Jin Mun Jeong
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Latest Publications
- 2 February 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 67 (10) , 1904-1929
Sanctions-Busting, Material Power, and Institutional Support for Economic Sanctions
International institutions play a key role in sanctions success. However, little is known about when senders mobilize institutional sanctions and how they induce international institutions to support their sanctioning efforts. Senders may need institutional support when they expect third-party states to engage in sanctions-busting. I suggest that senders anticipate sanctions-busting when they face third-party rivals which also have an alliance tie with targets. The presence of such potential sanctions busters may lead senders to seek institutional support. Also, senders should possess substantial material power to induce member states of international institutions to approve the sanctioning efforts. I assess the theoretical claim of this research by analyzing 1,038 sanctions episodes over the period 1951–2005. The findings support my argument that senders pursue institutional support when they face potential sanctions busters, and the success of their efforts partly depend on their material power.
- 2 February 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 67 (10) , 1904-1929
Sanctions-Busting, Material Power, and Institutional Support for Economic Sanctions
International institutions play a key role in sanctions success. However, little is known about when senders mobilize institutional sanctions and how they induce international institutions to support their sanctioning efforts. Senders may need institutional support when they expect third-party states to engage in sanctions-busting. I suggest that senders anticipate sanctions-busting when they face third-party rivals which also have an alliance tie with targets. The presence of such potential sanctions busters may lead senders to seek institutional support. Also, senders should possess substantial material power to induce member states of international institutions to approve the sanctioning efforts. I assess the theoretical claim of this research by analyzing 1,038 sanctions episodes over the period 1951–2005. The findings support my argument that senders pursue institutional support when they face potential sanctions busters, and the success of their efforts partly depend on their material power.
- 16 June 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defence and Peace Economics
- Vol. 32 (8) , 989-1005
Coercive Diplomacy and Foreign Supply of Essential Goods: Effects of Trade Restrictions and Foreign Aid Suspension on Food Imports
Economic sanctions constrain targets’ capacity to maintain essential goods imports from foreign suppliers. This research points out that target states may respond to this adverse effect of sanctions by redirecting the resources invested to secondary goods imports to essential goods imports. In addition, I suggest that the availability of this strategy significantly varies across sanctions instruments. When facing foreign aid sanctions, targets may be able to effectively reallocate their import funding to sustain foreign supply of essential items. However, when they are subject to trade sanctions, such a response is not readily available. In the data analysis with 150 countries from 1974 to 2006, I utilize foodstuffs as a proxy of essential goods and provide evidence that targets under foreign aid sanctions transfer their import funding to maintain adequate amount of food aid. Yet, I find no evidence that targets subject to trade sanctions also respond with the same manner.
- 16 June 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defence and Peace Economics
- Vol. 32 (8) , 989-1005
Coercive Diplomacy and Foreign Supply of Essential Goods: Effects of Trade Restrictions and Foreign Aid Suspension on Food Imports
Economic sanctions constrain targets’ capacity to maintain essential goods imports from foreign suppliers. This research points out that target states may respond to this adverse effect of sanctions by redirecting the resources invested to secondary goods imports to essential goods imports. In addition, I suggest that the availability of this strategy significantly varies across sanctions instruments. When facing foreign aid sanctions, targets may be able to effectively reallocate their import funding to sustain foreign supply of essential items. However, when they are subject to trade sanctions, such a response is not readily available. In the data analysis with 150 countries from 1974 to 2006, I utilize foodstuffs as a proxy of essential goods and provide evidence that targets under foreign aid sanctions transfer their import funding to maintain adequate amount of food aid. Yet, I find no evidence that targets subject to trade sanctions also respond with the same manner.
- 10 February 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
- Vol. 37 (6) , 674-693
Economic sanctions and income inequality: impacts of trade restrictions and foreign aid suspension on target countries
This research examines the relationship between economic sanctions and income inequality of sanctioned states. Economic sanctions have a discernible effect on target income inequality. I argue that such an effect significantly varies across sanctions instruments and economic conditions of sanctioned countries. Data analysis for 152 countries from 1974 to 2011 shows that import sanctions increase inequality of labor-abundant targets, but such an effect disappears in labor-scarce targets, whereas the findings provide no reliable evidence for the effect of export sanctions. The results also suggest that foreign aid sanctions reduce the inequality of targets that are significantly dependent on foreign assistance.
- 10 February 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
- Vol. 37 (6) , 674-693
Economic sanctions and income inequality: impacts of trade restrictions and foreign aid suspension on target countries
This research examines the relationship between economic sanctions and income inequality of sanctioned states. Economic sanctions have a discernible effect on target income inequality. I argue that such an effect significantly varies across sanctions instruments and economic conditions of sanctioned countries. Data analysis for 152 countries from 1974 to 2011 shows that import sanctions increase inequality of labor-abundant targets, but such an effect disappears in labor-scarce targets, whereas the findings provide no reliable evidence for the effect of export sanctions. The results also suggest that foreign aid sanctions reduce the inequality of targets that are significantly dependent on foreign assistance.