Wenyu Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Wenyu Wang has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Wei Wang
Queen’s University
4 shared publications Winston Wei Dou
3 shared publicationsXuan Tian
3 shared publications- Yongqiang Chu
Department of Finance and the Childress-Klein Center for Real Estate, Belk College of Business, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, North Carolina 28223
3 shared publications Di Li
Peking University - HSBC Business School
2 shared publicationsYufeng Wu
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Finance
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Blessing of Persistent Misvaluation
Conventional wisdom holds that equity misvaluation reduces mergers and acquisitions (M&A) efficiency by stimulating market timing. We show that this conclusion overlooks a critical dimension: the persistence of misvaluation. We develop and estimate a realoptions model in which persistent misvaluation reduces bidders’ urgency to exploit the financing window, shifting incentives back to deals with stronger fundamental synergies. Overvaluation boosts merger activities but lowers deal quality. In the estimated economy these two effects approximately cancel, keeping aggregate M&A value creation close to the no-misvaluation benchmark. This balance, however, hinges on persistence: transient, large-scale misvaluation can be sharply detrimental, while mild, persistent misvaluation can even push aggregate M&A value creation beyond the no-misvaluation benchmark. Price inefficiency, in this sense, can enhance real efficiency.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Blessing of Persistent Misvaluation
Conventional wisdom holds that equity misvaluation reduces mergers and acquisitions (M&A) efficiency by stimulating market timing. We show that this conclusion overlooks a critical dimension: the persistence of misvaluation. We develop and estimate a realoptions model in which persistent misvaluation reduces bidders’ urgency to exploit the financing window, shifting incentives back to deals with stronger fundamental synergies. Overvaluation boosts merger activities but lowers deal quality. In the estimated economy these two effects approximately cancel, keeping aggregate M&A value creation close to the no-misvaluation benchmark. This balance, however, hinges on persistence: transient, large-scale misvaluation can be sharply detrimental, while mild, persistent misvaluation can even push aggregate M&A value creation beyond the no-misvaluation benchmark. Price inefficiency, in this sense, can enhance real efficiency.
- Open Access
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Online Appendix for "The Cost of Intermediary Market Power for Distressed Borrowers"
This is the supplemental material to the paper titled "The Cost of Intermediary Market Power for Distressed Borrowers" (Dou et al., 2023). It includes the detailed presentation of sample and variable construction, comprehensive explanations on the steps of deriving the model solutions and performing estimation, as well as additional estimation results and quantitative analyses.
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessOnline Appendix for "The Cost of Intermediary Market Power for Distressed Borrowers"
This is the supplemental material to the paper titled "The Cost of Intermediary Market Power for Distressed Borrowers" (Dou et al., 2023). It includes the detailed presentation of sample and variable construction, comprehensive explanations on the steps of deriving the model solutions and performing estimation, as well as additional estimation results and quantitative analyses.
- 9 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 177
The incentives of SPAC sponsors
- 9 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 177
The incentives of SPAC sponsors
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Cost of Intermediary Market Power for Distressed Borrowers
Distressed firms need urgent financing to preserve operations and avoid inefficient liquidation, but they borrow in concentrated markets shaped by existing-creditor blocking power and a small group of specialized lenders. We show that these borrowers pay exceptionally high loan spreads even after removing compensation for credit risk, liquidity risk, and non-risk loan-making costs. To quantify and decompose lender market power, we develop and estimate a dynamic game-theoretic model of distressed lending with latent demand heterogeneity, endogenous lender participation, creditor blocking power, and tacit collusion sustained by repeated syndication. Using granular facility-level data on debtor-in-possession (DIP) loans and highly speculative loans, we find that lender market power explains 533 bps of risk-adjusted spreads in the DIP loan market and 300 bps in the highly speculative loan market, including about 140 bps from tacit collusion in each market. Lender market power is therefore a major source of financial distress costs, reducing survival-critical liquidity by 16–20% and thereby worsening asset-value destruction.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Cost of Intermediary Market Power for Distressed Borrowers
Distressed firms need urgent financing to preserve operations and avoid inefficient liquidation, but they borrow in concentrated markets shaped by existing-creditor blocking power and a small group of specialized lenders. We show that these borrowers pay exceptionally high loan spreads even after removing compensation for credit risk, liquidity risk, and non-risk loan-making costs. To quantify and decompose lender market power, we develop and estimate a dynamic game-theoretic model of distressed lending with latent demand heterogeneity, endogenous lender participation, creditor blocking power, and tacit collusion sustained by repeated syndication. Using granular facility-level data on debtor-in-possession (DIP) loans and highly speculative loans, we find that lender market power explains 533 bps of risk-adjusted spreads in the DIP loan market and 300 bps in the highly speculative loan market, including about 140 bps from tacit collusion in each market. Lender market power is therefore a major source of financial distress costs, reducing survival-critical liquidity by 16–20% and thereby worsening asset-value destruction.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
- 1 November 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (11) , 7829-7850
Big Fish in Small Ponds: Human Capital Migration and the Rise of Boutique Banks
We study the comparative advantage of firms with focused and multidivisional organizational forms at attracting valuable human capital. Using the merger and acquisition (M&A) advisory industry as a laboratory, we show that high-performing individuals are more likely to migrate to boutique (focused) banks, especially those who are still on the upward trajectory of their career. Such migration is amplified by the cross-subsidization inside bulge bracket (multidivisional) firms, proxied by poor performance of their non-M&A departments. The transition of skilled labor improves the performance of the boutique sector, potentially contributing to the rise of boutiques over the past two decades. Moreover, M&A deal outcomes differ when having boutique advisors. Our findings suggest that corporate organizational structure and labor migration can jointly shape industry dynamics. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance. Funding: W. Wang gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Daniel C. Smith Fellowship. Supplemental Material: Data and the internet appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.03829 .
