Ceren Budak

Can digital ads encourage users exposed to inaccurate information sources to follow accurate ones? We conduct a large-scale field experiment (N=28,582) on X, formerly Twitter, with users who follow accounts that spread health misinformation. Participants were exposed to four ad treatments varied on two dimensions: a neutral message versus a persuasive message appealing to values of independence, and a request to follow a health institution versus a request to follow a health influencer. We term this ad-based, social network intervention a follow nudge. The ad with a persuasive message to follow a well-known health institution generated significantly higher click-through rates than all other conditions (Bonferroni-corrected pairwise tests, all p<0.001). Given the overall low click-through rate across treatments and the high cost of digital advertising infrastructure on X, however, we conclude that our proposed intervention -- at least in its current ad-based format -- is not a cost-effective means to improve information environments online. We discuss challenges faced when conducting large-scale experiments on X following the platform's ownership change and subsequent restrictions on data access for research purposes.

How do Wikipedians maintain an accurate encyclopedia during an ongoing geopolitical conflict where state actors might seek to spread disinformation or conduct an information operation? In the context of the Russia-Ukraine War, this question becomes more pressing, given the Russian government's extensive history of orchestrating information campaigns. We conducted an interview study with 13 expert Wikipedians involved in the Russo-Ukrainian War topic area on the English-language edition of Wikipedia. While our participants did not perceive there to be clear evidence of a state-backed information operation, they agreed that war-related articles experienced high levels of disruptive editing from both Russia-aligned and Ukraine-aligned accounts. The English-language edition of Wikipedia had existing policies and processes at its disposal to counter such disruption. State-backed or not, the disruptive activity created time-intensive maintenance work for our participants. Finally, participants considered English-language Wikipedia to be more resilient than social media in preventing the spread of false information online. We conclude by discussing sociotechnical implications for Wikipedia and social platforms.

Tenet Media, a U.S.-based, right-wing media company, hired six established podcasters to create content related to U.S. politics and culture during the 2024 U.S. presidential election cycle. After publishing content on YouTube and Rumble for nearly a year, Tenet Media was declared by the U.S. government to be funded entirely by Russia -- making it effectively an outsourced state-sponsored information operation (SSIO). We present a complete dataset of the 560 podcast videos published by the Tenet Media channel on the video-sharing platform Rumble between November 2023 and September 2024. Our dataset includes video metadata and user comments, as well as high-quality video transcriptions, representing over 300 hours of video content. This dataset provides researchers with material to study a Russian SSIO, and notably on Rumble, which is an understudied platform in SSIO scholarship.

Anti-vaccine sentiment during the COVID-19 pandemic grew at an alarming rate, leaving much to understand about the relationship between people’s vaccination status and the information they were exposed to. This study investigated the relationship between vaccine behavior, decision rationales, and information exposure on social media over time. Using a cohort study that consisted of a nationally representative survey of American adults, three subpopulations (early adopters, late adopters, and nonadopters) were analyzed through a combination of statistical analysis, network analysis, and semi-supervised topic modeling. The main reasons Americans reported choosing to get vaccinated were safety and health. However, work requirements and travel were more important for late adopters than early adopters (95% CI on OR of [0.121, 0.453]). While late adopters’ and nonadopters’ primary reason for not getting vaccinated was it being too early, late adopters also mentioned safety issues more often and nonadopters mentioned government distrust (95% CI on OR of [0.125, 0.763]). Among those who shared Twitter/X accounts, early adopters and nonadopters followed a larger fraction of highly partisan political accounts compared to late adopters, and late adopters were exposed to more neutral and pro-vaccine messaging than nonadopters. Together, these findings suggest that the decision-making process and the information environments of these subpopulations have notable differences, and any online vaccination campaigns need to consider these differences when attempting to provide accurate vaccine information to all three subpopulations.

The controversy over online misinformation and social media has opened a gap between public discourse and scientific research. Public intellectuals and journalists frequently make sweeping claims about the effects of exposure to false content online that are inconsistent with much of the current empirical evidence. Here we identify three common misperceptions: that average exposure to problematic content is high, that algorithms are largely responsible for this exposure and that social media is a primary cause of broader social problems such as polarization. In our review of behavioural science research on online misinformation, we document a pattern of low exposure to false and inflammatory content that is concentrated among a narrow fringe with strong motivations to seek out such information. In response, we recommend holding platforms accountable for facilitating exposure to false and extreme content in the tails of the distribution, where consumption is highest and the risk of real-world harm is greatest. We also call for increased platform transparency, including collaborations with outside researchers, to better evaluate the effects of online misinformation and the most effective responses to it. Taking these steps is especially important outside the USA and Western Europe, where research and data are scant and harms may be more severe.

Many studies explore how people "come into" misinformation exposure. But much less is known about how people "come out of" misinformation exposure.Do people organically sever ties to misinformation spreaders? And what predicts doing so? Over six months, we tracked the frequency and predictors of ~900K followers unfollowing ~5K health misinformation spreaders on Twitter. We found that misinformation ties are persistent. Monthly unfollowing rates are just 0.52%. In other words, 99.5% of misinformation ties persist each month. Users are also 31% more likely to unfollownon- misinformation spreaders than they are to unfollow misinformation spreaders. Although generally infrequent, the factors most associated with unfollowing misinformation spreaders are (1) redundancy and (2) ideology. First, users initially following many spreaders, or who follow spreaders that tweet often, are most likely to unfollow later. Second, liberals are more likely to unfollow than conservatives. Overall, we observe a strong persistence of misinformation ties. The fact that users rarely unfollow misinformation spreaders suggests a need for external nudges and the importance of preventing exposure from arising in the first place.

The past decade in the US has been one of the most politically polarizing in recent memory. Ordinary Democrats and Republicans fundamentally dislike and distrust each other, even when they agree on policy issues. This increase in hostility towards opposing party supporters, commonly called affective polarization, has important ramifications that threaten democracy. Political science research suggests that at least part of this polarization stems from Democrats' misperceptions about Republicans' political views and vice-versa. Therefore, in this work, drawing on insights from political science and game studies research, we designed an online casual game that combines the relaxed, playful nonpartisan norms of casual games with corrective information about party supporters' political views that are often misperceived. Through an experiment, we found that playing the game significantly reduces negative feelings toward outparty supporters among Democrats, but not Republicans. It was also effective in improving willingness to talk politics with outparty supporters. Further, we identified psychological reactance as a potential mechanism that affects the effectiveness of depolarization interventions. Finally, our analyses suggest that the game versions with political content were rated to be just as fun to play as a game version without any political content suggesting that, contrary to popular belief, people do like to mix politics and play.

In studies of misinformation, the distinction between high- and low-credibility publishers is fundamental. However, there is much that we do not know about the relationship between the subject matter and timing of content produced by the two types of publishers. By analyzing the content of several million unique articles published over 28 months, we show that high- and low-credibility publishers operate in distinct news ecosystems. Bursts of news coverage generated by the two types of publishers tend to cover different subject matter at different times, even though fluctuations in their overall news production tend to be highly correlated. Regardless of the mechanism, temporally convergent coverage among low-credibility publishers has troubling implications for American news consumers.