James Richard Hill
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
James Richard Hill has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Peter A. Groothuis
Appalachian State University
3 shared publications - Johnny Ducking
Department of Economics, North Carolina A&T State University, Greensboro, USA
2 shared publications Peter A. Groothuis
Department of Economics, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC, USA
2 shared publicationsJason E. Taylor
Central Michigan University
1 shared publicationNicholas A. Jolly
Jolly: Department of Economics, Marquette University, PO Box 1881, Milwaukee, WI 53201‐1881. Phone 414‐288‐7576, Fax 414‐288‐5757
1 shared publication- Nicholas A. Jolly
The authors’ affiliation is Department of Economics, Central Michigan University, Mt Pleasant, MI. s:;. We would like to thank Peter Groothuis for helpful comments on a first draft of this paper
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 January 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Sports Economics
- Vol. 19 (6) , 873-883
Career Duration in the NBA
Using a panel of National Basketball Association players from 1990 through 2013, we analyze the determinants of career length in the league. We find that foreign-born players who did not play college basketball in the United States have shorter careers than do American-born players holding performance constant. Foreign-born players who played college basketball in the United States do not have shorter careers. We suggest that both push and pull immigration factors might cause this early exit.
- 30 January 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Sports Economics
- Vol. 19 (6) , 873-883
Open AccessCareer Duration in the NBA
Using a panel of National Basketball Association players from 1990 through 2013, we analyze the determinants of career length in the league. We find that foreign-born players who did not play college basketball in the United States have shorter careers than do American-born players holding performance constant. Foreign-born players who played college basketball in the United States do not have shorter careers. We suggest that both push and pull immigration factors might cause this early exit.
- 1 January 2015
- Published by SAGE Publications in The Review of Black Political Economy
- Vol. 42 (3) , 285-299
Exit Discrimination in the NFL: A Duration Analysis of Career Length
Exit discrimination is defined as the involuntary termination of employment due to racial characteristics holding productivity constant. We test for exit discrimination in the National Football League (NFL) using a panel study on career length. Our analysis focuses on six positional groups: defensive backs, defensive linemen, linebackers, running backs, tight ends and wide receivers. In our analysis, in addition to race, we include performance variables to determine their importance in determining career length. Using both parametric and semi-parametric hazard models, we find no evidence of exit discrimination in the NFL.
- 1 January 2015
- Published by SAGE Publications in The Review of Black Political Economy
- Vol. 42 (3) , 285-299
Exit Discrimination in the NFL: A Duration Analysis of Career Length
Exit discrimination is defined as the involuntary termination of employment due to racial characteristics holding productivity constant. We test for exit discrimination in the National Football League (NFL) using a panel study on career length. Our analysis focuses on six positional groups: defensive backs, defensive linemen, linebackers, running backs, tight ends and wide receivers. In our analysis, in addition to race, we include performance variables to determine their importance in determining career length. Using both parametric and semi-parametric hazard models, we find no evidence of exit discrimination in the NFL.
- 22 September 2014
- Published by Wiley in Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
- Vol. 53 (4) , 617-635
Minimum Pay Scale and Career Length in the NBA
- 22 September 2014
- Published by Wiley in Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
- Vol. 53 (4) , 617-635
Minimum Pay Scale and Career Length in the NBA
- 21 February 2014
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Economic Policy
- Vol. 32 (2) , 533-543
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT UNDER MLB FINAL‐OFFER SALARY ARBITRATION SYSTEM
This paper provides a detailed analysis of negotiated salaries under Major League Baseball's final‐offer arbitration process using data from the 2007–2010 seasons. There is a wage premium of 25% for hitters and 14% for pitchers filing for arbitration. Interestingly, there is an additional premium for exchanging offers for hitters but not for pitchers. The additional premium in salary for hitters who exchange offers with their clubs amounts to 7%. (JEL J31, J52)
- 21 February 2014
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Economic Policy
- Vol. 32 (2) , 533-543
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT UNDER MLB FINAL‐OFFER SALARY ARBITRATION SYSTEM
This paper provides a detailed analysis of negotiated salaries under Major League Baseball's final‐offer arbitration process using data from the 2007–2010 seasons. There is a wage premium of 25% for hitters and 14% for pitchers filing for arbitration. Interestingly, there is an additional premium for exchanging offers for hitters but not for pitchers. The additional premium in salary for hitters who exchange offers with their clubs amounts to 7%. (JEL J31, J52)
- 19 April 2012
- Published by Wiley in Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
- Vol. 51 (2) , 342-363
Salary Distribution and Collective Bargaining Agreements: A Case Study of the NBA
Traditional non‐sports unions attempt to institutionalize pay between workers by reducing productivity‐related differences in wages and increasing pay differences based on seniority and other non‐productivity‐related characteristics. Recent changes made to the collective bargaining agreements of the NBA have mirrored those of unions that are more traditional. The purpose of this article is to analyze how the changes made in the bargaining agreements of the NBA affect the salary distributions of players over time.
