Robert S. Goldfarb
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Robert S. Goldfarb has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Lee Sigelman
Department of Political Science , George Washington University , 2115 G Street, NW, Room 340, Washington , DC , 20052 , USA
2 shared publications- Bryan L. Boulier
Department of Economics , George Washington University , Washington , DC , USA
1 shared publication H. O. Stekler
1 shared publication- Joel David
NERA
1 shared publication Jonathan Ratner
Westat, Rockville , Maryland, USA
1 shared publicationMark C. Long
University of Washington, Seattle
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 13 March 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Methodology
- Vol. 19 (1) , 1-19
The influence of economics on political science: by what pathway?
The influence of economics, the most imperialistic of the social science disciplines, is widely thought to have been felt more decisively in political science than in any other discipline. After briefly reviewing some evidence that this alleged influence is not transmitted through the use of specific economics concepts, this paper explores the possibility that the influence instead stems from the importation of formal rational choice modeling techniques from economics into political science. This is carried out using a case study of an important political science literature on voting behavior and the voter turnout puzzle. The analysis produces what seems compelling evidence for the importation of economics-oriented analytical methods into the political science literature on voting.
- 13 March 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Methodology
- Vol. 19 (1) , 1-19
The influence of economics on political science: by what pathway?
The influence of economics, the most imperialistic of the social science disciplines, is widely thought to have been felt more decisively in political science than in any other discipline. After briefly reviewing some evidence that this alleged influence is not transmitted through the use of specific economics concepts, this paper explores the possibility that the influence instead stems from the importation of formal rational choice modeling techniques from economics into political science. This is carried out using a case study of an important political science literature on voting behavior and the voter turnout puzzle. The analysis produces what seems compelling evidence for the importation of economics-oriented analytical methods into the political science literature on voting.
- 20 July 2010
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 22 (3) , 275-300
Does ‘Civic Duty’ ‘Solve’ The Rational Choice Voter Turnout Puzzle?
Rational choice models of voter turnout try to account for why people vote by including on the ‘benefits’ side of the cost-benefit calculus some term representing either the collective benefits of voting or the satisfaction the individual derives from the very act of voting, a strategy subject to a number of telling criticisms. After a background discussion of three competing perspectives on this rational choice strategy, which we term the ‘accepter,’ ‘yes, but’ and ‘rejecter’ views, we address the following issues. First, how one’s view of ‘rationality’ affects the appropriateness of including ‘satisfaction from voting’ and related concepts in the rational choice model. Second, as a formal analytical matter, can a ‘sense of civic duty to vote’ be comfortably incorporated into the rational choice model of turnout? What other recent related embellishments have been made to that model? Third, even if ‘civic duty’ can be formally incorporated, would this defeat the efficacy of the rational choice model? Fourth, why the answer to the previous question might differ for economists versus political scientists. Fifth, what significant issues are raised by expanding the rational choice model to include civic duty? The analytical contribution of this article is showing how ‘civic duty’ can be incorporated into the rational choice model; the broader conceptual contribution is to evaluate whether and how that innovation advances our understanding of the efficacy of the rational choice approach for understanding voter turnout.
- 20 July 2010
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 22 (3) , 275-300
Does ‘Civic Duty’ ‘Solve’ The Rational Choice Voter Turnout Puzzle?
Rational choice models of voter turnout try to account for why people vote by including on the ‘benefits’ side of the cost-benefit calculus some term representing either the collective benefits of voting or the satisfaction the individual derives from the very act of voting, a strategy subject to a number of telling criticisms. After a background discussion of three competing perspectives on this rational choice strategy, which we term the ‘accepter,’ ‘yes, but’ and ‘rejecter’ views, we address the following issues. First, how one’s view of ‘rationality’ affects the appropriateness of including ‘satisfaction from voting’ and related concepts in the rational choice model. Second, as a formal analytical matter, can a ‘sense of civic duty to vote’ be comfortably incorporated into the rational choice model of turnout? What other recent related embellishments have been made to that model? Third, even if ‘civic duty’ can be formally incorporated, would this defeat the efficacy of the rational choice model? Fourth, why the answer to the previous question might differ for economists versus political scientists. Fifth, what significant issues are raised by expanding the rational choice model to include civic duty? The analytical contribution of this article is showing how ‘civic duty’ can be incorporated into the rational choice model; the broader conceptual contribution is to evaluate whether and how that innovation advances our understanding of the efficacy of the rational choice approach for understanding voter turnout.
