Tobias Rothmund
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Tobias Rothmund has a total of 566 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Flavio Azevedo
Utrecht University
11 shared publications - Fahima Farkhari
Institute of Communication Science, Friedrich-Schiller University Jena, Jena, Germany
8 shared publications - Adrian Dominik Wojcik
Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Toruń, Poland 1
6 shared publications - Aleksandra Cichocka
School of Psychology University of Kent Kent UK
6 shared publications - Anat Perry
Psychology Department, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
6 shared publications - Benno Torgler
ARC Training Centre for Behavioural Insights for Technology Adoption and School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia
6 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 5 November 2026
- Published by Hogrefe Publishing Group in Social Psychology
A Collaborative Omnibus Survey on the 2024 East German State Elections
This paper provides a methodological report on the 2024 East German State Election Study (EGSES24), an online quota-sampled two-wave panel survey conducted in the context of the 2024 state elections in Thuringia, Saxony, and Brandenburg. Designed as a collaborative omnibus project, the study integrates multiple research contributions within a shared survey infrastructure. Data were collected in two waves, one before and one after the elections to capture political attitudes, electoral behavior, and processes of political radicalization. This report outlines the study design, sampling strategy, and fieldwork implementation, including quota fulfillment, panel attrition, and follow-up recruitment. It provides a transparent introduction to the secondary use and interpretation of the data in future research projects.
- 5 November 2026
- Published by Hogrefe Publishing Group in Social Psychology
Open AccessA Collaborative Omnibus Survey on the 2024 East German State Elections
This paper provides a methodological report on the 2024 East German State Election Study (EGSES24), an online quota-sampled two-wave panel survey conducted in the context of the 2024 state elections in Thuringia, Saxony, and Brandenburg. Designed as a collaborative omnibus project, the study integrates multiple research contributions within a shared survey infrastructure. Data were collected in two waves, one before and one after the elections to capture political attitudes, electoral behavior, and processes of political radicalization. This report outlines the study design, sampling strategy, and fieldwork implementation, including quota fulfillment, panel attrition, and follow-up recruitment. It provides a transparent introduction to the secondary use and interpretation of the data in future research projects.
- Open Access
- 8 October 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Media, Culture & Society
Public construction of evidence: Rethinking scientific evidence in social media environments
This essay proposes a conceptual framework that reconceptualizes scientific evidence as a process of public construction in contemporary media environments. In social media contexts, scientists, journalists, influencers, NGOs, lay publics and AI agents participate in the circulation and interpretation of evidential claims. The essay’s contribution is to explain how evidential status itself is publicly assembled, circulated, internalized, and fed back into further communication. We distinguish two analytically coupled layers of this process: amalgamated evidence , the publicly visible circulation and recombination of claims across posts, comments and shares, and internalized evidence , the individual representations through which users interpret and evaluate these claims. Their reciprocal “circle of evidence” is driven by three recurring communicative behaviours—consumption, participation and generation—and shaped by platform logics that amplify, recontextualize and remix information. Under these conditions, evidential status emerges from communicative interaction rather than solely from scientific procedures, creating potential divergences between scientific records and what publics perceive as evidence. By conceptualizing evidencing as a socio-technical and communicative process, the framework aims to stimulate debate and outlines a research agenda for examining how public circulation and individual internalization mutually shape the authority of science in digital media environments.
- 8 October 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Media, Culture & Society
Open AccessPublic construction of evidence: Rethinking scientific evidence in social media environments
This essay proposes a conceptual framework that reconceptualizes scientific evidence as a process of public construction in contemporary media environments. In social media contexts, scientists, journalists, influencers, NGOs, lay publics and AI agents participate in the circulation and interpretation of evidential claims. The essay’s contribution is to explain how evidential status itself is publicly assembled, circulated, internalized, and fed back into further communication. We distinguish two analytically coupled layers of this process: amalgamated evidence , the publicly visible circulation and recombination of claims across posts, comments and shares, and internalized evidence , the individual representations through which users interpret and evaluate these claims. Their reciprocal “circle of evidence” is driven by three recurring communicative behaviours—consumption, participation and generation—and shaped by platform logics that amplify, recontextualize and remix information. Under these conditions, evidential status emerges from communicative interaction rather than solely from scientific procedures, creating potential divergences between scientific records and what publics perceive as evidence. By conceptualizing evidencing as a socio-technical and communicative process, the framework aims to stimulate debate and outlines a research agenda for examining how public circulation and individual internalization mutually shape the authority of science in digital media environments.
