Jing Li

While promoting the global economy and trade, ports impose serious pollution on the global ocean and atmosphere. Therefore, the development of ports is restrained by the policies and measures of governments and international organizations used to cope with climate change and environmental protection. With the development of information technology, the operation and expansion of ports is facing forms of green and intelligent reform. This research aims to link the development of green intelligent ports, government policies, and third-party organizations to find the most suitable evolutionary path for the development of green intelligent ports. This paper assumes that governments will push ports to transform into green intelligent ports from the perspective of benefiting long-term interests, that the goal of ports is to maximize their profits, and that third-party organizations will actively promote the development of green intelligent ports. Based on these assumptions, this paper has established an evolutionary game theory model of “government–port–third-party organization” regarding the development of green intelligent ports. The Jacobian matrix of the game theory system was constructed by using the replicator dynamic equation, and local stability analysis was performed to obtain the equilibrium stability point of the entire system. This research reveals the limitations of the development of green intelligent ports without government involvement and explores the ability of third-party organizations to promote the implementation of policies, confirming the role of government regulation and control in promoting the development of green intelligent ports. This paper may be helpful for the development of green intelligent ports in the future. The results show that: (1) The main factors affecting the choice of port strategy are the benefits of building a green intelligent port, the intensity of government regulation, and the quantitative influence of third-party evaluation results on the port strategy selection. (2) Government decision-making plays an important role in port transformation. If the relevant government chooses the wrong strategy, then the transformation of the port will be delayed. (3) Government regulation and control need to change with the change of the evolution stage. (4) Compared with the macro-control policies of the government, the influence of the third-party organization on the port is significantly smaller.

China's 2004 value‐added tax (VAT) pilot reform in the Northeast region, which changed the VAT from production type to consumption type, introduced a sizable tax credit for fixed investment in manufacturing industries, leading to more investment and higher productivity at firm level. This paper, however, uses difference‐in‐difference estimation and finds a negative structural effect; that is, the VAT pilot reform leads to a reduction in the export sophistication of Northeast cities relative to other cities in China, and the results hold for a battery of robustness checks. It is found that resources are reallocated towards less‐sophisticated industries. As the products with higher export sophistication are more skill and research and development (R&D) intensive, the shortfalls of skilled labor and R&D spending hinder the upgrading process. With a new round of revitalization plans in the Northeast, policymakers should be cautious with similar structural effects and focus on increasing skilled labor supply and R&D investment.