Hanlei Cheng

Ensuring edge data integrity is crucial for reliable and secure low-latency services in mobile edge computing. However, existing edge data integrity (EDI) schemes suffer from certain limitations. These include the generation of excessive communication overhead and significant time consumption due to multi-round communications between application vendors and individual edge servers during the integrity verification process. Additionally, there is a notable straggler effect when employing batch verification techniques. To overcome these challenges, this paper presents a pioneering solution scheme for per-edge one-round EDI, referred to as OR-EDI. The proposed scheme effectively mitigates communication overhead, reduces time consumption, and eliminates the straggler effect, while simultaneously maintaining a high level of corruption detection accuracy. To implement OR-EDI, we introduce a novel verification structure known as the Minimal Verification Tree (MVT) and devise algorithms for acquiring Auxiliary Verification Information (AVI) and constructing the MVT. To comprehensively evaluate the performance of OR-EDI, we conduct a rigorous analysis that encompasses its correctness, efficiency, and security aspects. Furthermore, we implement the proposed scheme and perform a comparative assessment against existing EDI schemes, presenting extensive experimental results. These results affirm the effectiveness and efficiency of OR-EDI in effectively addressing the challenges associated with EDI.

Blockchain technology (BCT) provides a new way to mitigate the default risks of lease contracts resulting from the information asymmetry in leasing. The conceptual architecture of a consortium blockchain-based leasing platform (CBLP) is first proposed to facilitate information sharing between small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs, the “lessees”) and leasing firms (LFs, the “lessors”). Then, based on evolutionary game theory (EGT), this study builds a two-party game model and analyzes the influences of four types of factors (i.e., information sharing, credit, incentive–penalty, and risk) on SMEs’ contract compliance or default behaviors with/without blockchain empowerment. The primary findings of this study are as follows: (1) SMEs and LFs eventually evolve to implement the ideal “win–win” strategies of complying with the contract and adopting BCT. (2) The large residual value of the leased asset can tempt SMEs to conduct a default action of unauthorized asset disposal, while leading LFs to access the CBLP to utilize information shared on-chain. (3) When the maintenance service is outsourced instead of being provided by lessors, the maintenance fee is not a core determinant affecting the equilibrium state. (4) There is a critical value concerning the default penalty on-chain to incentivize the involved parties to keep their commitments. (5) The capability of utilizing information, storage overhead, and security risk should all be taken into consideration when deciding on the optimal strategies for SMEs and LFs. This study provides comprehensive insights for designing an incentive mechanism to encourage lessees and lessors to cooperatively construct a sustainable and trustworthy leasing environment.