Lilong Zhu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Lilong Zhu has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Siyi Zhang
Shandong Normal University
5 shared publicationsBingjie Lu
School of Business, Shandong Normal University, Jinan, China
4 shared publicationsHui He
School of Business, Shandong Normal University, Ji’nan, China
1 shared publication- Hui He
School of Business, Shandong Normal University, Ji’nan, Shandong, China
1 shared publication - Jianxin You
School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China
1 shared publication Junmei Rong
School of Business, Shandong Normal University, Ji’nan, Shandong 250014, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 May 2025
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 20 (5) , e0320964
Pharmaceutical enterprises integrity supervision strategy when considering rent-seeking behavior and government reward and punishment mechanism
The integrity of pharmaceutical enterprises is crucial to public health, social stability, and national security, consistently garnering attention from both the government and society. The efficiency of pharmaceutical integrity supervision is closely linked to government oversight mechanisms and the behaviors of third-party testing agencies. This study constructs an evolutionary game model that incorporates rent-seeking dynamics and introduces a reward-punishment mechanism, integrating drug production enterprises, third-party testing agencies, government regulators, and drug wholesale enterprises. By solving for the stable equilibrium points of each participant’s strategic choices and analyzing the stability of strategy combinations using Lyapunov’s first method, the study employs Matlab 2022b for simulation analysis to verify the impact of various decision variables on the strategic choices of different entities. The findings reveal that: 1) The rejection of rent-seeking by third-party testing agencies enhances the incentives for drug production enterprises to operate with integrity, indicating that the government should increase penalties for accepting rent-seeking behavior. 2) Drug wholesale enterprises’ reporting likelihood increases production enterprises’ integrity and third-party testing agencies’ rejection of rent-seeking, inversely tied to reporting costs. 3) Reducing the costs of stringent government supervision and increasing the speculative costs of rent-seeking for third-party testing agencies help prevent dishonest practices among drug production enterprises. 4) A well-designed reward and punishment mechanism facilitates a synergistic environment of government supervision, self-discipline among pharmaceutical enterprises, and social harmony. This paper enriches the theoretical foundation of pharmaceutical integrity supervision and offers pertinent countermeasures and recommendations.
- 19 May 2025
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 20 (5) , e0320964
Open AccessPharmaceutical enterprises integrity supervision strategy when considering rent-seeking behavior and government reward and punishment mechanism
The integrity of pharmaceutical enterprises is crucial to public health, social stability, and national security, consistently garnering attention from both the government and society. The efficiency of pharmaceutical integrity supervision is closely linked to government oversight mechanisms and the behaviors of third-party testing agencies. This study constructs an evolutionary game model that incorporates rent-seeking dynamics and introduces a reward-punishment mechanism, integrating drug production enterprises, third-party testing agencies, government regulators, and drug wholesale enterprises. By solving for the stable equilibrium points of each participant’s strategic choices and analyzing the stability of strategy combinations using Lyapunov’s first method, the study employs Matlab 2022b for simulation analysis to verify the impact of various decision variables on the strategic choices of different entities. The findings reveal that: 1) The rejection of rent-seeking by third-party testing agencies enhances the incentives for drug production enterprises to operate with integrity, indicating that the government should increase penalties for accepting rent-seeking behavior. 2) Drug wholesale enterprises’ reporting likelihood increases production enterprises’ integrity and third-party testing agencies’ rejection of rent-seeking, inversely tied to reporting costs. 3) Reducing the costs of stringent government supervision and increasing the speculative costs of rent-seeking for third-party testing agencies help prevent dishonest practices among drug production enterprises. 4) A well-designed reward and punishment mechanism facilitates a synergistic environment of government supervision, self-discipline among pharmaceutical enterprises, and social harmony. This paper enriches the theoretical foundation of pharmaceutical integrity supervision and offers pertinent countermeasures and recommendations.
- Open Access
- 26 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Drug Quality Supervision Strategy Analysis under Government Rewards and Punishments: What Role does Patient Feedback Play?
