Guy Aridor
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Guy Aridor has a total of 35 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Aleksandrs Slivkins
Microsoft Research, New York, NY, USA
3 shared publications - Daniel Kluver
Dept. of Computer Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA
3 shared publications - Duarte Vasconcelos Gonçalves
Department of Economics University College London
3 shared publications - Joseph A. Konstan
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA
3 shared publications - Zhiwei Steven Wu
Carnegie Mellon University
3 shared publications - Ruoyan Kong
Department of Computer Science & Engineering, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 18 September 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 549-580
Experiments on social media
We provide a practical guide to designing, conducting, and analyzing experiments using social media platforms. First, we discuss the benefits and challenges of using the targeting capabilities of advertisements on social media to recruit participants for a large class of experiments. Next, we outline the different types of interventions and their advantages and disadvantages. Finally, we summarize available compliance and outcome data, as well as the main limitations and challenges involved in the design and analysis of social media experiments. Throughout, we provide technical details that are helpful when implementing these experiments. Overall, we argue that experiments on social media are powerful not only for studying economic issues around social media and online platforms but also for experiments studying economic behavior more broadly.
- 18 September 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 549-580
Experiments on social media
We provide a practical guide to designing, conducting, and analyzing experiments using social media platforms. First, we discuss the benefits and challenges of using the targeting capabilities of advertisements on social media to recruit participants for a large class of experiments. Next, we outline the different types of interventions and their advantages and disadvantages. Finally, we summarize available compliance and outcome data, as well as the main limitations and challenges involved in the design and analysis of social media experiments. Throughout, we provide technical details that are helpful when implementing these experiments. Overall, we argue that experiments on social media are powerful not only for studying economic issues around social media and online platforms but also for experiments studying economic behavior more broadly.
- 9 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 108
The value of personalized recommendations: Evidence from Netflix
- 9 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 108
The value of personalized recommendations: Evidence from Netflix
- 20 November 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Evaluating the Impact of Privacy Regulation on E-Commerce Firms: Evidence from Apple’s App Tracking Transparency
Assembling novel data sets on online advertiser spending, performance, and revenue, we quantify the economic effects of Apple’s App Tracking Transparency (ATT) privacy policy on e-commerce firms. We find that conversion-optimized Meta advertisements, affected most by ATT, saw a 37% reduction in click-through rates after ATT. Although firms responded by shifting ad spending from Meta to the Google ecosystem, firms with higher baseline Meta dependence nevertheless experienced a substantial decline in firm-wide revenue relative to firms with lower baseline Meta dependence. We quantify these effects using a variety of methods, finding revenue decreases in the range between 8% and 40% relative to less exposed firms. These declines were primarily borne by smaller e-commerce firms, raising questions about the tradeoffs between consumer privacy and the ability of smaller e-commerce and direct-to-consumer firms to succeed in the product market. This paper was accepted by Jean-Pierre Dube, marketing. Funding: This work was supported by the LEC Program on Economics & Privacy, MSI Research Grant [4001820]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06600 .
- 20 November 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Evaluating the Impact of Privacy Regulation on E-Commerce Firms: Evidence from Apple’s App Tracking Transparency
Assembling novel data sets on online advertiser spending, performance, and revenue, we quantify the economic effects of Apple’s App Tracking Transparency (ATT) privacy policy on e-commerce firms. We find that conversion-optimized Meta advertisements, affected most by ATT, saw a 37% reduction in click-through rates after ATT. Although firms responded by shifting ad spending from Meta to the Google ecosystem, firms with higher baseline Meta dependence nevertheless experienced a substantial decline in firm-wide revenue relative to firms with lower baseline Meta dependence. We quantify these effects using a variety of methods, finding revenue decreases in the range between 8% and 40% relative to less exposed firms. These declines were primarily borne by smaller e-commerce firms, raising questions about the tradeoffs between consumer privacy and the ability of smaller e-commerce and direct-to-consumer firms to succeed in the product market. This paper was accepted by Jean-Pierre Dube, marketing. Funding: This work was supported by the LEC Program on Economics & Privacy, MSI Research Grant [4001820]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06600 .
