Neil Garrett
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Neil Garrett has a total of 44 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Tali Sharot
Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, UK
9 shared publications Tali Sharot
Affective Brain Lab, Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, UK
4 shared publications- Christopher Summerfield
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.
2 shared publications - Leonie Glitz
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford OX2 6HG, United Kingdom
2 shared publications - Nathaniel Douglass Daw
Princeton University
2 shared publications Ana María González-Garzón
Affective Brain Laboratory, Experimental Psychology, University College London, London WC1H 0AP, United Kingdom
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Confirmation Bias Exists in the Face of False Information
Confirmation bias impacts judgments and decisions across a range of domains including finance, policy and science. Here we examine whether explicitly labelling information as true or false disrupts a core underlying computational mechanism that can generate this pervasive bias: asymmetric learning. Human participants (Study 1: N=47, Study 2: N=57) completed a two-alternative forced-choice task previously used to test for the presence of confirmation bias. Participants made choices between pairs of options that could win or lose money and received either factual or counterfactual feedback after each choice. We introduced a key novel feature into the task - providing explicit cues that signalled to participants whether feedback they had seen was true (verified) or false (debunked). Learning in response to feedback was attenuated under false compared to true labels but was present under both. Fitting participants' choices to computational models enabled us to examine how sensitivity to the feedback varied as a function of both the label (true/false) and confirmation (confirmatory/disconfirmatory). This revealed a distinct pattern of learning rates typical of confirmation bias (enhanced learning from positive prediction errors for chosen options and from negative prediction errors for unchosen options) in response to both true and false labels. The findings highlight how confirmation bias plays an important role in the effectiveness of interventions designed to verify true and/or debunk false claims. Verification is less likely to succeed when information disconfirms prior beliefs. Conversely, debunking false claims is unlikely to succeed when the information confirms one's prior beliefs.
Open AccessConfirmation Bias Exists in the Face of False Information
Confirmation bias impacts judgments and decisions across a range of domains including finance, policy and science. Here we examine whether explicitly labelling information as true or false disrupts a core underlying computational mechanism that can generate this pervasive bias: asymmetric learning. Human participants (Study 1: N=47, Study 2: N=57) completed a two-alternative forced-choice task previously used to test for the presence of confirmation bias. Participants made choices between pairs of options that could win or lose money and received either factual or counterfactual feedback after each choice. We introduced a key novel feature into the task - providing explicit cues that signalled to participants whether feedback they had seen was true (verified) or false (debunked). Learning in response to feedback was attenuated under false compared to true labels but was present under both. Fitting participants' choices to computational models enabled us to examine how sensitivity to the feedback varied as a function of both the label (true/false) and confirmation (confirmatory/disconfirmatory). This revealed a distinct pattern of learning rates typical of confirmation bias (enhanced learning from positive prediction errors for chosen options and from negative prediction errors for unchosen options) in response to both true and false labels. The findings highlight how confirmation bias plays an important role in the effectiveness of interventions designed to verify true and/or debunk false claims. Verification is less likely to succeed when information disconfirms prior beliefs. Conversely, debunking false claims is unlikely to succeed when the information confirms one's prior beliefs.
- Open Access
- 13 September 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Humans decide to help others more often in poor environments
Prosocial behaviours are essential for solving global challenges. Typically these behaviours are measured using economic games or tasks where people decide between helping or not. However, in everyday life, current behaviours are interrupted with alternatives. Across three samples, people (total n=510) watched a movie whilst encountering opportunities to interrupt it to benefit another person or themselves. Crucially, participants decided in poor and rich environments where the average reward values of opportunities changed. We demonstrate a robust environmental influence on decisions that benefit others. People were more willing to interrupt their behaviour to help others in poor compared to rich environments. Computational modelling revealed that the opportunity costs of different environments were valued distinctly for others. Factors of utilitarianism, empathy and motivation, captured variability in opportunity costs for others. We show that when we decide to engage in prosocial behaviours depends on the environment which is critical as environments change.
- 13 September 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessHumans decide to help others more often in poor environments
Prosocial behaviours are essential for solving global challenges. Typically these behaviours are measured using economic games or tasks where people decide between helping or not. However, in everyday life, current behaviours are interrupted with alternatives. Across three samples, people (total n=510) watched a movie whilst encountering opportunities to interrupt it to benefit another person or themselves. Crucially, participants decided in poor and rich environments where the average reward values of opportunities changed. We demonstrate a robust environmental influence on decisions that benefit others. People were more willing to interrupt their behaviour to help others in poor compared to rich environments. Computational modelling revealed that the opportunity costs of different environments were valued distinctly for others. Factors of utilitarianism, empathy and motivation, captured variability in opportunity costs for others. We show that when we decide to engage in prosocial behaviours depends on the environment which is critical as environments change.
