Johan Gars
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Johan Gars has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniel Spiro
Dept. of Economics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
4 shared publications Gustav Engström
2 shared publications- Gustav Engström
Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 10405, Stockholm, Sweden
2 shared publications - Henrik Wachtmeister
Department of Earth Sciences, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
2 shared publications - Albert V. Norstrom
Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
1 shared publication - Arthur A. van Benthem
National Bureau of Economic Research 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge Massachusetts 02138 U.S.A
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Price Cap on Russian Oil: A Quantitative Analysis
A price cap on Russian crude oil, at 60 USD/barrel, was implemented in December 2022. Using parsimonious modeling and detailed Russian oil-field data, this paper studies the price cap’s impact on the Russian economy, global winners and losers and how a cap at different levels affects these dynamics as well as the potential for Russian retaliation. A cap at 60 USD/barrel implies substantial Russian producer losses, and in turn government income losses, of several per cent of GDP. But since the cap diverts oil supply from exports to the Russian domestic market, the losses are partly offset by Russian consumer benefits. Russian net losses are, however, substantial: for every 5 USD that the cap is below the baseline world oil price, Russian net losses are equivalent to around 1% of its GDP (around 30% of pre-Ukraine-invasion military spending). Oil importers generally benefit from a cap as it works like a buyers’ cartel, except if the cap is very low (30 USD/barrel and below) in the long run. Among the major oil importers, India and China are the main beneficiaries due to their oil-intensive economies. A price cap of 40-50 USD/barrel maximizes oil importers’ benefits in the short run and implies virtually no Russian export reduction. In the long run, a cap of 50-60 USD/barrel maximizes oil importer’s benefits. However, every additional reduction of the cap by 5 USD imposes an additional Russian loss of 54 million USD/day (around 1% of GDP). Hence, if oil importers put even a small weight on restricting Russian income, a cap much lower than today is motivated. Russian retaliation through voluntary oil-export restrictions is, however, more likely under a lower cap since such retaliation hurts Russia less and oil importers more when the price cap is low. For a cap at 60 USD/barrel, the credibility of export-restriction threats hinges on Russia prioritizing importers’ harm much more than own-profit maximization. For a cap at 30 USD/barrel, it is sufficient that Russia puts equal weight on harm and own profit for the threat to be credible.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Price Cap on Russian Oil: A Quantitative Analysis
A price cap on Russian crude oil, at 60 USD/barrel, was implemented in December 2022. Using parsimonious modeling and detailed Russian oil-field data, this paper studies the price cap’s impact on the Russian economy, global winners and losers and how a cap at different levels affects these dynamics as well as the potential for Russian retaliation. A cap at 60 USD/barrel implies substantial Russian producer losses, and in turn government income losses, of several per cent of GDP. But since the cap diverts oil supply from exports to the Russian domestic market, the losses are partly offset by Russian consumer benefits. Russian net losses are, however, substantial: for every 5 USD that the cap is below the baseline world oil price, Russian net losses are equivalent to around 1% of its GDP (around 30% of pre-Ukraine-invasion military spending). Oil importers generally benefit from a cap as it works like a buyers’ cartel, except if the cap is very low (30 USD/barrel and below) in the long run. Among the major oil importers, India and China are the main beneficiaries due to their oil-intensive economies. A price cap of 40-50 USD/barrel maximizes oil importers’ benefits in the short run and implies virtually no Russian export reduction. In the long run, a cap of 50-60 USD/barrel maximizes oil importer’s benefits. However, every additional reduction of the cap by 5 USD imposes an additional Russian loss of 54 million USD/day (around 1% of GDP). Hence, if oil importers put even a small weight on restricting Russian income, a cap much lower than today is motivated. Russian retaliation through voluntary oil-export restrictions is, however, more likely under a lower cap since such retaliation hurts Russia less and oil importers more when the price cap is low. For a cap at 60 USD/barrel, the credibility of export-restriction threats hinges on Russia prioritizing importers’ harm much more than own-profit maximization. For a cap at 30 USD/barrel, it is sufficient that Russia puts equal weight on harm and own profit for the threat to be credible.
- Open Access
- 15 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Energy
- Vol. 7 (10) , 989-997
The effect of European fuel-tax cuts on the oil income of Russia
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there has been a surge in transport fuel prices. Consequently, many European Union (EU) countries are cutting taxes on petrol and diesel to shield consumers. Using standard theory and empirical estimates, here we assess how such tax cuts influence the oil income in Russia. We find that an EU-wide tax cut of €0.20 l−1increases Russia’s oil profits by around €8 million per day in the short and long term. This is equivalent to €3,100 million per year, 0.2% of Russia’s gross domestic product or 5% of its military spending. We show that a cash transfer to EU citizens—with a fiscal burden equivalent to the tax cut—reduces these side effects to a fraction.
- 15 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Energy
- Vol. 7 (10) , 989-997
Open AccessThe effect of European fuel-tax cuts on the oil income of Russia
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there has been a surge in transport fuel prices. Consequently, many European Union (EU) countries are cutting taxes on petrol and diesel to shield consumers. Using standard theory and empirical estimates, here we assess how such tax cuts influence the oil income in Russia. We find that an EU-wide tax cut of €0.20 l−1increases Russia’s oil profits by around €8 million per day in the short and long term. This is equivalent to €3,100 million per year, 0.2% of Russia’s gross domestic product or 5% of its military spending. We show that a cash transfer to EU citizens—with a fiscal burden equivalent to the tax cut—reduces these side effects to a fraction.
- 15 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Energy
- Vol. 7 (10) , 912-913
European fuel tax cuts increase Russian oil profits
- 15 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Energy
- Vol. 7 (10) , 912-913
European fuel tax cuts increase Russian oil profits
- 31 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 76 (4) , 789-810
What Policies Address Both the Coronavirus Crisis and the Climate Crisis?