- 1 November 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (11) , 7829-7850
Big Fish in Small Ponds: Human Capital Migration and the Rise of Boutique Banks
We study the comparative advantage of firms with focused and multidivisional organizational forms at attracting valuable human capital. Using the merger and acquisition (M&A) advisory industry as a laboratory, we show that high-performing individuals are more likely to migrate to boutique (focused) banks, especially those who are still on the upward trajectory of their career. Such migration is amplified by the cross-subsidization inside bulge bracket (multidivisional) firms, proxied by poor performance of their non-M&A departments. The transition of skilled labor improves the performance of the boutique sector, potentially contributing to the rise of boutiques over the past two decades. Moreover, M&A deal outcomes differ when having boutique advisors. Our findings suggest that corporate organizational structure and labor migration can jointly shape industry dynamics. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance. Funding: W. Wang gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Daniel C. Smith Fellowship. Supplemental Material: Data and the internet appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.03829 .
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
See the Gap: Firm Returns and Shareholder Incentives
Smart money often trades actively during times of large corporate events. We document in the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) that, during the bid negotiation period, institutional investors increase their holdings of acquirers in deals that generate positive value and decrease their holdings in those that generate negative value. The resulting trading profits create a significant gap between the return to the acquiring firm and the return to these investors, and this gap renders firm return a misleading measure of investors’ incentives in pursuing mergers. On average, institutional investors earn 2.4% from M&A while the return to acquirers is only -0.9%. In deals that deliver volatile returns to acquiring firms, the gap increases to 6.3%. We further show how the trading motive impacts the ex ante holdings of institutional investors and how the trading decision and the resulting gap are impacted by the investors’ ability to vote on the deals as well as other deal characteristics such as merger size, stock liquidity, initial holdings, and the institutional investors’ trading skills. Our study highlights that the group of investors who have influence over corporate actions do not necessarily bear the full consequences of such events, and therefore accounting for the dynamics of shareholder composition is critical in measuring investors’ incentives correctly.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSee the Gap: Firm Returns and Shareholder Incentives
Smart money often trades actively during times of large corporate events. We document in the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) that, during the bid negotiation period, institutional investors increase their holdings of acquirers in deals that generate positive value and decrease their holdings in those that generate negative value. The resulting trading profits create a significant gap between the return to the acquiring firm and the return to these investors, and this gap renders firm return a misleading measure of investors’ incentives in pursuing mergers. On average, institutional investors earn 2.4% from M&A while the return to acquirers is only -0.9%. In deals that deliver volatile returns to acquiring firms, the gap increases to 6.3%. We further show how the trading motive impacts the ex ante holdings of institutional investors and how the trading decision and the resulting gap are impacted by the investors’ ability to vote on the deals as well as other deal characteristics such as merger size, stock liquidity, initial holdings, and the institutional investors’ trading skills. Our study highlights that the group of investors who have influence over corporate actions do not necessarily bear the full consequences of such events, and therefore accounting for the dynamics of shareholder composition is critical in measuring investors’ incentives correctly.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Ignorance is Bliss: The Screening Effect of (Noisy) Information
This paper studies how the firm designs its internal information system when facing an adverse selection problem arising from unobservable managerial abilities. While more precise information allows the firm to make ex-post more efficient investment decisions, noisier information has an ex-ante screening effect that allows the firm to attract on-average better managers. The tradeoff between more effective screening of managers and more informed investment implies a non-monotonic relationship between firm value and information quality, and a marginal improvement of information quality does not necessarily lead to an overall improvement of firm value.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessIgnorance is Bliss: The Screening Effect of (Noisy) Information
