CWChangyun Wang

Changyun Wang

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Changyun Wang has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Holding cash for corruption? Evidence from China's anti‐corruption campaign

    by Yulin Chen, Changyun Wang, Yang Yi, Jianyu Zeng

    Exploiting China's anti‐corruption campaign in 2012 as a quasi‐natural experiment, we find that firms with higher prior entertainment and travel costs (ETC), a proxy for corruption, decrease cash holdings more because of the campaign. We further observe a greater decline in cash values for more corrupt firms. Moreover, the baseline pattern is more pronounced in financially constrained, better‐governed, and private enterprises. We also rule out possible confounders concerning firms' financing conditions and investment decisions. Overall, the evidence favours the liquidity hypothesis that firms demand less cash as they anticipate fewer corrupt opportunities in the business environment in the post‐campaign era.


  • Are Chinese warrants derivatives? Evidence from connections to their underlying stocks

    by Ke Tang, Changyun Wang

    In this paper, we empirically investigate warrant price behaviour in the Chinese market—the largest warrant market in the world in terms of trading volume since 2006. By examining warrant return properties, volatility behaviour and pricing errors, we document a stylized fact that call warrants have a considerable linkage with their underlying but put warrants have almost none. The combination of the arbitrage pricing theory and the resale-option bubble theory (proposed by Scheinkman and Xiong in 2003) is adopted to explain this stylized fact. Specifically, the arbitrage pricing framework tells that it is possible for puts (calls) to be overpriced (underpriced) due to short-sales prohibition in the Chinese stock market, while the resale-option bubble theory proves that puts do have bubbles but calls do not. The bubble dilutes the linkage between put prices and their underlying stock prices. Our findings have implications for Chinese investors as well as the derivatives regulator.


  • Liquidity, Liquidity Risk and Stock Returns: Evidence from Japan

    by Bo Li, Qian Sun, Changyun Wang

    This paper investigates‐whether liquidity and liquidity risk are priced in Japan. Using modified Amihud illiquidity measures, we find both cross‐sectional and time series evidence that liquidity is priced in the Japanese stock market during the period 1975–2006. The evidence is largely consistent with Amihud's (2002) findings in the US market. We further employ the liquidity‐adjusted CAPM proposed by Acharya and Pedersen (2005) to examine whether liquidity risk is priced in Japan. Consistent with Acharya and Pedersen's findings in the US, we show that liquidity risk is priced in the stock market, in addition to the liquidity level. These findings strengthen the confidence that liquidity is a determinant of stock returns.


  • Information Diffusion and Overreaction: Evidence from the Chinese Stock Market

    by Changyun Wang, Lei Xie

    This paper empirically examines the relation between overreaction and the speed of information diffusion in the Chinese stock market. Industry-adjusted firm size and residual analyst coverage are used to proxy the speed of information diffusion. We document strong evidence that the profitability of a monthly contrarian strategy decreases with industry-adjusted firm size or residual analyst coverage. Moreover, the profitability of contrarian strategies survives for a longer horizon for stocks with slower information diffusion than for those with faster information diffusion. This result holds true even if risk, bid-ask spread, lead-lag effect, inventory costs, and limits to arbitrage are properly accounted for. Our findings suggest that information environment and information diffusion determine the extent of overreaction.