Xin Zhao
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Xin Zhao has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Lei Wang
School of Economics, Ocean University of China, Qingdao, China
1 shared publication - Lili Ding
School of Economics, Ocean University of China, Qingdao, China
1 shared publication - Yu Bai
School of Economics, Ocean University of China, Qingdao, China and Marine Development Studies Institute of OUC, Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences at Universities, Ministry of Education, Qingdao, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 18 February 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 8, 47357-47369
Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Approach for Low-Carbon Power Grid Technology Cooperation With Government Intervention
Low-carbon technology innovation of power grid is vital for grid enterprises to improve their competitiveness and resource utilization efficiency. In this paper, a novel tripartite evolutionary game theory is proposed to examine the behavioral strategies of government, banks, and the grid enterprises in the low-carbon power grid technology innovation cooperation. The evolutionary replication dynamics equations are presented to study evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of participants. The meaningful simulation results are as follows: from the subsidy perspective, even if the government subsidies are phasing out, the ESS of the low-carbon grid technology cooperation still converges to the Pareto optimal equilibrium; from the cost perspective, the higher low-carbon technology innovation cost only slows down the evolution rate, while the higher business cost of carbon asset pledge credit and the lower incentive cost not only slow down the evolution rate but also change the evolution results. It shows that the business cost of carbon asset pledge credit has a greater impact on the evolution of the system than the incentive cost; from the benefit perspective, increasing the green revenue and the successful probability of the low-carbon technology innovation can both prompt the ESS to evolve to Pareto optimal state, and the effect of the former is greater than the latter. These results provide a theoretical guidance for government to promote the development of low-carbon technology innovation of power grid.
- 18 February 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 8, 47357-47369
Open AccessTripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Approach for Low-Carbon Power Grid Technology Cooperation With Government Intervention
Low-carbon technology innovation of power grid is vital for grid enterprises to improve their competitiveness and resource utilization efficiency. In this paper, a novel tripartite evolutionary game theory is proposed to examine the behavioral strategies of government, banks, and the grid enterprises in the low-carbon power grid technology innovation cooperation. The evolutionary replication dynamics equations are presented to study evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of participants. The meaningful simulation results are as follows: from the subsidy perspective, even if the government subsidies are phasing out, the ESS of the low-carbon grid technology cooperation still converges to the Pareto optimal equilibrium; from the cost perspective, the higher low-carbon technology innovation cost only slows down the evolution rate, while the higher business cost of carbon asset pledge credit and the lower incentive cost not only slow down the evolution rate but also change the evolution results. It shows that the business cost of carbon asset pledge credit has a greater impact on the evolution of the system than the incentive cost; from the benefit perspective, increasing the green revenue and the successful probability of the low-carbon technology innovation can both prompt the ESS to evolve to Pareto optimal state, and the effect of the former is greater than the latter. These results provide a theoretical guidance for government to promote the development of low-carbon technology innovation of power grid.