- 2 February 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought
- Vol. 17 (1) , 151-155
Jacob Mincer: A Founding Father of Modern Labour Economics
- 2 February 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought
- Vol. 17 (1) , 151-155
Jacob Mincer: A Founding Father of Modern Labour Economics
- 1 June 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Methodology
- Vol. 16 (2) , 159-174
Exploring different visions of the model–empirics nexus: Solow versus Lipsey
Does empirical work in economics both provoke and test theoretical models, or does model development proceed according to a theory-oriented research program, with little interaction with empirics? Robert Solow and Richard Lipsey have articulated different visions of this relationship. This paper: (i) describes these competing Solow versus Lipsey views; (ii) presents examples illustrating each view; and (iii) draws inferences about factors promoting a close relation between empirics and modeling. Three examples are examined in detail: the ‘nursing shortage’ literature; Lind's analysis of recent rent control models; and a wide-ranging evaluation of ‘is there too little theory in development economics?’ by leading development economists. Various factors promoting or inhibiting a close connection between modeling and empirics are identified.
- 1 June 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Methodology
- Vol. 16 (2) , 159-174
Exploring different visions of the model–empirics nexus: Solow versus Lipsey
Does empirical work in economics both provoke and test theoretical models, or does model development proceed according to a theory-oriented research program, with little interaction with empirics? Robert Solow and Richard Lipsey have articulated different visions of this relationship. This paper: (i) describes these competing Solow versus Lipsey views; (ii) presents examples illustrating each view; and (iii) draws inferences about factors promoting a close relation between empirics and modeling. Three examples are examined in detail: the ‘nursing shortage’ literature; Lind's analysis of recent rent control models; and a wide-ranging evaluation of ‘is there too little theory in development economics?’ by leading development economists. Various factors promoting or inhibiting a close connection between modeling and empirics are identified.
- 19 November 2008
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Forum for Health Economics and Policy
- Vol. 11 (2)
Explanations for Persistent Nursing Shortages
This paper contributes to the economics literature on nursing market shortages by putting forward two new models that suggest three new explanations for perceived nursing shortages. The first model focuses on hospitals hiring both permanent staff nurses and temporary contract nurses. It shows that hiring both classes of nurses can represent optimizing behavior, and that an interesting kind of perceived nursing shortage results from this dual hiring. The second model posits two classes of hospitals, ``premier" and ``funds-constrained," and generates two distinct kinds of nursing shortages: economic shortages, involving unfilled, budgeted positions, and ``noneconomic" professional standards shortages. We believe that the perceived existence of professional standards shortages may be a significant explanation for the widespread impression of persistent shortages.
- 19 November 2008
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Forum for Health Economics and Policy
- Vol. 11 (2)
Explanations for Persistent Nursing Shortages
This paper contributes to the economics literature on nursing market shortages by putting forward two new models that suggest three new explanations for perceived nursing shortages. The first model focuses on hospitals hiring both permanent staff nurses and temporary contract nurses. It shows that hiring both classes of nurses can represent optimizing behavior, and that an interesting kind of perceived nursing shortage results from this dual hiring. The second model posits two classes of hospitals, ``premier" and ``funds-constrained," and generates two distinct kinds of nursing shortages: economic shortages, involving unfilled, budgeted positions, and ``noneconomic" professional standards shortages. We believe that the perceived existence of professional standards shortages may be a significant explanation for the widespread impression of persistent shortages.
- 1 August 2008
- Published by SAGE Publications in Policy, Politics, & Nursing Practice
- Vol. 9 (3) , 192-202
Making Sense of Competing Nursing Shortage Concepts
Widespread and continuing discussions of nursing shortages frequently involve divergent concepts of shortage that can have differing policy implications. This article explains the shortage concepts used by economists, hospital administrators, and government policy makers. It discusses measurement problems and suggests possible improvements. It then sets forth the divergent policy implications of competing shortage concepts. The article's aim is to promote greater clarity in analyses of nursing shortages and more fruitful conversations among participants who use different notions of shortages.