In recent years, the frequent occurrence of drug quality and safety incidents, which seriously affect economic development, social stability and public’s health, has always been one of the hot issues that are widely concerned by all over the world. Therefore, this paper constructs a differential game model of drug quality supervision, analyses the influence of government and patients’ interaction mediated by co-regulation information platform on drug quality investment decision-making of pharmaceutical enterprises and retailers, and discusses the decision-making outcomes of pharmaceutical enterprises and retailers under government rewards and punishments. Backward Induction Method is used to solve the model, and Matlab 2021b is used for simulation analysis. The results show that, firstly, when patients give positive feedback, the reward strength of government and the quality perceived utility of patients jointly determine the external positive utility of pharmaceutical enterprises and retailers. Secondly, when patients give negative feedback, the supervision effect of punishment is affected by the market demand for the drug. Furthermore, government rewards and punishments will affect the drug’s wholesale and retail price. The decision-making of pharmaceutical enterprises is affected by the government rewards and punishments for retailers; at the same time, the retailers’ decision-making is also affected by the government rewards and punishments for pharmaceutical enterprises. Finally, this paper enriches and expands the theoretical basis of drug quality supervision, and put forwards countermeasures and suggestions for how to optimize the decision-making of the main subjects of the pharmaceutical supply chain.
- 26 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Open AccessDrug Quality Supervision Strategy Analysis under Government Rewards and Punishments: What Role does Patient Feedback Play?
In recent years, the frequent occurrence of drug quality and safety incidents, which seriously affect economic development, social stability and public’s health, has always been one of the hot issues that are widely concerned by all over the world. Therefore, this paper constructs a differential game model of drug quality supervision, analyses the influence of government and patients’ interaction mediated by co-regulation information platform on drug quality investment decision-making of pharmaceutical enterprises and retailers, and discusses the decision-making outcomes of pharmaceutical enterprises and retailers under government rewards and punishments. Backward Induction Method is used to solve the model, and Matlab 2021b is used for simulation analysis. The results show that, firstly, when patients give positive feedback, the reward strength of government and the quality perceived utility of patients jointly determine the external positive utility of pharmaceutical enterprises and retailers. Secondly, when patients give negative feedback, the supervision effect of punishment is affected by the market demand for the drug. Furthermore, government rewards and punishments will affect the drug’s wholesale and retail price. The decision-making of pharmaceutical enterprises is affected by the government rewards and punishments for retailers; at the same time, the retailers’ decision-making is also affected by the government rewards and punishments for pharmaceutical enterprises. Finally, this paper enriches and expands the theoretical basis of drug quality supervision, and put forwards countermeasures and suggestions for how to optimize the decision-making of the main subjects of the pharmaceutical supply chain.
- Open Access
- 17 November 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
- Vol. 19 (22) , 15197
Pharmaceutical Enterprises’ R&D Innovation Cooperation Moran Strategy When Considering Tax Incentives
Drug R&D innovation contributes to the high-quality development of the pharmaceutical industry, which is related to people’s life and health, economic development, and social stability. Tax incentives and industry cooperation are conducive to promoting pharmaceutical enterprises’ innovation. Therefore, this paper constructs a Moran process evolutionary game model and analyzes the evolutionary trajectory of N pharmaceutical enterprises’ drug R&D innovation strategic choice and considers the choice of R&D innovation strategy and non-R&D innovation strategy. We obtain the conditions for the two strategies to achieve evolutionary stability under the dominance of external factors, the dominance of expected revenue, and the dominance of super expected revenue. The evolutionary process is simulated by MATLAB 2021b. The results show that, firstly, when the number of pharmaceutical enterprises is higher than a threshold, the market is conducive to pharmaceutical enterprises choosing an R&D innovation strategy. Secondly, the higher the tax incentives, the higher the probability of pharmaceutical enterprises choosing an R&D innovation strategy. Thirdly, when the R&D success rate increases, pharmaceutical enterprises gradually change from choosing a non-R&D innovation strategy to choosing an R&D innovation strategy. Fourthly, the threshold of strategy change of pharmaceutical enterprises is the same under the dominance of expected revenue and super expected revenue. This paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions for promoting the R&D innovation of pharmaceutical enterprises in practice.
