Manmohan Aseri
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Manmohan Aseri has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Di Yuan
Harbert College of Business, Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama 36849
2 shared publications - Ganesh Janakiraman
Naveen Jindal School of Management, The University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080
2 shared publications - Kannan Srinivasan
Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213
2 shared publications - Milind Dawande
Naveen Jindal School of Management, The University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080
2 shared publications - Param Vir Singh
Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213
2 shared publications - Vijay Mookerjee
Naveen Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 15 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-16
Negotiating the Small Stuff: AI Agents for Low-Stakes Group Decisions
- 15 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-16
Negotiating the Small Stuff: AI Agents for Low-Stakes Group Decisions
- 4 May 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Backfiring AI? AI Deployment in Workplace
Seeking value from artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, firms are rapidly deploying them to augment employees and improve business performance. The diffusion of AI into a firm’s business processes affords the tracking of task actions performed by high-performing employees and the codification of best practices into recommendation systems and training programs. The rising trend in AI deployment reveals managers’ expectations that AI-facilitated knowledge transfer would elevate overall firm performance. However, deploying AI in a workplace has the potential to change the competitive dynamics among employees. The AI system can learn from high-performing employees and make that knowledge available to others. In a competitive environment, this can disincentivize high-performing employees and ultimately backfire, leading to a decline in overall firm productivity. In this paper, we study this problem of employee incentive issues when deploying AI in a competitive workplace, using a game-theoretic model. Our results show that when employees compete using both tangible (“hard”) and intangible (“soft”) skills, firm policies that favor AI-facilitated knowledge transfer and task outcome-based compensation may lower firm performance. We illustrate that payoffs from AI deployments depend on workforce heterogeneity, reliance on tangible skills, the skill disparity between employees, and AI efficacy. Using our model, we develop policy recommendations for maximizing the return on organizational AI deployments. Our results suggest that some ostensibly simple solutions, like guaranteeing or increasing the wages of adversely affected employees, may not solve the problem effectively, and firms would have to judiciously choose optimal AI efficacy levels for achieving better outcomes. This paper was accepted by D. J. Wu, information systems. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03108 .
- 4 May 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Backfiring AI? AI Deployment in Workplace
Seeking value from artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, firms are rapidly deploying them to augment employees and improve business performance. The diffusion of AI into a firm’s business processes affords the tracking of task actions performed by high-performing employees and the codification of best practices into recommendation systems and training programs. The rising trend in AI deployment reveals managers’ expectations that AI-facilitated knowledge transfer would elevate overall firm performance. However, deploying AI in a workplace has the potential to change the competitive dynamics among employees. The AI system can learn from high-performing employees and make that knowledge available to others. In a competitive environment, this can disincentivize high-performing employees and ultimately backfire, leading to a decline in overall firm productivity. In this paper, we study this problem of employee incentive issues when deploying AI in a competitive workplace, using a game-theoretic model. Our results show that when employees compete using both tangible (“hard”) and intangible (“soft”) skills, firm policies that favor AI-facilitated knowledge transfer and task outcome-based compensation may lower firm performance. We illustrate that payoffs from AI deployments depend on workforce heterogeneity, reliance on tangible skills, the skill disparity between employees, and AI efficacy. Using our model, we develop policy recommendations for maximizing the return on organizational AI deployments. Our results suggest that some ostensibly simple solutions, like guaranteeing or increasing the wages of adversely affected employees, may not solve the problem effectively, and firms would have to judiciously choose optimal AI efficacy levels for achieving better outcomes. This paper was accepted by D. J. Wu, information systems. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03108 .
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 45 (1) , 34-44
Is Fair Advertising Good for Platforms?
The paper analyzes various fairness policies for ensuring fairness in ad-auctions.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 45 (1) , 34-44
Is Fair Advertising Good for Platforms?
The paper analyzes various fairness policies for ensuring fairness in ad-auctions.
- 6 July 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 35 (2)
Should an Ad Agency Offer Geoconquesting or Protection from It?
- 6 July 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 35 (2)
Should an Ad Agency Offer Geoconquesting or Protection from It?
- 1 October 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (10) , 7323-7349
Why Bitcoin Will Fail to Scale?
