Cristina De Fuentes

This paper examines the economic consequences associated with an audit failure in the field of statutory auditing services, by analyzing changes in the audit firm’s market share around the time of the investigation process undertaken by the Spanish Public Oversight Board. We explore the variations in audit market share by applying the difference in differences method to a treatment group of 70 sanctioned audit firms and a matched control group of 70 non-sanctioned audit firms. The period of analysis covers the years from 1999 to 2015. Our results show that the sanctioned audit firms suffered a significant decrease in their relative number of clients. Moreover, this measure of market share decreased not only after the publication of the sanction disclosure (which may be attributed to reputational losses) but also after the initiation of the investigation (which may be attributed to the firm’s reluctance to audit risky clients). Findings are similar for both small and large firms when the market share is measured in terms of clients, whereas the evidence is weak concerning variations in their turnover-based market share. Our conclusions could be of interest for audit firms and also for audit regulators when designing disciplinary systems. Este trabajo examina las consecuencias económicas asociadas a un fallo de auditoría en el ámbito de los servicios de auditoría legal, analizando los cambios en la cuota de mercado de la firma de auditoría en torno al momento del proceso de investigación emprendido por el Consejo de Supervisión Pública español. Exploramos las variaciones en la cuota de mercado de la auditoría aplicando el método de diferencia en diferencias a un grupo de tratamiento de 70 firmas de auditoría sancionadas y a un grupo de control emparejado de 70 firmas de auditoría no sancionadas. El periodo de análisis abarca los años comprendidos entre 1999 y 2015. Nuestros resultados muestran que las firmas de auditoría sancionadas sufrieron un descenso significativo en su número relativo de clientes. Además, esta medida de la cuota de mercado disminuyó no sólo después de la publicación de la comunicación de la sanción (lo que puede atribuirse a las pérdidas de reputación), sino también después del inicio de la investigación (lo que puede atribuirse a la reticencia de la empresa a auditar clientes de riesgo). Los resultados son similares tanto para las pequeñas como para las grandes empresas cuando la cuota de mercado se mide en términos de clientes, mientras que la evidencia es débil en lo que respecta a las variaciones de su cuota de mercado basada en el volumen de negocio. Nuestras conclusiones podrían ser de interés para las firmas de auditoría y también para los reguladores de la auditoría a la hora de diseñar sistemas disciplinarios.

Ongoing regulatory efforts aim to link managerial compensation with a firm’s performance. However, little is known about whether and how Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) goals are considered in the design of the managerial compensation scheme. This paper addresses this research question by analyzing a sample of Spanish listed firms for the period spanning 2013–2018. The outcomes of the regressions suggest that there is a positive relationship between CSR and the managerial compensation, but this relationship is significant only with lower levels of CSR. The study also reveals that CSR is positively associated with the proportion of equity-based compensation and, therefore, negatively associated with the proportion of cash-based compensation. In all, our results suggest that firms with lower levels of CSR, likely following social pressures, seek to improve their investments in CSR; and, in doing so, they design a managerial compensation scheme that incentivizes the manager to meet the firm’s goals related to CSR investments. Hence, since CSR is associated with an increase in the long-term firm’s value, the equity-based component of the managerial scheme is higher than in the remaining firms. However, the high proportion of cash-based compensation is far from the desirable goals promoted by the Governance Codes.

This meta-analysis takes stock of 121 C.E.O. pay studies published between 1998 and 2018 with the objective of identifying the main drivers of C.E.O. pay from a global perspective and contributing to the agency vs managerial debate on this ground. The meta-results disclose a positive C.E.O. pay–performance correlation (the highest correlation coefficient corresponds to Earnings per share with a 34%) as the agency theory prescribes and the governance policies promote. However, firm size still predominates as the main driver of C.E.O. pay (correlation coefficient is around 44%) according to managerial premises. Moreover, our results reconcile both approaches because results of the meta-regressions suggest that larger companies and more independent boards strengthen the pay–performance association. Additional analyses of moderating factors on C.E.O. pay forces do not provide robust conclusions, though, they suggest: (1) weak impact, if any, of both the Cadbury Report and the S.O.X.; and (2) lack of homogeneity in the banking industry despite its specific regulation.

This study aims to identify the main determinants of audit failure and contribute to the current debate raised by recent European Union regulation on auditor’s tenure and economic policies to prevent impairment of auditor’s independence. We approach audit failure through auditing enforcement releases triggered by the investigations conducted by the Spanish public oversight board. The sample of sanctioned individual auditors and audit firms covers the period 2002–2013. Our results reveal that audit failure likelihood increases when the probability of financial distress is higher, the auditor is permissive of upward earnings management, and the audit report is signed by an individual auditor. The results reveal a positive association between auditor tenure and audit failure only for individual auditors. The relative economic weight of the auditor–client is also positively associated with audit failure, plausibly because audit firms are more concerned with reputation loss tied to big scandals than succumbing to economic pressure from their clients.

We analyse trends in inflation-adjusted audit and non-audit fees from 2003 to 2009 with the aim of identifying the impact of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Spain, where (a) the shift from national to international accounting standards represented major changes and (b) the implementation process was conducted in 2005 for group accounts of listed companies and 2008 for the individual accounts. To that end, we build a well-tested audit and non-audit fee model based on 2003 and compare the actual with the predicted values had the accounting reforms not taken place. We report unexpected higher audit fees for the group accounts model in the years 2004, 2005 and 2006. A plausible explanation for these results is the incremental audit costs associated with the mandatory IFRS adoption. Similarly, the unexpected increment in 2008 for parent company audit fees is feasibly associated with the new domestic accounting rules. The behaviour of non-audit fees is more erratic and likely influenced by the auditors’ independence regulation enacted in 2002. We only identify significant prediction errors in 2008 for group accounts. Total fees exhibit significant increases in 2005 and 2008 for group accounts and 2008 for parent company accounts. Our results are robust to different additional tests.

Following the publication of the Spanish Code of Corporate Good Governance in 1998 (known as the Olivencia Code), some companies voluntarily created audit committees in line with the recommendation that all firms, and especially listed companies, should do so. The aim of this work is to analyse the factors associated with voluntary audit committee formation in companies listed on the Spanish Capital Market through 1999. In particular we analyse factors such as board independence and size, the board chairman/CEO duality, auditor size, agency costs, ownership, economies of scale, institutional investors, the audit report and auditor tenure. We find that voluntary audit committee formation is positively correlated with the proportion of independent directors on the board of directors and economies of scale, while the evidence reveals a non-linear (quadratic) relationship between board size and voluntary audit committee formation. We also formed another sample excluding financial institutions, for which we found that audit committee formation is positively associated with board independence and economies of scale, and negatively associated with the audit report and audit tenure