- Open Access
- 7 February 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
- Vol. 13 (1) , 1-47
Competing Bandits: The Perils of Exploration Under Competition
Most online platforms learn from interactions with users and engage in exploration : making potentially suboptimal choices to acquire new information. We study the interplay between exploration and competition : how such platforms balance the exploration for learning and competition for users. We consider a stylized duopoly in which two firms face the same multi-armed bandit problem. Users arrive one by one and choose between the two firms, so that each firm makes progress on its bandit problem only if it is chosen. We study whether competition incentivizes the adoption of better algorithms. We find that stark competition disincentivizes exploration, leading to low welfare. However, weaker competition incentivizes better exploration algorithms and increases welfare. We investigate two channels for weakening the competition: stochastic user choice models and a first-mover advantage. Our findings speak to the competition–innovation relationship and the first-mover advantage in the digital economy.
- 7 February 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
- Vol. 13 (1) , 1-47
Open AccessCompeting Bandits: The Perils of Exploration Under Competition
Most online platforms learn from interactions with users and engage in exploration : making potentially suboptimal choices to acquire new information. We study the interplay between exploration and competition : how such platforms balance the exploration for learning and competition for users. We consider a stylized duopoly in which two firms face the same multi-armed bandit problem. Users arrive one by one and choose between the two firms, so that each firm makes progress on its bandit problem only if it is chosen. We study whether competition incentivizes the adoption of better algorithms. We find that stark competition disincentivizes exploration, leading to low welfare. However, weaker competition incentivizes better exploration algorithms and increases welfare. We investigate two channels for weakening the competition: stochastic user choice models and a first-mover advantage. Our findings speak to the competition–innovation relationship and the first-mover advantage in the digital economy.
- Open Access
- 8 October 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1
The MovieLens Beliefs Dataset: Collecting Pre-Choice Data for Online Recommender Systems
An increasingly important aspect of designing recommender systems involves considering how recommendations will influence consumer choices. This paper addresses this issue by introducing a method for collecting user beliefs about un-experienced goods – a critical predictor of choice behavior. We implemented this method on the MovieLens platform, resulting in a rich dataset that combines user ratings, beliefs, and observed recommendations. We document challenges to such data collection, including selection bias in response and limited coverage of the product space. This unique resource empowers researchers to delve deeper into user behavior and analyze user choices absent recommendations, measure the effectiveness of recommendations, and prototype algorithms that leverage user belief data, ultimately leading to more impactful recommender systems. The dataset can be found at https://grouplens.org/datasets/movielens/ml_belief_2024/.
- 8 October 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1
Open AccessThe MovieLens Beliefs Dataset: Collecting Pre-Choice Data for Online Recommender Systems
An increasingly important aspect of designing recommender systems involves considering how recommendations will influence consumer choices. This paper addresses this issue by introducing a method for collecting user beliefs about un-experienced goods – a critical predictor of choice behavior. We implemented this method on the MovieLens platform, resulting in a rich dataset that combines user ratings, beliefs, and observed recommendations. We document challenges to such data collection, including selection bias in response and limited coverage of the product space. This unique resource empowers researchers to delve deeper into user behavior and analyze user choices absent recommendations, measure the effectiveness of recommendations, and prototype algorithms that leverage user belief data, ultimately leading to more impactful recommender systems. The dataset can be found at https://grouplens.org/datasets/movielens/ml_belief_2024/.