- 1 August 2008
- Published by SAGE Publications in Policy, Politics, & Nursing Practice
- Vol. 9 (3) , 192-202
Making Sense of Competing Nursing Shortage Concepts
Widespread and continuing discussions of nursing shortages frequently involve divergent concepts of shortage that can have differing policy implications. This article explains the shortage concepts used by economists, hospital administrators, and government policy makers. It discusses measurement problems and suggests possible improvements. It then sets forth the divergent policy implications of competing shortage concepts. The article's aim is to promote greater clarity in analyses of nursing shortages and more fruitful conversations among participants who use different notions of shortages.
- 23 January 2007
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 7 (1)
Vaccination Externalities
Vaccination provides indirect benefits to the unvaccinated. Despite its important policy implications, there is little analytical or empirical work to quantify this externality, nor is it incorporated in a number of cost-benefit studies of vaccine programs. We use a standard epidemiological model to analyze how the magnitude of this externality varies with the number of vaccinations, vaccine efficacy, and disease infectiousness. We also provide empirical estimates using parameters for influenza and mumps epidemics. The pattern of the externality is complex and striking, unlike that suggested in standard treatments. The size of the externality is not necessarily monotonic in the number vaccinated, vaccine efficacy, nor disease infectiousness. Moreover, its magnitude can be remarkably large. In particular, the marginal externality of a vaccination can be greater than one case of illness prevented among the nonvaccinated, so its omission from policy analyses implies serious biases.
- 23 January 2007
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 7 (1)
Vaccination Externalities
Vaccination provides indirect benefits to the unvaccinated. Despite its important policy implications, there is little analytical or empirical work to quantify this externality, nor is it incorporated in a number of cost-benefit studies of vaccine programs. We use a standard epidemiological model to analyze how the magnitude of this externality varies with the number of vaccinations, vaccine efficacy, and disease infectiousness. We also provide empirical estimates using parameters for influenza and mumps epidemics. The pattern of the externality is complex and striking, unlike that suggested in standard treatments. The size of the externality is not necessarily monotonic in the number vaccinated, vaccine efficacy, nor disease infectiousness. Moreover, its magnitude can be remarkably large. In particular, the marginal externality of a vaccination can be greater than one case of illness prevented among the nonvaccinated, so its omission from policy analyses implies serious biases.
- 1 December 2005
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Methodology
- Vol. 12 (4) , 517-542
Methodological issues in forecasting: Insights from the egregious business forecast errors of late 1930
This paper examines some economic forecasts made in late 1930 that were intended to predict economic activity in the United States in order to shed light on several methodological issues. We document that these forecasts were extremely optimistic, predicting that the recession in the US would soon end, and that 1931 would show a recovery. These forecasts displayed egregious errors, because 1931 witnessed the largest negative growth rate for the US economy in any year in the twentieth century. A specific question is what led forecasters to make such serious and substantial empirical errors. A second more general issue involves the methodology of forecasting. The 1930 forecasts were sometimes based on explicit analogies with previous serious business cycles. Modern forecasting approaches are based on techniques that may not be recognized as analogies. Using the 1930 forecasts, we examine the implicit‐analogy content of forecasts, and what might render such implicit analogies valid or invalid. This 1930 forecast example also resonates beyond the confines of economic methodology because forecasts about the Great Depression are of continuing interest to the profession at large, and we produce a forecast series not previously available.
- 1 December 2005
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Methodology
- Vol. 12 (4) , 517-542
Methodological issues in forecasting: Insights from the egregious business forecast errors of late 1930
This paper examines some economic forecasts made in late 1930 that were intended to predict economic activity in the United States in order to shed light on several methodological issues. We document that these forecasts were extremely optimistic, predicting that the recession in the US would soon end, and that 1931 would show a recovery. These forecasts displayed egregious errors, because 1931 witnessed the largest negative growth rate for the US economy in any year in the twentieth century. A specific question is what led forecasters to make such serious and substantial empirical errors. A second more general issue involves the methodology of forecasting. The 1930 forecasts were sometimes based on explicit analogies with previous serious business cycles. Modern forecasting approaches are based on techniques that may not be recognized as analogies. Using the 1930 forecasts, we examine the implicit‐analogy content of forecasts, and what might render such implicit analogies valid or invalid. This 1930 forecast example also resonates beyond the confines of economic methodology because forecasts about the Great Depression are of continuing interest to the profession at large, and we produce a forecast series not previously available.