ASAein Rezaei Shahmirzadi

Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Uniform Sharing in Multiple Stages: Towards Second-Order Security

    by Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi, Artemii Ovchinnikov, Siemen Dhooghe

  • Open Access

    Uniform Sharing in Multiple Stages: NullFresh for Arbitrary Functions

    by Artemii Ovchinnikov, Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi, Siemen Dhooghe

    In the field of hardware masking, threshold implementations are a wellknown technique that provides glitch-resistant power analysis security. While they guarantee probing security, finding a uniform sharing without additional randomness is difficult, making it challenging to apply to certain functions and, consequently, making it impossible to develop a tool that can straightforwardly generate the masked circuit. Additionally, this approach forces designers to use at least three shares in the underlying masking, which can make the design more costly. Other schemes, like DOM, which can work with two shares, often require fresh randomness. To address these issues, Shahmirzadi and Moradi introduced the NullFresh masking technique at CHES 2021. This method allows for uniform sharing with no additional randomness, using the minimal number of shares. However, similar to original threshold implementations, it is not always straightforward to find a NullFresh masking for arbitrary functions. In this work, we introduce an automated technique to provide masking for arbitrary functions, ensuring first-order security. This technique is applicable to functions where the number of output bits does not exceed the number of input bits. While this technique introduces additional register stages (resulting in higher latency and area) compared to existing methods, it addresses the automation challenges of threshold implementations, which have remained an open problem since their inception. We present the masking technique, along with proofs of glitch-extended probing security, and demonstrate its application to several ciphers, including Prince, Midori, Skinny, Keccak, and AES. The masked designs were verified using SILVER and PROLEAD, and tested on an FPGA through TVLA.


  • Open Access

    Efficient Boolean-to-Arithmetic Mask Conversion in Hardware

    by Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi, Michael Hutter

    Masking schemes are key in thwarting side-channel attacks due to their robust theoretical foundation. Transitioning from Boolean to arithmetic (B2A) masking is a necessary step in various cryptography schemes, including hash functions, ARX-based ciphers, and lattice-based cryptography. While there exists a significant body of research focusing on B2A software implementations, studies pertaining to hardware implementations are quite limited, with the majority dedicated solely to creating efficient Boolean masked adders. In this paper, we present first- and second-order secure hardware implementations to perform B2A mask conversion efficiently without using masked adder structures. We first introduce a first-order secure low-latency gadget that executes a B2A2k in a single cycle. Furthermore, we propose a second-order secure B2A2k gadget that has a latency of only 4 clock cycles. Both gadgets are independent of the input word size k. We then show how these new primitives lead to improved B2Aq hardware implementations that perform a B2A mask conversion of integers modulo an arbitrary number. Our results show that our new gadgets outperform comparable solutions by more than a magnitude in terms of resource requirements and are at least 3 times faster in terms of latency and throughput. All gadgets have been formally verified and proven secure in the glitch-robust PINI security model. We additionally confirm the security of our gadgets on an FPGA platform using practical TVLA tests.


  • Open Access

    A Thorough Evaluation of RAMBAM

    by Daniel Lammers, Amir Moradi, Nicolai Müller, Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi

    The application of masking, widely regarded as the most robust and reliable countermeasure against Side-Channel Analysis~(SCA) attacks, has been the subject of extensive research across a range of cryptographic algorithms, especially AES. However, the implementation cost associated with applying such a countermeasure can be significant and even in some scenarios infeasible due to considerations such as area and latency overheads, as well as the need for fresh randomness to ensure the security properties of the resulting design. Most of these overheads originate from the ability to maintain security in the presence of physical defaults such as glitches and transitions. Among several schemes with a trade-off between such overheads, RAMBAM, presented at CHES~2022, offers an ultra-low latency in terms of the number of clock cycles. It is dedicated to the AES and utilizes redundant representations of the finite field elements to enhance protection against both passive and active physical attacks. In this paper, we have a deeper look at this technique and provide a comprehensive analysis. The original authors reported that the number of required traces to mount a successful attack increases exponentially with the size of the redundant representation. We however examine their scheme from theoretical point of view. More specifically, we investigate the relationship between RAMBAM and the well-established Boolean masking and, based on this, prove the insecurity of RAMBAM. Through the examples and use cases, we assess the leakage of the scheme in practice and use verification tools to demonstrate that RAMBAM does not necessarily offer adequate protection against SCA attacks neither in theory nor in practice. Confirmed by real-world experiments, we additionally highlight that - if no dedicated facility is incorporated - the RAMBAM designs are susceptible to fault-injection attacks despite providing some degree of protection against a sophisticated attack vector, i.e., SIFA.

  • Energy Consumption of Protected Cryptographic Hardware Cores

    by Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi, Thorben Moos, Amir Moradi


  • Impeccable Circuits II

    by Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi, Shahram Rasoolzadeh, Amir Moradi

    Protection against active physical attacks is of serious concerns of cryptographic hardware designers. Introduction of SIFA invalidating several previously-thought-effective counter-measures, made this challenge even harder. Here in this work we deal with error correction, and introduce a methodology which shows, depending on the selected adversary model, how to correctly embed error-correcting codes in a cryptographic implementation. Our construction guarantees the correction of faults, in any location of the circuit and at any clock cycle, as long as they fit into the underlying adversary model. Based on case studies evaluated by open-source fault diagnostic tools, we claim protection against SIFA.


  • Impeccable Circuits

    by Anita Aghaie, Amir Moradi, Shahram Rasoolzadeh, Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi, Falk Schellenberg, Tobias Schneider