- 17 November 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
- Vol. 19 (22) , 15197
Open AccessPharmaceutical Enterprises’ R&D Innovation Cooperation Moran Strategy When Considering Tax Incentives
Drug R&D innovation contributes to the high-quality development of the pharmaceutical industry, which is related to people’s life and health, economic development, and social stability. Tax incentives and industry cooperation are conducive to promoting pharmaceutical enterprises’ innovation. Therefore, this paper constructs a Moran process evolutionary game model and analyzes the evolutionary trajectory of N pharmaceutical enterprises’ drug R&D innovation strategic choice and considers the choice of R&D innovation strategy and non-R&D innovation strategy. We obtain the conditions for the two strategies to achieve evolutionary stability under the dominance of external factors, the dominance of expected revenue, and the dominance of super expected revenue. The evolutionary process is simulated by MATLAB 2021b. The results show that, firstly, when the number of pharmaceutical enterprises is higher than a threshold, the market is conducive to pharmaceutical enterprises choosing an R&D innovation strategy. Secondly, the higher the tax incentives, the higher the probability of pharmaceutical enterprises choosing an R&D innovation strategy. Thirdly, when the R&D success rate increases, pharmaceutical enterprises gradually change from choosing a non-R&D innovation strategy to choosing an R&D innovation strategy. Fourthly, the threshold of strategy change of pharmaceutical enterprises is the same under the dominance of expected revenue and super expected revenue. This paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions for promoting the R&D innovation of pharmaceutical enterprises in practice.
- Open Access
- 11 October 2022
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Public Health
- Vol. 10, 954371
Drugs quality supervision strategy of different distribution channels in pharmaceutical supply chain
Aiming at the dual-channel pharmaceutical supply chain, which consists of two distribution channels, offline medical institutions, and online e-commerce platforms, and taking into account the impact of different strategic choices made by relevant stakeholders on the drugs quality of different distribution channels, this article constructs an evolutionary game model involving the participation of government regulator, pharmaceutical enterprises, medical institutions, and pharmaceutical e-commerce companies. The stable equilibrium points of each participant's strategic choices are solved; the stability of strategic combination is analyzed by Lyapunov's first method, and MATLAB 2020b is used for simulation to verify the influence of each decision variable on the strategic choice of different participants. The results show that, first, the purpose of punishment is to ensure the drugs quality in the pharmaceutical supply chain, but when the fine is too high, it will restrain the economic behavior of pharmaceutical enterprises, which is not conducive to the performance of social responsibilities by other relevant participants. Second, the probability that government regulator strictly supervises the pharmaceutical supply chain and the probability that pharmaceutical enterprises provide high-quality drugs are negatively related to their additional cost. Third, whether medical institutions and pharmaceutical e-commerce companies choose inspection is affected by multiple factors such as inspection cost, sales price, and sales cost. Furthermore, when the penalty for non-inspection of pharmaceutical e-commerce companies is greater than the threshold Fm0, it can ensure that it chooses an inspection strategy. Finally, this article puts forward countermeasures and suggestions on the drugs quality supervision of different distribution channels in the pharmaceutical supply chain.
