JPJohn V. Petrocelli

John V. Petrocelli

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


John V. Petrocelli has a total of 33 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    When fools have greater influence than liars: testing the insidious bullshit hypothesis with the illusory truth effect

    by John V. Petrocelli, Elijah N. Rice, Joseph M. Curran

    In an era of viral misinformation and pervasive truth-indifferent communication, understanding what shapes everyday beliefs about what is true has never been more consequential. Little is known about the consequences of Frankfurtian bullshit (i.e., communications with little to no regard for truth, evidence, or established knowledge). A potential consequence of Frankfurtian bullshit is a deleterious effect on what people perceive to be true. Three experiments test the insidious bullshit hypotheses (i.e., bullshitting is evaluated less negatively, but has more negative consequences, than lying) in light of an illusory truth effect (i.e., repeated, false statements are easier to mentally process, and subsequently perceived as more truthful, than new statements). Experiment 1 ( N = 204) analyses revealed that statements from an alleged bullshitter or average person are perceived as equally true, and more true than the very same statements made by a liar. Experiment 2 ( N = 293) and Experiment 3 ( N = 318) revealed bullshitters reliably produce a more extreme illusory truth effect than do objective/honest communicators and liars. Together, these findings suggest that truth-indifferent communication may pose a greater and more insidious threat to public belief than deliberate deception—not because bullshitters intend to mislead, but precisely because they do not.

  • A Reply to Obenauer (2025): On the Empirical Distinctions Between Bullshitting and Lying

    by John V. Petrocelli, Kohyar Kiazad, Simon Lloyd D. Restubog, Fan Xuan (Jordan) Chen


  • Bullshitting and Bullibility – Conditions and Consequences

    by John V. Petrocelli, Yanying Li, Enhui Wang, Joseph M. Curran

    Bullshitting involves communicating with little to no regard for truth, established knowledge, or genuine evidence in a way that helps people impress, persuade, influence, or confuse others, or to embellish or explain things in an area in which their obligations to provide opinions exceed their actual knowledge in those domains. Put another way, bullshitting encompasses a set of rhetorical strategies employed to help a person sound like they know what they are talking about when they really do not. Although bullshit can be useful to individual bullshitters as a persuasive tool, it can have considerable negative consequences for learning, memory, attitudes, opinions, and beliefs about what is believed to be true. Deeper understanding of the conditions under which bullshitting and general bullibility (i.e., consistent failure to discern bullshit from nonbullshit despite social cues signaling something is bullshit) are likely to emerge should position observers with a more successful vantage point to detect this deceptive behavior in others.


  • Open Access

    Lies and bullshit: The negative effects of misinformation grow stronger over time

    by John V. Petrocelli, Catherine E. Seta, John J. Seta

    In a world where exposure to untrustworthy communicators is common, trust has become more important than ever for effective marketing. Nevertheless, we know very little about the long‐term consequences of exposure to untrustworthy sources, such bullshitters. This research examines how untrustworthy sources—liars and bullshitters—influence consumer attitudes toward a product. Frankfurt's (1986) insidious bullshit hypothesis (i.e., bullshitting is evaluated less negatively than lying but bullshit can be more harmful than are lies) is examined within a traditional sleeper effect—a persuasive influence that increases, rather than decays over time. We obtained a sleeper effect after participants learned that the source of the message was either a liar or a bullshitter. However, compared to the liar source condition, the same message from a bullshitter resulted in more extreme immediate and delayed attitudes that were in line with an otherwise discounted persuasive message (i.e., an advertisement). Interestingly, attitudes returned to control condition levels when a bullshitter was the source of the message, suggesting that knowing an initially discounted message may be potentially accurate/inaccurate (as is true with bullshit, but not lies) does not result in the long‐term discounting of that message. We discuss implications for marketing and other contexts of persuasion.


  • Open Access

    Countering conspiracy theory beliefs: Understanding the conjunction fallacy and considering disconfirming evidence

    by Lindsay M. Stall, John V. Petrocelli

    Research suggests that a number of cognitive processes—including pattern perception, intentionality bias, proportionality bias, and confirmation bias—may underlie belief in a conspiracy theory. However, there are reasons to believe that conspiracy theory beliefs also depend in part on a failure to understand the probability of actual events allegedly supporting those conspiracy theories as well as a failure to entertain disconfirming evidence that may contradict those beliefs. Study 1 examines the relationships between general beliefs in conspiracy theories, belief in a novel conspiracy theory, conjunctive error propensity, and the propensity to consider disconfirming evidence. Study 2 investigates the roles of confronting both the propensity to make conjunctive errors and the failure to consider disconfirming evidence in changing conspiracy theory beliefs as well as attitudes associated with those beliefs. The results of both studies suggest that corrections to one's propensity to make conjunctive errors and mindful consideration of disconfirming evidence may serve as viable methods of self‐persuasion pertaining to conspiracy theory beliefs.


  • Social perception and influence of lies vs. bullshit: a test of the insidious bullshit hypothesis

    by John V. Petrocelli, Haley E. Silverman, Samantha X. Shang


  • Politically oriented bullshit detection: Attitudinally conditional bullshit receptivity and bullshit sensitivity

    by John V. Petrocelli

    Bullshit results from communicating with little to no regard for truth, evidence, or established knowledge (Frankfurt, 1986; Petrocelli, 2018a). Such disregard for truth serves as a common source of antiscientific beliefs and endorsement of alternative facts and is thereby critical to understand. To examine how social perceptions of bullshit may be conditional upon the political orientation of a source and the extremity of one’s political attitudes, two experiments manipulated the alleged political source of bullshit messages and measured the direction and strength of political orientation. In Experiment 1, participants rated the profundity of nonsense statements allegedly stated by high-profile left/liberal or right/conservative political leaders. Experiment 2 participants rated the profundity of both bullshit statements and factual quotations regarding innovation. Results of both experiments suggest that bullshit receptivity and bullshit sensitivity are dependent on the alignment of the source’s bullshit content with the direction and extremity of one’s political attitudes.


  • Bullshitting and persuasion: The persuasiveness of a disregard for the truth

    by John V. Petrocelli

    Although generally viewed as a common and undesirable social behaviour, very little is known about the nature of bullshitting (i.e., communicating with little to no regard for evidence or truth; Raritan Q Rev 6 , 1986, 81); its consequences; and its potential communicative utility. Specifically, it is hypothesized that bullshitting may be may be relatively influential under specified conditions. Experiment 1 participants were exposed to a traditional persuasion paradigm, receiving either strong or weak arguments in either an evidence‐based or bullshit frame. Experiment 2 also incorporated a manipulation of a peripheral route cue (i.e., source attractiveness). Findings demonstrate that bullshitting can be an effective means of influence when arguments are weak, yet undermine persuasive attempts when arguments are strong. Results also suggest that bullshit frames may cue peripheral route processing of persuasive information relative to evidence‐based frames that appear to cue central route processing. Results are discussed in light of social perception and attitude change.