- Open Access
- 25 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
LLMs reveal how ideology and time shape intuitive vs. deliberative rhetoric across 31 European parliaments
Democratic deliberation depends on how political actors balance intuitive, affective appeals with analytically structured argumentation. Yet how ideology and time shape this rhetorical balance across diverse national contexts at large scale remains poorly understood. Informed by dual-process theories, we leverage large language models (LLMs) to analyze 3.3 million speeches from 31 European parliaments (2004–2023), quantifying two fundamental rhetorical styles: intuitive rhetoric, characterized by affective and heuristic expression, and deliberative rhetoric, characterized by analytical and evidence-oriented language. Across parliaments, ideological position is systematically associated with rhetorical style through curvilinear relationships. Intuitive rhetoric increases toward both ideological extremes, whereas deliberative rhetoric peaks near the political center and declines toward the fringes, forming a robust ideological horseshoe across institutional contexts. Temporal dynamics further document a shift toward greater reliance on intuitive rhetoric, accompanied by a modest decline in deliberative rhetoric, while the curvilinear ideological structuring of rhetorical styles persists throughout. These trends are consistent with a gradual adaptation to attention-driven communication environments, which structurally favor intuitive and affective expression over analytical depth. Together, our findings map the ideological and temporal contours of deliberative erosion in European democracies, with implications for institutional design and the resilience of democratic discourse.
- 25 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessLLMs reveal how ideology and time shape intuitive vs. deliberative rhetoric across 31 European parliaments
Democratic deliberation depends on how political actors balance intuitive, affective appeals with analytically structured argumentation. Yet how ideology and time shape this rhetorical balance across diverse national contexts at large scale remains poorly understood. Informed by dual-process theories, we leverage large language models (LLMs) to analyze 3.3 million speeches from 31 European parliaments (2004–2023), quantifying two fundamental rhetorical styles: intuitive rhetoric, characterized by affective and heuristic expression, and deliberative rhetoric, characterized by analytical and evidence-oriented language. Across parliaments, ideological position is systematically associated with rhetorical style through curvilinear relationships. Intuitive rhetoric increases toward both ideological extremes, whereas deliberative rhetoric peaks near the political center and declines toward the fringes, forming a robust ideological horseshoe across institutional contexts. Temporal dynamics further document a shift toward greater reliance on intuitive rhetoric, accompanied by a modest decline in deliberative rhetoric, while the curvilinear ideological structuring of rhetorical styles persists throughout. These trends are consistent with a gradual adaptation to attention-driven communication environments, which structurally favor intuitive and affective expression over analytical depth. Together, our findings map the ideological and temporal contours of deliberative erosion in European democracies, with implications for institutional design and the resilience of democratic discourse.
- Open Access
- 26 June 2026
- Published by Masaryk University Press in Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace
- Vol. 20 (3)
Towards a typology of online users in response to incivility: A latent profile analysis across six countries
Incivility is pervasive in the online communication landscape and has been linked to harmful consequences for individuals and the quality of public discourse. Understanding how people engage with online incivility is crucial for identifying mechanisms that may reinforce or mitigate such interactions. Although previous research investigated how incivility is experienced in different social roles such as victims, bystanders and perpetrators, most studies have examined these roles separately rather than analyzing how experiences, behaviors and attitudes toward incivility co-occur within individuals. To systematically identify and distinguish patterns of behaviors, experiences and attitudes associated with incivility, a Latent Profile Analysis was carried out, using a large-scale data set (N = 4,555) surveying young adults aged 18 to 26 (M = 21.69, SD = 2.24) from six countries (US, UK, Spain, Poland, France, Finland). Our results indicate that five profiles or types of users can be distinguished. Individuals are categorized as: perpetrator-victims; uninvolved; observers; defenders; tolerators. Additional analyses suggest that moral emotions vary systematically between these profiles. While perpetrator-victims report more pride, hate and guilt emotions when encountering incivility than any other profile, defenders indicate higher degrees of shame. By identifying distinct patterns of involvement in online incivility and their associated emotional responses, the findings provide insights into the psychological dynamics underlying uncivil online interactions and highlight potential targets for preventive interventions and future research.