- Open Access
- 14 August 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 35 (8) , 876-886
There is no belief update bias for neutral events: failure to replicate Burton et al. (2022)
In a recent paper, Burton et al. claim that individuals update beliefs to a greater extent when learning an event is less likely compared to more likely than expected. Here, we investigate Burton’s et al.’s, findings. First, we show how Burton et al.’s data do not in fact support a belief update bias for neutral events. Next, in an attempt to replicate their findings, we collect a new data set employing the original belief update task design, but with neutral events. A belief update bias for neutral events is not observed. Finally, we highlight the statistical errors and confounds in Burton et al.’s design and analysis. This includes mis-specifying a reinforcement learning approach to model the data and failing to follow standard computational model fitting sanity checks such as parameter recovery, model comparison and out of sample prediction. Together, the results find little evidence for biased updating for neutral events.
- 14 August 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 35 (8) , 876-886
Open AccessThere is no belief update bias for neutral events: failure to replicate Burton et al. (2022)
In a recent paper, Burton et al. claim that individuals update beliefs to a greater extent when learning an event is less likely compared to more likely than expected. Here, we investigate Burton’s et al.’s, findings. First, we show how Burton et al.’s data do not in fact support a belief update bias for neutral events. Next, in an attempt to replicate their findings, we collect a new data set employing the original belief update task design, but with neutral events. A belief update bias for neutral events is not observed. Finally, we highlight the statistical errors and confounds in Burton et al.’s design and analysis. This includes mis-specifying a reinforcement learning approach to model the data and failing to follow standard computational model fitting sanity checks such as parameter recovery, model comparison and out of sample prediction. Together, the results find little evidence for biased updating for neutral events.
- Open Access
- 1 February 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Addiction Neuroscience
- Vol. 6
Model based control can give rise to devaluation insensitive choice
- 1 February 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Addiction Neuroscience
- Vol. 6
Open AccessModel based control can give rise to devaluation insensitive choice
- Open Access
Model based control can give rise to devaluation insensitive choice
Influential recent work aims to ground psychiatric dysfunction in the brain’s basic computational mechanisms. For instance, compulsive symptoms as in drug abuse have been argued to arise from imbalance between multiple systems for instrumental learning. Computational models suggest that such multiplicity arises because the brain adaptively simplifies laborious “model-based” deliberation by sometimes relying on a cheaper, more habitual “model-free” shortcut. Support for this account comes in part from failures to appropriately change behavior in light of new events. Notably, instrumental responding can, in some circumstances, persist despite reinforcer devaluation, perhaps reflecting control by model-free mechanisms that are driven by past reinforcement rather than knowledge of the (now devalued) outcome. However, another important line of theory – heretofore mostly studied in Pavlovian conditioning – posits a different mechanism that can also modulate behavioral change. It concerns how animals identify different rules or contingencies that may apply in different circumstances, by covertly clustering experiences into distinct groups identified with different “latent causes” or contexts. Such clustering has been used to explain the return of Pavlovian responding following extinction. Here we combine both lines of theory to investigate the consequences of latent cause inference on instrumental sensitivity to reinforcer devaluation. We show that because segregating events into different latent clusters prevents generalization between them, instrumental insensitivity to reinforcer devaluation can arise in this theory even using only model-based planning, and does not require or imply any habitual, model-free component. In simulations, these ersatz habits (like laboratory ones) emerge after overtraining, interact with contextual cues, and show preserved sensitivity to reinforcer devaluation on a separate consumption test, a standard control. While these results do not rule out a contribution of model-free learning per se , they point to a subtle and important role of state inference in instrumental learning and highlight the need for caution in using reinforcer devaluation procedures to rule in (or out) the contribution of different learning mechanisms. They also offer a new perspective on the neurocomputational substrates of drug abuse and the relevance of laboratory reinforcer devaluation procedures to this phenomenon.
