Raymond da Silva Rosa
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Raymond da Silva Rosa has a total of 48 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Martin Bugeja
University of Technology Sydney Sydney Australia
8 shared publications Terry Walter
University of New South Wales
5 shared publicationsSusan Ngan
Murdoch University Murdoch WA Australia
2 shared publicationsAlexander Szimayer
Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, University of Hamburg
1 shared publicationAndrew Lee
1 shared publicationAnn Tarca
UWA Business School (M250), The University of Western Australia, Nedlands, Australia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 September 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance
- Vol. 23, 138-160
Web-based experimental economics software: How do they compare to desirable features?
- 1 September 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance
- Vol. 23, 138-160
Web-based experimental economics software: How do they compare to desirable features?
- 23 November 2017
- Published by Wiley in Accounting & Finance
- Vol. 59 (4) , 2235-2271
Choice of acquisition form in Australia and the post‐takeover employment of target firm directors on the acquiring firm board
In Australia, a corporate acquisition can be structured as either a scheme of arrangement or a takeover. We investigate the association between deal structure and the retention of target directors on the merged entity board. We find that the odds of a target director subsequently sitting on the merged entity's board are significantly higher in schemes. The results also show that premiums are lower in schemes of arrangement when additional target directors are appointed to the board of the acquiring firm. The findings indicate that target director appointment is unrelated to the merged entity's post‐acquisition performance.
- 23 November 2017
- Published by Wiley in Accounting & Finance
- Vol. 59 (4) , 2235-2271
Choice of acquisition form in Australia and the post‐takeover employment of target firm directors on the acquiring firm board
In Australia, a corporate acquisition can be structured as either a scheme of arrangement or a takeover. We investigate the association between deal structure and the retention of target directors on the merged entity board. We find that the odds of a target director subsequently sitting on the merged entity's board are significantly higher in schemes. The results also show that premiums are lower in schemes of arrangement when additional target directors are appointed to the board of the acquiring firm. The findings indicate that target director appointment is unrelated to the merged entity's post‐acquisition performance.
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Industrial Marketing Management
- Vol. 54, 154-163
Identity construction through role and network position
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Industrial Marketing Management
- Vol. 54, 154-163
Identity construction through role and network position
- 16 April 2015
- Published by SAGE Publications in Australian Journal of Management
- Vol. 41 (2) , 212-243
To scheme or bid? Choice of takeover method and impact on premium
In recent years there has been an increasing use of members’ schemes of arrangement to bring about a change in corporate control. This increasing use of schemes has been criticised in public quarters on the basis that unlike takeovers, schemes are not subject to the Eggleston principles and have arguably led to target shareholders receiving lower offer prices. This study provides the first large-sample empirical evidence on differences between schemes and takeovers. We find that the likelihood of the use of schemes significantly increases when target firm ownership concentration is higher and when the bidder has a lower toehold. Scheme usage is also more likely for larger targets and bidders with higher leverage. Consistent with public criticisms of schemes, we find that after controlling for self-selection premiums in schemes are significantly lower than those in takeovers.
- 16 April 2015
- Published by SAGE Publications in Australian Journal of Management
- Vol. 41 (2) , 212-243
To scheme or bid? Choice of takeover method and impact on premium
In recent years there has been an increasing use of members’ schemes of arrangement to bring about a change in corporate control. This increasing use of schemes has been criticised in public quarters on the basis that unlike takeovers, schemes are not subject to the Eggleston principles and have arguably led to target shareholders receiving lower offer prices. This study provides the first large-sample empirical evidence on differences between schemes and takeovers. We find that the likelihood of the use of schemes significantly increases when target firm ownership concentration is higher and when the bidder has a lower toehold. Scheme usage is also more likely for larger targets and bidders with higher leverage. Consistent with public criticisms of schemes, we find that after controlling for self-selection premiums in schemes are significantly lower than those in takeovers.
- 31 August 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 39 (9-10) , 1298-1329
CEO Compensation from M&As in Australia
Abstract: We investigate Australian CEO compensation following mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find CEOs of acquiring firms receive higher compensation in the year of M&A completion and one year after. We also find a positive correlation between CEO compensation and firm performance, and some measures of CEO effort and skill in completing the deal. However, CEOs of bidding firms receive a lower bonus and other compensation if they wield more managerial power (that is, if the CEO sits on the nominating committee, has a higher level of share ownership, or the board has more executive directors). This result is in sharp contrast to the US where compensation is influenced by CEO power. Overall our findings are more consistent with the predictions of the incentive alignment theory rather than the managerial power theory.
- 31 August 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 39 (9-10) , 1298-1329
CEO Compensation from M&As in Australia
Abstract: We investigate Australian CEO compensation following mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find CEOs of acquiring firms receive higher compensation in the year of M&A completion and one year after. We also find a positive correlation between CEO compensation and firm performance, and some measures of CEO effort and skill in completing the deal. However, CEOs of bidding firms receive a lower bonus and other compensation if they wield more managerial power (that is, if the CEO sits on the nominating committee, has a higher level of share ownership, or the board has more executive directors). This result is in sharp contrast to the US where compensation is influenced by CEO power. Overall our findings are more consistent with the predictions of the incentive alignment theory rather than the managerial power theory.
- 24 May 2010
- Published by Wiley in Accounting & Finance
- Vol. 50 (2) , 241-262
Capital gains taxation and shareholder wealth in takeovers
- 24 May 2010
- Published by Wiley in Accounting & Finance
- Vol. 50 (2) , 241-262
Capital gains taxation and shareholder wealth in takeovers
- 1 January 2009
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 36 (1-2) , 185-209
The Impact of Director Reputation and Performance on the Turnover and Board Seats of Target Firm Directors
Abstract: This study examines factors that explain the turnover and board seats held by target firm directors post‐takeover. Following successful takeovers the proportion of the board replaced is lower when the target has better performance. In failed takeovers, executive directors have lower turnover and the rate of turnover is reduced after a hostile takeover. Inconsistent with ex‐post settling‐up, actions that advance target shareholder wealth during the takeover does not assist a director obtain an increase in future board seats. Confirming a reputation effect, directors with multiple directorships have a lower rate of turnover and a higher increase in future board seats.
