Olivier Levillain
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Olivier Levillain has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hervé Debar
Telecom Sudparis, SAMOVAR UMR 5157
3 shared publications - Adam Oumar Abdel-Rahman
Samovar, Télécom SudParis, Institut Polytechnique de Paris
1 shared publication - Aina Toky Rasoamanana
Samovar, Institut Polytechnique de Paris
1 shared publication Arnaud Ébalard
ANSSI, Paris, France
1 shared publication- Arthur Tran Van
SAMOVAR, Télécom SudParis, Institut Polytechnique de Paris, France
1 shared publication - Aurelien Francillon
EURECOM, Sophia Antipolis, France
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 13 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 326-347
WasmStone: Enabling Transparent Execution of Standalone WebAssembly Applications in Keystone
- 13 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 326-347
WasmStone: Enabling Transparent Execution of Standalone WebAssembly Applications in Keystone
- 2 April 2026
- Published by Agence Bibliographique de l'Enseignement Supérieur
A study of the TLS ecosystem
Une étude de l’écosystème TLS: SSL/TLS, un protocole de sécurité datant de 1995, est devenu aujourd'hui une brique essentielle pour la sécurité des communications, depuis les sites de commerce en ligne ou les réseaux sociaux jusqu'aux réseaux privés virtuels (VPN), en passant par la protection des protocoles de messagerie électronique, et de nombreux autres protocoles. Ces dernières années, SSL/TLS a été l'objet de toutes les attentions, menant à la découverte de nombreuses failles de sécurité et à des améliorations du protocole. Dans cette thèse, nous commençons par explorer l'écosystème SSL/TLS sur Internet en énumérant les serveurs HTTPS sur l'espace IPv4; nous proposons pour cela des méthodologies de collecte et d'analyse permettant d'obtenir des résultats reproductibles et comparables entre différentes campagnes de mesure. Au-delà de ces observations, nous nous sommes intéressés en détail à deux aspects essentiels de la sécurité TLS: comment parer les attaques sur le Record Protocol, et comment implémenter des parsers sûrs et efficaces. Finalement, en se basant sur les nombreuses failles d'implémentation qui ont affecté presque toutes les piles TLS ces dernières années, nous tirons quelques enseignements concernant les difficultés liées à l'écriture d'une bibliothèque TLS de confiance
- 2 April 2026
- Published by Agence Bibliographique de l'Enseignement Supérieur
A study of the TLS ecosystem
Une étude de l’écosystème TLS: SSL/TLS, un protocole de sécurité datant de 1995, est devenu aujourd'hui une brique essentielle pour la sécurité des communications, depuis les sites de commerce en ligne ou les réseaux sociaux jusqu'aux réseaux privés virtuels (VPN), en passant par la protection des protocoles de messagerie électronique, et de nombreux autres protocoles. Ces dernières années, SSL/TLS a été l'objet de toutes les attentions, menant à la découverte de nombreuses failles de sécurité et à des améliorations du protocole. Dans cette thèse, nous commençons par explorer l'écosystème SSL/TLS sur Internet en énumérant les serveurs HTTPS sur l'espace IPv4; nous proposons pour cela des méthodologies de collecte et d'analyse permettant d'obtenir des résultats reproductibles et comparables entre différentes campagnes de mesure. Au-delà de ces observations, nous nous sommes intéressés en détail à deux aspects essentiels de la sécurité TLS: comment parer les attaques sur le Record Protocol, et comment implémenter des parsers sûrs et efficaces. Finalement, en se basant sur les nombreuses failles d'implémentation qui ont affecté presque toutes les piles TLS ces dernières années, nous tirons quelques enseignements concernant les difficultés liées à l'écriture d'une bibliothèque TLS de confiance
- 10 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 163-185
Striking Back at Cobalt: Using Network Traffic Metadata to Detect Cobalt Strike Masquerading Command and Control Channels
- 10 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 163-185
Striking Back at Cobalt: Using Network Traffic Metadata to Detect Cobalt Strike Masquerading Command and Control Channels
- Open Access
- 30 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-10
Mealy Verifier: An Automated, Exhaustive, and Explainable Methodology for Analyzing State Machines in Protocol Implementations
Many network protocol specifications are long and lack clarity, which paves the way to implementation errors. Such errors have led to vulnerabilities for secure protocols such as SSH and TLS. Active automata learning, a black-box method, is an efficient method to discover discrepancies between a specification and its implementation. It consists in extracting state machines by interacting with a network stack. It can be (and has been) combined with model checking to analyze the obtained state machines. Model checking is designed for exhibiting a single model violation instead of all model violations and thus leads to a limited understanding of implementation errors. As far as we are aware, there is only one specialized exhaustive method available for analyzing the outcomes of active automata learning applied to network protocols,Fiterau-Brostean’s method. We propose an alternative method, to improve the discovery of new bugs and vulnerabilities and enhance the exhaustiveness of model verification processes. In this article, we apply our method to two use cases: SSH, where we focus on the analysis of existing state machines and OPC UA, for which we present a full workflow from state machine inference to state machine analysis.