- 11 October 2022
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Public Health
- Vol. 10, 954371
Open AccessDrugs quality supervision strategy of different distribution channels in pharmaceutical supply chain
Aiming at the dual-channel pharmaceutical supply chain, which consists of two distribution channels, offline medical institutions, and online e-commerce platforms, and taking into account the impact of different strategic choices made by relevant stakeholders on the drugs quality of different distribution channels, this article constructs an evolutionary game model involving the participation of government regulator, pharmaceutical enterprises, medical institutions, and pharmaceutical e-commerce companies. The stable equilibrium points of each participant's strategic choices are solved; the stability of strategic combination is analyzed by Lyapunov's first method, and MATLAB 2020b is used for simulation to verify the influence of each decision variable on the strategic choice of different participants. The results show that, first, the purpose of punishment is to ensure the drugs quality in the pharmaceutical supply chain, but when the fine is too high, it will restrain the economic behavior of pharmaceutical enterprises, which is not conducive to the performance of social responsibilities by other relevant participants. Second, the probability that government regulator strictly supervises the pharmaceutical supply chain and the probability that pharmaceutical enterprises provide high-quality drugs are negatively related to their additional cost. Third, whether medical institutions and pharmaceutical e-commerce companies choose inspection is affected by multiple factors such as inspection cost, sales price, and sales cost. Furthermore, when the penalty for non-inspection of pharmaceutical e-commerce companies is greater than the threshold Fm0, it can ensure that it chooses an inspection strategy. Finally, this article puts forward countermeasures and suggestions on the drugs quality supervision of different distribution channels in the pharmaceutical supply chain.
- 16 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Soft Computing
- Vol. 26 (21) , 11749-11769
Public health events emergency management supervision strategy considering citizens’ and new media’s different ways of participation
Public health events have done great harm. Emergency management requires the joint participation of multiple parties including government department, pharmaceutical enterprises, citizens and new media. Then, what are the effects of different strategy choices in participation of citizens and new media on emergency management? To answer the question, we construct a four-party evolutionary game model, considering the citizens' two participation ways consisted of true evaluation and false evaluation, and the new media's two participation ways consisted of report after verification and report without verification. This is of more practical significance than simply studying whether citizens and new media participate in emergency management or not because citizen and new media participation does not represent the completely positive behavior. Then, we conduct the evolutionary stability analysis, solve the stable equilibrium points using the Lyapunov first method and conduct the simulation analysis with MATLAB 2020b. The results show that, firstly, the greater the probability of citizens making true evaluation, the more inclined the government department is to strictly implement the emergency management system; secondly, when the probability of citizens making true evaluation decreases, new media are more inclined to report after verification, and when new media lose more pageview value or should be punished more for reporting without verification, the probability that they report without verification is smaller; thirdly, the greater the probability of citizens making false evaluation, the less enthusiasm of pharmaceutical enterprises to participate in emergency management, which indicates that false evaluation is detrimental to prompt pharmaceutical enterprises to participate; what's more, the greater the probability of new media reporting after verification, the greater the probability of pharmaceutical enterprises actively participating, which shows that new media's verification to citizens' evaluation is beneficial to emergency management.
- 16 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Soft Computing
- Vol. 26 (21) , 11749-11769
Public health events emergency management supervision strategy considering citizens’ and new media’s different ways of participation
Public health events have done great harm. Emergency management requires the joint participation of multiple parties including government department, pharmaceutical enterprises, citizens and new media. Then, what are the effects of different strategy choices in participation of citizens and new media on emergency management? To answer the question, we construct a four-party evolutionary game model, considering the citizens' two participation ways consisted of true evaluation and false evaluation, and the new media's two participation ways consisted of report after verification and report without verification. This is of more practical significance than simply studying whether citizens and new media participate in emergency management or not because citizen and new media participation does not represent the completely positive behavior. Then, we conduct the evolutionary stability analysis, solve the stable equilibrium points using the Lyapunov first method and conduct the simulation analysis with MATLAB 2020b. The results show that, firstly, the greater the probability of citizens making true evaluation, the more inclined the government department is to strictly implement the emergency management system; secondly, when the probability of citizens making true evaluation decreases, new media are more inclined to report after verification, and when new media lose more pageview value or should be punished more for reporting without verification, the probability that they report without verification is smaller; thirdly, the greater the probability of citizens making false evaluation, the less enthusiasm of pharmaceutical enterprises to participate in emergency management, which indicates that false evaluation is detrimental to prompt pharmaceutical enterprises to participate; what's more, the greater the probability of new media reporting after verification, the greater the probability of pharmaceutical enterprises actively participating, which shows that new media's verification to citizens' evaluation is beneficial to emergency management.