- Open Access
Information-Constrained Coordination of Economic Behavior
We analyze a coordination game with information-constrained players. The players' actions are based on a noisy compressed representation of the game's payoffs in a particular case, where the compressed representation is a latent state learned by a variational autoencoder (VAE). The VAE is trained over a finite sample of past experiences, and is optimized to trade off the average payoff obtained over a distribution of possible games against the reconstruction error involved in predicting game payoffs on the basis of the latent state. Our use of the average payoff in the training objective requires us to generalize the basic VAE framework of Kingma and Welling (2014); we also compare our proposal to rationally inattentive decision making as modeled by Sims (2003) and Yang (2015). We apply our model to the coordination game in the experiment of Frydman and Nunnari (2022), and show that it offers an explanation for two salient features of the experimental evidence: both the gradual adjustment of the players' action probabilities with changes in the game payoffs, and the dependence of the degree of stochasticity of players' choices on the range of game payoffs encountered on different trials. Our approach also provides an account of the way in which play should gradually adjust to a change in the distribution of game payoffs that are encountered, offering an explanation for the history-dependent play documented by Arifovic et al. (2013). * We thank Francesco Grechi for help exploring the numerical properties of VAE models,
Open AccessInformation-Constrained Coordination of Economic Behavior
We analyze a coordination game with information-constrained players. The players' actions are based on a noisy compressed representation of the game's payoffs in a particular case, where the compressed representation is a latent state learned by a variational autoencoder (VAE). The VAE is trained over a finite sample of past experiences, and is optimized to trade off the average payoff obtained over a distribution of possible games against the reconstruction error involved in predicting game payoffs on the basis of the latent state. Our use of the average payoff in the training objective requires us to generalize the basic VAE framework of Kingma and Welling (2014); we also compare our proposal to rationally inattentive decision making as modeled by Sims (2003) and Yang (2015). We apply our model to the coordination game in the experiment of Frydman and Nunnari (2022), and show that it offers an explanation for two salient features of the experimental evidence: both the gradual adjustment of the players' action probabilities with changes in the game payoffs, and the dependence of the degree of stochasticity of players' choices on the range of game payoffs encountered on different trials. Our approach also provides an account of the way in which play should gradually adjust to a change in the distribution of game payoffs that are encountered, offering an explanation for the history-dependent play documented by Arifovic et al. (2013). * We thank Francesco Grechi for help exploring the numerical properties of VAE models,
- Open Access
- 7 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 116
Drivers of Digital Attention: Evidence from a Social Media Experiment
In this paper I report the results of an experiment where I continuously monitor how participants spend time on digital services and shut off their access to Instagram or YouTube on their phones for 1 or 2 weeks. I use the resulting data on how participants substitute their time during and after the restrictions in order to uncover a rich picture of the demand for social media and entertainment applications. I illustrate how the estimated substitution patterns can be used to guide questions of market definition that have troubled regulators.
- 7 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 116
Open AccessDrivers of Digital Attention: Evidence from a Social Media Experiment
In this paper I report the results of an experiment where I continuously monitor how participants spend time on digital services and shut off their access to Instagram or YouTube on their phones for 1 or 2 weeks. I use the resulting data on how participants substitute their time during and after the restrictions in order to uncover a rich picture of the demand for social media and entertainment applications. I illustrate how the estimated substitution patterns can be used to guide questions of market definition that have troubled regulators.
- Open Access
- 7 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 117
The Economics of Recommender Systems: Evidence from a Field Experiment on MovieLens
We conduct a 6 month field experiment on a movie-recommendation platform to identify if and how recommendation systems affect consumption. We use within-consumer randomization at the good level and elicit beliefs about unconsumed goods to disentangle exposure from informational effects. We have three experimental groups: (a) control, (b) exposed, and (c) recommended + exposed goods where only goods in (c) are recommended and we elicit beliefs about goods in (b) and (c). Comparing across these treatment arms we find recommendations increase consumption beyond its role in exposing goods to consumers. We provide support for an informational mechanism: recommendations affect consumers' beliefs, which in turn explain consumption. Recommendations reduce uncertainty about goods consumers are most uncertain about and induce information acquisition. Finally, we find evidence for spatial correlation in beliefs.