Open AccessModel based control can give rise to devaluation insensitive choice
Influential recent work aims to ground psychiatric dysfunction in the brain’s basic computational mechanisms. For instance, compulsive symptoms as in drug abuse have been argued to arise from imbalance between multiple systems for instrumental learning. Computational models suggest that such multiplicity arises because the brain adaptively simplifies laborious “model-based” deliberation by sometimes relying on a cheaper, more habitual “model-free” shortcut. Support for this account comes in part from failures to appropriately change behavior in light of new events. Notably, instrumental responding can, in some circumstances, persist despite reinforcer devaluation, perhaps reflecting control by model-free mechanisms that are driven by past reinforcement rather than knowledge of the (now devalued) outcome. However, another important line of theory – heretofore mostly studied in Pavlovian conditioning – posits a different mechanism that can also modulate behavioral change. It concerns how animals identify different rules or contingencies that may apply in different circumstances, by covertly clustering experiences into distinct groups identified with different “latent causes” or contexts. Such clustering has been used to explain the return of Pavlovian responding following extinction. Here we combine both lines of theory to investigate the consequences of latent cause inference on instrumental sensitivity to reinforcer devaluation. We show that because segregating events into different latent clusters prevents generalization between them, instrumental insensitivity to reinforcer devaluation can arise in this theory even using only model-based planning, and does not require or imply any habitual, model-free component. In simulations, these ersatz habits (like laboratory ones) emerge after overtraining, interact with contextual cues, and show preserved sensitivity to reinforcer devaluation on a separate consumption test, a standard control. While these results do not rule out a contribution of model-free learning per se , they point to a subtle and important role of state inference in instrumental learning and highlight the need for caution in using reinforcer devaluation procedures to rule in (or out) the contribution of different learning mechanisms. They also offer a new perspective on the neurocomputational substrates of drug abuse and the relevance of laboratory reinforcer devaluation procedures to this phenomenon.
- Open Access
- 4 July 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Quantifying the heritability of belief formation. Vellani et. al 2022
Individual differences in behaviour, traits and mental-health are partially heritable. Traditionally, studies have focused on quantifying the heritability of high-order characteristics, such as happiness or education attainment. Here, we quantify the degree of heritability of lower-level mental processes that likely contribute to complex traits and behaviour. In particular, we quantify the degree of heritability of cognitive and affective factors that contribute to the generation of beliefs about risk, which drive behavior in domains ranging from finance to health. Monozygotic and dizygotic twin pairs completed a belief formation task. We first show that beliefs about risk are associated with vividness of imagination, affective evaluation and learning abilities. We then demonstrate that the genetic contribution to individual differences in these processes range between 13.5%-39%, with affect evaluation showing a particular robust heritability component. These results provide clues to which mental factors may be driving the heritability component of beliefs formation, which in turn contribute to the heritability of complex traits.
- 4 July 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessQuantifying the heritability of belief formation. Vellani et. al 2022
Individual differences in behaviour, traits and mental-health are partially heritable. Traditionally, studies have focused on quantifying the heritability of high-order characteristics, such as happiness or education attainment. Here, we quantify the degree of heritability of lower-level mental processes that likely contribute to complex traits and behaviour. In particular, we quantify the degree of heritability of cognitive and affective factors that contribute to the generation of beliefs about risk, which drive behavior in domains ranging from finance to health. Monozygotic and dizygotic twin pairs completed a belief formation task. We first show that beliefs about risk are associated with vividness of imagination, affective evaluation and learning abilities. We then demonstrate that the genetic contribution to individual differences in these processes range between 13.5%-39%, with affect evaluation showing a particular robust heritability component. These results provide clues to which mental factors may be driving the heritability component of beliefs formation, which in turn contribute to the heritability of complex traits.
- 23 May 2022
- Published by Society for Neuroscience in Journal of Neuroscience
- Vol. 42 (27) , 5410-5426
Model Sharing in the Human Medial Temporal Lobe
Effective planning involves knowing where different actions take us. However, natural environments are rich and complex, leading to an exponential increase in memory demand as a plan grows in depth. One potential solution is to filter out features of the environment irrelevant to the task at hand. This enables a shared model of transition dynamics to be used for planning over a range of different input features. Here, we asked human participants (13 male, 16 female) to perform a sequential decision-making task, designed so that knowledge should be integrated independently of the input features (visual cues) present in one case but not in another. Participants efficiently switched between using a low-dimensional (cue independent) and a high-dimensional (cue specific) representation of state transitions. fMRI data identified the medial temporal lobe as a locus for learning state transitions. Within this region, multivariate patterns of BOLD responses were less correlated between trials with differing input features but similar state associations in the high dimensional than in the low dimensional case, suggesting that these patterns switched between separable (specific to input features) and shared (invariant to input features) transition models. Finally, we show that transition models are updated more strongly following the receipt of positive compared with negative outcomes, a finding that challenges conventional theories of planning. Together, these findings propose a computational and neural account of how information relevant for planning can be shared and segmented in response to the vast array of contextual features we encounter in our world. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Effective planning involves maintaining an accurate model of which actions take us to which locations. But in a world awash with information, mapping actions to states with the right level of complexity is critical. Using a new decision-making “heist task” in conjunction with computational modeling and fMRI, we show that patterns of BOLD responses in the medial temporal lobe—a brain region key for prospective planning—become less sensitive to the presence of visual features when these are irrelevant to the task at hand. By flexibly adapting the complexity of task-state representations in this way, state-action mappings learned under one set of features can be used to plan in the presence of others.