This paper studies how the firm designs its internal information system when facing an adverse selection problem arising from unobservable managerial abilities. While more precise information allows the firm to make ex-post more efficient investment decisions, noisier information has an ex-ante screening effect that allows the firm to attract on-average better managers. The tradeoff between more effective screening of managers and more informed investment implies a non-monotonic relationship between firm value and information quality, and a marginal improvement of information quality does not necessarily lead to an overall improvement of firm value.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Cost of Intermediary Market Power for Distressed Borrowers
Distressed firms need urgent financing to preserve operations and avoid inefficient liquidation, but they borrow in concentrated markets shaped by existing-creditor blocking power and a small group of specialized lenders. We show that these borrowers pay exceptionally high loan spreads even after removing compensation for credit risk, liquidity risk, and non-risk loan-making costs. To quantify and decompose lender market power, we develop and estimate a dynamic game-theoretic model of distressed lending with latent demand heterogeneity, endogenous lender participation, creditor blocking power, and tacit collusion sustained by repeated syndication. Using granular facility-level data on debtor-in-possession (DIP) and highly speculative loans, we find that lender market power explains 533 bps of risk-adjusted spreads in the DIP market and 300 bps in the highly speculative loan market, including about 140 bps from tacit collusion in each market. Smaller borrowers are especially vulnerable because their weaker bargaining positions and less elastic demand strengthen specialized lenders' incentives to collude. Lender market power is therefore a major source of financial distress costs, reducing survival-critical liquidity by 16--20\% and thereby worsening asset-value destruction.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Cost of Intermediary Market Power for Distressed Borrowers
Distressed firms need urgent financing to preserve operations and avoid inefficient liquidation, but they borrow in concentrated markets shaped by existing-creditor blocking power and a small group of specialized lenders. We show that these borrowers pay exceptionally high loan spreads even after removing compensation for credit risk, liquidity risk, and non-risk loan-making costs. To quantify and decompose lender market power, we develop and estimate a dynamic game-theoretic model of distressed lending with latent demand heterogeneity, endogenous lender participation, creditor blocking power, and tacit collusion sustained by repeated syndication. Using granular facility-level data on debtor-in-possession (DIP) and highly speculative loans, we find that lender market power explains 533 bps of risk-adjusted spreads in the DIP market and 300 bps in the highly speculative loan market, including about 140 bps from tacit collusion in each market. Smaller borrowers are especially vulnerable because their weaker bargaining positions and less elastic demand strengthen specialized lenders' incentives to collude. Lender market power is therefore a major source of financial distress costs, reducing survival-critical liquidity by 16--20\% and thereby worsening asset-value destruction.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Progress in Geography in Progress in Geography
- Vol. 40 (12) , 2101-2115
Progress of research on economic complexity and regional economic development in the perspective of evolutionary economic geography
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Progress in Geography in Progress in Geography
- Vol. 40 (12) , 2101-2115
Progress of research on economic complexity and regional economic development in the perspective of evolutionary economic geography
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 65 (6) , 2445-2466
Corporate Innovation Along the Supply Chain
In this paper, we document a positive effect of supplier–customer geographic proximity on supplier innovation. To establish causality, we explore plausibly exogenous variation in proximity caused by customer relocations. The positive effect of supplier–customer proximity on supplier innovation is stronger when customers are more innovative themselves, when suppliers and customers are closer in technological space, and when customers’ demand accounts for a larger fraction of suppliers’ total sales. These findings suggest that the feedback channel and the demand channel are likely underlying mechanisms through which supplier–customer proximity affects supplier innovation. Overall, our paper sheds new light on the real effect of supplier–customer relationship on corporate innovation.This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 65 (6) , 2445-2466
Top Cited PapersCorporate Innovation Along the Supply Chain
In this paper, we document a positive effect of supplier–customer geographic proximity on supplier innovation. To establish causality, we explore plausibly exogenous variation in proximity caused by customer relocations. The positive effect of supplier–customer proximity on supplier innovation is stronger when customers are more innovative themselves, when suppliers and customers are closer in technological space, and when customers’ demand accounts for a larger fraction of suppliers’ total sales. These findings suggest that the feedback channel and the demand channel are likely underlying mechanisms through which supplier–customer proximity affects supplier innovation. Overall, our paper sheds new light on the real effect of supplier–customer relationship on corporate innovation.This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.