Mauro Escobar
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Mauro Escobar has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniel Bienstock
Columbia University, New York, USA
4 shared publications - Leo Liberti
LIX CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique, Institut Polytechnique de Paris, Palaiseau, France
4 shared publications - Claudio Gentile
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche
2 shared publications Daniel Bienstock
Industrial Engineering and Operations Research Columbia University, NY, USA
2 shared publications- Martina Cerulli
Department of Computer Science University of Salerno Fisciano Italy
2 shared publications - Antoine Oustry
Institut Polytechnique de Paris
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 2 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 185-198
Power Network Design with Line Activity
- 24 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 314 (1) , 277-315
Mathematical programming formulations for the alternating current optimal power flow problem
- 24 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 314 (1) , 277-315
Mathematical programming formulations for the alternating current optimal power flow problem
- 15 September 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in 4OR
- Vol. 18 (3) , 249-292
Mathematical programming formulations for the alternating current optimal power flow problem
- 15 September 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in 4OR
- Vol. 18 (3) , 249-292
Mathematical programming formulations for the alternating current optimal power flow problem
- 29 October 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
- Vol. 7 (2) , 842-854
Stochastic Defense Against Complex Grid Attacks
- 29 October 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
- Vol. 7 (2) , 842-854
Stochastic Defense Against Complex Grid Attacks
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-6
Learning from power system data stream
Assuming access to synchronized stream of Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) data over a significant portion of a power system interconnect, say controlled by an Independent System Operator (ISO), what can you extract about past, current and future state of the system? We have focused on answering these practical questions pragmatically _ empowered with nothing but standard tools of data analysis, such as PCA, filtering and cross-correlation analysis. Quite surprisingly we have found that even during quiet “no significant events” periods this standard set of statistical tools allows the “phasor-detective” to extract from the data important hidden anomalies, such as problematic control loops at loads and wind farms, and mildly malfunctioning assets, such as transformers and generators.
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-6
Learning from power system data stream
Assuming access to synchronized stream of Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) data over a significant portion of a power system interconnect, say controlled by an Independent System Operator (ISO), what can you extract about past, current and future state of the system? We have focused on answering these practical questions pragmatically _ empowered with nothing but standard tools of data analysis, such as PCA, filtering and cross-correlation analysis. Quite surprisingly we have found that even during quiet “no significant events” periods this standard set of statistical tools allows the “phasor-detective” to extract from the data important hidden anomalies, such as problematic control loops at loads and wind farms, and mildly malfunctioning assets, such as transformers and generators.
- Open Access
- 11 October 2017
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
- Vol. 45 (2) , 115-118
Computing undetectable attacks on power grids
We consider combined data and physical attacks on power grids, motivated by recent events and research. We consider a setting where an attacker may alter the topology of a power grid by removing lines and may also alter the load (demand) of some nodes; simultaneously the attacker interdicts data flowing to the control center. We use the PMU model of data that provides high-fidelity AC power flow data (voltages and currents) The goal of the attacker is to provide data that paints a completely safe picture for the grid which is consistent with the net load change, while at the same time disguising large line overloads, a fundamentally dangerous situation that may lead to a cascading failure. We provide a computational procedure that efficiently computes sparse attacks even on cases of large grids.
- 11 October 2017
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
- Vol. 45 (2) , 115-118
Open AccessComputing undetectable attacks on power grids
We consider combined data and physical attacks on power grids, motivated by recent events and research. We consider a setting where an attacker may alter the topology of a power grid by removing lines and may also alter the load (demand) of some nodes; simultaneously the attacker interdicts data flowing to the control center. We use the PMU model of data that provides high-fidelity AC power flow data (voltages and currents) The goal of the attacker is to provide data that paints a completely safe picture for the grid which is consistent with the net load change, while at the same time disguising large line overloads, a fundamentally dangerous situation that may lead to a cascading failure. We provide a computational procedure that efficiently computes sparse attacks even on cases of large grids.