Laura Ana Bustamante
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Laura Ana Bustamante has a total of 32 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Nathaniel Douglass Daw
Princeton University
5 shared publications - Jonathan D. Cohen
Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, USA
4 shared publications - Mario Bogdanov
Center for Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Research, McLean Hospital, Belmont, USA
3 shared publications - Sean Devine
Department of Psychology, McGill University, Montreal, Canada
3 shared publications - Temitope Oshinowo
Princeton Neuroscience Institute and Department of Molecular Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
3 shared publications - A. Ross Otto
Department of Psychology, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 September 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Model-based planning in structured foraging environments
In order to maximize reward, humans need to balance engaging with currently available sources of reward and searching for better ones. Optimal foraging theory provides a formal but simple mathematical choice rule to make such stay/leave decisions, contrasting expected and experienced rewards. However, this rule (given by the Marginal Value Theorem; MVT) describes a strategy that does not consider the structure of the environment. In other words, it does not leave room for planning during foraging. Yet, the real world is replete with such opportunities. Therefore, we developed a new structured foraging task to study how people employ goal-directed planning during foraging. Specifically, we explore the extent to which participants incorporate an internal model of the task structure during stay/leave decisions. We find that behavior in this task follows the basic principles of the MVT, but that its structure invites people to also consider the value of alternative reward options when deciding to leave their current one. Importantly, this behavior is pronounced in more goal-directed participants. Computational modeling suggests that incorporating this alternative information is beneficial, but to an extent dictated by choice stochasticity. This study provides a novel method for studying decision making in structured environments, and has implications for understanding how foraging and planning interact.
- 16 September 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessModel-based planning in structured foraging environments
In order to maximize reward, humans need to balance engaging with currently available sources of reward and searching for better ones. Optimal foraging theory provides a formal but simple mathematical choice rule to make such stay/leave decisions, contrasting expected and experienced rewards. However, this rule (given by the Marginal Value Theorem; MVT) describes a strategy that does not consider the structure of the environment. In other words, it does not leave room for planning during foraging. Yet, the real world is replete with such opportunities. Therefore, we developed a new structured foraging task to study how people employ goal-directed planning during foraging. Specifically, we explore the extent to which participants incorporate an internal model of the task structure during stay/leave decisions. We find that behavior in this task follows the basic principles of the MVT, but that its structure invites people to also consider the value of alternative reward options when deciding to leave their current one. Importantly, this behavior is pronounced in more goal-directed participants. Computational modeling suggests that incorporating this alternative information is beneficial, but to an extent dictated by choice stochasticity. This study provides a novel method for studying decision making in structured environments, and has implications for understanding how foraging and planning interact.
- Open Access
- 12 August 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
No Evidence for a Generalized Construct of Cognitive Effort Avoidance
In general, people tend to avoid exertion of cognitive effort, a finding that has been consistently observed in numerous behavioral paradigms that examine motivation to engage with or withdraw from cognitively demanding tasks. Here, we investigate whether these paradigms probe a common latent construct of cognitive effort avoidance by comparing participants’ (n=240) behavior in a battery of four established paradigms. As expected, on a group-level, participants displayed pronounced effort avoidance in each paradigm. However, a multivariate, multi-level Bayesian Modeling approach revealed that individual-level effort avoidance did not generalize across effort paradigms. Instead, for all but one paradigm, effort avoidance was mainly correlated with individuals’ performance in the cognitively demanding task specific to each paradigm. Our findings challenge the assumption that commonly used effort-based decision-making paradigms measure a person’s general sensitivity to cognitive effort, and call into question the notion of a generalized, task-independent tendency to avoid mental effort.
