Jana Bianca Jarecki
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Jana Bianca Jarecki has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jörg Rieskamp
8 shared publicationsFlorian Ismael Seitz
5 shared publicationsAndreas Wilke
2 shared publications- Jolene H. Tan
Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195, Berlin, Germany
2 shared publications - Andreas Wilke
Clarkson University
1 shared publication - Bettina von Helversen
Department of Psychology University of Bremen Bremen Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 September 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Disentangling Perceptual and Process-Related Sources of Behavioral Variability in Categorization
People often categorize the same object variably over time. Such intra-individualbehavioral variability can be difficult to identify, because it can be confused with abehavioral bias in binary data and it can originate in different stages of the cognitivecategorization mechanism. This article provides an overview of possible sources ofbehavioral variability in categorization, focusing on perceptual and cognitive processes. Todisentangle various sources of behavioral variability, a simulation with a similarity-basedcategorization model was run. The simulation shows that noise during perceptual andcognitive processes can lead to considerable misestimations of a response determinismparameter that tries to capture the variability in the responses. However, the binarycategory responses cannot discriminate between the different sources of variability, as theyall lead to similar response patterns across the stimuli. The continuous model predictions,in turn, can identify the source of the variability: Noise during feature perception leads tovariable predictions for central stimuli close to the category boundary. Noisy attention tothe features, in turn, increases the prediction variability for stimuli differing from eachcategory on another feature. Finally, more general noise during similarity computationincreases the prediction variability for the stimuli with moderate predictions. Measuringpeople’s category beliefs in a continuous way may therefore help disentangle perceptual andprocess-related sources of behavioral variability. Ultimately, this can inform interventionsaimed at making human categorizations more precise in specific domains by indicatingwhich steps of the categorization mechanism to target.
- 7 September 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessDisentangling Perceptual and Process-Related Sources of Behavioral Variability in Categorization
People often categorize the same object variably over time. Such intra-individualbehavioral variability can be difficult to identify, because it can be confused with abehavioral bias in binary data and it can originate in different stages of the cognitivecategorization mechanism. This article provides an overview of possible sources ofbehavioral variability in categorization, focusing on perceptual and cognitive processes. Todisentangle various sources of behavioral variability, a simulation with a similarity-basedcategorization model was run. The simulation shows that noise during perceptual andcognitive processes can lead to considerable misestimations of a response determinismparameter that tries to capture the variability in the responses. However, the binarycategory responses cannot discriminate between the different sources of variability, as theyall lead to similar response patterns across the stimuli. The continuous model predictions,in turn, can identify the source of the variability: Noise during feature perception leads tovariable predictions for central stimuli close to the category boundary. Noisy attention tothe features, in turn, increases the prediction variability for stimuli differing from eachcategory on another feature. Finally, more general noise during similarity computationincreases the prediction variability for the stimuli with moderate predictions. Measuringpeople’s category beliefs in a continuous way may therefore help disentangle perceptual andprocess-related sources of behavioral variability. Ultimately, this can inform interventionsaimed at making human categorizations more precise in specific domains by indicatingwhich steps of the categorization mechanism to target.
- Open Access
- 9 May 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Modeling the Category Variability Effect in an Exemplar-Similarity Framework
The category variability effect describes assigning objects to high-variability categories. We show that similarity-based categorization theories can predict the category variability effect and conduct a rigorous empirical test. In an optimized categorization experiment, participants learned to assign geometrical figures to a high-variability and a low-variability category and then categorized transfer stimuli located between the categories. We compared a formal model that ignores category variability (Euclidean model) to one that considers category variability (Mahalanobis model) during similarity computation. The data (N = 43) revealed that most participants did not show the category variability effect, in line with the Euclidean model. Nevertheless, the Mahalanobis model consistently described the participants that selected the high-variability category. This demonstrates that—contrary to previous claims—similarity can explain the category variability effect. However, in our data, most people do not seem to show the effect, maybe because the low-variability category was more coherent than the high-variability category.
- 9 May 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessModeling the Category Variability Effect in an Exemplar-Similarity Framework
The category variability effect describes assigning objects to high-variability categories. We show that similarity-based categorization theories can predict the category variability effect and conduct a rigorous empirical test. In an optimized categorization experiment, participants learned to assign geometrical figures to a high-variability and a low-variability category and then categorized transfer stimuli located between the categories. We compared a formal model that ignores category variability (Euclidean model) to one that considers category variability (Mahalanobis model) during similarity computation. The data (N = 43) revealed that most participants did not show the category variability effect, in line with the Euclidean model. Nevertheless, the Mahalanobis model consistently described the participants that selected the high-variability category. This demonstrates that—contrary to previous claims—similarity can explain the category variability effect. However, in our data, most people do not seem to show the effect, maybe because the low-variability category was more coherent than the high-variability category.