Bitcoin falls dramatically short of the scale provided by banks for payments. Currently, its ledger grows by the addition of blocks of ∼2,000 transactions every 10 minutes. Intuitively, one would expect that increasing the block capacity would solve this scaling problem. However, we show that increasing the block capacity would be futile. We analyze strategic interactions of miners, who are heterogeneous in their power over block addition, and users, who are heterogeneous in the value of their transactions, using a game-theoretic model. We show that a capacity increase can facilitate large miners to tacitly collude—artificially reversing back the capacity via strategically adding partially filled blocks in order to extract economic rents. This strategic partial filling crowds out low-value payments. Collusion is sustained if the smallest colluding miner has a share of block addition power above a lower bound. We provide empirical evidence of such strategic partial filling of blocks by large miners of Bitcoin. We show that a protocol design intervention can breach the lower bound and eliminate collusion. However, this also makes the system less secure. On the one hand, collusion crowds out low-value payments; on the other hand, if collusion is suppressed, security threatens high-value payments. As a result, it is untenable to include a range of payments with vastly different outside options, willingness to bear security risk, and delay onto a single chain. Thus, we show economic limits to the scalability of Bitcoin. Under these economic limits, collusive rent extraction acts as an effective mechanism to invest in platform security and build responsiveness to demand shocks. These traits are otherwise hard to attain in a disintermediated setting owing to the high cost of consensus. This paper was accepted by Kartik Hosanagar, information systems.
- 1 October 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (10) , 7323-7349
Why Bitcoin Will Fail to Scale?
Bitcoin falls dramatically short of the scale provided by banks for payments. Currently, its ledger grows by the addition of blocks of ∼2,000 transactions every 10 minutes. Intuitively, one would expect that increasing the block capacity would solve this scaling problem. However, we show that increasing the block capacity would be futile. We analyze strategic interactions of miners, who are heterogeneous in their power over block addition, and users, who are heterogeneous in the value of their transactions, using a game-theoretic model. We show that a capacity increase can facilitate large miners to tacitly collude—artificially reversing back the capacity via strategically adding partially filled blocks in order to extract economic rents. This strategic partial filling crowds out low-value payments. Collusion is sustained if the smallest colluding miner has a share of block addition power above a lower bound. We provide empirical evidence of such strategic partial filling of blocks by large miners of Bitcoin. We show that a protocol design intervention can breach the lower bound and eliminate collusion. However, this also makes the system less secure. On the one hand, collusion crowds out low-value payments; on the other hand, if collusion is suppressed, security threatens high-value payments. As a result, it is untenable to include a range of payments with vastly different outside options, willingness to bear security risk, and delay onto a single chain. Thus, we show economic limits to the scalability of Bitcoin. Under these economic limits, collusive rent extraction acts as an effective mechanism to invest in platform security and build responsiveness to demand shocks. These traits are otherwise hard to attain in a disintermediated setting owing to the high cost of consensus. This paper was accepted by Kartik Hosanagar, information systems.
- 1 June 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (6) , 4173-4195
“Un”Fair Machine Learning Algorithms
Ensuring fairness in algorithmic decision making is a crucial policy issue. Current legislation ensures fairness by barring algorithm designers from using demographic information in their decision making. As a result, to be legally compliant, the algorithms need to ensure equal treatment. However, in many cases, ensuring equal treatment leads to disparate impact particularly when there are differences among groups based on demographic classes. In response, several “fair” machine learning (ML) algorithms that require impact parity (e.g., equal opportunity) at the cost of equal treatment have recently been proposed to adjust for the societal inequalities. Advocates of fair ML propose changing the law to allow the use of protected class-specific decision rules. We show that the proposed fair ML algorithms that require impact parity, while conceptually appealing, can make everyone worse off, including the very class they aim to protect. Compared with the current law, which requires treatment parity, the fair ML algorithms, which require impact parity, limit the benefits of a more accurate algorithm for a firm. As a result, profit maximizing firms could underinvest in learning, that is, improving the accuracy of their machine learning algorithms. We show that the investment in learning decreases when misclassification is costly, which is exactly the case when greater accuracy is otherwise desired. Our paper highlights the importance of considering strategic behavior of stake holders when developing and evaluating fair ML algorithms. Overall, our results indicate that fair ML algorithms that require impact parity, if turned into law, may not be able to deliver some of the anticipated benefits. This paper was accepted by Kartik Hosanagar, information systems.