- 12 August 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessNo Evidence for a Generalized Construct of Cognitive Effort Avoidance
In general, people tend to avoid exertion of cognitive effort, a finding that has been consistently observed in numerous behavioral paradigms that examine motivation to engage with or withdraw from cognitively demanding tasks. Here, we investigate whether these paradigms probe a common latent construct of cognitive effort avoidance by comparing participants’ (n=240) behavior in a battery of four established paradigms. As expected, on a group-level, participants displayed pronounced effort avoidance in each paradigm. However, a multivariate, multi-level Bayesian Modeling approach revealed that individual-level effort avoidance did not generalize across effort paradigms. Instead, for all but one paradigm, effort avoidance was mainly correlated with individuals’ performance in the cognitively demanding task specific to each paradigm. Our findings challenge the assumption that commonly used effort-based decision-making paradigms measure a person’s general sensitivity to cognitive effort, and call into question the notion of a generalized, task-independent tendency to avoid mental effort.
- Open Access
- 16 January 2025
- Published by Society for Neuroscience in The Journal of Neuroscience
- Vol. 45 (10)
Noninvasive Brain Stimulation over the Frontopolar Cortex Promotes Willingness to Exert Cognitive Effort in a Foraging-Like Sequential Choice Task
Individuals avoid spending cognitive effort unless expected rewards offset the perceived costs. Recent work employing tasks that provide explicit information about demands and incentives suggests causal involvement of the frontopolar cortex (FPC) in effort-based decision-making. Using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), we examined whether the FPC's role in motivating effort generalizes to sequential choice problems in which task demand and reward rates vary indirectly and as a function of experience. In a double-blind, within-subject design, 46 participants (36 female, 8 male, 1 “neither/other”) received anodal (i.e., excitatory) or sham stimulation over the right FPC during an Effort Foraging Task, which required choosing between harvesting patches for successively decreasing resources or traveling to replenished patches by performing a cognitive task with environment-specific difficulty. As expected, participants exited patches later (i.e., exhibited lower exit thresholds) when traveling required greater (versus less) effort, indicating increased travel costs in high-effort environments. Under anodal tDCS, the difference in exit thresholds between environments was significantly smaller relative to sham. Finally, individual differences analyses hint that participants with lower self-reported motivation to exert effort exhibited greater travel cost reductions following tDCS. Together, these findings support the theorized causal role of the FPC in motivating cognitively effortful behavior, expand its role to more ecologically valid serial decisions, and highlight the potential for tDCS as a tool to increase motivation with potential clinical applications.
- 16 January 2025
- Published by Society for Neuroscience in The Journal of Neuroscience
- Vol. 45 (10)
Open AccessNoninvasive Brain Stimulation over the Frontopolar Cortex Promotes Willingness to Exert Cognitive Effort in a Foraging-Like Sequential Choice Task
Individuals avoid spending cognitive effort unless expected rewards offset the perceived costs. Recent work employing tasks that provide explicit information about demands and incentives suggests causal involvement of the frontopolar cortex (FPC) in effort-based decision-making. Using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), we examined whether the FPC's role in motivating effort generalizes to sequential choice problems in which task demand and reward rates vary indirectly and as a function of experience. In a double-blind, within-subject design, 46 participants (36 female, 8 male, 1 “neither/other”) received anodal (i.e., excitatory) or sham stimulation over the right FPC during an Effort Foraging Task, which required choosing between harvesting patches for successively decreasing resources or traveling to replenished patches by performing a cognitive task with environment-specific difficulty. As expected, participants exited patches later (i.e., exhibited lower exit thresholds) when traveling required greater (versus less) effort, indicating increased travel costs in high-effort environments. Under anodal tDCS, the difference in exit thresholds between environments was significantly smaller relative to sham. Finally, individual differences analyses hint that participants with lower self-reported motivation to exert effort exhibited greater travel cost reductions following tDCS. Together, these findings support the theorized causal role of the FPC in motivating cognitively effortful behavior, expand its role to more ecologically valid serial decisions, and highlight the potential for tDCS as a tool to increase motivation with potential clinical applications.
