Sam Wilkinson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Sam Wilkinson has a total of 38 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniel Williams
University of Sussex
13 shared publications - Kengo Miyazono
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
13 shared publications - Vaughan Bell
Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology University College London London UK
4 shared publications - Ben Alderson-Day
Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham, UK
2 shared publications Callum Hendrie
Headway East London
2 shared publications- Felicity Deamer
Department of Philosophy, Durham University, Durham, UK
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 1-18
Introduction
This introductory chapter gives a brief overview of our project and the main questions we explore. The central thesis of this book is that human “sociality” in the broadest sense of this term—the fact that we are intensely social animals navigating intensely social environments—is crucial for understanding delusions and addressing many of the questions that they raise. Our approach is contrasted with the dominant, individualistic approach that focuses overwhelmingly on individual factors, such as cognitive biases, perceptual abnormalities, reasoning deficits, and neurochemical imbalances, with an overarching emphasis on what goes “wrong” within individual minds.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 1-18
Introduction
This introductory chapter gives a brief overview of our project and the main questions we explore. The central thesis of this book is that human “sociality” in the broadest sense of this term—the fact that we are intensely social animals navigating intensely social environments—is crucial for understanding delusions and addressing many of the questions that they raise. Our approach is contrasted with the dominant, individualistic approach that focuses overwhelmingly on individual factors, such as cognitive biases, perceptual abnormalities, reasoning deficits, and neurochemical imbalances, with an overarching emphasis on what goes “wrong” within individual minds.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 185-205
Existing Social Accounts of Clinical Delusions
Chapter 7: Existing Social Accounts of Clinical Delusions reviews attempts to replace traditional accounts of clinical delusions with explanatory approaches that trace them to localised abnormalities in social cognition. Focusing primarily on Ian and Joel Gold’s conjecture that clinical delusions result from a disordered “suspicion system” tasked with identifying and managing social threats, we argue that, although this theory has several promising features, it rests on implausible assumptions about the cognitive architecture of social threat management and struggles to explain the characteristics and heterogeneity of clinical delusions. Specifically, we raise three concerns: social threat detection is unlikely to be handled by a highly modular, informationally encapsulated module; the account cannot accommodate the profound heterogeneity exhibited in delusional contents, cognition, and causes; and a hyperactive or disordered suspicion system would be insufficient to produce persecutory delusions, let alone all delusions. These conclusions motivate the alternative, integrative framework developed in Chapters 8 and 9.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 185-205
Existing Social Accounts of Clinical Delusions
Chapter 7: Existing Social Accounts of Clinical Delusions reviews attempts to replace traditional accounts of clinical delusions with explanatory approaches that trace them to localised abnormalities in social cognition. Focusing primarily on Ian and Joel Gold’s conjecture that clinical delusions result from a disordered “suspicion system” tasked with identifying and managing social threats, we argue that, although this theory has several promising features, it rests on implausible assumptions about the cognitive architecture of social threat management and struggles to explain the characteristics and heterogeneity of clinical delusions. Specifically, we raise three concerns: social threat detection is unlikely to be handled by a highly modular, informationally encapsulated module; the account cannot accommodate the profound heterogeneity exhibited in delusional contents, cognition, and causes; and a hyperactive or disordered suspicion system would be insufficient to produce persecutory delusions, let alone all delusions. These conclusions motivate the alternative, integrative framework developed in Chapters 8 and 9.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 103-130
The Social Roots of Popular Delusions
Chapter 4: The Social Roots of Popular Delusions begins developing our positive account of popular delusions. We introduce the concepts of “socially adaptive belief” and “socially motivated cognition”, which arise when beliefs are adopted not to track reality or to regulate individual emotions, but in the process of achieving strategic, social objectives. The two most important forms of socially motivated cognition that we identify are propagandistic cognition, in which people internalise beliefs that they are motivated to advocate for or spread (“propagate”), and social signalling, in which people internalise beliefs acquired to signal their positive qualities and group allegiances. We show how these processes play highly consequential roles in canonical examples of popular delusions.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 103-130
The Social Roots of Popular Delusions