- 26 June 2026
- Published by Masaryk University Press in Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace
- Vol. 20 (3)
Open AccessTowards a typology of online users in response to incivility: A latent profile analysis across six countries
Incivility is pervasive in the online communication landscape and has been linked to harmful consequences for individuals and the quality of public discourse. Understanding how people engage with online incivility is crucial for identifying mechanisms that may reinforce or mitigate such interactions. Although previous research investigated how incivility is experienced in different social roles such as victims, bystanders and perpetrators, most studies have examined these roles separately rather than analyzing how experiences, behaviors and attitudes toward incivility co-occur within individuals. To systematically identify and distinguish patterns of behaviors, experiences and attitudes associated with incivility, a Latent Profile Analysis was carried out, using a large-scale data set (N = 4,555) surveying young adults aged 18 to 26 (M = 21.69, SD = 2.24) from six countries (US, UK, Spain, Poland, France, Finland). Our results indicate that five profiles or types of users can be distinguished. Individuals are categorized as: perpetrator-victims; uninvolved; observers; defenders; tolerators. Additional analyses suggest that moral emotions vary systematically between these profiles. While perpetrator-victims report more pride, hate and guilt emotions when encountering incivility than any other profile, defenders indicate higher degrees of shame. By identifying distinct patterns of involvement in online incivility and their associated emotional responses, the findings provide insights into the psychological dynamics underlying uncivil online interactions and highlight potential targets for preventive interventions and future research.
- Open Access
- 9 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Political Psychology
- Vol. 47 (2)
Zone‐flooding, public confusion, and signal detection theory: A theoretical framework and registered report
While historically, the aim of propaganda was to convince the public of a certain agenda, many political commentators contend that modern forms of disinformation come with a different goal in mind: To confuse, rather than convince. It is believed that to secure this goal, informational spaces are diluted, rather than dominated, a strategy termed “zone‐flooding.” The present research provides a unified psychological account of confusion that draws on methods from Signal Detection Theory and metacognition, to examine the public's object‐level ability to discern truth from falsehood and accurate metacognitive insight into that distinction. In two preregistered studies, including one Registered Report, we presented quota‐matched samples (Study 1, Germany: n = 1488; Study 2, USA: n = 1891) with true‐only, false‐only (“classical propaganda”) or noisy (“zone‐flooding”) information about climate change in the form of tweets. Across both studies, across various operationalizations of zone‐flooding (e.g., targeting the political left vs. right; different numbers of tweets), and against various baselines (politically equated vs. ecologically valid tweets), we find no empirical evidence for the notion that zone‐flooding causes confusion in this initial test. The present work lays the theoretical basis for a psychology of zone‐flooding and public confusion within one coherent theoretical and methodological framework.
- 9 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Political Psychology
- Vol. 47 (2)
Open AccessZone‐flooding, public confusion, and signal detection theory: A theoretical framework and registered report
While historically, the aim of propaganda was to convince the public of a certain agenda, many political commentators contend that modern forms of disinformation come with a different goal in mind: To confuse, rather than convince. It is believed that to secure this goal, informational spaces are diluted, rather than dominated, a strategy termed “zone‐flooding.” The present research provides a unified psychological account of confusion that draws on methods from Signal Detection Theory and metacognition, to examine the public's object‐level ability to discern truth from falsehood and accurate metacognitive insight into that distinction. In two preregistered studies, including one Registered Report, we presented quota‐matched samples (Study 1, Germany: n = 1488; Study 2, USA: n = 1891) with true‐only, false‐only (“classical propaganda”) or noisy (“zone‐flooding”) information about climate change in the form of tweets. Across both studies, across various operationalizations of zone‐flooding (e.g., targeting the political left vs. right; different numbers of tweets), and against various baselines (politically equated vs. ecologically valid tweets), we find no empirical evidence for the notion that zone‐flooding causes confusion in this initial test. The present work lays the theoretical basis for a psychology of zone‐flooding and public confusion within one coherent theoretical and methodological framework.
- Open Access
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Affective dynamics of online climate change denial
Climate change represents one of the most pressing challenges of our time, yet efforts to address it are still persistently obstructed by climate change denial. While emotions are recognized as crucial drivers of such denial, a comprehensive understanding of their dynamics and underlying affective dimensions is lacking. Here, we analyze over one million tweet cascades from a 10-year period (2013-2023) to compare the affective landscapes of climate denial and climate action posts. Our findings reveal that climate denial tweets consistently exhibit stronger negative affective signals, particularly anger and disgust, which have intensified over time and are strongly associated with higher user engagement. In contrast, climate action tweets show lower, more stable levels of negativity and are more frequently characterized by positive emotions like optimism and trust. A meta-regression analysis, framed by the Valence-Arousal-Dominance (VAD) model of affect, demonstrates that valence is the primary dimension explaining these affective differences, their evolution over time, and their impact on engagement. Results suggest that the sustained spread of climate denial is increasingly driven by a strategic mobilization of negative emotional valence. These findings offer a unified, theory-driven perspective on the affective mechanisms that shape the online climate change discourse and the propagation of climate misinformation.