- Open Access
- 21 February 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Perceptual Similarity Mostly Ignores Within-Category Feature Distributions: Evidence From Computational Modeling of Human Categorizations
Categorizing objects is a fundamental human skill, which entails assigning objects to categories based on features. Within categories, the objects are distributed, meaning that in each category the object features may vary and correlate, and processing this distribution can improve categorizations. Whether people use the within-category feature distribution information to categorize objects is unclear due to mixed evidence. To investigate the role of within-category feature distributions in categorization, we designed two experiments, manipulating the variances and correlations of features within categories through simulation-based optimal experimental design. Using computational cognitive modeling in an exemplar-similarity framework, we compared a psychological process that ignores the within-category feature distributions (Euclidean similarity) to a process that considers the within-category feature distributions (Mahalanobis similarity). The experiments (both Ns = 43) clearly showed that most participants did not consider the within-category feature distributions, and their behavior is best described by the simpler Euclidean similarity. Nevertheless, a minority of participants were described by the Mahalanobis similarity, which considers the within-category feature distributions, even though their categorizations were less evident than those of the participants described by the Euclidean similarity. In sum, the results suggest that in categorization the psychological processing of similarities between objects is mostly invariant to the distribution from which the objects stem, which may be because itis computationally more costly to estimate the distribution of features in categories.
- 21 February 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessPerceptual Similarity Mostly Ignores Within-Category Feature Distributions: Evidence From Computational Modeling of Human Categorizations
Categorizing objects is a fundamental human skill, which entails assigning objects to categories based on features. Within categories, the objects are distributed, meaning that in each category the object features may vary and correlate, and processing this distribution can improve categorizations. Whether people use the within-category feature distribution information to categorize objects is unclear due to mixed evidence. To investigate the role of within-category feature distributions in categorization, we designed two experiments, manipulating the variances and correlations of features within categories through simulation-based optimal experimental design. Using computational cognitive modeling in an exemplar-similarity framework, we compared a psychological process that ignores the within-category feature distributions (Euclidean similarity) to a process that considers the within-category feature distributions (Mahalanobis similarity). The experiments (both Ns = 43) clearly showed that most participants did not consider the within-category feature distributions, and their behavior is best described by the simpler Euclidean similarity. Nevertheless, a minority of participants were described by the Mahalanobis similarity, which considers the within-category feature distributions, even though their categorizations were less evident than those of the participants described by the Euclidean similarity. In sum, the results suggest that in categorization the psychological processing of similarities between objects is mostly invariant to the distribution from which the objects stem, which may be because itis computationally more costly to estimate the distribution of features in categories.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-9
Risk-Taking Behaviors
- Open Access
- 24 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in DECISION
- Vol. 49 (1) , 65-90
Comparing attribute-based and memory-based preferential choice
Common theories of multiattribute preferential choice predict that people choose options that have on average better attribute values than alternative options. However, following an alternative memory-based view on preferences people might sometimes prefer options that are more similar to memorized options that were experienced positively in the past. In two incentivized preferential choice experiments (N =32,N =28), we empirically compare these theoretical accounts, finding support for the memory-based value theory. Computational modeling using predictive model comparison showed that only a few participants could be described by a model that uses sums of subjectively weighted attribute values when experience was available. Most participants’ choices resembled the predictions of the memory-based model, according to which preferences are based on the similarity between novel and old memorized options. Further, people whose experience consisted of direct sensory exposure, like tasting a portion of food, were also those with higher likelihoods of a memory-based process, compared to people whose exposure was indirect. These results highlight the central role of memory and experience in preferential choices and add to the growing evidence for memory and similarity-based processes in the domain of human preferences.
- 24 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in DECISION
- Vol. 49 (1) , 65-90
Open AccessComparing attribute-based and memory-based preferential choice
Common theories of multiattribute preferential choice predict that people choose options that have on average better attribute values than alternative options. However, following an alternative memory-based view on preferences people might sometimes prefer options that are more similar to memorized options that were experienced positively in the past. In two incentivized preferential choice experiments (N =32,N =28), we empirically compare these theoretical accounts, finding support for the memory-based value theory. Computational modeling using predictive model comparison showed that only a few participants could be described by a model that uses sums of subjectively weighted attribute values when experience was available. Most participants’ choices resembled the predictions of the memory-based model, according to which preferences are based on the similarity between novel and old memorized options. Further, people whose experience consisted of direct sensory exposure, like tasting a portion of food, were also those with higher likelihoods of a memory-based process, compared to people whose exposure was indirect. These results highlight the central role of memory and experience in preferential choices and add to the growing evidence for memory and similarity-based processes in the domain of human preferences.
