SLStephan Luck

Stephan Luck

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Stephan Luck has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Bank Failures: The Roles of Solvency and Liquidity

    by Sergio Correia, Stephan Luck, Emil Verner

    Bank failures can stem from runs on otherwise solvent banks or from losses that render banks insolvent, regardless of withdrawals. Disentangling the relative importance of liquidity and solvency in explaining bank failures is central to understanding financial crises and designing effective financial stability policies. This article reviews evidence on the causes of bank failures. Bank failures—both with and without runs—are almost always related to poor fundamentals. Low recovery rates in failure suggest that most failed banks that experienced runs were likely fundamentally insolvent. Examiners’ postmortem assessments also emphasize the primacy of poor asset quality and solvency problems. Before deposit insurance, runs commonly triggered the failure of insolvent banks. However, runs rarely caused the failure of strong banks, as such runs were typically resolved through other mechanisms, including interbank cooperation, equity injections, public signals of strength, or suspension of convertibility. We discuss the policy implications of these findings and outline directions for future research.

  • Open Access

    Bank Failures: The Roles of Solvency and Liquidity

    by Sergio Correia, Stephan Luck, Emil Verner

    Bank failures can stem from runs on otherwise solvent banks or from losses that render banks insolvent, regardless of withdrawals. Disentangling the relative importance of liquidity and solvency in explaining bank failures is central to understanding financial crises and designing effective financial stability policies. This paper reviews evidence on the causes of bank failures. Bank failures -- both with and without runs -- are almost always related to poor fundamentals. Low recovery rates in failure suggest that most failed banks that experienced runs were likely fundamentally insolvent. Examiners' postmortem assessments also emphasize the primacy of poor asset quality and solvency problems. Before deposit insurance, runs commonly triggered the failure of insolvent banks. However, runs rarely caused the failure of strong banks, as such runs were typically resolved through other mechanisms, including interbank cooperation, equity injections, public signals of strength, or suspension of convertibility. We discuss the policy implications of these findings and outline directions for future research.

  • Open Access

    Failing Banks

    by Sergio Correia, Stephan Luck, Emil Verner

    Why do banks fail? We create a panel covering most commercial banks from 1863 through 2024 to study the history of failing banks in the United States. Failing banks are characterized by rising asset losses, deteriorating solvency, and an increasing reliance on expensive noncore funding. These commonalities imply that bank failures are highly predictable using simple accounting metrics from publicly available financial statements. Failures with runs were common before deposit insurance, but these failures are strongly related to weak fundamentals, casting doubt on the importance of non-fundamental runs. Furthermore, low recovery rates on failed banks' assets suggest that most failed banks were fundamentally insolvent, barring strong assumptions about the value destruction of receiverships. Altogether, our evidence suggests that the primary cause of bank failures and banking crises is almost always and everywhere a deterioration of bank fundamentals.

  • Open Access

    The Debt-Inflation Channel of the German (Hyper-)Inflation

    by Markus K. Brunnermeier, Sergio Correia, Stephan Luck, Emil Verner, Tom Zimmermann

    This paper studies how a large increase in the price level is transmitted to the real economy through firm balance sheets. Using newly digitized macro- and micro-level data from the German inflation of 1919-1923, we show that inflation led to a large reduction in real debt burdens and bankruptcies. Firms with higher nominal liabilities at the onset of inflation experienced a larger decline in interest expenses, a relative increase in their equity values, and higher employment during the inflation. The results are consistent with real effects of a debt-inflation channel that operates even when prices and wages are flexible.

  • Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail?

    by Kristian Blickle, Markus Brunnermeier, Stephan Luck

    We study the run on the German banking system in 1931 to understand whether depositors anticipate which banks will fail in a major financial crisis. We find that deposits decline by around 20% during the run. There is an equal outflow of retail and nonfinancial wholesale deposits from both failing and surviving banks. In contrast, we find that interbank deposits almost exclusively decline for failing banks. Our evidence suggests that banks are better informed about which fellow banks will fail. In turn, banks being informed allows the interbank market to continue providing liquidity even during times of severe financial distress.


  • Open Access

    The Valuation of Collateral in Bank Lending – CORRIGENDUM

    by Stephan Luck, João A. C. Santos

    The Valuation of Collateral in Bank Lending – CORRIGENDUM


  • The Valuation of Collateral in Bank Lending

    by Stephan Luck, João A. C. Santos

    We study the valuation of collateral by comparing spreads on loans by the same bank, to the same borrower, at the same origination date, but backed by different types of collateral. Pledging collateral reduces borrowing costs by 23 BPS on average. The effect varies across different types of collateral, with marketable securities being most valuable, and real estate and accounts receivables and inventory being more valuable than fixed assets and a blanket lien. Further, the rate reduction from pledging collateral is sensitive to the value of the underlying collateral, and collateral tends to be more valuable for smaller and private firms and for loans with longer maturity.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Pandemics Depress the Economy, Public Health Interventions Do Not: Evidence from the 1918 Flu

    by Sergio Correia, Stephan Luck, Emil Verner

    We study the impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) on mortality and economic activity across U.S. cities during the 1918 Flu Pandemic. The combination of fast and stringent NPIs reduced peak mortality by 50 percent and cumulative excess mortality by 24 to 34 percent. However, while the pandemic itself was associated with short-run economic disruptions, we find that these disruptions were similar across cities with strict and lenient NPIs. NPIs also did not worsen medium-run economic outcomes. Our findings indicate that NPIs can reduce disease transmission without further depressing economic activity, a finding also reflected in discussions in contemporary newspapers.


  • Open Access

    Digitizing Historical Balance Sheet Data: A Practitioner's Guide

    by Sergio Correia, Stephan Luck

    This paper discusses how to successfully digitize large-scale historical micro-data by augmenting optical character recognition (OCR) engines with pre- and post-processing methods. Although OCR software has improved dramatically in recent years due to improvements in machine learning, off-the-shelf OCR applications still present high error rates which limit their applications for accurate extraction of structured information. Complementing OCR with additional methods can however dramatically increase its success rate, making it a powerful and cost-efficient tool for economic historians. This paper showcases these methods and explains why they are useful. We apply them against two large balance sheet datasets and introduce quipucamayoc, a Python package containing these methods in a unified framework.