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessAffective dynamics of online climate change denial
Climate change represents one of the most pressing challenges of our time, yet efforts to address it are still persistently obstructed by climate change denial. While emotions are recognized as crucial drivers of such denial, a comprehensive understanding of their dynamics and underlying affective dimensions is lacking. Here, we analyze over one million tweet cascades from a 10-year period (2013-2023) to compare the affective landscapes of climate denial and climate action posts. Our findings reveal that climate denial tweets consistently exhibit stronger negative affective signals, particularly anger and disgust, which have intensified over time and are strongly associated with higher user engagement. In contrast, climate action tweets show lower, more stable levels of negativity and are more frequently characterized by positive emotions like optimism and trust. A meta-regression analysis, framed by the Valence-Arousal-Dominance (VAD) model of affect, demonstrates that valence is the primary dimension explaining these affective differences, their evolution over time, and their impact on engagement. Results suggest that the sustained spread of climate denial is increasingly driven by a strategic mobilization of negative emotional valence. These findings offer a unified, theory-driven perspective on the affective mechanisms that shape the online climate change discourse and the propagation of climate misinformation.
- Open Access
- 25 July 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Solidarity With Ukraine? How Fear- and Moral-Based Motivations Explain the Psychological Tug-of-War in the German Public
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine beginning in February 2022 has resulted in tens of thousands of casualties and initiated the fastest growing refugee movement in Europe since World War II. Ukraine’s military, economic, and humanitarian position relies significantly on international support, including Germany. However, German citizens’ solidarity with Ukraine has been put to the test due to public concerns about economic and social repercussions. In this article, we investigate the motivational and dispositional predictors of political solidarity with Ukraine. In a representative survey of German citizens in September 2022 (N = 1,210), we examined the role of moral- and fear-based motivations and ideological, cognitive, and sociodemographic predictors of political solidarity with Ukraine. Our analyses indicate that political solidarity with Ukraine was in part motivated by moral convictions (β = .25) and compromised by fears about economic and societal consequences (β = −.21). Conspiracy mentality (β = −.22), populist voting (β =−.19), right-wing orientation (β = −.08), and living in East Germany (β = −.08) were additional negative predictors for solidarity with Ukraine, while national identification with Germany emerged as facilitating factor for solidarity (β = .16). Moral- and fear-based motivations partly mediated the effect of these factors on political solidarity in a structural equation model, explaining 34% of variance. Our findings highlight the power of psychological factors—particularly conspiracy mentality, moral convictions, and existential fears—in shaping political solidarity with Ukraine, illustrating how diverse motivations and concerns influence public support in the context of war and international conflict.
- 25 July 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessSolidarity With Ukraine? How Fear- and Moral-Based Motivations Explain the Psychological Tug-of-War in the German Public
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine beginning in February 2022 has resulted in tens of thousands of casualties and initiated the fastest growing refugee movement in Europe since World War II. Ukraine’s military, economic, and humanitarian position relies significantly on international support, including Germany. However, German citizens’ solidarity with Ukraine has been put to the test due to public concerns about economic and social repercussions. In this article, we investigate the motivational and dispositional predictors of political solidarity with Ukraine. In a representative survey of German citizens in September 2022 (N = 1,210), we examined the role of moral- and fear-based motivations and ideological, cognitive, and sociodemographic predictors of political solidarity with Ukraine. Our analyses indicate that political solidarity with Ukraine was in part motivated by moral convictions (β = .25) and compromised by fears about economic and societal consequences (β = −.21). Conspiracy mentality (β = −.22), populist voting (β =−.19), right-wing orientation (β = −.08), and living in East Germany (β = −.08) were additional negative predictors for solidarity with Ukraine, while national identification with Germany emerged as facilitating factor for solidarity (β = .16). Moral- and fear-based motivations partly mediated the effect of these factors on political solidarity in a structural equation model, explaining 34% of variance. Our findings highlight the power of psychological factors—particularly conspiracy mentality, moral convictions, and existential fears—in shaping political solidarity with Ukraine, illustrating how diverse motivations and concerns influence public support in the context of war and international conflict.