- 29 September 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
- Vol. 75 (1) , 1-17
The influence of sample size on preferences from experience
People often learn from experience about the distribution of outcomes of risky options. Typically, people draw small samples, when they can actively sample information from risky gambles to make decisions. We examine how the size of the sample that people experience in decision from experience affects their preferences between risky options. In two studies ( N = 40 each), we manipulated the size of samples that people could experience from risky gambles and measured subjective selling prices and the confidence in selling price judgements after sampling. The results show that, on average, sample size influenced neither the selling prices nor confidence. However, cognitive modelling of individual-level learning showed that around half of the participants could be classified as Bayesian learners, whereas the other half adhered to a frequentist learning strategy and that if learning was cognitively simpler more participants adhered to the latter. The observed selling prices of Bayesian learners changed with sample size as predicted by Bayesian principles, whereas sample size affected the judgements of frequentist learners much less. These results illustrate the variability in how people learn from sampled information and provide an explanation for why sample size often does not affect judgements.
- 29 September 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
- Vol. 75 (1) , 1-17
The influence of sample size on preferences from experience
People often learn from experience about the distribution of outcomes of risky options. Typically, people draw small samples, when they can actively sample information from risky gambles to make decisions. We examine how the size of the sample that people experience in decision from experience affects their preferences between risky options. In two studies ( N = 40 each), we manipulated the size of samples that people could experience from risky gambles and measured subjective selling prices and the confidence in selling price judgements after sampling. The results show that, on average, sample size influenced neither the selling prices nor confidence. However, cognitive modelling of individual-level learning showed that around half of the participants could be classified as Bayesian learners, whereas the other half adhered to a frequentist learning strategy and that if learning was cognitively simpler more participants adhered to the latter. The observed selling prices of Bayesian learners changed with sample size as predicted by Bayesian principles, whereas sample size affected the judgements of frequentist learners much less. These results illustrate the variability in how people learn from sampled information and provide an explanation for why sample size often does not affect judgements.
- Open Access
- 21 June 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
People are Insensitive to Within-Category Feature Correlations in Categorization
This work compares two types of psychological similarity in categorization. Similarity is a central component of categorization theories. Exemplar theories, for instance, assume that people categorize new exemplars based on their similarity to previous category members. Traditionally, the underlying psychological similarity is based on the sum of two exemplars' squared feature value differences (Euclidean similarity). The Euclidean similarity, however, ignores the distribution of exemplars within categories by assuming uncorrelated features within categories. The Mahalanobis similarity, in turn, extends the Euclidean similarity by accounting for within-category feature correlations. Results from machine learning have shown that in categorization problems involving correlated features within categories, the Mahalanobis similarity can outperform the Euclidean similarity. On the empirical side, results from psychology indicate that people can be sensitive to within-category feature correlations: Some findings suggest a general sensitivity for within-category feature correlations, yet others have argued that this sensitivity depends on the category structure, task format, and amount of training. The present work rigorously tested the correlation-insensitive Euclidean similarity against the correlation-sensitive Mahalanobis similarity to investigate if people use within-category feature correlations in categorization.
- 21 June 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessPeople are Insensitive to Within-Category Feature Correlations in Categorization
This work compares two types of psychological similarity in categorization. Similarity is a central component of categorization theories. Exemplar theories, for instance, assume that people categorize new exemplars based on their similarity to previous category members. Traditionally, the underlying psychological similarity is based on the sum of two exemplars' squared feature value differences (Euclidean similarity). The Euclidean similarity, however, ignores the distribution of exemplars within categories by assuming uncorrelated features within categories. The Mahalanobis similarity, in turn, extends the Euclidean similarity by accounting for within-category feature correlations. Results from machine learning have shown that in categorization problems involving correlated features within categories, the Mahalanobis similarity can outperform the Euclidean similarity. On the empirical side, results from psychology indicate that people can be sensitive to within-category feature correlations: Some findings suggest a general sensitivity for within-category feature correlations, yet others have argued that this sensitivity depends on the category structure, task format, and amount of training. The present work rigorously tested the correlation-insensitive Euclidean similarity against the correlation-sensitive Mahalanobis similarity to investigate if people use within-category feature correlations in categorization.
- Open Access
- 13 May 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
How Goals Erase Framing Effects in Risky Decision Making
Evidence has shown that goals systematically change risk preferences in repeated decisions under risk. For instance, decision makers could aim to reach goals in a limited time, such as “making at least $1000 with ten stock investments within a year.” We test whether goal-based risky decisions differ when facing gains as compared to losses. More specifically, we examine the impact of outcome framing (gains vs. losses) and state framing (positive vs. negative resource states) on goal-based risky decisions. Our results (N=100) reveal no framing effects; instead, we find a consistently strong effect of the goal on risk preferences independent of framing. Computational modeling showed that a dynamic version of prospect theory, with a goal-dependent reference point, described 87% of participants best. This model treats outcomes as gains and losses depending on the state-goal distance. Our results show how goals can erase standard framing effects observed in risky choices without goals.