- Open Access
- 1 November 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Psychological Medicine
- Vol. 54 (15) , 4396-4407
Major depression symptom severity associations with willingness to exert effort and patch foraging strategy
Background: Individuals with major depressive disorder (MDD) can experience reduced motivation and cognitive function, leading to challenges with goal-directed behavior. When selecting goals, people maximize ‘expected value’ by selecting actions that maximize potential reward while minimizing associated costs, including effort ‘costs’ and the opportunity cost of time. In MDD, differential weighing of costs and benefits are theorized mechanisms underlying changes in goal-directed cognition and may contribute to symptom heterogeneity.Methods: We used the Effort Foraging Task to quantify cognitive and physical effort costs, and patch leaving thresholds in low effort conditions (reflecting perceived opportunity cost of time) and investigated their shared versus distinct relationships to clinical features in participants with MDD (N = 52, 43 in-episode) and comparisons (N = 27).Results: Contrary to our predictions, none of the decision-making measures differed with MDD diagnosis. However, each of the measures was related to symptom severity, over and above effects of ability (i.e. performance). Greater anxiety symptoms were selectively associated with lower cognitive effort cost (i.e. greater willingness to exert effort). Anhedonia and behavioral apathy were associated with increased physical effort costs. Finally, greater overall depression was related to decreased patch leaving thresholds.Conclusions: Markers of effort-based decision-making may inform understanding of MDD heterogeneity. Increased willingness to exert cognitive effort may contribute to anxiety symptoms such as worry. Decreased leaving threshold associations with symptom severity are consistent with reward rate-based accounts of reduced vigor in MDD. Future research should address subtypes of depression with or without anxiety, which may relate differentially to cognitive effort decisions.
- 1 November 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Psychological Medicine
- Vol. 54 (15) , 4396-4407
Open AccessMajor depression symptom severity associations with willingness to exert effort and patch foraging strategy
Background: Individuals with major depressive disorder (MDD) can experience reduced motivation and cognitive function, leading to challenges with goal-directed behavior. When selecting goals, people maximize ‘expected value’ by selecting actions that maximize potential reward while minimizing associated costs, including effort ‘costs’ and the opportunity cost of time. In MDD, differential weighing of costs and benefits are theorized mechanisms underlying changes in goal-directed cognition and may contribute to symptom heterogeneity.Methods: We used the Effort Foraging Task to quantify cognitive and physical effort costs, and patch leaving thresholds in low effort conditions (reflecting perceived opportunity cost of time) and investigated their shared versus distinct relationships to clinical features in participants with MDD (N = 52, 43 in-episode) and comparisons (N = 27).Results: Contrary to our predictions, none of the decision-making measures differed with MDD diagnosis. However, each of the measures was related to symptom severity, over and above effects of ability (i.e. performance). Greater anxiety symptoms were selectively associated with lower cognitive effort cost (i.e. greater willingness to exert effort). Anhedonia and behavioral apathy were associated with increased physical effort costs. Finally, greater overall depression was related to decreased patch leaving thresholds.Conclusions: Markers of effort-based decision-making may inform understanding of MDD heterogeneity. Increased willingness to exert cognitive effort may contribute to anxiety symptoms such as worry. Decreased leaving threshold associations with symptom severity are consistent with reward rate-based accounts of reduced vigor in MDD. Future research should address subtypes of depression with or without anxiety, which may relate differentially to cognitive effort decisions.
- Open Access
Non-invasive brain stimulation over the Frontopolar Cortex promotes willingness to exert cognitive effort in a foraging-like sequential choice task
Individuals avoid spending cognitive effort unless expected rewards offset the perceived costs. Recent work employing tasks that provide explicit information about demands and incentives, suggests causal involvement of the Frontopolar Cortex (FPC) in effort-based decision-making. Using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), we examined whether the FPC’s role in motivating effort generalizes to sequential choice problems in which task demand and reward rates vary indirectly and as a function of experience. In a double-blind, within- subject design, 46 participants received anodal (i.e., excitatory) or sham stimulation over the right FPC during an Effort Foraging Task, which required choosing between harvesting patches for successively decreasing resources or traveling to replenished patches by performing a cognitive task with environment-specific difficulty. As expected, participants exited patches later (i.e., displayed lower exit thresholds) when travelling required greater (versus less) effort, indicating increased travel costs in high-effort environments. Under anodal tDCS, the difference in exit thresholds between environments was significantly smaller relative to sham. Finally, individual differences analyses hint that participants with lower self-reported motivation to exert effort exhibited greater travel cost reductions following tDCS. Together, these findings support the theorized causal role of the FPC in motivating cognitively effortful behavior, expand its role to more ecologically valid serial decisions and highlight the potential for tDCS as a tool to increase motivation with potential clinical applications. Significance statement: Uncovering the neural mechanisms regulating engagement in effortful behavior is crucial, as it will improve our understanding and treatment of conditions characterized by reduced motivation, e.g., apathy and anhedonia. The Frontopolar Cortex (FPC) has been implicated in increasing effort exertion in settings that provide explicit information about effort demand and reward. Using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), we investigated whether the FPC retains its motivating capacity in sequential choice problems that vary effort and reward indirectly. We demonstrate that FPC stimulation decreases cognitive effort-based travel costs in an Effort Foraging Task, indicating a causal and general involvement of the FPC in motivating effortful behavior, highlighting the potential of tDCS as a new avenue for increasing motivation with potential clinical applications.