- 1 June 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (6) , 4173-4195
“Un”Fair Machine Learning Algorithms
Ensuring fairness in algorithmic decision making is a crucial policy issue. Current legislation ensures fairness by barring algorithm designers from using demographic information in their decision making. As a result, to be legally compliant, the algorithms need to ensure equal treatment. However, in many cases, ensuring equal treatment leads to disparate impact particularly when there are differences among groups based on demographic classes. In response, several “fair” machine learning (ML) algorithms that require impact parity (e.g., equal opportunity) at the cost of equal treatment have recently been proposed to adjust for the societal inequalities. Advocates of fair ML propose changing the law to allow the use of protected class-specific decision rules. We show that the proposed fair ML algorithms that require impact parity, while conceptually appealing, can make everyone worse off, including the very class they aim to protect. Compared with the current law, which requires treatment parity, the fair ML algorithms, which require impact parity, limit the benefits of a more accurate algorithm for a firm. As a result, profit maximizing firms could underinvest in learning, that is, improving the accuracy of their machine learning algorithms. We show that the investment in learning decreases when misclassification is costly, which is exactly the case when greater accuracy is otherwise desired. Our paper highlights the importance of considering strategic behavior of stake holders when developing and evaluating fair ML algorithms. Overall, our results indicate that fair ML algorithms that require impact parity, if turned into law, may not be able to deliver some of the anticipated benefits. This paper was accepted by Kartik Hosanagar, information systems.
- 1 June 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 31 (2) , 627-646
Ad-Blockers: A Blessing or a Curse?
Practice- and Policy-Oriented Abstract
- 1 June 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 31 (2) , 627-646
Ad-Blockers: A Blessing or a Curse?
Practice- and Policy-Oriented Abstract
- 1 October 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 64 (10) , 4590-4607
Procurement Policies for Mobile-Promotion Platforms
Mobile-promotion platforms enable advertisers (individual users or businesses) to directly launch their personalized mobile advertising campaigns. These platforms contract with advertisers to provide a certain number of impressions on mobile apps in their desired sets of geographic locations (usually cities or zip codes) within their desired time durations (for example, a month); the execution of each such a contract is referred to as a campaign. To fulfill the demands of the campaigns, the platform bids in real time at an ad exchange to win mobile impressions arising over the desired sets of locations of the campaigns and then allocates the acquired impressions among the ongoing campaigns. The core features that characterize this procurement problem—supply is uncertain, supply cannot be inventoried, and there are demand-side commitments to be met—are applicable to a variety of other business settings as well. Our analysis in this paper offers near-optimal policies for both a static model and a dynamic model of campaign arrivals. The static model represents a subscription-based setting, where customers provide information of their campaigns in advance to the platform. The dynamic model represents a setting where campaigns arrive randomly and the platform reacts to these arrivals in real time; for this model, our rolling-horizon policy periodically recomputes the platform’s procurement (or bidding) and allocation decisions. We establish performance bounds on our policies for both models and demonstrate the attractiveness of these bounds on real data. By isolating important structural features of a given set of campaigns, we discuss practical implementation issues and offer procurement-policy recommendations for a variety of settings based on these features. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2837 . This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.
- 1 October 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 64 (10) , 4590-4607
Procurement Policies for Mobile-Promotion Platforms
Mobile-promotion platforms enable advertisers (individual users or businesses) to directly launch their personalized mobile advertising campaigns. These platforms contract with advertisers to provide a certain number of impressions on mobile apps in their desired sets of geographic locations (usually cities or zip codes) within their desired time durations (for example, a month); the execution of each such a contract is referred to as a campaign. To fulfill the demands of the campaigns, the platform bids in real time at an ad exchange to win mobile impressions arising over the desired sets of locations of the campaigns and then allocates the acquired impressions among the ongoing campaigns. The core features that characterize this procurement problem—supply is uncertain, supply cannot be inventoried, and there are demand-side commitments to be met—are applicable to a variety of other business settings as well. Our analysis in this paper offers near-optimal policies for both a static model and a dynamic model of campaign arrivals. The static model represents a subscription-based setting, where customers provide information of their campaigns in advance to the platform. The dynamic model represents a setting where campaigns arrive randomly and the platform reacts to these arrivals in real time; for this model, our rolling-horizon policy periodically recomputes the platform’s procurement (or bidding) and allocation decisions. We establish performance bounds on our policies for both models and demonstrate the attractiveness of these bounds on real data. By isolating important structural features of a given set of campaigns, we discuss practical implementation issues and offer procurement-policy recommendations for a variety of settings based on these features. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2837 . This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.