The coronavirus pandemic has led many countries to initiate unprecedented economic recovery packages. Policymakers tackling the coronavirus crisis have also been encouraged to prioritize policies which help mitigate a second, looming crisis: climate change. We identify and analyze policies that combat both the coronavirus crisis and the climate crisis. We analyze both the long-run climate impacts from coronavirus-related economic recovery policies, and the impacts of long-run climate policies on economic recovery and public health post-recession. We base our analysis on data on emissions, employment and corona-related layoffs across sectors, and on previous research. We show that, among climate policies, labor-intensive green infrastructure projects, planting trees, and in particular pricing carbon coupled with reduced labor taxation boost economic recovery. Among coronavirus policies, aiding services sectors (leisure services such as restaurants and culture, or professional services such as technology), education and the healthcare sector appear most promising, being labor intensive yet low-emission—if such sectoral aid is conditioned on being directed towards employment and on low-carbon supply chains. Large-scale green infrastructure projects and green R&D investment, while good for the climate, are unlikely to generate enough employment to effectively alleviate the coronavirus crisis.
- 31 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 76 (4) , 789-810
What Policies Address Both the Coronavirus Crisis and the Climate Crisis?
The coronavirus pandemic has led many countries to initiate unprecedented economic recovery packages. Policymakers tackling the coronavirus crisis have also been encouraged to prioritize policies which help mitigate a second, looming crisis: climate change. We identify and analyze policies that combat both the coronavirus crisis and the climate crisis. We analyze both the long-run climate impacts from coronavirus-related economic recovery policies, and the impacts of long-run climate policies on economic recovery and public health post-recession. We base our analysis on data on emissions, employment and corona-related layoffs across sectors, and on previous research. We show that, among climate policies, labor-intensive green infrastructure projects, planting trees, and in particular pricing carbon coupled with reduced labor taxation boost economic recovery. Among coronavirus policies, aiding services sectors (leisure services such as restaurants and culture, or professional services such as technology), education and the healthcare sector appear most promising, being labor intensive yet low-emission—if such sectoral aid is conditioned on being directed towards employment and on low-carbon supply chains. Large-scale green infrastructure projects and green R&D investment, while good for the climate, are unlikely to generate enough employment to effectively alleviate the coronavirus crisis.
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 184
Fuel for economic growth?
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 184
Fuel for economic growth?
- 1 January 2018
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
- Vol. 5 (1) , 155-206
Trade and the Risk of Renewable-Resource Collapse
- 1 January 2018
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
- Vol. 5 (1) , 155-206
Trade and the Risk of Renewable-Resource Collapse
- 14 June 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 65 (3) , 541-571
Climatic Tipping Points and Optimal Fossil-Fuel Use
- 14 June 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 65 (3) , 541-571
Climatic Tipping Points and Optimal Fossil-Fuel Use
- 1 October 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Ecology & Evolution
- Vol. 30 (10) , 571-580
Why Ecologists Should Care about Financial Markets
- 1 October 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Ecology & Evolution
- Vol. 30 (10) , 571-580
Why Ecologists Should Care about Financial Markets
- 1 October 2015
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Resource Economics
- Vol. 7 (1) , 127-150
Optimal Taxation in the Macroeconomics of Climate Change
Climate change has in recent years moved to the forefront of the policy scene. At the same time, the research literature on macroeconomic aspects of climate change has grown and broadened significantly. In this review, we survey and discuss this literature, with special attention given to results that help shed light on important qualitative questions regarding how an optimal carbon tax should be set. The review covers topics such as spatial aspects of optimal taxes, interactions with other taxes, uncertainty, technological change, and the qualitative time profile of the optimal tax.
- 1 October 2015
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Resource Economics
- Vol. 7 (1) , 127-150
Optimal Taxation in the Macroeconomics of Climate Change
Climate change has in recent years moved to the forefront of the policy scene. At the same time, the research literature on macroeconomic aspects of climate change has grown and broadened significantly. In this review, we survey and discuss this literature, with special attention given to results that help shed light on important qualitative questions regarding how an optimal carbon tax should be set. The review covers topics such as spatial aspects of optimal taxes, interactions with other taxes, uncertainty, technological change, and the qualitative time profile of the optimal tax.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Resilience Alliance, Inc. in Ecology and Society
- Vol. 19 (3)
Three necessary conditions for establishing effective Sustainable Development Goals in the Anthropocene
Norström, A. V., A. Dannenberg, G. McCarney, M. Milkoreit, F. Diekert, G. Engström, R. Fishman, J. Gars, E. Kyriakopoolou, V. Manoussi, K. Meng, M. Metian, M. Sanctuary, M. Schlüter, M. Schoon, L. Schultz, and M. Sjöstedt. 2014. Three necessary conditions for establishing effective Sustainable Development Goals in the Anthropocene. Ecology and Society 19(3): 8.http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-06602-190308
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Resilience Alliance, Inc. in Ecology and Society
- Vol. 19 (3)
Open AccessThree necessary conditions for establishing effective Sustainable Development Goals in the Anthropocene
Norström, A. V., A. Dannenberg, G. McCarney, M. Milkoreit, F. Diekert, G. Engström, R. Fishman, J. Gars, E. Kyriakopoolou, V. Manoussi, K. Meng, M. Metian, M. Sanctuary, M. Schlüter, M. Schoon, L. Schultz, and M. Sjöstedt. 2014. Three necessary conditions for establishing effective Sustainable Development Goals in the Anthropocene. Ecology and Society 19(3): 8.http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-06602-190308