Robin Kopecký
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Robin Kopecký has a total of 30 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jaroslav Flegr
Department of Philosophy and History of Science, Faculty of Science, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic
4 shared publications - Lenka Příplatová
Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague
3 shared publications - Silvia Boschetti
Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague
3 shared publications - Jakub Binter
University of Jan Evangelista Purkyne
2 shared publications - Konrad Talmont-Kaminski
Society and Cognition Unit, University of Białystok
2 shared publications - Michaela Jirout Košová
Department of Philosophy and History of Science Faculty of Science Charles University Prague Czechia
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion
- p. 1-14
Black and White Magic: Efficacy of In-Group versus Out-Group Rituals
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion
- p. 1-14
Open AccessBlack and White Magic: Efficacy of In-Group versus Out-Group Rituals
- 23 April 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Religion in Europe
- Vol. 18 (2) , 205-227
Superstitions, Religious Identity, and COVID-19 Conspiracy Beliefs in Secularized Czechia
The paper explores how individuals’ religious identity—categorized as non-religious, religious but not affiliated, and religiously affiliated with traditional churches—influences COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs in Czechia. Based on an online sample of more than 7,800 Czech participants, our findings indicate that religiously affiliated individuals were less likely to endorse COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs compared to religious but not affiliated individuals. However, after accounting for individuals’ superstitious beliefs, the differences in COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs between the three categories became negligible. Additionally, we found that public practices negatively affected COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs among individuals affiliated with traditional churches.
- 23 April 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Religion in Europe
- Vol. 18 (2) , 205-227
Superstitions, Religious Identity, and COVID-19 Conspiracy Beliefs in Secularized Czechia
The paper explores how individuals’ religious identity—categorized as non-religious, religious but not affiliated, and religiously affiliated with traditional churches—influences COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs in Czechia. Based on an online sample of more than 7,800 Czech participants, our findings indicate that religiously affiliated individuals were less likely to endorse COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs compared to religious but not affiliated individuals. However, after accounting for individuals’ superstitious beliefs, the differences in COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs between the three categories became negligible. Additionally, we found that public practices negatively affected COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs among individuals affiliated with traditional churches.
- Open Access
- 30 December 2023
- Published by University of Hradec Kralove in FILOSOFIE DNES
- Vol. 15 (1)
Obava ze ztráty vlastního aktérství a absence morálního aktéra u autonomních dopravních prostředků
Diskuse o filosofických problémech spojených s nástupem autonomní dopravy je často spojena s negativy a je vedena v duchu techno-pesimismu. Významný prostor v této debatě je věnován aplikaci vozíkového dilematu („trolley problem“) do řídících algoritmů vozů. V této eseji se však zamýšlíme nad dalším problémem našich morálních intuic – otázkou morálního aktérství. Pocit morální odpovědnosti si žádá faktickou kontrolu nad situací a kauzální odpovědnost. O tu bývalý řidič jako pasažér autonomního vozu přichází, ale přesto může cítit vinu. Prioritně bychom se měli soustřeďovat na morální psychologii uživatele, spíše než na hledání optima kolizí pro algoritmy. V eseji poukazujeme na historické paralely absence aktéra v automatických systémech i na to, že lidé snáze přijímají autonomní nákladní dopravu než dopravu osob. Dále nastiňujeme možné způsoby řešení přesunu odpovědnosti, a to nejprve prostřednictvím analogie s řidičem přicházejícím o aktérství