Yushan Jiang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Yushan Jiang has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yuan Hu
Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
1 shared publication - Zhen Peng
School of Business, Hubei University, Wuhan 430062, China
1 shared publication - Zhiqiang Hu
Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Pricing Constraint and the Complexity of IPO Timing in the Stock Market: A Dynamic Game Analysis
The timing of an initial public offering (IPO) is a complex dynamic game in the stock market. Based on a dynamic game model with the real option, this paper investigates the relationship between pricing constraint and the complexity of IPO timing in the stock market, and further discusses its mechanism. The model shows that the IPO pricing constraint reduced the exercise value of the real option of IPO timing, thus restricting the enterprise’s independent timing and promoting an earlier listing. The IPO price limit has a stronger effect on high-trait enterprises, such as technology enterprises. Lowering the upper limit of the pricing constraint increases the probability that enterprises are bound by this restriction during IPO. A high discount cost and stock-market volatility are also reasons for early listing. This paper suggests a theoretical explanation for the mechanism of the pricing constraint on IPO timing in the complex market environment, which is an extension of IPO timing theory, itself an interpretation of the IPO behavior of Chinese enterprises. These findings provide new insights in understanding the complexity of IPOs in relation to the Chinese stock market.
Open AccessPricing Constraint and the Complexity of IPO Timing in the Stock Market: A Dynamic Game Analysis
The timing of an initial public offering (IPO) is a complex dynamic game in the stock market. Based on a dynamic game model with the real option, this paper investigates the relationship between pricing constraint and the complexity of IPO timing in the stock market, and further discusses its mechanism. The model shows that the IPO pricing constraint reduced the exercise value of the real option of IPO timing, thus restricting the enterprise’s independent timing and promoting an earlier listing. The IPO price limit has a stronger effect on high-trait enterprises, such as technology enterprises. Lowering the upper limit of the pricing constraint increases the probability that enterprises are bound by this restriction during IPO. A high discount cost and stock-market volatility are also reasons for early listing. This paper suggests a theoretical explanation for the mechanism of the pricing constraint on IPO timing in the complex market environment, which is an extension of IPO timing theory, itself an interpretation of the IPO behavior of Chinese enterprises. These findings provide new insights in understanding the complexity of IPOs in relation to the Chinese stock market.