Open AccessNon-invasive brain stimulation over the Frontopolar Cortex promotes willingness to exert cognitive effort in a foraging-like sequential choice task
Individuals avoid spending cognitive effort unless expected rewards offset the perceived costs. Recent work employing tasks that provide explicit information about demands and incentives, suggests causal involvement of the Frontopolar Cortex (FPC) in effort-based decision-making. Using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), we examined whether the FPC’s role in motivating effort generalizes to sequential choice problems in which task demand and reward rates vary indirectly and as a function of experience. In a double-blind, within- subject design, 46 participants received anodal (i.e., excitatory) or sham stimulation over the right FPC during an Effort Foraging Task, which required choosing between harvesting patches for successively decreasing resources or traveling to replenished patches by performing a cognitive task with environment-specific difficulty. As expected, participants exited patches later (i.e., displayed lower exit thresholds) when travelling required greater (versus less) effort, indicating increased travel costs in high-effort environments. Under anodal tDCS, the difference in exit thresholds between environments was significantly smaller relative to sham. Finally, individual differences analyses hint that participants with lower self-reported motivation to exert effort exhibited greater travel cost reductions following tDCS. Together, these findings support the theorized causal role of the FPC in motivating cognitively effortful behavior, expand its role to more ecologically valid serial decisions and highlight the potential for tDCS as a tool to increase motivation with potential clinical applications. Significance statement: Uncovering the neural mechanisms regulating engagement in effortful behavior is crucial, as it will improve our understanding and treatment of conditions characterized by reduced motivation, e.g., apathy and anhedonia. The Frontopolar Cortex (FPC) has been implicated in increasing effort exertion in settings that provide explicit information about effort demand and reward. Using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), we investigated whether the FPC retains its motivating capacity in sequential choice problems that vary effort and reward indirectly. We demonstrate that FPC stimulation decreases cognitive effort-based travel costs in an Effort Foraging Task, indicating a causal and general involvement of the FPC in motivating effortful behavior, highlighting the potential of tDCS as a new avenue for increasing motivation with potential clinical applications.
- Open Access
Major depression symptom severity associations with willingness to exert effort and patch foraging strategy
Background: Individuals with major depressive disorder (MDD) can experience reduced motivation and cognitive function, leading to challenges with goal-directed behavior. When selecting goals, people maximize ‘expected value’ by selecting actions that maximize potential reward while minimizing associated costs, including effort ‘costs’ and the opportunity cost of time. In MDD, differential weighing of costs and benefits are theorized mechanisms underlying changes in goal-directed cognition and may contribute to symptom heterogeneity. Methods: We used the Effort Foraging Task to quantify cognitive and physical effort costs, and patch leaving thresholds in low effort conditions (reflecting perceived opportunity cost of time) and investigated their shared versus distinct relationships to clinical features in participants with MDD (N=52, 43 in-episode) and comparisons (N=27). Results: Contrary to our predictions, none of the decision-making measures differed with MDD diagnosis. However, each of the measures were related to symptom severity, over and above effects of ability (i.e., performance). Greater anxiety symptoms were selectively associated with lower cognitive effort cost (i.e. greater willingness to exert effort). Anhedonia and behavioral apathy were associated with increased physical effort costs. Finally, greater overall depression was related to decreased patch leaving thresholds. Conclusions: Markers of effort-based decision-making may inform understanding of MDD heterogeneity. Increased willingness to exert cognitive effort may contribute to anxiety symptoms such as worry. Decreased leaving thresholds associations with symptom severity is consistent with reward rate-based accounts of reduced vigor in MDD. Future research should address subtypes of depression with or without anxiety, which may relate differentially to cognitive effort decisions.
