Magdalena Garvanova

Conspiracy beliefs vary substantially across countries and regions, yet the ecological factors underlying this variation remain largely unexplored. Drawing on behavioral immune system theory, which suggests that pathogen threat can heighten vigilance toward potential dangers, we examined whether pathogen prevalence predicts conspiracy beliefs. Study 1 analyzed four cross-national datasets (20-32 countries) and found that conspiracy beliefs were higher in countries with greater historical pathogen prevalence. Study 2 tested this relationship in a preregistered study using a larger sample (N = 15,503 from 55 countries) and found that historical pathogen prevalence predicted higher levels of conspiracy beliefs. Study 3 extended these findings to the US state level using data from 123,781 participants across 50 states. Finally, Study 4 (N = 493) experimentally manipulated perceived pathogen prevalence and found causal effects on generic and vaccine-related conspiracy beliefs. These findings extend behavioral immune system research by relating pathogen-rich ecologies to contemporary conspiracy thinking.

Public evaluation of those in power is fundamental to societal stability. However, how people judge powerholders depends on their positions within the socioeconomic hierarchy. Drawing on two large-scale cross-cultural studies encompassing 160 samples from 80 cultures, we examined whether socioeconomic status (SES) shapes how people appraise the motive of institutional powerholders. Though scepticism toward powerholders was widespread across the socioeconomic spectrum, higher-SES individuals consistently attributed lesser self-orientation and greater other-orientation to powerholders. In less corrupt societies, perceptions of powerholders were more favourable, and SES-based differences were more pronounced, indicating that the quality of national governance matters as well. In contrast, in highly corrupt national contexts, class-based distinctions largely disappeared. These findings suggest that viewing authorities as serving the common good may be both a privilege of one’s socioeconomic position and a privilege of living in a well-governed society. The results carry important implications for institutional legitimacy, social mobility, and the possible psychological foundations of populist movements.

This chapter presents the results of a nationally representative empirical sociological survey conducted in April 2023 among Bulgarian citizens (n=1,011), which aims to reveal the youth group (18–29 y.o.) as an active subject of the social change in the country. The obtained empirical findings show that the young people exemplify the new culture of transformational leadership through active participation in ecological causes, donation initiatives, educational campaigns, civic associations supporting democratic values, and socially responsible business environments. The general conclusion of the conducted research is that the young generations constitute Bulgaria’s great chance to achieve economic well-being and national prosperity.

Evolutionary theory and historical evidence suggest humans possess distinct psychological tendencies for defensive and offensive violence, which have insufficiently been considered in research. In a large-scale preregistered study across 58 countries ( N = 18,128), we demonstrate that violent extremist intentions manifest along two distinct psychological phenomena: defensive extremism, motivated by protecting one’s group from (perceived) threats, and offensive extremism, driven by establishing group dominance. We show that these dimensions a) can be reliably differentiated across diverse cultural contexts, b) are distinctively associated with psychological dispositions, and c) systematically differentiate countries varying in macrolevel sociopolitical functioning and violence. Across nations, a two-factorial structure was observed that was invariant at the scalar level. Defensive extremist intentions were consistently higher than offensive extremism in 56 out of 58 countries, suggesting greater moral acceptance of protective violence. While psychopathy was positively related to both types of violent extremist intentions, those high in Machiavellianism and narcissism demonstrated particularly higher levels of defensive extremist intentions. By contrast, those scoring high on religious fundamentalism and social dominance orientation demonstrated particularly higher levels of offensive extremist intentions. Unexpectedly, liberal political group identification was associated with higher offensive but lower defensive extremist intentions. Crucially, offensive (but not defensive) intentions were associated with macrolevel societal dysfunction, including political terror and internal conflict. These findings establish that defensive and offensive violent extremist intentions represent two conceptually different forms of extremism across a large and diverse range of countries, with consequences for research and practice.

Evolutionary theory and historical evidence suggest humans possess distinct psychological tendencies for defensive and offensive violence, which have insufficiently been considered in research. In a large-scale pre-registered study across 58 countries (N = 18,128), we demonstrate that violent extremist intentions manifest along two distinct psychological phenomena: defensive extremism, motivated by protecting one’s group from (perceived) threats, and offensive extremism, driven by establishing group dominance. We show that these dimensions can (a) be reliably differentiated across diverse cultural contexts, (b) are distinctively associated with psychological dispositions, and (c) systematically differentiate countries varying in macro-level sociopolitical functioning and violence. Across nations, a two-factorial structure was observed that was invariant at the scalar level. Defensive extremist intentions were consistently higher than offensive extremism in 56 out of 58 countries, suggesting greater moral acceptance of protective violence. While psychopathy was positively related to both types of violent extremist intentions, those high in Machiavellianism and narcissism demonstrated particularly higher levels of defensive extremist intentions. By contrast, those scoring high on religious fundamentalism and social dominance orientation demonstrated particularly higher levels of offensive extremist intentions. Unexpectedly, liberal political group identification was associated with higher offensive but lower defensive extremist intentions. Crucially, offensive (but not defensive) intentions were associated with macro-level societal function, including political terror and internal conflict. These findings establish that defensive and offensive violent extremist intentions represent two conceptually different forms of extremism across a large and diverse range of countries, with consequences for research and practice.