- Open Access
- 29 April 2022
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Public Health
- Vol. 10, 858705
Drug Quality Co-regulation Supervision Strategy Considering Collusion Behavior With New Media Participation
The efficiency and level of drug quality supervision are highly related to the distorted or true reporting of new media, and the collusion or non-collusion of third-party testing agencies. Therefore, based on the co-regulation information platform, considering the strategic choices of local government, drug enterprises, third-party testing agencies and new media, this article constructs a four-party evolutionary game model of co-regulation supervision. The stable equilibrium points of each participant's strategic choices are solved. The stability of the strategic combination is analyzed by Lyapunov's first method, and Matlab 2020b is used for simulation analysis to verify the influence of each decision variable on different players' strategic choices. The results show that, firstly, new media's true reporting can make up for the lack of supervision of drug enterprises by local government, and the greater the impact of new media reporting, the more active drug enterprises will be to produce high-quality drugs. Secondly, non-collusion of third-party testing agencies can improve the self-discipline ability of drug enterprises, encourage new media to report truthfully, and play the role of co-regulation supervision. Furthermore, the greater the probability of new media's true reporting, the more local government tend to be stricter, and the probability of strict supervision is positively related to the central government's accountability. Finally, increasing penalty for producing low-quality drugs and collusion will help standardize the behavior of drug enterprises and third-party testing agencies. This article enriches and expands the theoretical basis of the drug quality co-regulation supervision and proposes corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.
- 29 April 2022
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Public Health
- Vol. 10, 858705
Open AccessDrug Quality Co-regulation Supervision Strategy Considering Collusion Behavior With New Media Participation
The efficiency and level of drug quality supervision are highly related to the distorted or true reporting of new media, and the collusion or non-collusion of third-party testing agencies. Therefore, based on the co-regulation information platform, considering the strategic choices of local government, drug enterprises, third-party testing agencies and new media, this article constructs a four-party evolutionary game model of co-regulation supervision. The stable equilibrium points of each participant's strategic choices are solved. The stability of the strategic combination is analyzed by Lyapunov's first method, and Matlab 2020b is used for simulation analysis to verify the influence of each decision variable on different players' strategic choices. The results show that, firstly, new media's true reporting can make up for the lack of supervision of drug enterprises by local government, and the greater the impact of new media reporting, the more active drug enterprises will be to produce high-quality drugs. Secondly, non-collusion of third-party testing agencies can improve the self-discipline ability of drug enterprises, encourage new media to report truthfully, and play the role of co-regulation supervision. Furthermore, the greater the probability of new media's true reporting, the more local government tend to be stricter, and the probability of strict supervision is positively related to the central government's accountability. Finally, increasing penalty for producing low-quality drugs and collusion will help standardize the behavior of drug enterprises and third-party testing agencies. This article enriches and expands the theoretical basis of the drug quality co-regulation supervision and proposes corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.
- Open Access
- 11 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Public Health Events Emergency Management Supervision Strategy Considering New Media and Citizen Participation
Public health events endanger the citizen health, economic development, social stability and national security seriously. Emergency management requires the joint participation of multiple parties. Therefore, we construct an evolutionary game model involving government department, pharmaceutical enterprises, citizens and new media, analyze the evolutionary stability, solve the stable equilibrium points using the Lyapunov first method and conduct the simulation analysis with Matlab 2020b. The results show that, firstly, the greater the probability of citizens making true evaluation, the more inclined the government department is to strictly implement the emergency management system, and when true evaluation causes the government department to bear more punishment, the probability that the government department doesn't strictly implement is smaller; secondly, when the probability of citizens making true evaluation decreases, new media are more inclined to report after verification, and when new media lose more pageview value or should be punished more for reporting without verification, the probability that they report without verification is smaller; thirdly, the greater the probability of citizens making false evaluation, the less enthusiasm of pharmaceutical enterprises to participate in emergency management, which indicates that false evaluation is detrimental to prompt pharmaceutical enterprises to participate; what's more, the greater the probability of new media reporting after verification, the greater the probability of pharmaceutical enterprises actively participating, which shows that new media's verification to citizens' evaluation is beneficial to emergency management. So, this paper provides suggestions for the emergency management and supervision.