Open AccessMajor depression symptom severity associations with willingness to exert effort and patch foraging strategy
Background: Individuals with major depressive disorder (MDD) can experience reduced motivation and cognitive function, leading to challenges with goal-directed behavior. When selecting goals, people maximize ‘expected value’ by selecting actions that maximize potential reward while minimizing associated costs, including effort ‘costs’ and the opportunity cost of time. In MDD, differential weighing of costs and benefits are theorized mechanisms underlying changes in goal-directed cognition and may contribute to symptom heterogeneity. Methods: We used the Effort Foraging Task to quantify cognitive and physical effort costs, and patch leaving thresholds in low effort conditions (reflecting perceived opportunity cost of time) and investigated their shared versus distinct relationships to clinical features in participants with MDD (N=52, 43 in-episode) and comparisons (N=27). Results: Contrary to our predictions, none of the decision-making measures differed with MDD diagnosis. However, each of the measures were related to symptom severity, over and above effects of ability (i.e., performance). Greater anxiety symptoms were selectively associated with lower cognitive effort cost (i.e. greater willingness to exert effort). Anhedonia and behavioral apathy were associated with increased physical effort costs. Finally, greater overall depression was related to decreased patch leaving thresholds. Conclusions: Markers of effort-based decision-making may inform understanding of MDD heterogeneity. Increased willingness to exert cognitive effort may contribute to anxiety symptoms such as worry. Decreased leaving thresholds associations with symptom severity is consistent with reward rate-based accounts of reduced vigor in MDD. Future research should address subtypes of depression with or without anxiety, which may relate differentially to cognitive effort decisions.
- Open Access
- 8 December 2023
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 120 (50)
Effort Foraging Task reveals positive correlation between individual differences in the cost of cognitive and physical effort in humans
Effort-based decisions, in which people weigh potential future rewards against effort costs required to achieve those rewards involve both cognitive and physical effort, though the mechanistic relationship between them is not yet understood. Here, we use an individual differences approach to isolate and measure the computational processes underlying effort-based decisions and test the association between cognitive and physical domains. Patch foraging is an ecologically valid reward rate maximization problem with well-developed theoretical tools. We developed the Effort Foraging Task, which embedded cognitive or physical effort into patch foraging, to quantify the cost of both cognitive and physical effort indirectly, by their effects on foraging choices. Participants chose between harvesting a depleting patch, or traveling to a new patch that was costly in time and effort. Participants’ exit thresholds (reflecting the reward they expected to receive by harvesting when they chose to travel to a new patch) were sensitive to cognitive and physical effort demands, allowing us to quantify the perceived effort cost in monetary terms. The indirect sequential choice style revealed effort-seeking behavior in a minority of participants (preferring high over low effort) that has apparently been missed by many previous approaches. Individual differences in cognitive and physical effort costs were positively correlated, suggesting that these are perceived and processed in common. We used canonical correlation analysis to probe the relationship of task measures to self-reported affect and motivation, and found correlations of cognitive effort with anxiety, cognitive function, behavioral activation, and self-efficacy, but no similar correlations with physical effort.