nástupem do vozu hromadné dopravy. Možný operátor autonomních vozů, který na provoz dohlíží místo skutečného řidiče, může představovat dočasné opatření. Skutečnou alternativou morální odpovědnosti by se ale mohl stát fiktivní morální aktér dosazený provozovatelem vozů. Oproštění se od vlastnictví autonomního vozu osvobozuje lidi od konečného vnímání morální odpovědnosti, takže krátkodobé výpůjčky, sdílení nebo hromadná doprava by mohly být další vhodnou odpovědí na tento psychologický fenomén. Klíčová slova: aktérství, autonomní vozidla, morální odpovědnost, morální intuice Discussion about philosophical problems associated with the rise of autonomous driving is often associated with negatives and is conducted in the spirit of techno-pessimism. A significant space in this debate is dedicated to the application of the “trolley problem” to vehicle control algorithms. However, in this essay, we reflect on another problem of our moral intuitions – the question of moral agency. The feeling of moral responsibility demands factual control over the situation and causal responsibility. The former driver, now a passenger in an autonomous vehicle, loses this control, but may still experience guilt. Primarily, we should focus on the moral psychology of the user rather than searching for collision optima for algorithms. In the essay, we point out historical parallels of the absence of agency in automated systems and the fact that people are more accepting of autonomous freight transportation than personal transportation. Furthermore, we outline possible ways to shift responsibility, starting with an analogy to a driver losing agency when entering public transportation. A possible operator of autonomous vehicles, overseeing the operation instead of a real driver, could serve as a temporary solution. However, a fictional moral agent appointed by the vehicle operator could potentially become a genuine alternative to moral responsibility. Detachment from ownership of an autonomous vehicle frees individuals from a final perception of moral responsibility, so short-term rentals, sharing, or public transportation could be suitable responses to this psychological phenomenon. Key words: agency, autonomous vehicles, moral responsibility, moral intuitions
- 30 December 2023
- Published by University of Hradec Kralove in FILOSOFIE DNES
- Vol. 15 (1)
Open AccessObava ze ztráty vlastního aktérství a absence morálního aktéra u autonomních dopravních prostředků
Diskuse o filosofických problémech spojených s nástupem autonomní dopravy je často spojena s negativy a je vedena v duchu techno-pesimismu. Významný prostor v této debatě je věnován aplikaci vozíkového dilematu („trolley problem“) do řídících algoritmů vozů. V této eseji se však zamýšlíme nad dalším problémem našich morálních intuic – otázkou morálního aktérství. Pocit morální odpovědnosti si žádá faktickou kontrolu nad situací a kauzální odpovědnost. O tu bývalý řidič jako pasažér autonomního vozu přichází, ale přesto může cítit vinu. Prioritně bychom se měli soustřeďovat na morální psychologii uživatele, spíše než na hledání optima kolizí pro algoritmy. V eseji poukazujeme na historické paralely absence aktéra v automatických systémech i na to, že lidé snáze přijímají autonomní nákladní dopravu než dopravu osob. Dále nastiňujeme možné způsoby řešení přesunu odpovědnosti, a to nejprve prostřednictvím analogie s řidičem přicházejícím o aktérství nástupem do vozu hromadné dopravy. Možný operátor autonomních vozů, který na provoz dohlíží místo skutečného řidiče, může představovat dočasné opatření. Skutečnou alternativou morální odpovědnosti by se ale mohl stát fiktivní morální aktér dosazený provozovatelem vozů. Oproštění se od vlastnictví autonomního vozu osvobozuje lidi od konečného vnímání morální odpovědnosti, takže krátkodobé výpůjčky, sdílení nebo hromadná doprava by mohly být další vhodnou odpovědí na tento psychologický fenomén. Klíčová slova: aktérství, autonomní vozidla, morální odpovědnost, morální intuice Discussion about philosophical problems associated with the rise of autonomous driving is often associated with negatives and is conducted in the spirit of techno-pessimism. A significant space in this debate is dedicated to the application of the “trolley problem” to vehicle control algorithms. However, in this essay, we reflect on another problem of our moral intuitions – the question of moral