- 1 January 2009
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 36 (1-2) , 185-209
The Impact of Director Reputation and Performance on the Turnover and Board Seats of Target Firm Directors
Abstract: This study examines factors that explain the turnover and board seats held by target firm directors post‐takeover. Following successful takeovers the proportion of the board replaced is lower when the target has better performance. In failed takeovers, executive directors have lower turnover and the rate of turnover is reduced after a hostile takeover. Inconsistent with ex‐post settling‐up, actions that advance target shareholder wealth during the takeover does not assist a director obtain an increase in future board seats. Confirming a reputation effect, directors with multiple directorships have a lower rate of turnover and a higher increase in future board seats.
- 28 August 2008
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Accounting Research Journal
- Vol. 21 (1) , 67-86
ASIC actions: canaries for poor corporate governance?
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate whether companies subject to an Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) action have poorer corporate governance than other companies. Evidence from the USA suggests such a relationship but the issue has not been investigated for Australian firms. Design/methodology/approach – The paper considers a matched sample of 240 companies, including 120 which were subject to 143 actions relating to; interpretation of accounting standards; the continuous disclosure regime; and other governance matters during the period 1998-2004. Findings – We find that companies subject to ASIC actions are less likely to comply with the Australian stock exchange (ASX) best practice governance recommendations and that the main area of difference relates to separation of the roles of the CEO and board chair. Research limitations/implications – We were able to investigate only 3 of 10 items in the ASX recommendations due to data availability. The sample of ASIC companies is not randomly drawn, thus our results are not generalisable the wider population of listed companies. Capital market consequences of ASIC actions, such as effect on share price, bid-ask spread, analyst following and cost of capital, are not considered and could be investigated in future research. Practical implications – The results suggest that, in relation to publicised cases, ASIC is effective in targeting more poorly governed companies, a positive signal for Australian capital markets. Originality/value – Few papers investigate ASIC's publicised cases and no prior study has linked ASIC cases and corporate governance practices. The findings will be of interest to Australian capital market participants, some of whom question the benefits of corporate governance recommendations.
- 28 August 2008
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Accounting Research Journal
- Vol. 21 (1) , 67-86
ASIC actions: canaries for poor corporate governance?
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate whether companies subject to an Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) action have poorer corporate governance than other companies. Evidence from the USA suggests such a relationship but the issue has not been investigated for Australian firms. Design/methodology/approach – The paper considers a matched sample of 240 companies, including 120 which were subject to 143 actions relating to; interpretation of accounting standards; the continuous disclosure regime; and other governance matters during the period 1998-2004. Findings – We find that companies subject to ASIC actions are less likely to comply with the Australian stock exchange (ASX) best practice governance recommendations and that the main area of difference relates to separation of the roles of the CEO and board chair. Research limitations/implications – We were able to investigate only 3 of 10 items in the ASX recommendations due to data availability. The sample of ASIC companies is not randomly drawn, thus our results are not generalisable the wider population of listed companies. Capital market consequences of ASIC actions, such as effect on share price, bid-ask spread, analyst following and cost of capital, are not considered and could be investigated in future research. Practical implications – The results suggest that, in relation to publicised cases, ASIC is effective in targeting more poorly governed companies, a positive signal for Australian capital markets. Originality/value – Few papers investigate ASIC's publicised cases and no prior study has linked ASIC cases and corporate governance practices. The findings will be of interest to Australian capital market participants, some of whom question the benefits of corporate governance recommendations.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2008
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Ownership and Control
- Vol. 6 (Special 1) , 15-34
Board governance and IPO performance in the short-run and long-run
In light of the best practice recommendations released by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in March 2003, this study tests the relationship between initial public offering (IPO) firm performance and board governance quality, captured by board size, board leadership, board composition, and director’s share ownership. Based on a sample of Australian IPO firms that lodged prospectuses with ASX between 1994 and 1999, we do not find evidence that links underpricing to board structures at the time of IPO. IPO firms’ board structures are insignificant in explaining the level of IPO underpricing, and board size is the only board governance variable significant in explaining long-run after market performance, after controlling for the size of the firm. That is, IPO firms with larger boards at the time of issuance perform better in the long-run, consistent with the resource dependence theory. Thus, we conclude that ASX’s best practice recommendations are likely to distort the market-driven practice salready in place, and our findings lead us to question the role played by the board of directors in signalling firm quality.
- 1 January 2008
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Ownership and Control
- Vol. 6 (Special 1) , 15-34
Open AccessBoard governance and IPO performance in the short-run and long-run
In light of the best practice recommendations released by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in March 2003, this study tests the relationship between initial public offering (IPO) firm performance and board governance quality, captured by board size, board leadership, board composition, and director’s share ownership. Based on a sample of Australian IPO firms that lodged prospectuses with ASX between 1994 and 1999, we do not find evidence that links underpricing to board structures at the time of IPO. IPO firms’ board structures are insignificant in explaining the level of IPO underpricing, and board size is the only board governance variable significant in explaining long-run after market performance, after controlling for the size of the firm. That is, IPO firms with larger boards at the time of issuance perform better in the long-run, consistent with the resource dependence theory. Thus, we conclude that ASX’s best practice recommendations are likely to distort the market-driven practice salready in place, and our findings lead us to question the role played by the board of directors in signalling firm quality.