Chapter 4: The Social Roots of Popular Delusions begins developing our positive account of popular delusions. We introduce the concepts of “socially adaptive belief” and “socially motivated cognition”, which arise when beliefs are adopted not to track reality or to regulate individual emotions, but in the process of achieving strategic, social objectives. The two most important forms of socially motivated cognition that we identify are propagandistic cognition, in which people internalise beliefs that they are motivated to advocate for or spread (“propagate”), and social signalling, in which people internalise beliefs acquired to signal their positive qualities and group allegiances. We show how these processes play highly consequential roles in canonical examples of popular delusions.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 75-102
The Puzzle of Popular Delusions
Chapter 3: The Puzzle of Popular Delusions introduces what we call the “functional delusions puzzle”: why healthy, otherwise rational communities often embrace beliefs that outsiders view as bafflingly and incorrigibly irrational. After documenting several examples of such beliefs, we identify five of their recurrent features that demand explanation: their unusual epistemic irrationality, the selectivity of this irrationality, their compartmentalisation, people’s attachment to the relevant beliefs, and the social practices that sustain them. We review individualistic explanations of such beliefs that appeal to cognitive biases and motivated reasoning, and argue that while these factors likely play important roles, they cannot fully account for the distinctive features and complexities of popular delusions.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 75-102
The Puzzle of Popular Delusions
Chapter 3: The Puzzle of Popular Delusions introduces what we call the “functional delusions puzzle”: why healthy, otherwise rational communities often embrace beliefs that outsiders view as bafflingly and incorrigibly irrational. After documenting several examples of such beliefs, we identify five of their recurrent features that demand explanation: their unusual epistemic irrationality, the selectivity of this irrationality, their compartmentalisation, people’s attachment to the relevant beliefs, and the social practices that sustain them. We review individualistic explanations of such beliefs that appeal to cognitive biases and motivated reasoning, and argue that while these factors likely play important roles, they cannot fully account for the distinctive features and complexities of popular delusions.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 43-74
Why Do We Call People Delusional?
Chapter 2: Why Do We Call People Delusional? Turns to the concept of delusion itself. After exploring traditional approaches to defining this concept, we argue that it is more fruitful to set aside questions of definitions and counterexamples and instead examine how the practice of delusion attribution fits into human social life. In our account, this practice involves marking certain beliefs as violations of shared epistemic norms and signalling that ordinary processes of rational argument and persuasion have become impossible. This perspective opens up space for significant heterogeneity in the causes of beliefs that trigger this social response, explains the true relationship between delusion and pathology and how it is not as tight as many have supposed, and illuminates why the boundaries of what counts as delusional shift across cultural and historical contexts.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 43-74
Why Do We Call People Delusional?
Chapter 2: Why Do We Call People Delusional? Turns to the concept of delusion itself. After exploring traditional approaches to defining this concept, we argue that it is more fruitful to set aside questions of definitions and counterexamples and instead examine how the practice of delusion attribution fits into human social life. In our account, this practice involves marking certain beliefs as violations of shared epistemic norms and signalling that ordinary processes of rational argument and persuasion have become impossible. This perspective opens up space for significant heterogeneity in the causes of beliefs that trigger this social response, explains the true relationship between delusion and pathology and how it is not as tight as many have supposed, and illuminates why the boundaries of what counts as delusional shift across cultural and historical contexts.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 261-278
Conclusion
This concluding chapter presents a synthesis of the book’s arguments. It highlights the book’s most significant contributions and identifies two unifying themes. The first is the deep and wide-ranging relevance of human interdependence: delusions and belief formation more generally must be understood against the background of our reliance on complex systems of cooperation, testimony, norms, reputations, and shared epistemic practices. The second is the fragility of knowledge: accurate belief is rarely the default state of isolated minds but a precarious collective accomplishment. The chapter then explores how the book’s framework relates to debates about rationality, anomalous experiences, and predictive processing. It concludes by identifying limitations of this framework and outlining future research on empirical testing, mechanistic and formal modelling, and ethical and political implications.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 261-278
Conclusion
This concluding chapter presents a synthesis of the book’s arguments. It highlights the book’s most significant contributions and identifies two unifying themes. The first is the deep and wide-ranging relevance of human interdependence: delusions and belief formation more generally must be understood against the background of our reliance on complex systems of cooperation, testimony, norms, reputations, and shared epistemic practices. The second is the fragility of knowledge: accurate belief is rarely the default state of isolated minds but a precarious collective accomplishment. The chapter then explores how the book’s framework relates to debates about rationality, anomalous experiences, and predictive processing. It concludes by identifying limitations of this framework and outlining future research on empirical testing, mechanistic and formal modelling, and ethical and political implications.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Preface