- 11 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Open AccessPublic Health Events Emergency Management Supervision Strategy Considering New Media and Citizen Participation
Public health events endanger the citizen health, economic development, social stability and national security seriously. Emergency management requires the joint participation of multiple parties. Therefore, we construct an evolutionary game model involving government department, pharmaceutical enterprises, citizens and new media, analyze the evolutionary stability, solve the stable equilibrium points using the Lyapunov first method and conduct the simulation analysis with Matlab 2020b. The results show that, firstly, the greater the probability of citizens making true evaluation, the more inclined the government department is to strictly implement the emergency management system, and when true evaluation causes the government department to bear more punishment, the probability that the government department doesn't strictly implement is smaller; secondly, when the probability of citizens making true evaluation decreases, new media are more inclined to report after verification, and when new media lose more pageview value or should be punished more for reporting without verification, the probability that they report without verification is smaller; thirdly, the greater the probability of citizens making false evaluation, the less enthusiasm of pharmaceutical enterprises to participate in emergency management, which indicates that false evaluation is detrimental to prompt pharmaceutical enterprises to participate; what's more, the greater the probability of new media reporting after verification, the greater the probability of pharmaceutical enterprises actively participating, which shows that new media's verification to citizens' evaluation is beneficial to emergency management. So, this paper provides suggestions for the emergency management and supervision.
- 27 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Soft Computing
- Vol. 26 (2) , 829-840
Product quality control strategy of dual distribution channel structure in three-echelon supply chain
- 27 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Soft Computing
- Vol. 26 (2) , 829-840
Product quality control strategy of dual distribution channel structure in three-echelon supply chain
- Open Access
- 20 September 2021
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Environmental Science
- Vol. 9
Green Product Quality Supervision Strategy in Online Shopping With Consumer Evaluation and Complaint
Green consumption is an important foundation for achieving stable and long-term economic development goals. With the rapid development of e-commerce and people’s widespread attention to sustainability, more and more consumers purchase green products online. Therefore, we consider consumer feedback mechanisms including evaluation and complaint and construct an evolutionary game model of green product quality supervision with the participation of governmental supervision department, third-party e-commerce platform, online seller and consumer, which analyzes the four parties’ evolutionary stable strategies. To verify the theoretical results, we conduct a numerical simulation by Matlab 2020b. Moreover, we study the conditions that make evolutionary stable strategy combination exist based on Lyapunov’s First Method. And we find that when consumer chooses complaint, (0, 0, 1) is likely to become an only evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller chooses to provide high-quality green product, third-party e-commerce platform chooses not to strengthen inspection, and governmental supervision department chooses to strictly supervise. Conversely, when the consumer chooses no complaint, (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) may become an evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller cannot be stable in providing high-quality green product. What’s more, governmental supervision department increases the penalty, which can incentivize a third-party e-commerce platform to strengthen inspection. Third-party e-commerce platform increases the reward and can promote online seller to provide high-quality green product. On the one hand, this paper enriches the theoretical basis of online shopping green product quality supervision. On the other hand, compared with existing literature, it extends the main body of the evolutionary game to four paries and broadens the application scope of the game model. In addition, it has put forward feasible suggestions for the government supervision department to strengthen the quality supervision, and provided decision-making support for the third-party e-commerce platform to assume the responsibility of quality inspection.