- Open Access
- 24 July 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Ideological (A-)Symmetries in Moral Judgments of Online Hate
Political ideology is key in how we react to social and political events, but how does it predict moral judgments of online hate? The contextual symmetry hypothesis suggests that conservatives and liberals condemn online hate similarly when it targets ideologically favored groups. The generalizable asymmetry hypothesis proposes that conservatives, compared to liberals, are less condemning of hate comments regardless of the target. In pre-registered experiments in Germany (N = 903) and the U.S. (N = 490), we found consistent evidence for the contextual symmetry account: Conservatives and liberals differ in their sensitivity towards online hate depending on the target and ground their moral judgments on perceptions of the aggressor's responsibility and the victim's vulnerability and suffering. These findings imply that legal stalemates on hate speech regulation stem from ideological disparities in perceptions of who must be protected from harm rather than a general conservative indifference to online hate.
- 24 July 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessIdeological (A-)Symmetries in Moral Judgments of Online Hate
Political ideology is key in how we react to social and political events, but how does it predict moral judgments of online hate? The contextual symmetry hypothesis suggests that conservatives and liberals condemn online hate similarly when it targets ideologically favored groups. The generalizable asymmetry hypothesis proposes that conservatives, compared to liberals, are less condemning of hate comments regardless of the target. In pre-registered experiments in Germany (N = 903) and the U.S. (N = 490), we found consistent evidence for the contextual symmetry account: Conservatives and liberals differ in their sensitivity towards online hate depending on the target and ground their moral judgments on perceptions of the aggressor's responsibility and the victim's vulnerability and suffering. These findings imply that legal stalemates on hate speech regulation stem from ideological disparities in perceptions of who must be protected from harm rather than a general conservative indifference to online hate.
- Open Access
- 11 July 2025
- Published by Wiley in Political Psychology
- Vol. 47 (2)
Yesterday, all our troubles seemed so far away—(Re)conceptualizing nostalgic deprivation as a predictor for radical‐right support
The return to “old glories” is one of the main promises of radical‐right parties, picking up on widespread longings for the collective past. Many people argue that radical‐right support is motivated by Relative Deprivation, that is, the perception of being worse off than others. We suggest that radical‐right support is more likely to reflect Nostalgic Deprivation —the perception of an unfair decline in the ingroup's status compared to the past. However, psychological theorizing is rare, and previous studies differ in their conceptualization and measurement. We seek to fill this gap by introducing and validating a standardized measure of nostalgic deprivation. Based on a literature review, we start with a concise definition and conceptualization of nostalgic deprivation. We developed a reliable nine‐item self‐report scale that captures nostalgic deprivation indicated by (a) a temporal disadvantage comparison, (b) injustice appraisal, and (c) collective anger and nostalgia ( N = 398). We estimated the reliability and validity using empirical indicators of demographics, right‐wing populist attitudes, voting and personality measures in German ( N = 1206) and US‐quota samples ( N = 490). Our data shed light on the great predictive power of nostalgic deprivation for radical‐right support surpassing established measures of relative deprivation and nostalgia.
- 11 July 2025
- Published by Wiley in Political Psychology
- Vol. 47 (2)
Open AccessYesterday, all our troubles seemed so far away—(Re)conceptualizing nostalgic deprivation as a predictor for radical‐right support
The return to “old glories” is one of the main promises of radical‐right parties, picking up on widespread longings for the collective past. Many people argue that radical‐right support is motivated by Relative Deprivation, that is, the perception of being worse off than others. We suggest that radical‐right support is more likely to reflect Nostalgic Deprivation —the perception of an unfair decline in the ingroup's status compared to the past. However, psychological theorizing is rare, and previous studies differ in their conceptualization and measurement. We seek to fill this gap by introducing and validating a standardized measure of nostalgic deprivation. Based on a literature review, we start with a concise definition and conceptualization of nostalgic deprivation. We developed a reliable nine‐item self‐report scale that captures nostalgic deprivation indicated by (a) a temporal disadvantage comparison, (b) injustice appraisal, and (c) collective anger and nostalgia ( N = 398). We estimated the reliability and validity using empirical indicators of demographics, right‐wing populist attitudes, voting and personality measures in German ( N = 1206) and US‐quota samples ( N = 490). Our data shed light on the great predictive power of nostalgic deprivation for radical‐right support surpassing established measures of relative deprivation and nostalgia.
- 4 September 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Communications
- Vol. 49 (3) , 371-377
Online hate: A European communication perspective
Article Online hate: A European communication perspective was published on September 30, 2024 in the journal Communications (volume 49, issue 3).
- 4 September 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Communications
- Vol. 49 (3) , 371-377
Online hate: A European communication perspective
Article Online hate: A European communication perspective was published on September 30, 2024 in the journal Communications (volume 49, issue 3).