Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Yousik Lee has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Proposal for the Sixth Error Type for Cyberattack Detection and Defense in CAN Protocol

    by Yunkeun Song, Yongeun Kim, Yousik Lee, Samuel Woo

    Having long served as the backbone of automotive communication, the Controller Area Network utilizes error handling mechanisms under the ISO 11898 standard for communication reliability. However, these legacy error types do not explicitly distinguish between simple electrical noise and malicious intent. To address this structural limitation, we propose a sixth error type as a specialized protocol extension considering cybersecurity along with an error frame designed to notify other controllers and the driver of cybersecurity attacks. By defining a specific detection logic capable of identifying impersonation and replay attacks and introducing a specialized frame structure, this study enables the data link layer to take immediate defensive action without complex cryptographic overhead. Through FPGA based prototyping and Vector CANoe testing, we demonstrated that this mechanism successfully invalidates malicious attempts while preserving compatibility with the existing CAN error-handling mechanism. This research argues that cybersecurity can no longer be treated as an add-on but should be embedded within the protocol itself. Our findings provide a technical foundation for the next evolution of the ISO 11898 standard and toward security integrated CAN communication.

  • Open Access

    Facial Anonymization Model Evaluation Criteria: Development and Validation in Autonomous Vehicle Environments

    by Chaeyoung Ko, Daul Jeon, Yunkeun Song, Yousik Lee

    With the rapid advancement of autonomous driving technology and the commercialization of Human–Machine Interface (HMI) services, camera-based systems for external environment perception are being extensively deployed. While comprehensive camera systems enhance safety and convenience, they simultaneously raise serious privacy concerns by collecting facial and biometric information of Vulnerable Road Users (VRUs) and passengers. Although facial anonymization technology has emerged as a key solution, the field currently faces a fundamental challenge: the absence of unified performance evaluation criteria. Existing studies employ disparate evaluation metrics, making objective inter-model comparison and performance verification difficult. This study proposes quantitative evaluation metrics and corresponding evaluation criteria that enable systematic and objective assessment of facial anonymization model performance. Through large-scale experiments, we developed quantitative evaluation metrics encompassing facial landmark variations, visual similarity, and re-identification prevention capability, and derived specific threshold values based on statistical methodologies. Furthermore, to validate the proposed evaluation criteria, we conducted systematic empirical assessments using models that adopt different technical approaches. The validation experiments showed that the evaluation criteria proposed in this study can be applied across models with distinct technical characteristics. This research is expected to contribute to resolving the heterogeneous evaluation criteria issues in existing studies by providing unified evaluation criteria. It may also support the development of privacy protection technologies in autonomous driving environments.

  • Open Access

    An Orchestration Model for TARA across Vehicle Manufacturers and Suppliers in Software-Defined Vehicles

    by Yunkeun Song, Samuel Woo, Suji Lee, Yousik Lee

    Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs) increase cybersecurity complexity through the combination of external connectivity, software-intensive functions, and distributed development across vehicle manufacturers and suppliers. Although United Nations (UN) Regulation No. 155 and ISO/SAE 21434 require Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) throughout the vehicle lifecycle, conventional TARA methodologies remain largely system-focused and often provide limited procedural guidance for coordinating supplier-derived TARA results at the vehicle level. This paper proposes an orchestration model for TARA across vehicle manufacturers and suppliers that structures TARA activities into the concept phase and the product development phases. The model defines interactions between the vehicle and system perspectives throughout the TARA process. In particular, it supports vehicle-perspective re-rating of system-perspective impact ratings, integration of electrical/electronic (E/E)-architecture-based and technical attack paths, signal-level asset refinement, and asset clustering. The feasibility and industrial applicability of the proposed approach are demonstrated through its application to the Driving Control Unit (DCU): Rear in a virtual SDV model using a commercial TARA tool. In addition, an expert-based qualitative evaluation indicates that the model improves the precision, consistency, traceability, and practical applicability of TARA activities in vehicle manufacturer–supplier collaboration. The results suggest that the proposed orchestration model provides a structured and industry-applicable mechanism for lifecycle-aware and vehicle-level TARA.