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 155-184
Individualistic Accounts of Clinical Delusions
Chapter 6: Individualistic Accounts of Clinical Delusions reviews traditional explanatory approaches to clinical delusions, including cognition-based, experience-based, two-factor, and predictive processing accounts. Although we acknowledge that these approaches often contain important insights, we identify three underappreciated social dimensions of clinical delusions that pose explanatory challenges for them: the challenge of social determinants (the causal relevance of factors like abuse and marginalisation to delusions); the challenge of social focus (the predominant, cross-cultural social focus of delusional content); and the challenge of social evidence (why social and non-social evidence appear to be treated differently in the delusion formation process). These challenges are not intended as decisive objections to individualistic accounts but suggest that research on clinical delusions must engage more fully with human sociality.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 155-184
Individualistic Accounts of Clinical Delusions
Chapter 6: Individualistic Accounts of Clinical Delusions reviews traditional explanatory approaches to clinical delusions, including cognition-based, experience-based, two-factor, and predictive processing accounts. Although we acknowledge that these approaches often contain important insights, we identify three underappreciated social dimensions of clinical delusions that pose explanatory challenges for them: the challenge of social determinants (the causal relevance of factors like abuse and marginalisation to delusions); the challenge of social focus (the predominant, cross-cultural social focus of delusional content); and the challenge of social evidence (why social and non-social evidence appear to be treated differently in the delusion formation process). These challenges are not intended as decisive objections to individualistic accounts but suggest that research on clinical delusions must engage more fully with human sociality.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 19-42
A New Kind of Social Animal
Chapter 1: A New Kind of Social Animal examines what makes humans distinctive in terms of social psychology and organisation. Drawing on evolutionary psychology, anthropology, and cognitive science, we identify three key features of human sociality: intense cooperation structured by norms, reputation, and partner choice; epistemic interdependence and cumulative culture, which enable extensive information sharing and collective knowledge production; and competition for power and prestige. We demonstrate how these features and their complex interactions have shaped our psychology and environments, creating minds that are exquisitely attuned to social information, feedback, and threats, and deeply embedded in networks of shared beliefs and practices.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 19-42
A New Kind of Social Animal
Chapter 1: A New Kind of Social Animal examines what makes humans distinctive in terms of social psychology and organisation. Drawing on evolutionary psychology, anthropology, and cognitive science, we identify three key features of human sociality: intense cooperation structured by norms, reputation, and partner choice; epistemic interdependence and cumulative culture, which enable extensive information sharing and collective knowledge production; and competition for power and prestige. We demonstrate how these features and their complex interactions have shaped our psychology and environments, creating minds that are exquisitely attuned to social information, feedback, and threats, and deeply embedded in networks of shared beliefs and practices.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 206-233
The Social Determinants and Focus of Clinical Delusions
Chapter 8: The Social Determinants and Focus of Clinical Delusions addresses the challenges of social determinants and social focus. We argue that clinical delusions typically arise from complex, dynamic interactions between anomalous experiences, domain-general cognitive biases, emotions, behaviours, and the social environment. In this explanatory context, the social determinants of clinical delusions increase delusion risk via multiple pathways, including by heightening social vigilance, disrupting mood regulation, undermining generalised coping abilities, and creating social withdrawal. The predominant social themes of delusions then emerge not because of dysfunctions in dedicated social modules, but because delusion-producing factors arise in ultra-social minds that are biased towards interpreting ambiguous events in terms of agency and social meaning.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 206-233
The Social Determinants and Focus of Clinical Delusions
Chapter 8: The Social Determinants and Focus of Clinical Delusions addresses the challenges of social determinants and social focus. We argue that clinical delusions typically arise from complex, dynamic interactions between anomalous experiences, domain-general cognitive biases, emotions, behaviours, and the social environment. In this explanatory context, the social determinants of clinical delusions increase delusion risk via multiple pathways, including by heightening social vigilance, disrupting mood regulation, undermining generalised coping abilities, and creating social withdrawal. The predominant social themes of delusions then emerge not because of dysfunctions in dedicated social modules, but because delusion-producing factors arise in ultra-social minds that are biased towards interpreting ambiguous events in terms of agency and social meaning.