Rakesh Chaturvedi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Rakesh Chaturvedi has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Sanjit K. Kaul
Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology, Delhi (IIIT-Delhi), New Delhi, India
3 shared publications - Sneihil Gopal
Wireless Systems Lab IIIT-Delhi India
3 shared publications - Sumit Roy
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
3 shared publications Sanjit K. Kaul
Wireless Systems Lab IIIT-Delhi India
2 shared publicationsSneihil Gopal
Wireless Systems Lab IIIT-Delhi India
2 shared publicationsAshish Kumar Pandey
Department of Mathematics IIIT Delhi Delhi India
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 16 May 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 146, 105-120
Integrating Raiffa and Nash approaches to bargaining using interim agreements
- 16 May 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 146, 105-120
Integrating Raiffa and Nash approaches to bargaining using interim agreements
- 30 October 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 26 (1)
Double auction for trading perfect complements
For a trading problem where a buyer is interested in an aggregate resource with fragmented ownership, the individually owned resources are perfect complements in trade. A double auction, chosen in accordance with a value alignment principle which we formulate, is shown to be strategy proof for owners. Since it also values the aggregate resource correctly, it mitigates the holdout problem by changing the source of inefficiency from complementarity on owners' side to lack of competition on buyer side. The value alignment principle implies that this double auction has a majority trading rule. With multiple buyers, a suitable modification makes the double auction strategy proof even for the buyers, thus mitigating the holdout problem by achieving approximate ex post efficiency when the number of owners is large.
- 30 October 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 26 (1)
Double auction for trading perfect complements
For a trading problem where a buyer is interested in an aggregate resource with fragmented ownership, the individually owned resources are perfect complements in trade. A double auction, chosen in accordance with a value alignment principle which we formulate, is shown to be strategy proof for owners. Since it also values the aggregate resource correctly, it mitigates the holdout problem by changing the source of inefficiency from complementarity on owners' side to lack of competition on buyer side. The value alignment principle implies that this double auction has a majority trading rule. With multiple buyers, a suitable modification makes the double auction strategy proof even for the buyers, thus mitigating the holdout problem by achieving approximate ex post efficiency when the number of owners is large.
- Open Access
Spectrum Sharing For Information Freshness: A Repeated Games Perspective
We consider selfish sources that send updates to a monitor over a shared wireless access. The sources would like to minimize the age of their information at the monitor. Our goal is to devise strategies that incentivize such sources to use the shared spectrum cooperatively. Earlier work has modeled such a setting using a non-cooperative one-shot game, played over a single access slot, and has shown that under certain access settings the dominant strategy of each source is to transmit in any slot, resulting in packet collisions between the sources' transmissions and causing all of them to be decoded in error at the monitor. We capture the interaction of the sources over an infinitely many medium access slots using infinitely repeated games. We investigate strategies that enable cooperation resulting in an efficient use of the wireless access, while disincentivizing any source from unilaterally deviating from the strategy. Formally, we are interested in strategies that are a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). We begin by investigating the properties of the one-stage (slot) optimal and access-fair correlated strategies. We then consider their many-slot variants, the age-fair and access-fair strategies, in the infinitely repeated game model. We prove that the access-fair and age-fair strategies are SPNEs for when collision slots are longer than successful transmission slots. Otherwise, neither is a SPNE. We end with simulations that shed light on a possible SPNE for the latter case.
Open AccessSpectrum Sharing For Information Freshness: A Repeated Games Perspective
We consider selfish sources that send updates to a monitor over a shared wireless access. The sources would like to minimize the age of their information at the monitor. Our goal is to devise strategies that incentivize such sources to use the shared spectrum cooperatively. Earlier work has modeled such a setting using a non-cooperative one-shot game, played over a single access slot, and has shown that under certain access settings the dominant strategy of each source is to transmit in any slot, resulting in packet collisions between the sources' transmissions and causing all of them to be decoded in error at the monitor. We capture the interaction of the sources over an infinitely many medium access slots using infinitely repeated games. We investigate strategies that enable cooperation resulting in an efficient use of the wireless access, while disincentivizing any source from unilaterally deviating from the strategy. Formally, we are interested in strategies that are a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). We begin by investigating the properties of the one-stage (slot) optimal and access-fair correlated strategies. We then consider their many-slot variants, the age-fair and access-fair strategies, in the infinitely repeated game model. We prove that the access-fair and age-fair strategies are SPNEs for when collision slots are longer than successful transmission slots. Otherwise, neither is a SPNE. We end with simulations that shed light on a possible SPNE for the latter case.
- 25 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 230
Cost of efficiency in trading perfect complements
- 25 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 230
Cost of efficiency in trading perfect complements
- 29 November 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Indian Economic Review
- Vol. 56 (2) , 313-333
Stability and efficiency in a model of production and pillage
- 29 November 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Indian Economic Review
- Vol. 56 (2) , 313-333
Stability and efficiency in a model of production and pillage
- 7 October 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 191, 620-638
An economic model of the last-mile internet
- 7 October 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 191, 620-638
An economic model of the last-mile internet
- 1 April 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
- Vol. 29 (4) , 1494-1508
Coexistence of Age and Throughput Optimizing Networks: A Spectrum Sharing Game
We investigate the coexistence of an age optimizing network (AON) and a throughput optimizing network (TON) that share a common spectrum band. We consider two modes of long run coexistence: (a) networks compete with each other for spectrum access, causing them to interfere and (b) networks cooperate to achieve non-interfering access. To model competition, we define a non-cooperative stage game parameterized by the average age of the AON at the beginning of the stage, derive its mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE), and analyze the evolution of age and throughput over an infinitely repeated game in which each network plays the MSNE at every stage. Cooperation uses a coordination device that performs a coin toss during each stage to select the network that must access the medium. Networks use the grim trigger punishment strategy, reverting to playing the MSNE every stage forever if the other disobeys the device. We determine if there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium, i.e., the networks obey the device forever as they find cooperation beneficial. We show that networks choose to cooperate only when they consist of a sufficiently small number of nodes, otherwise they prefer to disobey the device and compete.