- 30 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-10
Open AccessMealy Verifier: An Automated, Exhaustive, and Explainable Methodology for Analyzing State Machines in Protocol Implementations
Many network protocol specifications are long and lack clarity, which paves the way to implementation errors. Such errors have led to vulnerabilities for secure protocols such as SSH and TLS. Active automata learning, a black-box method, is an efficient method to discover discrepancies between a specification and its implementation. It consists in extracting state machines by interacting with a network stack. It can be (and has been) combined with model checking to analyze the obtained state machines. Model checking is designed for exhibiting a single model violation instead of all model violations and thus leads to a limited understanding of implementation errors. As far as we are aware, there is only one specialized exhaustive method available for analyzing the outcomes of active automata learning applied to network protocols,Fiterau-Brostean’s method. We propose an alternative method, to improve the discovery of new bugs and vulnerabilities and enhance the exhaustiveness of model verification processes. In this article, we apply our method to two use cases: SSH, where we focus on the analysis of existing state machines and OPC UA, for which we present a full workflow from state machine inference to state machine analysis.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 35-48
X-Ray-TLS: Transparent Decryption of TLS Sessions by Extracting Session Keys from Memory
While internet communications have been originally all in the clear, the past decade has seen secure protocols like TLS becoming pervasive, significantly improving internet security for individuals and enterprises. However, encrypted traffic raises new challenges for intrusion detection and network monitoring. Existing interception solutions such as Man-In-The-Middle are undesirable in many settings: they tend to lower overall security or are challenging to use at scale. We present X-Ray-TLS, a new target-agnostic TLS decryption method that supports TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3, and QUIC. Our method relies only on existing kernel facilities and does not require a hypervisor or modification of the target programs, making it easily applicable at scale. X-Ray-TLS works on major TLS libraries by extracting TLS secrets from process memory using a memory changes reconstruction algorithm. It works with TLS hardening, such as certificate pinning and perfect forward secrecy. We benchmark X-Ray-TLS on major TLS libraries, CLI tools, and a web browser. We show that X-Ray-TLS significantly reduces the manual effort required to decrypt TLS traffic of programs running locally, thus simplifying security analysis or reverse engineering. We identified several use cases for X-Ray-TLS, such as large-scale TLS decryption for CI/CD pipelines to support the detection of software supply chain attacks.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 35-48
Open AccessX-Ray-TLS: Transparent Decryption of TLS Sessions by Extracting Session Keys from Memory
While internet communications have been originally all in the clear, the past decade has seen secure protocols like TLS becoming pervasive, significantly improving internet security for individuals and enterprises. However, encrypted traffic raises new challenges for intrusion detection and network monitoring. Existing interception solutions such as Man-In-The-Middle are undesirable in many settings: they tend to lower overall security or are challenging to use at scale. We present X-Ray-TLS, a new target-agnostic TLS decryption method that supports TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3, and QUIC. Our method relies only on existing kernel facilities and does not require a hypervisor or modification of the target programs, making it easily applicable at scale. X-Ray-TLS works on major TLS libraries by extracting TLS secrets from process memory using a memory changes reconstruction algorithm. It works with TLS hardening, such as certificate pinning and perfect forward secrecy. We benchmark X-Ray-TLS on major TLS libraries, CLI tools, and a web browser. We show that X-Ray-TLS significantly reduces the manual effort required to decrypt TLS traffic of programs running locally, thus simplifying security analysis or reverse engineering. We identified several use cases for X-Ray-TLS, such as large-scale TLS decryption for CI/CD pipelines to support the detection of software supply chain attacks.
- 16 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 185-199
A Privacy-Preserving Infrastructure to Monitor Encrypted DNS Logs
- 16 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 185-199
A Privacy-Preserving Infrastructure to Monitor Encrypted DNS Logs
- 24 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 637-657
Towards a Systematic and Automatic Use of State Machine Inference to Uncover Security Flaws and Fingerprint TLS Stacks
- 24 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 637-657
Towards a Systematic and Automatic Use of State Machine Inference to Uncover Security Flaws and Fingerprint TLS Stacks
- 12 February 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 87-104
Implementation Flaws in TLS Stacks: Lessons Learned and Study of TLS 1.3 Benefits
- 12 February 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 87-104
Implementation Flaws in TLS Stacks: Lessons Learned and Study of TLS 1.3 Benefits
- 2 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 169-184
Analysis of QUIC Session Establishment and Its Implementations
- 2 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 169-184
Analysis of QUIC Session Establishment and Its Implementations