Nils Holtug
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Nils Holtug has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Xavier Landes
Stockholm School of Economics in Riga
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 22 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 11-31
Equality of Opportunity and Identity Politics
- 27 May 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Moral Philosophy and Politics
- Vol. 12 (1) , 183-204
Writing the Other: The Ethics of Out-Group Representation in Art
Recently, there have been cases in which out-group representation in art has faced severe criticism. Out-group representation occurs when an artist in her work engages with people, characters, or subject matters that do not fall within her own identity group. This is exemplified by the case of finding a translator for Amanda Gorman’s The Hill We Climb in the Netherlands, where the original choice was criticized because, unlike Gorman, the translator was not Black, and by the case of Dana Schutz’s painting of Emmett Till in his casket at the Whitney Museum in New York, which was criticized for being painted by a White person who could not understand the suffering Emmett Till and his mother had gone through. A number of objections to out-group representation are identified in the debate, namely, an objection from authenticity, an objection from equality of opportunity, and the suggestion that out-group representation is disrespectful and/or harmful. It is argued that none of these objections establishes that it is morally problematic to engage in out-group representation in art per se, although, importantly, there are a number of moral concerns that those who thus engage should be sensitive to.
- 27 May 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Moral Philosophy and Politics
- Vol. 12 (1) , 183-204
Writing the Other: The Ethics of Out-Group Representation in Art
Recently, there have been cases in which out-group representation in art has faced severe criticism. Out-group representation occurs when an artist in her work engages with people, characters, or subject matters that do not fall within her own identity group. This is exemplified by the case of finding a translator for Amanda Gorman’s The Hill We Climb in the Netherlands, where the original choice was criticized because, unlike Gorman, the translator was not Black, and by the case of Dana Schutz’s painting of Emmett Till in his casket at the Whitney Museum in New York, which was criticized for being painted by a White person who could not understand the suffering Emmett Till and his mother had gone through. A number of objections to out-group representation are identified in the debate, namely, an objection from authenticity, an objection from equality of opportunity, and the suggestion that out-group representation is disrespectful and/or harmful. It is argued that none of these objections establishes that it is morally problematic to engage in out-group representation in art per se, although, importantly, there are a number of moral concerns that those who thus engage should be sensitive to.
- 19 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Res Publica
- Vol. 28 (1) , 33-47
Climate Refugees, Demandingness and Kagan’s Conditional
- 19 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Res Publica
- Vol. 28 (1) , 33-47
Climate Refugees, Demandingness and Kagan’s Conditional
- 28 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 499-511
National Identity, Shared Values, and Social Cohesion
- 28 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 499-511
National Identity, Shared Values, and Social Cohesion
- 6 August 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-13
National Identity, Shared Values, and Social Cohesion
- 6 August 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-13
National Identity, Shared Values, and Social Cohesion
- 8 September 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
- Vol. 43 (7) , 1084-1100
Identity, causality and social cohesion
According to the Identity Thesis, sharing an identity tends to promote social cohesion. The article focuses on two aspects of social cohesion, namely trust and solidarity. It distinguishes between different versions of the Identity Thesis that differ regarding the causal efficacy attributed to specific values and the sharing of values, and with respect to the value sets that may be fed into the thesis (relying on work in political theory on nationalism, liberalism and multiculturalism). Having established the existence of different versions of the thesis, four different accounts of why shared identities could be expected to promote social cohesion are considered and assessed.
- 8 September 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
- Vol. 43 (7) , 1084-1100
Identity, causality and social cohesion
According to the Identity Thesis, sharing an identity tends to promote social cohesion. The article focuses on two aspects of social cohesion, namely trust and solidarity. It distinguishes between different versions of the Identity Thesis that differ regarding the causal efficacy attributed to specific values and the sharing of values, and with respect to the value sets that may be fed into the thesis (relying on work in political theory on nationalism, liberalism and multiculturalism). Having established the existence of different versions of the thesis, four different accounts of why shared identities could be expected to promote social cohesion are considered and assessed.
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Global Ethics
- Vol. 12 (3) , 279-288
A fair distribution of refugees in the European Union
In light of the large recent inflow of refugees to the EU and the Commission’s efforts to relocate them, I raise the question of what a fair distribution of refugees between EU countries would look like. More specifically, I consider what concerns such a distributive scheme should be sensitive to. First, I put forward some arguments for why states are obligated to admit refugees and outline how I believe the EU should respond to the refugee crisis. This involves, among other things, resettling a proportion of refugees from countries neighbouring Syria in the EU. Second, I consider how the intake into the EU should be distributed between member states, that is, the shares different countries can be expected to admit. I discuss the relevance of a number of different factors that may be claimed to affect such shares, including population size, GDP, number of refugees admitted so far, unemployment rate, country-specific costs and cultural ‘closeness’. Third, I consider whether the distributive scheme should be restricted to reflect specific states’ responsibility for creating refugees in the first place, levels of racism and xenophobia, and whether other states are required to pick up the slack if some refuse to admit their fair share.
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Global Ethics
- Vol. 12 (3) , 279-288
A fair distribution of refugees in the European Union
In light of the large recent inflow of refugees to the EU and the Commission’s efforts to relocate them, I raise the question of what a fair distribution of refugees between EU countries would look like. More specifically, I consider what concerns such a distributive scheme should be sensitive to. First, I put forward some arguments for why states are obligated to admit refugees and outline how I believe the EU should respond to the refugee crisis. This involves, among other things, resettling a proportion of refugees from countries neighbouring Syria in the EU. Second, I consider how the intake into the EU should be distributed between member states, that is, the shares different countries can be expected to admit. I discuss the relevance of a number of different factors that may be claimed to affect such shares, including population size, GDP, number of refugees admitted so far, unemployment rate, country-specific costs and cultural ‘closeness’. Third, I consider whether the distributive scheme should be restricted to reflect specific states’ responsibility for creating refugees in the first place, levels of racism and xenophobia, and whether other states are required to pick up the slack if some refuse to admit their fair share.
- 11 March 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Res Publica
- Vol. 21 (2) , 111-118
Insurance, Equality and the Welfare State: Political Philosophy and (of) Public Insurance
- 11 March 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Res Publica
- Vol. 21 (2) , 111-118
Insurance, Equality and the Welfare State: Political Philosophy and (of) Public Insurance
- 1 October 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 121 (484) , 1106-1110
Are Liberty and Equality Compatible? by Jan Narveson and James P. Sterba.
- 1 October 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 121 (484) , 1106-1110
Are Liberty and Equality Compatible? by Jan Narveson and James P. Sterba.