Xiang Zhang

Research Question/Issue: We investigate whether a quasi‐official minority shareholder, the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), affects firms' investor relations management when it actively exercises its shareholder rights in listed firms. Research Findings/Insights: We employ a machine learning–based algorithm to estimate response quality scores from over 4 million question‐and‐answer (Q&A) interactions involving all A‐share listed firms on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges between 2009 and 2022. Using a staggered difference‐in‐differences research design, we find that the active exercise of shareholder rights by a quasi‐official shareholder enhances corporate communication with stakeholders and increases minority shareholder participation and attendance at annual shareholders' meetings. Cross‐sectional analyses further reveal that the effects are more pronounced among firms with lower board independence, those audited by smaller audit firms, and firms with limited analyst coverage. Theoretical/Academic Implications: These findings contribute to the broader understanding of mechanisms that support minority shareholder protection and engagement in the governance of Chinese listed firms and highlight the potential of structured shareholder activism in amplifying minority voices and creating value in capital markets. Practitioner/Policy Implications: The evidence indicates that CSISC's shareholder activism enhances corporate communication, fosters inclusive and transparent governance, and reduces information asymmetry, particularly benefiting minority shareholders. For managers and boards, high‐quality investor communication helps reduce the reputational and valuation costs associated with increased governance scrutiny.