Richard P. Lippmann
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Richard P. Lippmann has a total of 76 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
E.I. Chang
5 shared publicationsKyle Ingols
MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA
5 shared publicationsJ.W. Haines
Lincoln Laboratory|Massachusetts Institute of Technology
3 shared publicationsR.K. Cunningham
Lincoln Lab., MIT, Lexington, MA, USA
3 shared publicationsSeth Webster
MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA
3 shared publicationsB. Gold
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 22 May 2012
- Published by Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)
Continuous Security Metrics for Prevalent Network Threats: Introduction and First Four Metrics
The goal of this work is to introduce meaningful security metrics that motivate effective improvements in network security. We present a methodology for directly deriving security metrics from realistic mathematical models of adversarial behaviors and systems and also a maturity model to guide the adoption and use of these metrics. Four security metrics are described that assess the risk from prevalent network threats. These can be computed automatically and continuously on a network to assess the effectiveness of controls. Each new metric directly assesses the effect of controls that mitigate vulnerabilities, continuously estimates the risk from one adversary, and provides direct insight into what changes must be made to improve security. Details of an explicit maturity model are provided for each metric that guide security practitioners through three stages where they (1) develop foundational understanding, tools and procedures, (2) make accurate and timely measurements that cover all relevant network components and specify security conditions to test, and (3) perform continuous risk assessments and network improvements. Metrics are designed to address specific threats, maintain practicality and simplicity, and motivate risk reduction. These initial four metrics and additional ones we are developing should be added incrementally to a network to gradually improve overall security as scores drop to acceptable levels and the risks from associated cyber threats are mitigated.
- 22 May 2012
- Published by Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)
Continuous Security Metrics for Prevalent Network Threats: Introduction and First Four Metrics
The goal of this work is to introduce meaningful security metrics that motivate effective improvements in network security. We present a methodology for directly deriving security metrics from realistic mathematical models of adversarial behaviors and systems and also a maturity model to guide the adoption and use of these metrics. Four security metrics are described that assess the risk from prevalent network threats. These can be computed automatically and continuously on a network to assess the effectiveness of controls. Each new metric directly assesses the effect of controls that mitigate vulnerabilities, continuously estimates the risk from one adversary, and provides direct insight into what changes must be made to improve security. Details of an explicit maturity model are provided for each metric that guide security practitioners through three stages where they (1) develop foundational understanding, tools and procedures, (2) make accurate and timely measurements that cover all relevant network components and specify security conditions to test, and (3) perform continuous risk assessments and network improvements. Metrics are designed to address specific threats, maintain practicality and simplicity, and motivate risk reduction. These initial four metrics and additional ones we are developing should be added incrementally to a network to gradually improve overall security as scores drop to acceptable levels and the risks from associated cyber threats are mitigated.
- Open Access
- 14 September 2010
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 22-33
Visualizing attack graphs, reachability, and trust relationships with NAVIGATOR
- 14 September 2010
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 22-33
Open AccessVisualizing attack graphs, reachability, and trust relationships with NAVIGATOR
- 27 August 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Machine Learning
- Vol. 81 (2) , 115-119
Machine learning in adversarial environments
- 27 August 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Machine Learning
- Vol. 81 (2) , 115-119
Machine learning in adversarial environments
- 1 December 2009
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- No. 10639527,p. 117-126
Modeling Modern Network Attacks and Countermeasures Using Attack Graphs
By accurately measuring risk for enterprise networks, attack graphs allow network defenders to understand the most critical threats and select the most effective countermeasures. This paper describes substantial enhancements to the NetSPA attack graph system required to model additional present-day threats (zero-day exploits and client-side attacks) and countermeasures (intrusion prevention systems, proxy firewalls, personal firewalls, and host-based vulnerability scans). Point-to-point reachability algorithms and structures were extensively redesigned to support "reverse" reachability computations and personal firewalls. Host-based vulnerability scans are imported and analyzed. Analysis of an operational network with 84 hosts demonstrates that client-side attacks pose a serious threat. Experiments on larger simulated networks demonstrated that NetSPA's previous excellent scaling is maintained. Less than two minutes are required to completely analyze a four-enclave simulated network with more than 40,000 hosts protected by personal firewalls.