- 8 December 2023
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 120 (50)
Open AccessEffort Foraging Task reveals positive correlation between individual differences in the cost of cognitive and physical effort in humans
Effort-based decisions, in which people weigh potential future rewards against effort costs required to achieve those rewards involve both cognitive and physical effort, though the mechanistic relationship between them is not yet understood. Here, we use an individual differences approach to isolate and measure the computational processes underlying effort-based decisions and test the association between cognitive and physical domains. Patch foraging is an ecologically valid reward rate maximization problem with well-developed theoretical tools. We developed the Effort Foraging Task, which embedded cognitive or physical effort into patch foraging, to quantify the cost of both cognitive and physical effort indirectly, by their effects on foraging choices. Participants chose between harvesting a depleting patch, or traveling to a new patch that was costly in time and effort. Participants’ exit thresholds (reflecting the reward they expected to receive by harvesting when they chose to travel to a new patch) were sensitive to cognitive and physical effort demands, allowing us to quantify the perceived effort cost in monetary terms. The indirect sequential choice style revealed effort-seeking behavior in a minority of participants (preferring high over low effort) that has apparently been missed by many previous approaches. Individual differences in cognitive and physical effort costs were positively correlated, suggesting that these are perceived and processed in common. We used canonical correlation analysis to probe the relationship of task measures to self-reported affect and motivation, and found correlations of cognitive effort with anxiety, cognitive function, behavioral activation, and self-efficacy, but no similar correlations with physical effort.
- Open Access
Effort Foraging Task reveals positive correlation between individual differences in the cost of cognitive and physical effort in humans
Effort-based decisions, in which people weigh potential future rewards against effort costs required to achieve those rewards, have largely been studied separately for cognitive or physical effort, yet most real-world actions incur both effort costs. What is the relationship between cognitive and physical effort costs? Here we attempt to formalize the mechanisms underlying effort-based decisions and address methodological challenges to isolate and measure these mechanisms. Patch foraging is an ecologically valid reward rate maximization problem with well-developed theoretical tools to understand choices. We developed the Effort Foraging Task, which embedded cognitive or physical effort into a patch foraging sequential decision task, to isolate and quantify the cost of both cognitive and physical effort using a computational model. Participants chose between harvesting a depleting patch, or traveling to a new patch that was costly in time and effort. Participants’ exit thresholds (reflecting the reward they expected to receive by harvesting when they chose to travel to a new patch) were sensitive to cognitive and physical effort demands, allowing us to quantify the perceived effort cost in monetary terms. Individual differences in cognitive and physical effort costs were positively correlated, suggesting that these are perceived and processed in common terms across different domains. We found patterns of correlation of both cognitive and physical effort costs with self-reported anxiety, cognitive function, behavioral activation, and self-efficacy. This suggests the task captures decision mechanisms associated with real-world motivation and can be used to study individual variation in effort-based decisions across domains of cost.
Open AccessEffort Foraging Task reveals positive correlation between individual differences in the cost of cognitive and physical effort in humans
Effort-based decisions, in which people weigh potential future rewards against effort costs required to achieve those rewards, have largely been studied separately for cognitive or physical effort, yet most real-world actions incur both effort costs. What is the relationship between cognitive and physical effort costs? Here we attempt to formalize the mechanisms underlying effort-based decisions and address methodological challenges to isolate and measure these mechanisms. Patch foraging is an ecologically valid reward rate maximization problem with well-developed theoretical tools to understand choices. We developed the Effort Foraging Task, which embedded cognitive or physical effort into a patch foraging sequential decision task, to isolate and quantify the cost of both cognitive and physical effort using a computational model. Participants chose between harvesting a depleting patch, or traveling to a new patch that was costly in time and effort. Participants’ exit thresholds (reflecting the reward they expected to receive by harvesting when they chose to travel to a new patch) were sensitive to cognitive and physical effort demands, allowing us to quantify the perceived effort cost in monetary terms. Individual differences in cognitive and physical effort costs were positively correlated, suggesting that these are perceived and processed in common terms across different domains. We found patterns of correlation of both cognitive and physical effort costs with self-reported anxiety, cognitive function, behavioral activation, and self-efficacy. This suggests the task captures decision mechanisms associated with real-world motivation and can be used to study individual variation in effort-based decisions across domains of cost.