  • Open Access

    A Practical Method for Identifying ECUs Using Differential Voltage

    by Jungho Lee, Samuel Woo, Yousik Lee

    Modern vehicles are rapidly converging with information technology (IT) to improve their performance and the driver’s convenience. As autonomous vehicles and connected cars become more popular, software is increasingly added to vehicles, and connections with outside vehicles are also increasing. As a result, cyberattacks, which occur in the traditional IT environment, are rapidly appearing in the automotive environment. Therefore, various security measures have been studied and applied to protect drivers and pedestrians from cyberattacks. An intrusion-detection system (IDS) detects in-vehicle network attacks and is a representative security measure. However, the success of IDS systems is limited due to the low performance of in-vehicle systems and limitations of in-vehicle network protocols such as CAN (Controller-Area Network). In this study, we propose an enhanced authentication technique using a differential voltage uniquely assigned to each electronic control unit (ECU) as well as the CAN identifier. This technique uses hardware-based characteristics and can be implemented inexpensively with little change to existing systems. It can also detect attacks such as spoofing, replay, and impersonation, which are most frequently used in vehicle cyberattacks, without complex and expensive IDS.


  • Real Time Perfect Bit Modification Attack on In-Vehicle CAN

    by Yousik Lee, Yong-Eun Kim, Jin-Gyun Chung, Samuel Woo

    The vulnerabilities of controller area network (CAN) are often targeted by various types of vehicle hacking. To this end, conventional cyber attacks have used a frame injection and a dominant bit injection. However, these two techniques cannot modify data frames sent from an electronic control unit (ECU) in real time. Thus, the frame injection cannot perfectly control the target system. The dominant bit injection can only perform denial of service (DoS) attacks, which means that it cannot perfectly control the ECU. In this paper, we propose a new attack technique for modifying either dominant or recessive bits represented in a CAN bus as the attacker intends. This technique is called perfect bit modification (PBM). We introduce two attack models using the PBM technique, the bus possession attack (BPA) and the target ID attack (TIA). The BPA can perform an attack without breaking the communication pattern of the CAN bus, and the TIA can perfectly seize control of a specific ECU. In addition, we produce an attack tool with the PBM functionality using the SN65HVD230 (CAN transceiver) and the FDS8949 (MOSFET). Both SN65HVD230 and FDS8949 are components that are commonly used to build ECUs, which cost less than two dollars. This means that our attack models are likely to be utilized for supply chain attacks. To demonstrate the feasibility of BPA and TIA, we conduct attack experiments using two real vehicles. Finally, we analyze the characteristics of existing attack techniques including PBM and suggest countermeasures to construct a secure CAN environment.


  • Open Access

    Practical Vulnerability-Information-Sharing Architecture for Automotive Security-Risk Analysis

    by Yousik Lee, Samuel Woo, Yunkeun Song, Jungho Lee, Dong Hoon Lee

    Emerging trends that are shaping the future of the automotive industry include electrification, autonomous driving, sharing, and connectivity, and these trends keep changing annually. Thus, the automotive industry is shifting from mechanical devices to electronic control devices, and is not moving to Internet of Things devices connected to 5G networks. Owing to the convergence of automobile-information and communication technology (ICT), the safety and convenience features of automobiles have improved significantly. However, cyberattacks that occur in the existing ICT environment and can occur in the upcoming 5G network are being replicated in the automobile environment. In a hyper-connected society where 5G networks are commercially available, automotive security is extremely important, as vehicles become the center of vehicle to everything (V2X) communication connected to everything around them. Designing, developing, and deploying information security techniques for vehicles require a systematic security-risk-assessment and management process throughout the vehicle's lifecycle. To do this, a security risk analysis (SRA) must be performed, which requires an analysis of cyber threats on automotive vehicles. In this study, we introduce a cyber kill chain-based cyberattack analysis method to create a formal vulnerability-analysis system. We can also analyze car-hacking studies that were conducted on real cars to identify the characteristics of the attack stages of existing car-hacking techniques and propose the minimum but essential measures for defense. Finally, we propose an automotive common-vulnerabilities-and-exposure system to manage and share evolving vehicle-related cyberattacks, threats, and vulnerabilities.