Per H. Hansen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Latest Publications
- 1 September 2012
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Enterprise & Society
- Vol. 13 (3) , 672-706
Making Sense of Financial Crisis and Scandal: A Danish Bank Failure in the First Era of Finance Capitalism
In this paper I discuss a dramatic financial collapse and scandal in Denmark in the interwar period. I analyze the asset price bubble from 1914 to 1920 and the subsequent failure in 1922 of Scandinavia's largest bank, the Danish Landmandsbanken, as well as the downfall of its CEO Emil Glückstadt. I discuss the sense-making process, first during the bubble and then following Landmandsbanken's collapse and Glückstadt's fall from power in 1922, and finally until the introduction of a new bank act in 1930. I further argue that such crises and scandals force contemporaries to make sense of the dramatic fall from the top of society of these icons and of their role in the collapse of their banks. I view the sense-making process as centered on the construction of narratives that explain the crisis and enable or constrain institutional response to the crisis. To conclude, I argue that the process of sense-making in the case of Landmandsbanken can be generalized as the way in which society enforces norms and values in cases of dramatic financial crisis and scandal.
- 1 September 2012
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Enterprise & Society
- Vol. 13 (3) , 672-706
Making Sense of Financial Crisis and Scandal: A Danish Bank Failure in the First Era of Finance Capitalism
In this paper I discuss a dramatic financial collapse and scandal in Denmark in the interwar period. I analyze the asset price bubble from 1914 to 1920 and the subsequent failure in 1922 of Scandinavia's largest bank, the Danish Landmandsbanken, as well as the downfall of its CEO Emil Glückstadt. I discuss the sense-making process, first during the bubble and then following Landmandsbanken's collapse and Glückstadt's fall from power in 1922, and finally until the introduction of a new bank act in 1930. I further argue that such crises and scandals force contemporaries to make sense of the dramatic fall from the top of society of these icons and of their role in the collapse of their banks. I view the sense-making process as centered on the construction of narratives that explain the crisis and enable or constrain institutional response to the crisis. To conclude, I argue that the process of sense-making in the case of Landmandsbanken can be generalized as the way in which society enforces norms and values in cases of dramatic financial crisis and scandal.
- 9 February 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Scandinavian Journal of History
- Vol. 37 (1) , 87-107
Cooperate or Free Ride?: the Scandinavian central banks, Bank for International Settlements and the Austrian financial crisis of 1931
In this article, I discuss the role of the three Scandinavian central banks in the establishment of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in 1930, and in the international lender of last resort operation towards Austria in 1931. I argue that small central banks were reluctant supporters in the establishment of the BIS and free riders in the Austrian crisis, even though there were marked differences in their attitude to international cooperation. These results run counter to the views of those International Political Economy (IPE) theorists who argue that small states should be in favour of international cooperation. On the other hand, the evidence seems to confirm Kindleberger's hypothesis that small countries were free riding during the international financial crisis of 1931, and that therefore there is a need for some coordinating mechanism, or a hegemon, in such crises.
- 9 February 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Scandinavian Journal of History
- Vol. 37 (1) , 87-107
Cooperate or Free Ride?: the Scandinavian central banks, Bank for International Settlements and the Austrian financial crisis of 1931
In this article, I discuss the role of the three Scandinavian central banks in the establishment of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in 1930, and in the international lender of last resort operation towards Austria in 1931. I argue that small central banks were reluctant supporters in the establishment of the BIS and free riders in the Austrian crisis, even though there were marked differences in their attitude to international cooperation. These results run counter to the views of those International Political Economy (IPE) theorists who argue that small states should be in favour of international cooperation. On the other hand, the evidence seems to confirm Kindleberger's hypothesis that small countries were free riding during the international financial crisis of 1931, and that therefore there is a need for some coordinating mechanism, or a hegemon, in such crises.
- 1 December 2007
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Enterprise & Society
- Vol. 8 (4) , 920-953
Organizational Culture and Organizational Change: The Transformation of Savings Banks in Denmark, 1965–1990
In this article, I argue that organizations' historical narratives are a basic and important component of their culture and identity, and that these narratives can be resources as well as constraints. I combine a narrative approach with Joanne Martin's three perspective theory of organizational culture, and using the transformation of Danish savings banks as a case, I demonstrate how a narrative approach can provide a new and better understanding of organizational behaviour and change than mainstream economics and the abundant functionalist organizational culture literature. I demonstrate how, when change was called for by external pressures, the savings banks choice set was constrained by a shared narrative about their historical origins. This narrative, in turn, constituted the identity, image and organizational culture of savings banks and to a high degree restrained learning capabilities, created organizational inertia and delayed the adoption of a new strategy.
- 1 December 2007
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Enterprise & Society
- Vol. 8 (4) , 920-953
Organizational Culture and Organizational Change: The Transformation of Savings Banks in Denmark, 1965–1990
In this article, I argue that organizations' historical narratives are a basic and important component of their culture and identity, and that these narratives can be resources as well as constraints. I combine a narrative approach with Joanne Martin's three perspective theory of organizational culture, and using the transformation of Danish savings banks as a case, I demonstrate how a narrative approach can provide a new and better understanding of organizational behaviour and change than mainstream economics and the abundant functionalist organizational culture literature. I demonstrate how, when change was called for by external pressures, the savings banks choice set was constrained by a shared narrative about their historical origins. This narrative, in turn, constituted the identity, image and organizational culture of savings banks and to a high degree restrained learning capabilities, created organizational inertia and delayed the adoption of a new strategy.