- 13 May 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessHow Goals Erase Framing Effects in Risky Decision Making
Evidence has shown that goals systematically change risk preferences in repeated decisions under risk. For instance, decision makers could aim to reach goals in a limited time, such as “making at least $1000 with ten stock investments within a year.” We test whether goal-based risky decisions differ when facing gains as compared to losses. More specifically, we examine the impact of outcome framing (gains vs. losses) and state framing (positive vs. negative resource states) on goal-based risky decisions. Our results (N=100) reveal no framing effects; instead, we find a consistently strong effect of the goal on risk preferences independent of framing. Computational modeling showed that a dynamic version of prospect theory, with a goal-dependent reference point, described 87% of participants best. This model treats outcomes as gains and losses depending on the state-goal distance. Our results show how goals can erase standard framing effects observed in risky choices without goals.
- Open Access
- 1 December 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Risk Preferences and Risk Perception Affect the Acceptance of Digital Contact Tracing
Digital contact-tracing applications (DCTAs) can control the spread of epidemics, like the COVID-19 pandemic. But people in Western societies fail to accept DCTAs. Understanding the low acceptance is key to policymakers who support DCTAs to avoid harsh nationwide lock-downs. In a preregistered study in a representative Swiss sample(N=757), we compare the role of individual risk perception, risk preferences, social preferences, and social values in the acceptance of and compliance with DCTA. The results show a low acceptance of DCTAs but high compliance with the measures recommended by DCTAs. Risk preferences and perceptions, but not social preferences, influenced accepting DCTAs; a high health risk perception and a low data-security risk perception increased acceptance. Additionally, supporting political measures, technical abilities, and understanding the DCTA functionality had large effects on accepting DCTAs. Therefore, we recommend highlighting personal health risks and clearly explaining DCTAs, focusing on data security, to enhance DCTA acceptance.
- 1 December 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessRisk Preferences and Risk Perception Affect the Acceptance of Digital Contact Tracing
Digital contact-tracing applications (DCTAs) can control the spread of epidemics, like the COVID-19 pandemic. But people in Western societies fail to accept DCTAs. Understanding the low acceptance is key to policymakers who support DCTAs to avoid harsh nationwide lock-downs. In a preregistered study in a representative Swiss sample(N=757), we compare the role of individual risk perception, risk preferences, social preferences, and social values in the acceptance of and compliance with DCTA. The results show a low acceptance of DCTAs but high compliance with the measures recommended by DCTAs. Risk preferences and perceptions, but not social preferences, influenced accepting DCTAs; a high health risk perception and a low data-security risk perception increased acceptance. Additionally, supporting political measures, technical abilities, and understanding the DCTA functionality had large effects on accepting DCTAs. Therefore, we recommend highlighting personal health risks and clearly explaining DCTAs, focusing on data security, to enhance DCTA acceptance.
- Open Access
- 15 July 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Cognitivemodels: An R Package for Formal Cognitive Modeling
We introduce cognitivemodels---a free software package for formal cognitive modeling in the statistical programming environment R. The package offers novice modelers a collection of models and offers experienced modelers a back-end for model development. This paper introduces the syntax of the package by example. The models in the software package include, for instance, the generalized context model for categorization (Nosofsky, 1986), cumulative prospect theory for risky choice (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), and a Bayesian probability learning model. The package allows modelers to estimate model parameters and to constrain parameters by box constraints and equality constraints; it also allows to select choice rules such as soft maximum, epsilon greedy, or Luce's rule. It further offers modelers a selection of goodness of fit measures such as a binomial or normal log-likelihood and mean-squared error, and a selection of 22 numeric optimization routines for parameter estimation. We believe this software package may facilitate the usage and testing of formal cognitive theories and may increase the robustness of cognitive modeling.
- 15 July 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessCognitivemodels: An R Package for Formal Cognitive Modeling
We introduce cognitivemodels---a free software package for formal cognitive modeling in the statistical programming environment R. The package offers novice modelers a collection of models and offers experienced modelers a back-end for model development. This paper introduces the syntax of the package by example. The models in the software package include, for instance, the generalized context model for categorization (Nosofsky, 1986), cumulative prospect theory for risky choice (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), and a Bayesian probability learning model. The package allows modelers to estimate model parameters and to constrain parameters by box constraints and equality constraints; it also allows to select choice rules such as soft maximum, epsilon greedy, or Luce's rule. It further offers modelers a selection of goodness of fit measures such as a binomial or normal log-likelihood and mean-squared error, and a selection of 22 numeric optimization routines for parameter estimation. We believe this software package may facilitate the usage and testing of formal cognitive theories and may increase the robustness of cognitive modeling.