- 1 December 2009
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- No. 10639527,p. 117-126
Modeling Modern Network Attacks and Countermeasures Using Attack Graphs
By accurately measuring risk for enterprise networks, attack graphs allow network defenders to understand the most critical threats and select the most effective countermeasures. This paper describes substantial enhancements to the NetSPA attack graph system required to model additional present-day threats (zero-day exploits and client-side attacks) and countermeasures (intrusion prevention systems, proxy firewalls, personal firewalls, and host-based vulnerability scans). Point-to-point reachability algorithms and structures were extensively redesigned to support "reverse" reachability computations and personal firewalls. Host-based vulnerability scans are imported and analyzed. Analysis of an operational network with 84 hosts demonstrates that client-side attacks pose a serious threat. Experiments on larger simulated networks demonstrated that NetSPA's previous excellent scaling is maintained. Less than two minutes are required to completely analyze a four-enclave simulated network with more than 40,000 hosts protected by personal firewalls.
- 14 September 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- p. 44-59
GARNET: A Graphical Attack Graph and Reachability Network Evaluation Tool
- 14 September 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- p. 44-59
GARNET: A Graphical Attack Graph and Reachability Network Evaluation Tool
- 4 June 2008
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 221-236
An Interactive Attack Graph Cascade and Reachability Display
- 4 June 2008
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 221-236
An Interactive Attack Graph Cascade and Reachability Display
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in Twenty-Third Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2007)
- No. 10639527,p. 121-130
Practical Attack Graph Generation for Network Defense
Attack graphs are a valuable tool to network defenders, illustrating paths an attacker can use to gain access to a targeted network. Defenders can then focus their efforts on patching the vulnerabilities and configuration errors that allow the attackers the greatest amount of access. We have created a new type of attack graph, the multiple-prerequisite graph, that scales nearly linearly as the size of a typical network increases. We have built a prototype system using this graph type. The prototype uses readily available source data to automatically compute network reachability, classify vulnerabilities, build the graph, and recommend actions to improve network security. We have tested the prototype on an operational network with over 250 hosts, where it helped to discover a previously unknown configuration error. It has processed complex simulated networks with over 50,000 hosts in under four minutes
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in Twenty-Third Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2007)
- No. 10639527,p. 121-130
Practical Attack Graph Generation for Network Defense
Attack graphs are a valuable tool to network defenders, illustrating paths an attacker can use to gain access to a targeted network. Defenders can then focus their efforts on patching the vulnerabilities and configuration errors that allow the attackers the greatest amount of access. We have created a new type of attack graph, the multiple-prerequisite graph, that scales nearly linearly as the size of a typical network increases. We have built a prototype system using this graph type. The prototype uses readily available source data to automatically compute network reachability, classify vulnerabilities, build the graph, and recommend actions to improve network security. We have tested the prototype on an operational network with over 250 hosts, where it helped to discover a previously unknown configuration error. It has processed complex simulated networks with over 50,000 hosts in under four minutes
- 1 October 2006
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- No. 21557578,p. 1-10
Validating and Restoring Defense in Depth Using Attack Graphs
Defense in depth is a common strategy that uses layers of firewalls to protect supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) subnets and other critical resources on enterprise networks. A tool named NetSPA is presented that analyzes firewall rules and vulnerabilities to construct attack graphs. These show how inside and outside attackers can progress by successively compromising exposed vulnerable hosts with the goal of reaching critical internal targets. NetSPA generates attack graphs and automatically analyzes them to produce a small set of prioritized recommendations to restore defense in depth. Field trials on networks with up to 3,400 hosts demonstrate that firewalls often do not provide defense in depth due to misconfigurations and critical unpatched vulnerabilities on hosts. In all cases, a small number of recommendations was provided to restore defense in depth. Simulations on networks with up to 50,000 hosts demonstrate that this approach scales well to enterprise-size networks
- 1 October 2006
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- No. 21557578,p. 1-10
Validating and Restoring Defense in Depth Using Attack Graphs
Defense in depth is a common strategy that uses layers of firewalls to protect supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) subnets and other critical resources on enterprise networks. A tool named NetSPA is presented that analyzes firewall rules and vulnerabilities to construct attack graphs. These show how inside and outside attackers can progress by successively compromising exposed vulnerable hosts with the goal of reaching critical internal targets. NetSPA generates attack graphs and automatically analyzes them to produce a small set of prioritized recommendations to restore defense in depth. Field trials on networks with up to 3,400 hosts demonstrate that firewalls often do not provide defense in depth due to misconfigurations and critical unpatched vulnerabilities on hosts. In all cases, a small number of recommendations was provided to restore defense in depth. Simulations on networks with up to 50,000 hosts demonstrate that this approach scales well to enterprise-size networks
- Top Cited Papers
- 25 August 2005
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 273-284
Automated generation and analysis of attack graphs
An integral part of modeling the global view of network security isconstructing attack graphs.In practice, attack graphs areproduced manually by Red Teams.Construction by hand, however, istedious, error-prone, and impractical for attack graphs larger than ahundred nodes.In this paper we present an automated technique forgenerating and analyzing attack graphs.We base our technique onsymbolic model checking algorithms,letting us construct attack graphs automatically and efficiently.Wealso describe two analyses to help decide which attacks would be mostcost-effective to guard against.We implemented our technique in atool suite and tested it on a small network example, which includesmodels of a firewall and an intrusion detection system.