- 1 April 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
- Vol. 29 (4) , 1494-1508
Coexistence of Age and Throughput Optimizing Networks: A Spectrum Sharing Game
We investigate the coexistence of an age optimizing network (AON) and a throughput optimizing network (TON) that share a common spectrum band. We consider two modes of long run coexistence: (a) networks compete with each other for spectrum access, causing them to interfere and (b) networks cooperate to achieve non-interfering access. To model competition, we define a non-cooperative stage game parameterized by the average age of the AON at the beginning of the stage, derive its mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE), and analyze the evolution of age and throughput over an infinitely repeated game in which each network plays the MSNE at every stage. Cooperation uses a coordination device that performs a coin toss during each stage to select the network that must access the medium. Networks use the grim trigger punishment strategy, reverting to playing the MSNE every stage forever if the other disobeys the device. We determine if there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium, i.e., the networks obey the device forever as they find cooperation beneficial. We show that networks choose to cooperate only when they consist of a sufficiently small number of nodes, otherwise they prefer to disobey the device and compete.
- Open Access
Coexistence of Age and Throughput Optimizing Networks: A Spectrum Sharing Game
We investigate the coexistence of an age optimizing network (AON) and a throughput optimizing network (TON) that share a common spectrum band. We consider two modes of long run coexistence: (a) networks compete with each other for spectrum access, causing them to interfere and (b) networks cooperate to achieve non-interfering access. To model competition, we define a non-cooperative stage game parameterized by the average age of the AON at the beginning of the stage, derive its mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE), and analyze the evolution of age and throughput over an infinitely repeated game in which each network plays the MSNE at every stage. Cooperation uses a coordination device that performs a coin toss during each stage to select the network that must access the medium. Networks use the grim trigger punishment strategy, reverting to playing the MSNE every stage forever if the other disobeys the device. We determine if there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium, i.e., the networks obey the device forever as they find cooperation beneficial. We show that networks choose to cooperate only when they consist of a sufficiently small number of nodes, otherwise they prefer to disobey the device and compete.
Open AccessCoexistence of Age and Throughput Optimizing Networks: A Spectrum Sharing Game
We investigate the coexistence of an age optimizing network (AON) and a throughput optimizing network (TON) that share a common spectrum band. We consider two modes of long run coexistence: (a) networks compete with each other for spectrum access, causing them to interfere and (b) networks cooperate to achieve non-interfering access. To model competition, we define a non-cooperative stage game parameterized by the average age of the AON at the beginning of the stage, derive its mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE), and analyze the evolution of age and throughput over an infinitely repeated game in which each network plays the MSNE at every stage. Cooperation uses a coordination device that performs a coin toss during each stage to select the network that must access the medium. Networks use the grim trigger punishment strategy, reverting to playing the MSNE every stage forever if the other disobeys the device. We determine if there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium, i.e., the networks obey the device forever as they find cooperation beneficial. We show that networks choose to cooperate only when they consist of a sufficiently small number of nodes, otherwise they prefer to disobey the device and compete.
- 1 March 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 120, 325-335
Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly
- 1 March 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 120, 325-335
Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly
- Open Access
A Non-Cooperative Multiple Access Game for Timely Updates
We consider a network of selfish nodes that would like to minimize the age of their updates at the other nodes. The nodes send their updates over a shared spectrum using a CSMA/CA based access mechanism. We model the resulting competition as a non-cooperative one-shot multiple access game and investigate equilibrium strategies for two distinct medium access settings (a) collisions are shorter than successful transmissions and (b) collisions are longer. We investigate competition in a CSMA/CA slot, where a node may choose to transmit or stay idle. We find that medium access settings exert strong incentive effects on the nodes. We show that when collisions are shorter, transmit is a weakly dominant strategy. This leads to all nodes transmitting in the CSMA/CA slot, therefore guaranteeing a collision. In contrast, when collisions are longer, no weakly dominant strategy exists and under certain conditions on the ages at the beginning of the slot, we derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Open AccessA Non-Cooperative Multiple Access Game for Timely Updates
We consider a network of selfish nodes that would like to minimize the age of their updates at the other nodes. The nodes send their updates over a shared spectrum using a CSMA/CA based access mechanism. We model the resulting competition as a non-cooperative one-shot multiple access game and investigate equilibrium strategies for two distinct medium access settings (a) collisions are shorter than successful transmissions and (b) collisions are longer. We investigate competition in a CSMA/CA slot, where a node may choose to transmit or stay idle. We find that medium access settings exert strong incentive effects on the nodes. We show that when collisions are shorter, transmit is a weakly dominant strategy. This leads to all nodes transmitting in the CSMA/CA slot, therefore guaranteeing a collision. In contrast, when collisions are longer, no weakly dominant strategy exists and under certain conditions on the ages at the beginning of the slot, we derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.