- 20 September 2021
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Environmental Science
- Vol. 9
Open AccessGreen Product Quality Supervision Strategy in Online Shopping With Consumer Evaluation and Complaint
Green consumption is an important foundation for achieving stable and long-term economic development goals. With the rapid development of e-commerce and people’s widespread attention to sustainability, more and more consumers purchase green products online. Therefore, we consider consumer feedback mechanisms including evaluation and complaint and construct an evolutionary game model of green product quality supervision with the participation of governmental supervision department, third-party e-commerce platform, online seller and consumer, which analyzes the four parties’ evolutionary stable strategies. To verify the theoretical results, we conduct a numerical simulation by Matlab 2020b. Moreover, we study the conditions that make evolutionary stable strategy combination exist based on Lyapunov’s First Method. And we find that when consumer chooses complaint, (0, 0, 1) is likely to become an only evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller chooses to provide high-quality green product, third-party e-commerce platform chooses not to strengthen inspection, and governmental supervision department chooses to strictly supervise. Conversely, when the consumer chooses no complaint, (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) may become an evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller cannot be stable in providing high-quality green product. What’s more, governmental supervision department increases the penalty, which can incentivize a third-party e-commerce platform to strengthen inspection. Third-party e-commerce platform increases the reward and can promote online seller to provide high-quality green product. On the one hand, this paper enriches the theoretical basis of online shopping green product quality supervision. On the other hand, compared with existing literature, it extends the main body of the evolutionary game to four paries and broadens the application scope of the game model. In addition, it has put forward feasible suggestions for the government supervision department to strengthen the quality supervision, and provided decision-making support for the third-party e-commerce platform to assume the responsibility of quality inspection.
- Open Access
- 26 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Product Quality Control Strategy of Dual Distribution Channel Structure in Three-Echelon Supply Chain
Based on the three-stage Stackelberg dynamic game model, this paper considers how to make product quality control strategy in the three-echelon supply chain consisting of the manufacturer, retailer and customer in the case of retailer dual channel structure (traditional retail channel, internet channel) and manufacturer dual channel structure (traditional retail channel, a third-party platform internet channel). When there are two types of decision model (decentralized decision, centralized decision), we analyze the demand price elasticity, market share ratio, revenue sharing ratio and quality cost coefficient how to influence the product demand, product quality level, retail price and direct price in different channels, expected revenue functions of manufacturer and retailer, consumer surplus and product quality control strategy. We find that: First of all, the retail price and direct price are positively related to product quality level, and the product quality level is negatively related with the demand price elasticity in traditional retail channel and the demand price elasticity in internet channel. What's more, the retailers’ retail price in traditional retail channel will be higher than direct price in internet channel. Thirdly, in the case of centralized decision, the manufacturers' product quality level, retail price, joint expected revenue and consumer surplus will all rise, but the direct price will fall. Fourthly, when the manufacturer establishes the dual channel structure, i.e., entrusting the third-party platform to build the internet channel, the manufacturer's product quality level, retail price, direct price, expected revenue, and consumer surplus will all decline. Finally, we conduct the numerical example by Matlab 2018, which verifies the validity and credibility of our conclusions, and points out the direction for the specific application of the model in practice.
- 26 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Open AccessProduct Quality Control Strategy of Dual Distribution Channel Structure in Three-Echelon Supply Chain
Based on the three-stage Stackelberg dynamic game model, this paper considers how to make product quality control strategy in the three-echelon supply chain consisting of the manufacturer, retailer and customer in the case of retailer dual channel structure (traditional retail channel, internet channel) and manufacturer dual channel structure (traditional retail channel, a third-party platform internet channel). When there are two types of decision model (decentralized decision, centralized decision), we analyze the demand price elasticity, market share ratio, revenue sharing ratio and quality cost coefficient how to influence the product demand, product quality level, retail price and direct price in different channels, expected revenue functions of manufacturer and retailer, consumer surplus and product quality control strategy. We find that: First of all, the retail price and direct price are positively related to product quality level, and the product quality level is negatively related with the demand price elasticity in traditional retail channel and the demand price elasticity in internet channel. What's more, the retailers’ retail price in traditional retail channel will be higher than direct price in internet channel. Thirdly, in the case of centralized decision, the manufacturers' product quality level, retail price, joint expected revenue and consumer surplus will all rise, but the direct price will fall. Fourthly, when the manufacturer establishes the dual channel structure, i.e., entrusting the third-party platform to build the internet channel, the manufacturer's product quality level, retail price, direct price, expected revenue, and consumer surplus will all decline. Finally, we conduct the numerical example by Matlab 2018, which verifies the validity and credibility of our conclusions, and points out the direction for the specific application of the model in practice.