AccessAsset bubbles and wealth inequality
We examine the causal link between asset bubbles and wealth inequality in a two‐agent macroeconomic model. Bubbles influence wealth inequality through two channels: altering the debt–asset ratio and fuelling speculation. When bubbles grow, they can temporarily decrease wealth inequality if asset prices rise faster than debt. However, when they burst, wealth inequality increases as the debt–asset ratio rises. Steady‐state wealth inequality is unaffected by bubbles if household types share symmetric speculative timing. Although macroprudential policy, communication, and leaning against the wind can reduce negative bubble effects on aggregate utility, they have a limited effect on wealth inequality.
- Open Access
- 5 September 2023
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 56 (4) , 1551-1582
Macroeconomic tail risk, currency crises and the inter‐war gold standard
We introduce macroeconomic tail risk into the canonical global game model of currency crises. The exchange rate peg is attacked if fundamentals reach a critical threshold, or if there is a sufficiently large public shock. Large shocks generate doubt amongst investors about both the state of the world and about what others know, giving rise to multiple equilibria. We find a non‐monotonic relationship between tail risk and the probability of (a fundamentals‐based) crisis and show how this effect depends on the magnitude and direction of public shocks. We consider the implications of policy intervention and identify conditions under which active intervention produces doubt about the level of fundamentals and, hence, how others will respond. Our analysis clarifies how financial contagion in Europe precipitated the sterling crisis of 1931.
- 5 September 2023
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 56 (4) , 1551-1582
Open AccessMacroeconomic tail risk, currency crises and the inter‐war gold standard
We introduce macroeconomic tail risk into the canonical global game model of currency crises. The exchange rate peg is attacked if fundamentals reach a critical threshold, or if there is a sufficiently large public shock. Large shocks generate doubt amongst investors about both the state of the world and about what others know, giving rise to multiple equilibria. We find a non‐monotonic relationship between tail risk and the probability of (a fundamentals‐based) crisis and show how this effect depends on the magnitude and direction of public shocks. We consider the implications of policy intervention and identify conditions under which active intervention produces doubt about the level of fundamentals and, hence, how others will respond. Our analysis clarifies how financial contagion in Europe precipitated the sterling crisis of 1931.
- 23 February 2023
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 99 (325) , 238-252
On Market‐Friendly Central Bankers*
- 23 February 2023
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 99 (325) , 238-252
On Market‐Friendly Central Bankers*
- 31 May 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in National Institute Economic Review
- Vol. 259, 51-61
MISCOORDINATION, POLITICS AND POPULISM
We present two models that shed light on two issues in the political economy of populism: incumbents who refuse to give up office following a democratic election; and politicians gambling with major policy shifts when their consequences are uncertain. In the democratic transition of power, common knowledge about the veracity of the election process enables citizens to threaten incumbents with protests if they attempt to retain their seats in power. If doubt over electoral integrity prevails, office-seeking incumbents sometimes reject electoral rules. In considering policy gambles, politicians supply policy shifts in response to voters and elites vying for a greater share of economic output. When the mapping from policy to outcomes is uncertain, voters opt for policy gambles, even though these are detrimental to their ex ante welfare, to redress the division of output. These models underscore the importance of institutions that address the source of each coordination failure.
- 31 May 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in National Institute Economic Review
- Vol. 259, 51-61
MISCOORDINATION, POLITICS AND POPULISM
We present two models that shed light on two issues in the political economy of populism: incumbents who refuse to give up office following a democratic election; and politicians gambling with major policy shifts when their consequences are uncertain. In the democratic transition of power, common knowledge about the veracity of the election process enables citizens to threaten incumbents with protests if they attempt to retain their seats in power. If doubt over electoral integrity prevails, office-seeking incumbents sometimes reject electoral rules. In considering policy gambles, politicians supply policy shifts in response to voters and elites vying for a greater share of economic output. When the mapping from policy to outcomes is uncertain, voters opt for policy gambles, even though these are detrimental to their ex ante welfare, to redress the division of output. These models underscore the importance of institutions that address the source of each coordination failure.