agency. The feeling of moral responsibility demands factual control over the situation and causal responsibility. The former driver, now a passenger in an autonomous vehicle, loses this control, but may still experience guilt. Primarily, we should focus on the moral psychology of the user rather than searching for collision optima for algorithms. In the essay, we point out historical parallels of the absence of agency in automated systems and the fact that people are more accepting of autonomous freight transportation than personal transportation. Furthermore, we outline possible ways to shift responsibility, starting with an analogy to a driver losing agency when entering public transportation. A possible operator of autonomous vehicles, overseeing the operation instead of a real driver, could serve as a temporary solution. However, a fictional moral agent appointed by the vehicle operator could potentially become a genuine alternative to moral responsibility. Detachment from ownership of an autonomous vehicle frees individuals from a final perception of moral responsibility, so short-term rentals, sharing, or public transportation could be suitable responses to this psychological phenomenon. Key words: agency, autonomous vehicles, moral responsibility, moral intuitions
- Open Access
- 30 December 2023
- Published by University of Hradec Kralove in FILOSOFIE DNES
- Vol. 15 (1)
Obava ze ztráty vlastního aktérství a absence morálního aktéra u autonomních dopravních prostředků
Diskuse o filosofických problémech spojených s nástupem autonomní dopravy je často spojena s negativy a je vedena v duchu techno-pesimismu. Významný prostor v této debatě je věnován aplikaci vozíkového dilematu („trolley problem“) do řídících algoritmů vozů. V této eseji se však zamýšlíme nad dalším problémem našich morálních intuic – otázkou morálního aktérství. Pocit morální odpovědnosti si žádá faktickou kontrolu nad situací a kauzální odpovědnost. O tu bývalý řidič jako pasažér autonomního vozu přichází, ale přesto může cítit vinu. Prioritně bychom se měli soustřeďovat na morální psychologii uživatele, spíše než na hledání optima kolizí pro algoritmy. V eseji poukazujeme na historické paralely absence aktéra v automatických systémech i na to, že lidé snáze přijímají autonomní nákladní dopravu než dopravu osob. Dále nastiňujeme možné způsoby řešení přesunu odpovědnosti, a to nejprve prostřednictvím analogie s řidičem přicházejícím o aktérství nástupem do vozu hromadné dopravy. Možný operátor autonomních vozů, který na provoz dohlíží místo skutečného řidiče, může představovat dočasné opatření. Skutečnou alternativou morální odpovědnosti by se ale mohl stát fiktivní morální aktér dosazený provozovatelem vozů. Oproštění se od vlastnictví autonomního vozu osvobozuje lidi od konečného vnímání morální odpovědnosti, takže krátkodobé výpůjčky, sdílení nebo hromadná doprava by mohly být další vhodnou odpovědí na tento psychologický fenomén. Klíčová slova: aktérství, autonomní vozidla, morální odpovědnost, morální intuice
- 30 December 2023
- Published by University of Hradec Kralove in FILOSOFIE DNES
- Vol. 15 (1)
Open AccessObava ze ztráty vlastního aktérství a absence morálního aktéra u autonomních dopravních prostředků
Diskuse o filosofických problémech spojených s nástupem autonomní dopravy je často spojena s negativy a je vedena v duchu techno-pesimismu. Významný prostor v této debatě je věnován aplikaci vozíkového dilematu („trolley problem“) do řídících algoritmů vozů. V této eseji se však zamýšlíme nad dalším problémem našich morálních intuic – otázkou morálního aktérství. Pocit morální odpovědnosti si žádá faktickou kontrolu nad situací a kauzální odpovědnost. O tu bývalý řidič jako pasažér autonomního vozu přichází, ale přesto může cítit vinu. Prioritně bychom se měli soustřeďovat na morální psychologii uživatele, spíše než na hledání optima kolizí pro algoritmy. V eseji poukazujeme na historické paralely absence aktéra v automatických systémech i na to, že lidé snáze přijímají autonomní nákladní dopravu než dopravu osob. Dále nastiňujeme možné způsoby řešení přesunu odpovědnosti, a to nejprve prostřednictvím analogie s řidičem přicházejícím o aktérství nástupem do vozu hromadné dopravy. Možný operátor autonomních vozů, který na provoz dohlíží místo skutečného řidiče, může představovat dočasné opatření. Skutečnou alternativou morální odpovědnosti by se ale mohl stát fiktivní morální aktér dosazený provozovatelem vozů. Oproštění se od vlastnictví autonomního vozu osvobozuje lidi od konečného vnímání morální odpovědnosti, takže krátkodobé výpůjčky, sdílení nebo hromadná doprava by mohly být další vhodnou odpovědí na tento psychologický fenomén. Klíčová slova: aktérství, autonomní vozidla, morální odpovědnost, morální intuice