- 7 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 117
Open AccessThe Economics of Recommender Systems: Evidence from a Field Experiment on MovieLens
We conduct a 6 month field experiment on a movie-recommendation platform to identify if and how recommendation systems affect consumption. We use within-consumer randomization at the good level and elicit beliefs about unconsumed goods to disentangle exposure from informational effects. We have three experimental groups: (a) control, (b) exposed, and (c) recommended + exposed goods where only goods in (c) are recommended and we elicit beliefs about goods in (b) and (c). Comparing across these treatment arms we find recommendations increase consumption beyond its role in exposing goods to consumers. We provide support for an informational mechanism: recommendations affect consumers' beliefs, which in turn explain consumption. Recommendations reduce uncertainty about goods consumers are most uncertain about and induce information acquisition. Finally, we find evidence for spatial correlation in beliefs.
- Open Access
Competing Bandits: The Perils of Exploration Under Competition
Most online platforms strive to learn from interactions with users, and many engage in exploration: making potentially suboptimal choices for the sake of acquiring new information. We study the interplay between exploration and competition: how such platforms balance the exploration for learning and the competition for users. Here users play three distinct roles: they are customers that generate revenue, they are sources of data for learning, and they are self-interested agents which choose among the competing platforms. We consider a stylized duopoly model in which two firms face the same multi-armed bandit problem. Users arrive one by one and choose between the two firms, so that each firm makes progress on its bandit problem only if it is chosen. Through a mix of theoretical results and numerical simulations, we study whether and to what extent competition incentivizes the adoption of better bandit algorithms, and whether it leads to welfare increases for users. We find that stark competition induces firms to commit to a "greedy" bandit algorithm that leads to low welfare. However, weakening competition by providing firms with some "free" users incentivizes better exploration strategies and increases welfare. We investigate two channels for weakening the competition: relaxing the rationality of users and giving one firm a first-mover advantage. Our findings are closely related to the "competition vs. innovation" relationship, and elucidate the first-mover advantage in the digital economy.
Open AccessCompeting Bandits: The Perils of Exploration Under Competition
Most online platforms strive to learn from interactions with users, and many engage in exploration: making potentially suboptimal choices for the sake of acquiring new information. We study the interplay between exploration and competition: how such platforms balance the exploration for learning and the competition for users. Here users play three distinct roles: they are customers that generate revenue, they are sources of data for learning, and they are self-interested agents which choose among the competing platforms. We consider a stylized duopoly model in which two firms face the same multi-armed bandit problem. Users arrive one by one and choose between the two firms, so that each firm makes progress on its bandit problem only if it is chosen. Through a mix of theoretical results and numerical simulations, we study whether and to what extent competition incentivizes the adoption of better bandit algorithms, and whether it leads to welfare increases for users. We find that stark competition induces firms to commit to a "greedy" bandit algorithm that leads to low welfare. However, weakening competition by providing firms with some "free" users incentivizes better exploration strategies and increases welfare. We investigate two channels for weakening the competition: relaxing the rationality of users and giving one firm a first-mover advantage. Our findings are closely related to the "competition vs. innovation" relationship, and elucidate the first-mover advantage in the digital economy.
- Open Access
The Economics of Recommender Systems: Evidence from a Field Experiment on MovieLens
We conduct a field experiment on a movie-recommendation platform to identify if and how recommendations affect consumption. We use within-consumer randomization at the good level and elicit beliefs about unconsumed goods to disentangle exposure from informational effects. We find recommendations increase consumption beyond its role in exposing goods to consumers. We provide support for an informational mechanism: recommendations affect consumers' beliefs, which in turn explain consumption. Recommendations reduce uncertainty about goods consumers are most uncertain about and induce information acquisition. Our results highlight the importance of recommender systems' informational role when considering policies targeting these systems in online marketplaces.
Open AccessThe Economics of Recommender Systems: Evidence from a Field Experiment on MovieLens
We conduct a field experiment on a movie-recommendation platform to identify if and how recommendations affect consumption. We use within-consumer randomization at the good level and elicit beliefs about unconsumed goods to disentangle exposure from informational effects. We find recommendations increase consumption beyond its role in exposing goods to consumers. We provide support for an informational mechanism: recommendations affect consumers' beliefs, which in turn explain consumption. Recommendations reduce uncertainty about goods consumers are most uncertain about and induce information acquisition. Our results highlight the importance of recommender systems' informational role when considering policies targeting these systems in online marketplaces.