- 19 April 2012
- Published by Wiley in Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
- Vol. 51 (2) , 342-363
Salary Distribution and Collective Bargaining Agreements: A Case Study of the NBA
Traditional non‐sports unions attempt to institutionalize pay between workers by reducing productivity‐related differences in wages and increasing pay differences based on seniority and other non‐productivity‐related characteristics. Recent changes made to the collective bargaining agreements of the NBA have mirrored those of unions that are more traditional. The purpose of this article is to analyze how the changes made in the bargaining agreements of the NBA affect the salary distributions of players over time.
- 19 November 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 41 (25) , 3193-3198
The dilemma of choosing talent: Michael Jordans are hard to find
This article explores the dilemma of choosing talent using NBA data from 1987 to 2003. We find there is much uncertainty in selecting talent. If superstars are found, they are usually identified early. However, more false positives exist than correct decisions with high draft picks. Our results suggest the dilemma of choosing talent is not so much a winner's curse but more like a purchase of a lottery ticket. Most times you lose, but, if you are going to win, you must buy a ticket.
- 19 November 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 41 (25) , 3193-3198
The dilemma of choosing talent: Michael Jordans are hard to find
This article explores the dilemma of choosing talent using NBA data from 1987 to 2003. We find there is much uncertainty in selecting talent. If superstars are found, they are usually identified early. However, more false positives exist than correct decisions with high draft picks. Our results suggest the dilemma of choosing talent is not so much a winner's curse but more like a purchase of a lottery ticket. Most times you lose, but, if you are going to win, you must buy a ticket.
- 29 June 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Labor Research
- Vol. 29 (1) , 56-67
Do Professional Sports Unions Fit the Standard Model of Traditional Unionism?
- 29 June 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Labor Research
- Vol. 29 (1) , 56-67
Do Professional Sports Unions Fit the Standard Model of Traditional Unionism?
- 1 April 2004
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 42 (2) , 341-349
Exit Discrimination in the NBA: A Duration Analysis of Career Length
Using a panel study of annual NBA data (1989–99) we do not find evidence of exit discrimination on career length in the NBA. This result is inconsistent with results from data in the 1980s but is consistent with more recent findings that have measured wage discrimination in sports in the 1990s. In our semiparametric duration analysis, we find that performance variables are important in determining career length. These results suggest that team owners in the pursuit of championships keep talented players regardless of race. This is an affirmation of Becker's theoretical implications of market competition on discrimination. (JELJ71,J23)
- 1 April 2004
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 42 (2) , 341-349
Exit Discrimination in the NBA: A Duration Analysis of Career Length
Using a panel study of annual NBA data (1989–99) we do not find evidence of exit discrimination on career length in the NBA. This result is inconsistent with results from data in the 1980s but is consistent with more recent findings that have measured wage discrimination in sports in the 1990s. In our semiparametric duration analysis, we find that performance variables are important in determining career length. These results suggest that team owners in the pursuit of championships keep talented players regardless of race. This is an affirmation of Becker's theoretical implications of market competition on discrimination. (JELJ71,J23)