- Open Access
- 24 March 2023
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 53 (4) , 779-804
Innocence over utilitarianism: Heightened moral standards for robots in rescue dilemmas
Research in moral psychology has found that robots, more than humans, are expected to make utilitarian decisions. This expectation is found specifically when contrasting utilitarian action to deontological inaction. In a series of eight experiments (total N = 3752), we compared judgments about robots’ and humans’ decisions in a rescue dilemma with no possibility of deontological inaction. A robot's decision to rescue an innocent victim of an accident was judged more positively than the decision to rescue two people culpable for the accident (Studies 1–2b). This pattern repeated in a large‐scale web survey (Study 3, N = ∼19,000) and reversed when all victims were equally culpable/innocent (Study 5). Differences in judgments about humans’ and robots’ decisions were largest for norm‐violating decisions. In sum, robots are not always expected to make utilitarian decisions, and their decisions are judged differently from those of humans based on other moral standards as well.
- 24 March 2023
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 53 (4) , 779-804
Open AccessInnocence over utilitarianism: Heightened moral standards for robots in rescue dilemmas
Research in moral psychology has found that robots, more than humans, are expected to make utilitarian decisions. This expectation is found specifically when contrasting utilitarian action to deontological inaction. In a series of eight experiments (total N = 3752), we compared judgments about robots’ and humans’ decisions in a rescue dilemma with no possibility of deontological inaction. A robot's decision to rescue an innocent victim of an accident was judged more positively than the decision to rescue two people culpable for the accident (Studies 1–2b). This pattern repeated in a large‐scale web survey (Study 3, N = ∼19,000) and reversed when all victims were equally culpable/innocent (Study 5). Differences in judgments about humans’ and robots’ decisions were largest for norm‐violating decisions. In sum, robots are not always expected to make utilitarian decisions, and their decisions are judged differently from those of humans based on other moral standards as well.
- Open Access
- 29 July 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Evolutionary Psychology
- Vol. 20 (3)
Le Petit Machiavellian Prince: Effects of Latent Toxoplasmosis on Political Beliefs and Values
Humans infected by Toxoplasma gondii express no specific symptoms but manifest higher incidence of many diseases, disorders and differences in personality and behavior. The aim of this study was to compare the political beliefs and values of Toxoplasma-infected and Toxoplasma-free participants. We measured beliefs and values of 2315 responders via an online survey (477 Toxoplasma-infected) using the Political Beliefs and Values Inventory (PI34). This study showed Toxoplasma-infected and Toxoplasma-free participants of our cross-sectional study differed in three of four factors of PI34, scoring higher in Tribalism and lower in Cultural liberalism and Anti-Authoritarianism. We found sex differences in political beliefs associated with Toxoplasma infection. Infected women scored higher in tribalism and lower in cultural liberalism, compared with the Toxoplasma-free control group, while infected men scored higher in economic equity. These results fit with sexual differences in behavior and attitude observed after toxoplasmosis infection. Controlling for the effect of worse physical health and mental health had little impact, suggesting that impaired health did not cause these changes. Rather than adaptation to prevalence of parasites, as suggested by parasite-stress theory, the differences might be side-effects of long-term mild inflammatory reaction. However, to get clear picture of the mild inflammation effects, more research focused on different infectious diseases is needed.
