Zhijun Hu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Zhijun Hu has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Xiaoqin Wu
School of Mathematics and Statistics, GuiZhou University, Guiyang, China
2 shared publications - Enquan Luo
School of Management, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China
1 shared publication Hang Wang
School of Management Guizhou University Guiyang China
1 shared publication- Hui Yang
School of Mathematics and Statistics, GuiZhou University, Guiyang, China
1 shared publication - Jia Jia Chang
College of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University, Guiyang, China
1 shared publication Jiajia Chang
School of Mathematics and Statistics, GuiZhou University, Guiyang, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 13 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Robust consumption and portfolio optimization under climate risk and uncertainty
This paper examines a robust consumption-investment problem for a representative investor endowed with Epstein-Zin stochastic differential utility over an infinite horizon. The financial market comprises green and brown risky assets, each exposed to climate-related and macroeconomic shocks, while brown assets are additionally subject to policy risk induced by climate regulation. The investor is ambiguity-averse and particularly concerned about model uncertainty regarding these risks. Using a robust control method based on relative entropy, we derive a semi-closed-form solution for the case of unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and an approximate solution for the case where EIS is less than one. Our results indicate that optimal portfolio strategies are primarily influenced by ambiguity regarding price diffusion in both green and brown assets. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the interplay between ambiguity aversion and diversification motives leads the investor to overweight green assets, resulting in a gradual transition from high-carbon to low-carbon production. For investors with EIS less than one, the negative income effect dominates the positive intertemporal substitution effect due to the downward jump in extreme Poisson events, leading to a reduction in the current consumption-to-wealth ratio. Finally, we quantify the wealth losses resulting from ignoring ambiguity and show that most of these losses stem from ignoring the ambiguity about the diffusion risk of brown assets. By integrating climate-related risks and ambiguity aversion into a robust consumption and portfolio framework, this study provides novel insights for investors navigating the transition to a low-carbon economy.
- 13 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Open AccessRobust consumption and portfolio optimization under climate risk and uncertainty
This paper examines a robust consumption-investment problem for a representative investor endowed with Epstein-Zin stochastic differential utility over an infinite horizon. The financial market comprises green and brown risky assets, each exposed to climate-related and macroeconomic shocks, while brown assets are additionally subject to policy risk induced by climate regulation. The investor is ambiguity-averse and particularly concerned about model uncertainty regarding these risks. Using a robust control method based on relative entropy, we derive a semi-closed-form solution for the case of unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and an approximate solution for the case where EIS is less than one. Our results indicate that optimal portfolio strategies are primarily influenced by ambiguity regarding price diffusion in both green and brown assets. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the interplay between ambiguity aversion and diversification motives leads the investor to overweight green assets, resulting in a gradual transition from high-carbon to low-carbon production. For investors with EIS less than one, the negative income effect dominates the positive intertemporal substitution effect due to the downward jump in extreme Poisson events, leading to a reduction in the current consumption-to-wealth ratio. Finally, we quantify the wealth losses resulting from ignoring ambiguity and show that most of these losses stem from ignoring the ambiguity about the diffusion risk of brown assets. By integrating climate-related risks and ambiguity aversion into a robust consumption and portfolio framework, this study provides novel insights for investors navigating the transition to a low-carbon economy.
- 19 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
- Vol. 101 (2) , 259-303
Strategic capacity investment under demand ambiguity with creative destruction
- 19 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
- Vol. 101 (2) , 259-303
Strategic capacity investment under demand ambiguity with creative destruction
- 20 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Optimization and Engineering
- Vol. 26 (2) , 1407-1449
Strategic capacity investment with stochastic volatility in a duopoly market
- 20 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Optimization and Engineering
- Vol. 26 (2) , 1407-1449
Strategic capacity investment with stochastic volatility in a duopoly market
- 14 March 2024
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 45 (5) , 2820-2837
Optimal investment timing and size decision‐making with jump risk and time‐inconsistent preferences
- 14 March 2024
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 45 (5) , 2820-2837
Optimal investment timing and size decision‐making with jump risk and time‐inconsistent preferences
- Open Access
- 23 January 2024
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 16 (3) , 944
The Design of Ecological Compensation for Air Pollution Based on Differential Game
Establishing a scientific ecological compensation mechanism for air pollution is crucial for air protection. This study models the ecological compensation mechanism of the Stackelberg differential game between the local regulator and an enterprise with a competitor by introducing the air quality index and the social welfare benefits of the local regulator. Using the Pontryagin maximum principle, this study obtains dynamic strategies for the local regulator and the enterprise while maximizing the benefits. The evolution of the shadow price is analyzed with the inverse differential equation method. Then, the effects of the shadow price on the optimal dynamic strategies are analyzed using numerical simulation, together with the effects of the introduction of social welfare benefits on the efforts of the local regulator to protect the air environment. The conclusions show that introducing social welfare benefits as an ecological compensation criterion for air pollution promotes air protection by the local regulator.