- 7 November 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in New Zealand Economic Papers
- Vol. 55 (2) , 155-165
The safe asset frontier
We identify the frontier between safe and unsafe assets and show how the growth rate of the economy and its fiscal capacity interact with differences of opinion amongst investors to determine the safe asset equilibrium. Multiple equilibria emerge in our set-up due to strategic complementarities across counterparties, and the safety of the bond depends on the extent to which investors' opinions diverge from the credit rating of the asset.
- 7 November 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in New Zealand Economic Papers
- Vol. 55 (2) , 155-165
The safe asset frontier
We identify the frontier between safe and unsafe assets and show how the growth rate of the economy and its fiscal capacity interact with differences of opinion amongst investors to determine the safe asset equilibrium. Multiple equilibria emerge in our set-up due to strategic complementarities across counterparties, and the safety of the bond depends on the extent to which investors' opinions diverge from the credit rating of the asset.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Regulatory Complexity and the Quest for Robust Regulation
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessRegulatory Complexity and the Quest for Robust Regulation
- 3 December 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in New Zealand Economic Papers
- Vol. 54 (1) , 1-15
The New Zealand financial cycle 1968–2017
This paper identifies a financial cycle for New Zealand over the period 1968–2017 using spectral analysis and band-pass filter methods. We report the main characteristics of the financial cycle and examine the extent to which it is synchronised with the business cycle in New Zealand and the financial cycle in the United States. Our results suggest that the median length of the financial cycle in New Zealand is 8 years, and its duration has increased substantially (from 4.75 to 9.75 years) following the economic reforms of the mid-eighties. There appears to be a strong relationship between financial cycle contractions and real economic outcomes, with 83% of financial cycle contractions preceding a recession by a median of 2.5 years. We also find a strong degree of synchronicity between the New Zealand and US financial cycles.
- 3 December 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in New Zealand Economic Papers
- Vol. 54 (1) , 1-15
The New Zealand financial cycle 1968–2017
This paper identifies a financial cycle for New Zealand over the period 1968–2017 using spectral analysis and band-pass filter methods. We report the main characteristics of the financial cycle and examine the extent to which it is synchronised with the business cycle in New Zealand and the financial cycle in the United States. Our results suggest that the median length of the financial cycle in New Zealand is 8 years, and its duration has increased substantially (from 4.75 to 9.75 years) following the economic reforms of the mid-eighties. There appears to be a strong relationship between financial cycle contractions and real economic outcomes, with 83% of financial cycle contractions preceding a recession by a median of 2.5 years. We also find a strong degree of synchronicity between the New Zealand and US financial cycles.
- 22 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 32 (6) , 2422-2455
Asset Encumbrance, Bank Funding, and Fragility
We model asset encumbrance by banks subject to rollover risk and study the consequences for fragility, funding costs, and prudential regulation. A bank’s privately optimal encumbrance choice balances the benefit of expanding profitable, yet illiquid, investment funded by cheap long-term senior secured debt, against the cost of greater fragility from runs on unsecured debt. We derive testable implications about encumbrance ratios. The introduction of deposit insurance or wholesale funding guarantees induces excessive encumbrance and fragility. Limits on asset encumbrance or Pigovian taxes eliminate such risk-shifting incentives. Our results shed light on prudential policies currently being pursued in several jurisdictions.
- 22 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 32 (6) , 2422-2455
Asset Encumbrance, Bank Funding, and Fragility
We model asset encumbrance by banks subject to rollover risk and study the consequences for fragility, funding costs, and prudential regulation. A bank’s privately optimal encumbrance choice balances the benefit of expanding profitable, yet illiquid, investment funded by cheap long-term senior secured debt, against the cost of greater fragility from runs on unsecured debt. We derive testable implications about encumbrance ratios. The introduction of deposit insurance or wholesale funding guarantees induces excessive encumbrance and fragility. Limits on asset encumbrance or Pigovian taxes eliminate such risk-shifting incentives. Our results shed light on prudential policies currently being pursued in several jurisdictions.