- Open Access
- 9 May 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Leveraging Psychometrics of Rational Inattention to Estimate Individual Differences in the Capacity for Cognitive Control
Recent years have witnessed significant advances in our understanding of bounds on rationality in both cognitive psychology and economics. These two fields have been making separate progress, but time is ripe for unifying these efforts. In this article, we introduce recently developed economic tools, themselves rooted in the psychometric tradition, to quantify individual differences in the capacity for cognitive control. These tools suggest that a reliable assessment of the capacity for cognitive control may be accomplished by examining task performance as a function of reward. We demonstrate through simulation studies that an incentive-informed measure of task performance does a better job of recovering individual differences in one’s capacity for cognitive control, compared to the commonly used congruency effect. Furthermore, we show that the economic approach can be used to predict control-dependent behavior across different task settings. We conclude by discussing future directions for the fruitful integration of behavioral economics and cognitive psychology with the aim of improved measurement of individual differences in the capacity for cognitive control.
- 9 May 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessLeveraging Psychometrics of Rational Inattention to Estimate Individual Differences in the Capacity for Cognitive Control
Recent years have witnessed significant advances in our understanding of bounds on rationality in both cognitive psychology and economics. These two fields have been making separate progress, but time is ripe for unifying these efforts. In this article, we introduce recently developed economic tools, themselves rooted in the psychometric tradition, to quantify individual differences in the capacity for cognitive control. These tools suggest that a reliable assessment of the capacity for cognitive control may be accomplished by examining task performance as a function of reward. We demonstrate through simulation studies that an incentive-informed measure of task performance does a better job of recovering individual differences in one’s capacity for cognitive control, compared to the commonly used congruency effect. Furthermore, we show that the economic approach can be used to predict control-dependent behavior across different task settings. We conclude by discussing future directions for the fruitful integration of behavioral economics and cognitive psychology with the aim of improved measurement of individual differences in the capacity for cognitive control.
- Open Access
- 6 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience
- Vol. 21 (3) , 453-471
Learning to Overexert Cognitive Control in a Stroop Task
How do people learn when to allocate how much cognitive control to which task? According to the Learned Value of Control (LVOC) model, people learn to predict the value of alternative control allocations from features of a situation. This suggests that people may generalize the value of control learned in one situation to others with shared features, even when demands for control are different. This makes the intriguing prediction that what a person learned in one setting could cause them to misestimate the need for, and potentially overexert, control in another setting, even if this harms their performance. To test this prediction, we had participants perform a novel variant of the Stroop task in which, on each trial, they could choose to either name the color (more control-demanding) or read the word (more automatic). Only one of these tasks was rewarded each trial and could be predicted by one or more stimulus features (the color and/or word). Participants first learned colors and then words that predicted the rewarded task. Then, we tested how these learned feature associations transferred to novel stimuli with some overlapping features. The stimulus-task-reward associations were designed so that for certain combinations of stimuli, transfer of learned feature associations would incorrectly predict that more highly rewarded task would be color-naming, even though the actually rewarded task was word-reading and therefore did not require engaging control. Our results demonstrated that participants overexerted control for these stimuli, providing support for the feature-based learning mechanism described by the LVOC model.
- 6 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience
- Vol. 21 (3) , 453-471
Open AccessLearning to Overexert Cognitive Control in a Stroop Task
How do people learn when to allocate how much cognitive control to which task? According to the Learned Value of Control (LVOC) model, people learn to predict the value of alternative control allocations from features of a situation. This suggests that people may generalize the value of control learned in one situation to others with shared features, even when demands for control are different. This makes the intriguing prediction that what a person learned in one setting could cause them to misestimate the need for, and potentially overexert, control in another setting, even if this harms their performance. To test this prediction, we had participants perform a novel variant of the Stroop task in which, on each trial, they could choose to either name the color (more control-demanding) or read the word (more automatic). Only one of these tasks was rewarded each trial and could be predicted by one or more stimulus features (the color and/or word). Participants first learned colors and then words that predicted the rewarded task. Then, we tested how these learned feature associations transferred to novel stimuli with some overlapping features. The stimulus-task-reward associations were designed so that for certain combinations of stimuli, transfer of learned feature associations would incorrectly predict that more highly rewarded task would be color-naming, even though the actually rewarded task was word-reading and therefore did not require engaging control. Our results demonstrated that participants overexerted control for these stimuli, providing support for the feature-based learning mechanism described by the LVOC model.