- 23 January 2024
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 16 (3) , 944
Open AccessThe Design of Ecological Compensation for Air Pollution Based on Differential Game
Establishing a scientific ecological compensation mechanism for air pollution is crucial for air protection. This study models the ecological compensation mechanism of the Stackelberg differential game between the local regulator and an enterprise with a competitor by introducing the air quality index and the social welfare benefits of the local regulator. Using the Pontryagin maximum principle, this study obtains dynamic strategies for the local regulator and the enterprise while maximizing the benefits. The evolution of the shadow price is analyzed with the inverse differential equation method. Then, the effects of the shadow price on the optimal dynamic strategies are analyzed using numerical simulation, together with the effects of the introduction of social welfare benefits on the efforts of the local regulator to protect the air environment. The conclusions show that introducing social welfare benefits as an ecological compensation criterion for air pollution promotes air protection by the local regulator.
- 21 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematics and Financial Economics
- Vol. 16 (1) , 125-152
Investment timing and capacity choice in duopolistic competition under a jump-diffusion model
This paper aims to apply the real options game theoretic to study the impact of sudden events on the optimal investment timing and capacity choice in a duopoly market. We model the market demand and investment cost as the geometric Brownian motions with jumps driven by the Poisson processes. A new computing method independent on specific distribution functions is proposed for the real option models with jump processes of random frequency and amplitude. Based on this method, we find that both firms delay investment with a larger capacity as uncertainties of demand and investment cost increase. We also demonstrate that two firms both invest later and the optimal capacity relationship between them is ambiguous in the presence of two sources of uncertainty. Numerical simulation reveals that upward (downward) jump in demand and downward (upward) jump in investment cost cause the firms to invest earlier (later) with a larger (smaller) capacity. Finally, in a duopoly with symmetric firms, the first investor invests earlier than in an asymmetric duopoly due to the threat of preemption.
- 21 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematics and Financial Economics
- Vol. 16 (1) , 125-152
Investment timing and capacity choice in duopolistic competition under a jump-diffusion model
This paper aims to apply the real options game theoretic to study the impact of sudden events on the optimal investment timing and capacity choice in a duopoly market. We model the market demand and investment cost as the geometric Brownian motions with jumps driven by the Poisson processes. A new computing method independent on specific distribution functions is proposed for the real option models with jump processes of random frequency and amplitude. Based on this method, we find that both firms delay investment with a larger capacity as uncertainties of demand and investment cost increase. We also demonstrate that two firms both invest later and the optimal capacity relationship between them is ambiguous in the presence of two sources of uncertainty. Numerical simulation reveals that upward (downward) jump in demand and downward (upward) jump in investment cost cause the firms to invest earlier (later) with a larger (smaller) capacity. Finally, in a duopoly with symmetric firms, the first investor invests earlier than in an asymmetric duopoly due to the threat of preemption.
- Open Access
- 19 January 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 8 (1) , 140
Venture Capital Contracting with Ambiguity Sharing and Effort Complementarity Effect
In this paper, we established a continuous-time agency model in which an ambiguity-averse venture capitalist (VC) employs an ambiguity-neutral entrepreneur (EN) to manage an innovative project. We analyzed the connection between ambiguity sharing and incentives under double moral hazard. Applying a stochastic dynamic programming approach, we solved the VC’s maximization problem and obtained the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation under a special form of the value function. We showed that the optimal pay-performance sensitivity was a fixed point of a nonlinear equation. The model ambiguity on the probability measure induced a tradeoff between ambiguity sharing and the incentive compensation that improved the EN’s pay-performance sensitivity level. Besides, we simulated the model and showed that when two efforts were complementary, the VC’s effort did not monotonically decrease with respect to the pay-performance sensitivity, while the EN’s effort did not monotonically increase in the pay-performance sensitivity level. More importantly, we found that as efforts tended to be more complementary, the optimal pay-performance sensitivity tended to approach those that maximized the efforts exerted by the EN and the VC.