- 23 May 2022
- Published by Society for Neuroscience in Journal of Neuroscience
- Vol. 42 (27) , 5410-5426
Model Sharing in the Human Medial Temporal Lobe
Effective planning involves knowing where different actions take us. However, natural environments are rich and complex, leading to an exponential increase in memory demand as a plan grows in depth. One potential solution is to filter out features of the environment irrelevant to the task at hand. This enables a shared model of transition dynamics to be used for planning over a range of different input features. Here, we asked human participants (13 male, 16 female) to perform a sequential decision-making task, designed so that knowledge should be integrated independently of the input features (visual cues) present in one case but not in another. Participants efficiently switched between using a low-dimensional (cue independent) and a high-dimensional (cue specific) representation of state transitions. fMRI data identified the medial temporal lobe as a locus for learning state transitions. Within this region, multivariate patterns of BOLD responses were less correlated between trials with differing input features but similar state associations in the high dimensional than in the low dimensional case, suggesting that these patterns switched between separable (specific to input features) and shared (invariant to input features) transition models. Finally, we show that transition models are updated more strongly following the receipt of positive compared with negative outcomes, a finding that challenges conventional theories of planning. Together, these findings propose a computational and neural account of how information relevant for planning can be shared and segmented in response to the vast array of contextual features we encounter in our world. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Effective planning involves maintaining an accurate model of which actions take us to which locations. But in a world awash with information, mapping actions to states with the right level of complexity is critical. Using a new decision-making “heist task” in conjunction with computational modeling and fMRI, we show that patterns of BOLD responses in the medial temporal lobe—a brain region key for prospective planning—become less sensitive to the presence of visual features when these are irrelevant to the task at hand. By flexibly adapting the complexity of task-state representations in this way, state-action mappings learned under one set of features can be used to plan in the presence of others.
- Open Access
- 20 April 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Methods in Psychology
- Vol. 6
A guideline and cautionary Note: How to use the belief update task correctly
- 20 April 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Methods in Psychology
- Vol. 6
Open AccessA guideline and cautionary Note: How to use the belief update task correctly
- Open Access
- 3 November 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Communications
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-12
A habenula-insular circuit encodes the willingness to act
The decision that it is worth doing something rather than nothing is a core yet understudied feature of voluntary behaviour. Here we study “willingness to act”, the probability of making a response given the context. Human volunteers encountered opportunities to make effortful actions in order to receive rewards, while watching a movie inside a 7 T MRI scanner. Reward and other context features determined willingness-to-act. Activity in the habenula tracked trial-by-trial variation in participants’ willingness-to-act. The anterior insula encoded individual environment features that determined this willingness. We identify a multi-layered network in which contextual information is encoded in the anterior insula, converges on the habenula, and is then transmitted to the supplementary motor area, where the decision is made to either act or refrain from acting via the nigrostriatal pathway.
- 3 November 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Communications
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-12
Open AccessA habenula-insular circuit encodes the willingness to act
The decision that it is worth doing something rather than nothing is a core yet understudied feature of voluntary behaviour. Here we study “willingness to act”, the probability of making a response given the context. Human volunteers encountered opportunities to make effortful actions in order to receive rewards, while watching a movie inside a 7 T MRI scanner. Reward and other context features determined willingness-to-act. Activity in the habenula tracked trial-by-trial variation in participants’ willingness-to-act. The anterior insula encoded individual environment features that determined this willingness. We identify a multi-layered network in which contextual information is encoded in the anterior insula, converges on the habenula, and is then transmitted to the supplementary motor area, where the decision is made to either act or refrain from acting via the nigrostriatal pathway.
- Open Access
- 29 October 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Failure to Replicate Burton, Harris, Shah & Hahn (2021): There is No Belief Update Bias for Neutral Events
We investigate Burton’s et al.’s, recent findings of a belief update bias for neutral events. First, we find that Burton et al. fail to replicate their own findings in three out of the four experiments they conduct. When aggregating their data over their four experiments (500 participants) the results do not support a belief update bias for neutral events. In an attempt to replicate their findings, we collect a new data set employing the original belief update task design, but with neutral events. A belief update bias for neutral events is not observed. Finally, we highlight the wide range of statistical errors and confounds in Burton et al.’s design and analysis and the misleading statements they make.
- 29 October 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessFailure to Replicate Burton, Harris, Shah & Hahn (2021): There is No Belief Update Bias for Neutral Events
We investigate Burton’s et al.’s, recent findings of a belief update bias for neutral events. First, we find that Burton et al. fail to replicate their own findings in three out of the four experiments they conduct. When aggregating their data over their four experiments (500 participants) the results do not support a belief update bias for neutral events. In an attempt to replicate their findings, we collect a new data set employing the original belief update task design, but with neutral events. A belief update bias for neutral events is not observed. Finally, we highlight the wide range of statistical errors and confounds in Burton et al.’s design and analysis and the misleading statements they make.