YHYanting Huang

Yanting Huang

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Yanting Huang has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Information Strategies in the Electric Vehicles Battery Reverse Supply Chain with Blockchain Technology

    by San Jose State University, Tianqin Shi, Yanting Huang, Shenzhen University

    The surge in demand for electric vehicles (EV) and EV batteries, coupled with supply chain vulnerabilities and price instability, has driven the need for efficient and sustainable EV battery recycling processes. This report investigates the potential of blockchain technology to address the challenges in the EV battery reverse supply chain (moving goods from the end customer back towards the manufacturer), focusing on enhancing transparency and coordination, as well as mitigating the impact of unregulated recycling. Key stakeholders in this analysis include manufacturers, recyclers, and regulatory bodies. To achieve these objectives, the study employs a mixed-methods approach. It includes semi-structured interviews with industry experts from EV and battery manufacturing companies to gather qualitative insights into the current challenges and the potential of blockchain technology. Furthermore, the study used a model based on the Stackelberg game theory to analyze the impact of blockchain adoption on the behavior and profitability of supply chain members, specifically focusing on the interaction between regulated and unregulated recyclers. The findings show that blockchain technology can offer significant benefits to the EV battery reverse supply chain. Specifically, blockchain adoption can increase the total recycling quantity, provided that the implementation costs are relatively low. Additionally, blockchain can help empower regulated recyclers to achieve higher buyback prices and recycling quantities compared to unregulated recyclers, enhancing the competitiveness of responsible recycling practices. However, the adoption of blockchain technology depends on its cost-effectiveness and the intensity of competition within the recycling sector. These results highlight the importance of strategic blockchain implementation and regulatory support to foster a sustainable and efficient EV battery recycling ecosystem, which supports a sustainable transportation industry.

  • Open Access

    Manufacturer’s cooperation strategies of closed-loop supply chain considering recycling advertising

    by Yanting Huang, Ni Peng

    Online recycling shows great potential to significantly boost recoverable quantity and attract advertising investment. This study focuses on exploring how retail and recycling advertising affects the manufacturer’s cooperation strategy in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). The CLSC model consisting of a manufacturer, an online recycling platform with recycling advertising, and a retailer with retail advertising considers four cooperation strategies by a manufacturer: no cooperation, cooperation with only the retailer, cooperation with only the online recycling platform, and cooperation with the online recycling platform and the retailer. After comparing four strategies, it is found that the manufacturer collaborates with the retailer, or the online recycling platform based on retail and recycling advertising coefficients. Furthermore, cooperation between the manufacturer and the retailer increases retail advertising and sales, which incentivizes the manufacturer to collaborate with the retailer. Collaboration between the manufacturer and the online recycling platform will increase both recycling advertising and quantity, which incentivizes the manufacturer to collaborate with the online recycling platform. These results would encourage more manufacturers to improve their operational efficiency through cooperation with online recycling platforms because the online recycling platforms conveniently utilize recycling advertising to increase the quantity of used products recycled, which in turn contributes to environmental sustainability.


  • The pricing strategy of group buying under a dual-channel supply chain with price discounts and waiting time

    by Jingyi Shi, Yanting Huang

    Purpose: As an important form of the e-commerce industry, online group buying is under the spotlight from with two sides: cheaper price but longer waiting time. The purpose of this paper is to adequately investigate the interaction between saving and waiting time of group buying comprehensively.Design/methodology/approach: To fill the research gap, the authors elaborate a dual-channel supply chain (SC) with regular retail (individual buying) and group-buying channel, and formulate the demand based on the consumer utility with the positive effect of saving money and the negative effect of wasting time.Findings: The authors find that power structure only changes the optimal prices, instead of the waiting time. The selling price mainly influences consumer demands, instead of the price discount of group buying. The SC profits are only positive to the channel preference, and it is the decisive parameter of consumers' choice. The price sensitivity lays a more remarkable impact on the SC compared to the time sensitivity. Above all, the price is the main factor of group buying, instead of time.Originality/value: These results underscore the improvement for the dual-channel SC of group buying, providing managerial insights for the group-buying industry.


  • Pricing decisions for closed-loop supply chains with technology licensing and carbon constraint under reward-penalty mechanism

    by Yanting Huang, Zongjun Wang

    This paper investigates the effect of the reward-penalty mechanism in a closed-loop supply chain with a manufacturer, a distributor and a third party under technology licensing and carbon constraints. There remanufacturing scenarios are developed, namely (1) the manufacturer is engaged in remanufacturing activities, (2) the manufacturer subcontracts the distributor to conduct remanufacturing, and (3) the third party undertakes remanufacturing with the manufacturer's authorization. We apply the Stackelberg game to derive the equilibrium strategies of each scenario with and without reward-penalty mechanism. We find that, the implementation of the reward-penalty mechanism is profitable to remanufacturing activities. If producing remanufactured products doesn't effectively reduce carbon emissions, chain members have no incentive to undertake collecting and remanufacturing activities. The manufacturer prefers to license other chain members to remanufacture because more cost savings from remanufacturing and more rewards from government can achieve in distributor-remanufacturing and third-party remanufacturing scenarios.


