Timothy S. Rich

What do South Koreans expect that the United States would do if North Korea invaded, and what shapes these views? Existing research addresses US abilities to deter North Korean aggression, as well as South Korean expectations for the US military presence. Rather than just address the credibility of the alliance in the abstract, we assess what specific actions South Koreans expected from the United States if North Korea invaded. Through an original national Web survey of 1,000 South Koreans in 2025, we find that most respondents expect the United States to provide aid, with fewer expecting troop and air support and over one in five expecting the use of tactical nuclear weapons. We find that preexisting views of the United States are a stronger predictor of expecting US action than subjective security threat assessments or views of the North Korean regime. The findings suggest the perceived credibility of American commitment is the strongest factor in South Korean expectations of American defence.

While a growing literature tackles institutional trust in democracies, the extent to which partisanship, performance evaluations, and generalised social trust influence this trust remains poorly understood. Against this backdrop, Taiwan, a third-wave democracy, faces many of the same challenges of declining trust, as well as the potential lingering influences of authoritarian nostalgia influencing views on institutions and democracy more broadly. Through an original national survey in May–June 2023, we parse out the factors influencing trust in the presidency, legislature, courts, national government, local government, and the media. We find mixed evidence of a partisan divergence, with supporters of the ruling party generally more supportive, with stronger evidence of a positive boost associated with social trust and democratic satisfaction.

What explains public support for free speech limitations in Taiwan? I suggest that one’s partisanship, cultural factors prioritizing stability, and views on democracy itself shape tolerance for speech limitations. Although a combination of existing data from the Taiwan Social Change Survey and AsianBarometer, along with original survey data, I find broad opposition to free speech limitations, however supporters of the ruling party consistently were more likely to support such limits. Moreover, those who believed that inconsistent ideas bring chaos or who were indifferent about regime types were also more likely to support speech restrictions.

How do forms of trust influence South Korean views of North Korean arrivals? While a broad literature addresses the institutional and generalized social trust impacting a range of public perceptions, this has not been extended to views on North Korean arrivals. Meanwhile, research on views of arrivals often relies on only one measure for what are likely complex concerns. Through the use of a 2021 Korean Social Integration Survey, we find evidence of institutional and social trust positively influencing overall views of arrivals, with mixed results on the impact on proximal tolerance of arrivals, suggesting that policy efforts to enhance trust as a means to improve integration efforts may fail to produce substantive improvements for arrivals.

What explains institutional trust in South Korea and to what extent does this differ across types of institutions? Existing research focuses on performance versus generalized social trust, but rarely evaluates types of state institutions or compares them with views on non-state institutions, making it unclear whether the same underlying factors shape perceptions. With data from South Korea's 2021 Social Integration Survey, I find stronger evidence of generalized social trust over performance measures, with variation across categories of institutions.

Would the results of Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election have differed under preferential voting rules? Observers assume that the split in the opposition virtually guaranteed Lai Ching-te’s victory, but no analysis has aimed to measure ranked preferences across the three presidential candidates. This analysis combines original pre-election survey data that includes preference ordering of candidates with simulation analysis of the actual election results under the alternative vote and Borda count systems. The original survey finds Ko Wen-je would have won under both preferential systems, while simulating preference ordering using the 2024 election results suggests Lai would have won under alternative vote but lost to Hou You-ih under Borda count.

How does vote choice and partisanship affect institutional trust in Taiwan? While the literature tackles institutional trust in democracies, analyses often focus on only one time period with aggregate measures of trust. Data from two waves from the Asian Barometer finds evidence consistent with losers’ consent of trust in electoral institutions corresponding with party support and vote choice, factors that remain after controlling for trust in non-electoral institutions and generalized trust. However, these factors do not seem to affect overall satisfaction with democracy, suggesting the public differentiates between support for the ideal of democracy and its constituent parts.

How does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine affect Taiwanese perceptions about their own defense? Despite frequent comparisons of the war in Ukraine with a potential invasion of Taiwan, existing analyses do not directly measure Taiwanese public perceptions of a linkage. Using survey data from the Taiwan Institute for Governance and Communication Research, we identify not only the extent of concern about the war but also how this corresponds to worries about a Chinese invasion, confidence in Taiwan’s ability to win such a war, and belief about US defensive commitments to Taiwan.

How does satisfaction in COVID policies influence presidential evaluations? Taiwan’s initial handling of the pandemic garnered considerable international attention, with initial high public satisfaction. Little attention, however, falls on how this satisfaction influenced evaluations of Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, over time. With nine survey waves from 2020 to 2022, this analysis finds that satisfaction with COVID policies corresponded with both greater satisfaction with and trust in Tsai; however, the impact of this satisfaction was smaller than on traditional policy areas.