- 19 January 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 8 (1) , 140
Open AccessVenture Capital Contracting with Ambiguity Sharing and Effort Complementarity Effect
In this paper, we established a continuous-time agency model in which an ambiguity-averse venture capitalist (VC) employs an ambiguity-neutral entrepreneur (EN) to manage an innovative project. We analyzed the connection between ambiguity sharing and incentives under double moral hazard. Applying a stochastic dynamic programming approach, we solved the VC’s maximization problem and obtained the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation under a special form of the value function. We showed that the optimal pay-performance sensitivity was a fixed point of a nonlinear equation. The model ambiguity on the probability measure induced a tradeoff between ambiguity sharing and the incentive compensation that improved the EN’s pay-performance sensitivity level. Besides, we simulated the model and showed that when two efforts were complementary, the VC’s effort did not monotonically decrease with respect to the pay-performance sensitivity, while the EN’s effort did not monotonically increase in the pay-performance sensitivity level. More importantly, we found that as efforts tended to be more complementary, the optimal pay-performance sensitivity tended to approach those that maximized the efforts exerted by the EN and the VC.
- Open Access
- 16 December 2018
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Problems in Engineering
- Vol. 2018, 1-13
Venture Capital Contracting with Double-Sided Moral Hazard and Fairness Concerns
The development of new venture enterprise is the result of joint efforts of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists who collaborate based on complementary resources. In this paper, we analyze a venture capital incentive contracting model in which a venture capitalist interacts with an entrepreneur who is risk neutral and fairness concerned, offering him an equity contract. We solve the venture capitalist’s maximization problem in the presence of double-sided moral hazard. Our results show that fairness concerns change the structure of the optimal contract. More importantly, we show that the solution to the contract regarding the optimal share given to the entrepreneur is nonlinear and is a fixed point between 0 and 1. Further, we simulate the model under the assumption that venture project’s revenue is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function and obtain the following results. (1) When the two efforts are complementary, the venture capitalist’s effort does not monotonically decrease in the share allocated to the entrepreneur, while the entrepreneur’s effort does not monotonically increase in his share. (2) Relative to the benchmark case where the entrepreneur is fairness neutral, the optimal equity share allocated to the fair-minded entrepreneur is larger than 1/2, and as the degree of efforts complementarity increases, the optimal equity share tends to 60%. In this scenario, for a given efforts substitution parameter, the fair-minded entrepreneur provides a higher effort level than the venture capitalist.
- 16 December 2018
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Problems in Engineering
- Vol. 2018, 1-13
Open AccessVenture Capital Contracting with Double-Sided Moral Hazard and Fairness Concerns
The development of new venture enterprise is the result of joint efforts of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists who collaborate based on complementary resources. In this paper, we analyze a venture capital incentive contracting model in which a venture capitalist interacts with an entrepreneur who is risk neutral and fairness concerned, offering him an equity contract. We solve the venture capitalist’s maximization problem in the presence of double-sided moral hazard. Our results show that fairness concerns change the structure of the optimal contract. More importantly, we show that the solution to the contract regarding the optimal share given to the entrepreneur is nonlinear and is a fixed point between 0 and 1. Further, we simulate the model under the assumption that venture project’s revenue is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function and obtain the following results. (1) When the two efforts are complementary, the venture capitalist’s effort does not monotonically decrease in the share allocated to the entrepreneur, while the entrepreneur’s effort does not monotonically increase in his share. (2) Relative to the benchmark case where the entrepreneur is fairness neutral, the optimal equity share allocated to the fair-minded entrepreneur is larger than 1/2, and as the degree of efforts complementarity increases, the optimal equity share tends to 60%. In this scenario, for a given efforts substitution parameter, the fair-minded entrepreneur provides a higher effort level than the venture capitalist.