Geoff Kenny

Standard macroeconomic theories assume that representative or heterogeneous agents share a common model of how the economy operates. Yet evidence shows that households hold heterogeneous subjective models---distinct beliefs about how macroeconomic variables interact. As a result, identical shocks or policies may elicit different responses from otherwise similar households. We test this hypothesis by measuring subjective models and investigating their role in the transmission of monetary policy to consumption embedding randomized controlled experiment in a large-scale, multi-country survey. Consumers who believe that monetary tightening primarily operates through its effects on borrowing or savings rates plan to reduce consumption more in response to randomly assigned rate increase scenarios. By contrast, those who think about inflation or general equilibrium effects adjust consumption less. These differences are not explained by demographics, financial characteristics, including mortgage holdings and mortgage type, or country-level factors. Households' actual consumption responses to endogenous policy-rate changes exhibit broadly similar patterns. Our findings stress that heterogeneity in subjective models is an overlooked determinant of monetary policy transmission.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Global temperatures are rising rapidly, yet little is known about how consumers associate climate change with expectations about the macroeconomy. We address this gap by conducting a series of experiments within a large-scale, population-representative survey of euro area consumers. A 0.5°C rise scenario in global temperatures increases five-year-ahead inflation expectations by 0.65 percentage points. Effects are stronger among consumers with greater awareness of climate change. Additionally, consumers expect adverse effects of global warming on economic growth, employment, and tax burden. Many consumers demonstrate limited willingness to pay for mitigating further temperature increases. Instead, they place primary responsibility for climate action on governments.

We examine recent changes in stock market participation using newly available survey data from eleven euro area countries over the period 2020–2024. The evidence points to substantial turnover, with around 10% of non-stockholders entering the market each year, and more than 20% of stockholders exiting. New entrants tend to have lower education, income, financial literacy, and risk tolerance than established investors, indicating a shift in the composition of market participants. We also highlight the growing importance of cryptocurrency investments among retail investors. Overall, these findings shed new light on evolving household financial behavior and its implications for market participation and financial stability.

Using a large survey of euro area consumers, we conduct an experiment in which respondents report how they would adjust their labor market participation, hours worked, and job search effort (if not employed) in response to randomly assigned windfall gain scenarios. Windfall gains reduce labor supply, but only when the gains are substantial. At the extensive margin, gains of €25,000 or less have no effects, while gains between €50,000 and €100,000 reduce the probability of working by 1.5 to 3.5 percentage points. At the intensive margin, small gains produce no impact, while gains above €50,000 lead to a reduction of approximately one hour of work per week. The effects among women and workers near retirement are stronger. The share of non-employed respondents who stop or reduce job search intensity declines by 1 percentage point for each €10,000 in windfall gain, with the strongest effects observed among older individuals receiving €100,000.

We field a series of experiments in a population-representative survey of European consumers to examine their attitudes towards the possible introduction of a digital euro. First, we show that a short video explaining the key features of the digital euro is effective in changing consumers’ beliefs about such a new form of payment and increases the likelihood of adoption by 12pp relative to a control group that is not shown the video. Second, we find that on aggregate consumers would allocate a relatively small fraction from a positive wealth shock to digital euros and their allocation to other liquid assets would be little affected. Third, holding limits in the range of €1,000 to €10,000 have insignificant differential effects on the composition of liquid asset holdings. We also show that a non-trivial fraction of consumers report that they will not adopt the digital euro due to strong preferences for existing forms of payment.

Summary: We propose to treat survey‐based density expectations as compositional data when testing either for heterogeneity in density forecasts across different groups of agents or for changes over time. Monte Carlo simulations show that the proposed test has more power relative to both a bootstrap approach based on the KLIC and an approach that involves multiple testing for differences of individual parts of the density. In addition, the test is computationally much faster than the KLIC‐based one, which relies on simulations, and allows for comparisons across multiple groups. Using density expectations from the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters and the US Survey of Consumer Expectations, we show the usefulness of the test in detecting possible changes in density expectations over time and across different types of forecasters.

We implement a survey-based randomized information treatment that generates independent variation in the inflation expectations and the uncertainty about future inflation of European households. This variation allows us to assess how both first and second moments of inflation expectations separately affect subsequent household decisions. We document several key findings. First, higher inflation uncertainty leads households to reduce their subsequent durable goods purchases for several months, while a higher expected level of inflation increases them. Second, an increase in uncertainty about inflation induces households to tilt their portfolios towards safe and away from riskier asset holdings. Third, higher inflation uncertainty encourages household job search, leading to higher subsequent employment among the unemployed and less under-employment among the employed. Finally, we document that the level of inflation expectations has a different effect from uncertainty in inflation expectations and thus it is crucial to take into account both to measure their separate effects on decisions.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

This paper discusses the recent wave of research that has emphasized the importance of measures of consumers’ inflation expectations. In contrast to other measures of expected inflation, such as for experts or financial market participants, consumers’ inflation expectations capture the broader distribution of societal beliefs about inflation. This research has revealed very significant deviations from traditional assumptions about rationality in consumers’ expectations formation. However, households do act on their beliefs about inflation, though in heterogeneous ways that can depart from the predictions of conventional economic models. Recent euro area experiences highlight the importance of tracking the degree of anchoring in consumers’ inflation expectations in a way that considers their inherent complexity, heterogeneity, and subjectivity. On average, consumers’ medium and longer-term expectations deviate noticeably in levels from central bank targets and, in contrast with expert expectations, often co-move more closely with shorter-term inflation news. By stepping up their engagement with the wider public, central banks may be able to influence expectations by building up greater knowledge and trust and thereby support more effective monetary transmission. Communication efforts need to be persistent because central banks must compete with many other demands on consumers’ attention.

This paper discusses the recent wave of research that has emphasized the importance of measures of consumers’ inflation expectations. In contrast to other measures of expected inflation, such as for experts or financial market participants, consumers’ inflation expectations capture the broader distribution of societal beliefs about inflation. This research has revealed very significant deviations from traditional assumptions about rationality in consumers’ expectations formation. However, households do act on their beliefs about inflation, though in heterogeneous ways that can depart from the predictions of conventional economic models. Recent euro area experiences highlight the importance of tracking the degree of anchoring in consumers’ inflation expectations in a way that considers their inherent complexity, heterogeneity, and subjectivity. On average, consumers’ medium and longer-term expectations deviate noticeably in levels from central bank targets and, in contrast with expert expectations, often co-move more closely with shorter-term inflation news. By stepping up their engagement with the wider public, central banks may be able to influence expectations by building up greater knowledge and trust and thereby support more effective monetary transmission. Communication efforts need to be persistent because central banks must compete with many other demands on consumers’ attention. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.