Takashi Kunimoto
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Takashi Kunimoto has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Roberto Serrano
4 shared publicationsRene Saran
Department of Economics, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221
2 shared publicationsCuiling Zhang
1 shared publication- Cuiling Zhang
The Institute for Advanced Economic Research, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian, China
1 shared publication - Cuiling Zhang1 shared publication
- Paulo Ramos1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences
Are there ways to enforce incentives free of equilibrium considerations? When the normative goals for a set of agents can be summarized in a set-valued rule and agents take actions that are rationalizable, a new theory of incentives emerges in which standard Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) is relaxed significantly. The paper studies the interim rationalizable implementation of social choice sets with a Cartesian product structure, a leading example thereof being ex-post efficiency. Setwise incentive compatibility (setwise IC), much weaker than BIC, is shown to be necessary for implementation. Setwise IC enforces incentives flexibly within the entire correspondence, instead of the pointwise enforcement entailed by BIC. Sufficient conditions, while based on the existence of SCFs in the correspondence that make truthful revelation a dominant strategy, are shown to be permissive to allow the implementation of ex-post efficiency in many settings where equilibrium implementation fails (e.g., bilateral trading, multidimensional signals). Furthermore, this success comes at little cost: all our mechanisms are well behaved, in the sense that best responses always exist.
- 2 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessRationalizable Incentives: Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences
Are there ways to enforce incentives free of equilibrium considerations? When the normative goals for a set of agents can be summarized in a set-valued rule and agents take actions that are rationalizable, a new theory of incentives emerges in which standard Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) is relaxed significantly. The paper studies the interim rationalizable implementation of social choice sets with a Cartesian product structure, a leading example thereof being ex-post efficiency. Setwise incentive compatibility (setwise IC), much weaker than BIC, is shown to be necessary for implementation. Setwise IC enforces incentives flexibly within the entire correspondence, instead of the pointwise enforcement entailed by BIC. Sufficient conditions, while based on the existence of SCFs in the correspondence that make truthful revelation a dominant strategy, are shown to be permissive to allow the implementation of ex-post efficiency in many settings where equilibrium implementation fails (e.g., bilateral trading, multidimensional signals). Furthermore, this success comes at little cost: all our mechanisms are well behaved, in the sense that best responses always exist.
- 25 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 158, 35-62
Compellingness in Nash implementation
- 25 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 158, 35-62
Compellingness in Nash implementation
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 51 (1) , 666-667
Corrigendum to “Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions” (Kunimoto T, Saran R, Serrano R (2024) Mathematics of Operations Research 49(3):1791–1824)
This is the brief corrigendum to “Interim rationalizable implementation of functions” [Kunimoto T, Saran R, Serrano R (2024) Interim rationalizable implementation of functions. Math. Oper Res. 49(3):1791–1824]. Funding: This research was supported by the Ministry of Education—Singapore [Grant MOE-T2EP402A20-0].
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 51 (1) , 666-667
Corrigendum to “Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions” (Kunimoto T, Saran R, Serrano R (2024) Mathematics of Operations Research 49(3):1791–1824)
This is the brief corrigendum to “Interim rationalizable implementation of functions” [Kunimoto T, Saran R, Serrano R (2024) Interim rationalizable implementation of functions. Math. Oper Res. 49(3):1791–1824]. Funding: This research was supported by the Ministry of Education—Singapore [Grant MOE-T2EP402A20-0].
- 17 November 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 122
Efficient bilateral trade with interdependent values: The use of two-stage mechanisms
- 17 November 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 122
Efficient bilateral trade with interdependent values: The use of two-stage mechanisms
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 49 (3) , 1791-1824
Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions
This paper investigates rationalizable implementation of social choice functions (SCFs) in incomplete information environments. We identify weak interim rationalizable monotonicity (weak IRM) as a novel condition and show it to be a necessary and almost sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation. We show by means of robust examples that interim rationalizable monotonicity (IRM), found in the literature, is strictly stronger than weak IRM and that IRM is not necessary for rationalizable implementation, as had been previously claimed. These examples also demonstrate that Bayesian monotonicity, the key condition for full Bayesian implementation, is not necessary for rationalizable implementation. That is, rationalizable implementation can be more permissive than Bayesian implementation. We revisit well-studied classes of economic environments and show that the SCFs considered there are interim rationalizable implementable. A comprehensive discussion of related issues, including well-behaved mechanisms, mechanisms satisfying the best response property, double implementation, and responsive SCFs is also provided. Funding: This work was supported by Ministry of Education, Singapore [Grant MOE Academic Research Fund Tier 2/MOE-T2EP402A20-0].
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 49 (3) , 1791-1824
Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions
This paper investigates rationalizable implementation of social choice functions (SCFs) in incomplete information environments. We identify weak interim rationalizable monotonicity (weak IRM) as a novel condition and show it to be a necessary and almost sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation. We show by means of robust examples that interim rationalizable monotonicity (IRM), found in the literature, is strictly stronger than weak IRM and that IRM is not necessary for rationalizable implementation, as had been previously claimed. These examples also demonstrate that Bayesian monotonicity, the key condition for full Bayesian implementation, is not necessary for rationalizable implementation. That is, rationalizable implementation can be more permissive than Bayesian implementation. We revisit well-studied classes of economic environments and show that the SCFs considered there are interim rationalizable implementable. A comprehensive discussion of related issues, including well-behaved mechanisms, mechanisms satisfying the best response property, double implementation, and responsive SCFs is also provided. Funding: This work was supported by Ministry of Education, Singapore [Grant MOE Academic Research Fund Tier 2/MOE-T2EP402A20-0].
- 5 March 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 209
Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge
- 5 March 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 209
Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge
- 1 September 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 129, 181-197
Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
- 1 September 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 129, 181-197
Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
- 24 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 57 (2) , 431-468
On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
- 24 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 57 (2) , 431-468
On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
- Open Access
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 108, 62-73
Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 108, 62-73
Open AccessRobust virtual implementation with almost complete information