- 29 July 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Evolutionary Psychology
- Vol. 20 (3)
Open AccessLe Petit Machiavellian Prince: Effects of Latent Toxoplasmosis on Political Beliefs and Values
Humans infected by Toxoplasma gondii express no specific symptoms but manifest higher incidence of many diseases, disorders and differences in personality and behavior. The aim of this study was to compare the political beliefs and values of Toxoplasma-infected and Toxoplasma-free participants. We measured beliefs and values of 2315 responders via an online survey (477 Toxoplasma-infected) using the Political Beliefs and Values Inventory (PI34). This study showed Toxoplasma-infected and Toxoplasma-free participants of our cross-sectional study differed in three of four factors of PI34, scoring higher in Tribalism and lower in Cultural liberalism and Anti-Authoritarianism. We found sex differences in political beliefs associated with Toxoplasma infection. Infected women scored higher in tribalism and lower in cultural liberalism, compared with the Toxoplasma-free control group, while infected men scored higher in economic equity. These results fit with sexual differences in behavior and attitude observed after toxoplasmosis infection. Controlling for the effect of worse physical health and mental health had little impact, suggesting that impaired health did not cause these changes. Rather than adaptation to prevalence of parasites, as suggested by parasite-stress theory, the differences might be side-effects of long-term mild inflammatory reaction. However, to get clear picture of the mild inflammation effects, more research focused on different infectious diseases is needed.
- 12 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in AI & SOCIETY
- Vol. 38 (2) , 937-946
How virtue signalling makes us better: moral preferences with respect to autonomous vehicle type choices
- 12 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in AI & SOCIETY
- Vol. 38 (2) , 937-946
How virtue signalling makes us better: moral preferences with respect to autonomous vehicle type choices
- Open Access
- 20 July 2020
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 15 (7) , e0236134
Rhesus-minus phenotype as a predictor of sexual desire and behavior, wellbeing, mental health, and fecundity
Since its discovery in the 1930s, the effects of Rh phenotype on human health and wellbeing, with the exception of the effects of Rh-negativity of a mother on the risk of hemolytic anemia of Rh-positive children, has only rarely been studied. In the last few years, however, several studies have shown that Rh-negative subjects have worse health and performance in certain tests than their Rh-positive peers. Nothing is known about the effect of Rh phenotype on the quality of life of subjects as measured by a standard instrument. We hereby analyzed the data of 1768 male (24% Rh-negative) and 3759 female participants (23% Rh-negative) of an anonymous internet study using the partial Kendall test with the age and the population of the hometown of subjects controlled. The results showed that the Rh-negative women, but not men, scored worse in wellbeing measured with the WHO-BREFF. The Rh-negative men scored worse in mental health-related variables and in their reported economic situation and the Rh-negative women scored better in physical health-related variables. Both the Rh-negative men and women reported higher sexual activity than their Rh-positive peers. The effects of the Rh phenotype were significant after the correction for multiple tests. However, they were usually weaker and less numerous than those of smoking, consuming alcohol, and high body mass index, which were used as a sort of internal control.
- 20 July 2020
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 15 (7) , e0236134
Open AccessRhesus-minus phenotype as a predictor of sexual desire and behavior, wellbeing, mental health, and fecundity
Since its discovery in the 1930s, the effects of Rh phenotype on human health and wellbeing, with the exception of the effects of Rh-negativity of a mother on the risk of hemolytic anemia of Rh-positive children, has only rarely been studied. In the last few years, however, several studies have shown that Rh-negative subjects have worse health and performance in certain tests than their Rh-positive peers. Nothing is known about the effect of Rh phenotype on the quality of life of subjects as measured by a standard instrument. We hereby analyzed the data of 1768 male (24% Rh-negative) and 3759 female participants (23% Rh-negative) of an anonymous internet study using the partial Kendall test with the age and the population of the hometown of subjects controlled. The results showed that the Rh-negative women, but not men, scored worse in wellbeing measured with the WHO-BREFF. The Rh-negative men scored worse in mental health-related variables and in their reported economic situation and the Rh-negative women scored better in physical health-related variables. Both the Rh-negative men and women reported higher sexual activity than their Rh-positive peers. The effects of the Rh phenotype were significant after the correction for multiple tests. However, they were usually weaker and less numerous than those of smoking, consuming alcohol, and high body mass index, which were used as a sort of internal control.