  • Government policies for e-commerce supply chain with fairness concerns towards sustainable remanufacturing

    by Yanting Huang, Sijia Liu, Yuqing Liang

    Purpose: This paper aims to explore the effect of fairness concerns on supply chain members' optimal decisions and profits, to compare their profits under different policies, and to investigate the impact of each policy on members, consumers, and the environment with fairness concerns.Design/methodology/approach: Considering government policies and fairness concerns in recycling management, this paper develops five recycling and remanufacturing decision models (anarchy policy model, reward-penalty mechanism model, recycling investment subsidies model, government tax model, and fund subsidy system model). In each model, the manufacturer and the online platform form the Stackelberg game. This research further discusses comprehensive environmental benefits and consumer surplus under five scenarios.Findings: First, the fairness concerns of the online platform inhibit the recovery rate and supply chain members' profit while increasing the platform's utility. Second, fairness concerns increase the profit gap between the manufacturer and online platform, and the higher the degree of fairness concerns, the greater the profit gap; however, the four policies reduce the profit gap. Finally, when there are fairness concerns, environmental taxes damage the interests of supply chain members and consumers, but are most beneficial to the environment; recycling investment subsidies are on the contrary; the fund subsidy system depends on the relative size of the treatment fund and the subsidy fund.Originality/value: This paper provides useful insights on how to regulate government policy to improve supply chain management with fairness concerns.


  • Exploring the strategies of online and offline recycling channels in closed-loop supply chain under government subsidy

    by Yanting Huang, Yuqing Liang

    The influence of online and offline dual recycling channels in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) is investigated in our work. The CLSC models of three recycling modes (single online recycling, single offline recycling, and dual recycling channels of online and offline) are established, respectively, and the impact of government subsidies on the pricing decision-making and recycling mode selection of channel members is therefore researched. The study found that the remanufacturer sets appropriate recycling price and transfer price to coordinate online and offline recycling channels and maximize its profits in the dual recycling modes; collector’s offline recycling faces the competitive threat of remanufacturers’ online recycling under the dual recycling modes, so the collector prefers a single offline recycling mode; the relationship between the collection quantities of the three modes depends on consumers’ preference of the online recycling channel. In the meanwhile, it is illustrated that government subsidy plays a positive role in promoting the recycling and remanufacturing willingness of remanufacturers and collectors. This work provides practical insights for the CLSC system to make recycle decisions.


  • Open Access

    Closed-loop Supply Chain with Advertising Investment and Reward-Penalty Mechanism Based on Different CSR Sharing Models

    by Yi Liu, Yanting Huang

    This paper considers a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer based on different corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviors. In addition, the advertising investment and government’s reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) are also taken in account. To explore the impact of CSR behaviors on supply chain, we developed three models: (1) Only the manufacturer undertakes CSR (model M); (2) only the retailer undertakes CSR (model R); (3) the manufacturer and the retailer share CSR (model MR). By analyzing the results, we found that: (1) The advertising investment level and waste products return rate both increase with the increase of the extent to members undertake CSR when there is only retailer undertakes CSR and when the manufacturer and retailer share CSR, and remain unchanged when there is only the manufacturer undertakes CSR; (2) the overall social welfare increases with the increase of the extent to members undertake CSR no matter which member undertakes CSR, and reaches the highest when there is only the retailer undertakes CSR; (3) it is the most conductive for the performance of the closedloop supply chain when there is only the retailer undertakes CSR.

  • Open Access

    Decision Analysis of E-commerce Closed-loop Supply Chain with Different Recycling Modes

    by Sijia Liu, Yanting Huang

    According to an e-commerce closed-loop supply chain dominated by manufacturers, which is composed of manufacturers and e-commerce platforms, divided into three different recovery mode: manufacturers recycling mode alone, electric business platform recycling mode alone, and manufacturers and electric business platform mixed mode, using the game theory to solve, compares three closed-loop supply chains found: (1)When the recycling price sensitivity is high, the optimal strategy of the manufacturer is the manufacturers recycling mode alone; when the price sensitivity of recycling is low, the manufacturer’s best strategy is the independent recycling mode of the e-commerce platform. No matter how sensitive the recycling price is, the profits of the manufacturer under the mixed recycling mode are always lower than those under the other two recycling modes. (2) When the recycling price sensitivity is high, the optimal strategy of the electric business platform is the mixed recycling mode; when the price sensitivity of recycling is low, the optimal solution of the electric business platform is the independent recycling mode of the electric business platform. (3) When the recovery price sensitivity is low, the best strategy of both is the separate recycling mode of the electric business platform.