- 25 August 2005
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 273-284
Top Cited PapersAutomated generation and analysis of attack graphs
An integral part of modeling the global view of network security isconstructing attack graphs.In practice, attack graphs areproduced manually by Red Teams.Construction by hand, however, istedious, error-prone, and impractical for attack graphs larger than ahundred nodes.In this paper we present an automated technique forgenerating and analyzing attack graphs.We base our technique onsymbolic model checking algorithms,letting us construct attack graphs automatically and efficiently.Wealso describe two analyses to help decide which attacks would be mostcost-effective to guard against.We implemented our technique in atool suite and tested it on a small network example, which includesmodels of a firewall and an intrusion detection system.
- 31 March 2005
- Published by Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)
An Annotated Review of Past Papers on Attack Graphs
This report reviews past research papers that describe how to construct attack graphs, how to use them to improve security of computer networks, and how to use them to analyze alerts from intrusion detection systems. Two commercial systems are described 1, 2, and a summary table compares important characteristics of past research studies. For each study, information is provided on the number of attacker goals, how graphs are constructed, sizes of networks analyzed, how well the approach scales to larger networks, and the general approach. Although research has made significant progress in the past few years, no system has analyzed networks with more than 20 hosts, and computation for most approaches scales poorly and would be impractical for networks with more than even a few hundred hosts. Current approaches also are limited because many require extensive and difficult-to-obtain details on attacks, many assume that host-to-host reachability information between all hosts is already available, and many produce an attack graph but do not automatically generate recommendations from that graph. Researchers have suggested promising approaches to alleviate some of these limitations, including grouping hosts to improve scaling, using worst-case default values for unknown attack details, and symbolically analyzing attack graphs to generate recommendations that improve security for critical hosts. Future research should explore these and other approaches to develop attack graph construction and analysis algorithms that can be applied to large enterprise networks.
- 31 March 2005
- Published by Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)
An Annotated Review of Past Papers on Attack Graphs
This report reviews past research papers that describe how to construct attack graphs, how to use them to improve security of computer networks, and how to use them to analyze alerts from intrusion detection systems. Two commercial systems are described 1, 2, and a summary table compares important characteristics of past research studies. For each study, information is provided on the number of attacker goals, how graphs are constructed, sizes of networks analyzed, how well the approach scales to larger networks, and the general approach. Although research has made significant progress in the past few years, no system has analyzed networks with more than 20 hosts, and computation for most approaches scales poorly and would be impractical for networks with more than even a few hundred hosts. Current approaches also are limited because many require extensive and difficult-to-obtain details on attacks, many assume that host-to-host reachability information between all hosts is already available, and many produce an attack graph but do not automatically generate recommendations from that graph. Researchers have suggested promising approaches to alleviate some of these limitations, including grouping hosts to improve scaling, using worst-case default values for unknown attack details, and symbolically analyzing attack graphs to generate recommendations that improve security for critical hosts. Future research should explore these and other approaches to develop attack graph construction and analysis algorithms that can be applied to large enterprise networks.